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ABSTRACT
THE PROCESS OF ENGAGEMENT 
IN NON-VIOLENT COLLECTIVE ACTION
Case Studies from the 1980s 
by Lynne Mastnak
This thesis examines the process of engagement in non­
violent collective action. It is a cross- cultural study - 
using the methods of life history interview, participant 
observation and archival research - of twelve individuals 
drawn from three anti-militarist movements that emerged in 
the 1980s. The movements were: in Britain, the Greenham 
Common women; in Poland, Wolnosc i Pokoj; and, in Guatemala, 
the Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic Communities. Its aim is 
to understand how individuals move from belief to collective 
action and how their values are incorporated into the 
movements in which they engage.
My findings challenge the global model of protest 
behaviour that fails to separate non-violent collective
action from other forms of protest. They also challenge the 
idea of a unitary explanatory model of commitment: in
particular, both the psychopathological model - in which 
political engagement is a decontextualised, irrational
process - and the hypothesis that engagement is simply a 
response to structural injustice. My findings suggest that 
political engagement may be not only the result of
psychological processes within the individual or merely a 
response to the external world, but, rather, a unique 
combination of the two: it is a particular individual's
response to a particular set of historical circumstances 
that produces engagement. Three possible models are 
proposed: they involve both affective and cognitive
processes and depend on the interplay of historical events 
with the individual's own life circumstances. There are 
cross-cultural continuities, but also significant 
differences in the role of fear which are crucial to 
understanding the timing of initial involvement.
Finally, I examine the relationship between choice of 
method of action and the process of commitment. Culture can 
have an overriding influence on the development of a 
particular moral perspective but no one moral perspective is 
especially associated with non-violence. Engagement in non­
violent action can foster awareness of the importance of 
connection and relationship. Moreover, moral perspective 
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It is December 1981, a woman sits with a few others around 
a fire in deep snow. The fire is outside a military base in 
southern England and the woman has walked from her home in 
Wales to camp there in permanent protest at the plans to 
deploy a new generation of nuclear missiles at the site. 
Few people know of the action and the Ministry of Defence 
has informed them that the matter has been fully debated and 
that they can stay as long as they like. It is December 
1981, a young man sits in prison in Krakow, Poland, where he 
has been interned by his government for organising an 
independent students union under the auspices of Solidarity. 
By 1991 the missiles had come and gone, as had the 
government that imprisoned the young man, as had the Soviet 
Empire and the Cold War itself.
One approach to understanding this period is to 
understand the history of those individuals who helped to 
create it? who, committed in principle to non-violence, 
organising collectively, and acting outside the established 
political systems of their country, aimed quite simply to 
increase social and political justice and peace. It seems 
particularly important to understand how such people came to 
choose to act, often at great personal risk, and why they 
chose non-violence. It is this process of engagement in 
non-violent collective action that I decided to make the 
topic of my dissertation.
This is a wide question. I focussed it by
5concentrating on those activists who at some point in time 
had made a full-time commitment to an issue. I wanted to 
look at individuals using non-violence to confront what I 
regarded as the key issues of the time, indeed the issues 
that made up the bipolar logic of the Cold War: peace and 
human rights. I stress the use of non-violence. Many 
studies of dissent or opposition movements have not bothered 
to distinguish activists by their choice of method or noted 
the use of non-violent means at all. Non-violent protestors 
and terrorists are all too often seen as part of the same 
large group. Yet non-violence is one of the outstanding 
features of most of the significant movements of the 1980s: 
whether outside the Russian White House, on the streets of 
Prague, at Greenham Common, in Santiago, or Manila.
In addition, I was anxious not to confine myself to one 
country or political culture. The impact of the Cold War 
was global. Its bitter logic created repression and conflict 
throughout the Third World as well as in Western and Eastern 
Europe and I wished my sample to reflect these different 
manifestations. I was also struck by the fact that 
activists in non-violent social movements seemed to have 
much in common with each other, even when acting in 
different countries. Finally, as all social movements are 
composed of smaller tendencies and fragments, I wanted to 
identify activists in groups which had a short enough 
history to allow me to study the political context of their 
actions fairly comprehensively, and which would provide easy 
access to the main participants.
6Thus I chose to identify activists in three groups that 
were already familiar to me from my own activism and 
journalism in the 1980s: one, the Greenham Common women, is
from a Western liberal democracy: a feminist peace movement 
in Britain, it began in 1981 and was a prime mover in the 
massive West European mobilisation against the arms race in 
the early 1980s. The second, Wolnosc i Pokoj (WiP: Freedom 
and Peace), is from Poland, then an East European
totalitarian state. WiP, an independent peace and human 
rights movement, was founded in 1985 and played a
significant role in helping Solidarity re-emerge from the 
underground. The third is the Runujel Junam Council of 
Ethnic Communities (CERJ) in Guatemala, a Central American 
country which, though under quasi-civilian rule, continues 
to be dominated by the military. Founded in 1988, along with 
its sister movement, CONAVIGUA, a self help group for 
widows, CERJ was the main indigenous human rights movement 
in Guatemala.
In each of these groups I planned to identify ten
activists to interview in depth in order to explore the
process of engagement. I should make clear that the groups 
themselves were not the main objects of my research. They 
provided the framework and context within which the 
respondents in my study acted for a substantial part of 
their careers. This, then, was the starting point of my 
research.
This is an interdisciplinary study: in the course of my 
inquiry I have drawn upon the disciplines of social
psychology, political science, sociology, and social 
history. In fact, as my own conception of the issues 
initially derived from my personal experience of living with 
activists over a number of years, I have found limitations 
in all these approaches, and I am presenting what I see as 
a synthesis of them. The result is not one theoretical 
model of the process of engagement which is then tested by 
the data. Rather, I have drawn on both my data and previous 
research to produce a pluralistic perspective. It is 
because of this that I have adopted a slightly unusual 
chapter order. I deal with the methodological issues first. 
I do this because I feel that it makes sense to describe the 
process through which one engages in research, including the 
way one's research ideas emerge from both personal 
experience and a reading of the relevant literature, before 
actually reviewing that literature. This is also consistent 
with my commitment to a narrative approach. Thus in 
chapters 1 and 2 I explain the reasoning behind my use of 
particular qualitative research methods and describe the 
processes involved in actually carrying out the research: 
that is, how I developed the methods I used, the problems I 
encountered, and the way my ideas developed over time. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature that has informed my own 
thinking on individual commitment and non-violent collective 
action. Chapter 4 summarises the ways in which I believe my 
own data challenges the established models and suggests new 
theoretical perspectives on the process of engagement. 
Chapter 5 summarises the history of the three groups and
explains the historical and political context in which they 
functioned. Chapter 6 examines the background and formative 
experiences of the activists prior to their engagement. 
Chapter 7 looks at the processes of engagement in detail. 
Chapter 8 looks at the specific role that childhood trauma 
might play in later engagement. Chapter 9 examines the 
choice of non-violence as a means of action and the 
relationship this has with the individual's sense of self 




In Chapter 2 I will explain how I did the research. In this
chapter I intend to explain why I conducted the research in
the manner that I did. Just as there is no such thing as 
value-free research, I also believe there is no such thing 
as a value-free choice of method. Thus it seems important 
at the outset to explain how my choice of method was
determined not only by the theoretical and practical 
considerations of what was most appropriate for the task, 
given my resources, but what personal factors influenced 
that choice.
Firstly, through my experience as a doctor and
psychiatrist I was familiar with both the rigours and 
usefulness of the positivist approach of the natural 
sciences, in particular with the sacredness and assumed 
objectivity of the double-blind, randomised, controlled 
trial in evaluating treatment; and with the manner in which, 
all too frequently, in my own specialty "patients” appeared 
to act idiosyncratically and defy science. I had discovered 
that there was no way that any number of clinical tests, and 
personality and symptom checklists, could be substituted for 
the information gained through the human interaction that 
occurred in taking a full life history. This was the only 
way to aquire an understanding of the processes which had 
brought a patient to the consultation, the thoughts and 
feelings involved, the contexts in which they occured and
10
their meaning for the patient. Nor was there any way to 
measure or quantify the impact of one of the most important 
aspects of treatment, the formation of a relationship. To 
be understood these processes had to be described in all 
their singularity. In this way they could also increase 
understanding and provide some guidance for the next "case".
Secondly, I was aware both of the dangers of doing 
decontextualised research and of the growing critique of 
that form of research, from the feminist movement in 
particular. And as an activist I had also noticed how 
difficult it was to convey one's own understanding of 
oneself and one's actions to others. Too often journalists 
and researchers arrived at an action with questions based on 
preconceived ideas and stereotypes, and had little interest 
in shifting the framework of the discussion to what those 
engaged in the action felt was appropriate, so that the 
activist was left with the choice of silence or distortion.
The feminist critique of scientific method that 
challenges both this "invisibility or distortion of women as 
objects of knowledge", and the positivist approach that 
seeks to "establish universal laws of cause and effect 
within a world of objectively defined facts, . . . existing 
independently of the activities of social agents",1 made 
sense to me. For example, no amount of quantified data 
determining the effectiveness of drug A could compensate for 
a lack of understanding of the personal, cultural and
1 M. Westkott, "Feminist Critiscism of the Social 
Sciences", Harvard Educational Review 49, 4 (1979), p. 423.
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historical factors that made person B choose not to take it 
when prescribed. The taking of measurements in order to 
"predict and control" too often seems a substitute for 
genuine understanding and "obscures the way that 
psychological studies necessarily involve relationships 
between persons, rather than between psychologist as 
'expert' and his subject as the object of research".2
Such a critique comes not only from feminists. Reason 
and Rowan, in introducing what they define as "new paradigm 
research", challenge "the whole language of 'operational 
definition' [and] 'dependent and independent variables' [as] 
highly suspect. It assumes that people can be reduced to a 
set of variables which are somehow equivalent across persons 
and across situations. [This] is a flight from
understanding in depth, a flight from knowing human 
phenomena as wholes. It means that the person, group, 
community as such is never known".3
Critiques such as these have led to a growth in 
qualitative research in the human sciences. Fortunately, a 
qualitative methodology appeared appropriate to my research 
from a theoretical as well as personal point of view. I 
needed a method that both would allow me to examine dynamic 
and interactive processes taking place over time and would 
help me to understand behaviour taking place in specific
2 Karen Henwood and Nick Pidgeon, "Seeing Through 
Women's Eyes: Qualitative Methods and Feminist Research", 
June 1992. (Mimeographed.)
3 Peter Reason and John Rowan, Human Inquiry: A Source 
Book of New Paradigm Research (Chichester: Wiley, 1981), p. 
xiv.
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cultural and political contexts. In addition, while I 
wished to examine and understand the process of engagement 
in non-violent collective action, at the outset I had no 
specific hypotheses or assumptions about this process that 
I wished to test. On the contrary, I hoped that the data 
itself would generate theories.
Thus, my principle source of data has been activist 
life histories obtained by in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews. In addition, I have spent periods with each 
group as a participant observer, and have drawn on data 
collected by myself as participant or journalist in the 
years preceding my research. I have also made extensive use 
of library and archival sources to increase my understanding 
of the historical, cultural and political context of each 
group, and where possible to verify information obtained 
using the other methods.
The Life History Approach
The life history approach actually encompasses a number of 
different approaches, ranging from psychoanalytic 
psychobiographies of prominent individuals to brief case 
studies for judicial or clinical purposes. I would define 
my own approach as drawing on what Runyan defines as a "life 
course theoretical orientation" and on the psychohistorical 
tradition. Runyan defines the life course orientation as 
being "concerned with sequences of experience in the natural
environment and thus with the processes through which 
persons, situations and behaviours influence each other over 
the course of time”. Runyan conceptualises the life course 
as a sequence of processes, interacting with each other: 
”(1) behaviour-determining processes: resulting from the 
interaction of persons with situations, (2) 
person-determining processes: or the processes which create, 
maintain, and change personal states and characterisics, and 
(3) situation-determining processes: or the processes
through which people select, create and influence the 
situations they encounter.”4 His illustration of the 
relationship between these three is given in Figure 1 
(p.47). Runyan's argument is that while personality trait, 
behavioural, or sociostructural approaches may provide some 
understanding of particular groups of people engaging in a 
specific behaviour over time in a particular environment, 
the full career can only be understood with a "sequential 
interactionist" approach.5 Thus, instead of asking what are 
the personality traits or what are the environmental 
conditions that lead to engagement, the questions become: 
what sort of person in what sort of situation behaves in 
this way? And how does this behaviour subsequently affect 
the person and their situation and further behaviour?
I also draw on the psychohistorical tradition. By 
psychohistorical I mean the use of explicit and formal
4 William McKinley Runyan, Life Histories and 
Psychobiography: Explorations in Theory and Method (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 83— 87.
5 Ibid., p. 84.
psychological theory to understand historical behaviour.6 
As will be clear from my review of the literature in Chapter 
3, I share Runyan's critique of the ahistorical, 
reductionist and determinist nature of many 
psychobiographical studies, studies in which, particularly 
in the psychoanalytic work, adult behaviour is seen to be 
solely determined by early childhood experiences. But I 
also agree with him that psychodynamic concepts and social 
psychology can be resources that are drawn upon to 
understand particular events and processes.7 Lifton 
advocates the study of "groups of men and women whose own 
history can illuminate important characteristics of our 
era". He suggests that in such groups one can detect 
"shared psychohistorical themes" that emerge from specific 
collective experiences.8 My own choice of groups of peace 
and human rights activists who were confronting violence and 
oppression in different cultural settings was made in the 
hope that their experiences could indeed illuminate some of 
the grimmest and the most hopeful aspects of life in the 
last decade of the Cold War.
It is difficult to see how the particular topic I 
wished to explore could be examined in any other way than by 
asking individuals to tell their own stories. The process 
of engagement has some observable behavioural
6 Ibid., p. 201.
7 Ibid., pp. 213, 116.
8 Robert Jay Lifton, History and Human Survival (Hew 
York: Random House, 1971) pp. 7— 8.
manifestations, such as changes in work pattern, friendship 
circle and so on. Nevertheless, for the most part, the 
process is made up of a shift in beliefs and feelings 
motivated by interpretations of past and present events, and 
it can only be understood by asking the person concerned to 
tell one about it. Nor is it possible to see how any form 
of structured questionnaire could fully encompass the likely 
range of experiences. Rather, a questionnaire would impose 
on the subject my own preconceived frameworks and 
expectations. Narrative, Runyan argues, is "indispensable, 
for indicating how people thought and felt, what they said 
and did, what situations they were in, the subjective 
meanings of events, how their words and actions were 
interpreted by others, and the processes by which they 
interacted with their worlds over time".9 Asking 
individuals to relate their own stories of the process of 
engagement; what they felt led up to it; and what was its 
impact on their lives: all this provided the most
significant part of my data: the activists' own
understanding of events. I supplemented this approach with 
questions to deepen my own understanding of the events and 
to increase my biographical knowledge. This allowed me to 
add my own speculations without supplanting theirs.
9 Runyan, Life Histories and Psychobiography, p. 61.
Participant Observation
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In addition, I drew on periods of participant observation. 
The term "participant observation" also has a number of 
meanings and the role is variously described.10 In my case 
I have used data gathered from periods as a total 
participant, such as when I lived at Greenham Common as an 
activist myself; data gathered as a sympathetic observer, 
such as when working as a journalist in Poland and Guatemala 
in the mid-1980s; and data gathered as a participant 
observer when I lived in the environment of each group for 
three months. Given the geographic dispersal of the 
membership of these groups, what this entailed was periods 
living with my respondents, sharing aspects of their daily 
lives, including actions and meetings when they occurred - 
always clearly identified as a researcher. Gans describes 
total participation as the "most fruitful. For only by 
being completely immersed in an event as an involved person 
can one really confront and grasp the social and emotional 
incentives and pressures that act on people in groups." He 
recommends that all fieldworkers involve themselves totally 
for brief periods, although he acknowledges the obvious
10 See, for example, Ronald Frankenberg, "Participant 
Observers", and Herbert J Gans, "The Participant Observer as 
Human Being: Observations on The Personal Aspects of
Fieldwork", in Field Research: A Source Book and Field 




! difficulties of observing and recording in such situations,
and the question of bias (which I discuss below).11
Even without total participation 1 found that living in 
a similar cultural and political context increased my 
empathy for my respondents. For example, I arrived in 
Guatemala in March 1990 at a point of increasing political 
tension. Deaths and disappearances were on the increase, as 
were attacks on foreigners. An American nun had been 
recently kidnapped and tortured and a bomb thrown into the 
house of some Western human rights monitors. There was also 
an upsurge of guerilla activity. Westerners and 
Guatemalans, like my very charming landlord in Antigua, 
where I was based, warned me repeatedly against doing 
research on human rights activists, for my own safety. I 
wrote in my journal in the first week:
I am at least learning a lot about fear. What a 
powerful weapon it is. If you can frighten 
people, you don't have to do much else because it 
is totally paralysing, and what cleverer way to 
induce it than by random and arbitrary acts of 
violence so that there are no rules to help one 
protect oneself. The night before coming here 
[the CERJ human rights office in Quiche] was 
broken by dreams too bizarre and frightening to 
put down, but on the bus in the early morning 
light it all evaporates and none of the people 
here are frightened so it is impossible to be so 
when with them.
In fact, the danger to me was miniscule compared to 
that facing my respondents. However, I did gain a small
11 Herbert J. Gans, MThe Participant Observer as Human 
Being", p. 54.
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insight into the kind of atmosphere in which they worked, 
and into the way in which a certain level of denial, 
combined with modelling normal behaviour to each other 
within the group, helped my respondents to cope with and 
habituate to the situation. This paralysing fear was quite 
different to the angry fear I experienced participating in 
Cruisewatch with a group of Greenham women, watching the 
missile launchers thunder past us on a deployment exercise. 
Understanding the distinction was important in formulating 
my own theories about motivation (as will be clear in 
Chapter 7).
I found that my periods of formal participant 
observation - mostly spent in the presence of at least one 
of the respondents - served a number of important 
functions.12 These periods gave me a chance to learn far 
more about the political and cultural context in which 
action occurred; to observe the relationships of my 
respondents with others, their role in the group, the way 
action fitted into their daily lives; and to understand the 
processes by which collective actions were organised and 
carried out. Much of this was not large scale public 
actions but the "submerged" and "invisible" activity that 
Melucci sees as sustaining social movements.13 Such
12 Most of these points are made in Howard S. Becker and 
Geer Blanche, "Participant Observation and Interviewing: A 
Comparison", in Qualitative Methodology: Firsthand 
Involvement With the Social World, ed. William J. Filstead 
(Chicago: Markham, 1971) pp. 132— 152.
13 Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present (London: 
Hutchinson Radius, 1989), pp. 207— 208.
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activity is hard to detect through interviews, for the 
activists themselves may not regard it as significant. 
Participant observation allowed time for informal 
discussions over meals that were often more revealing than 
the formal interview. It also gave me the chance to check 
some descriptions against fact, and to spot relevant issues 
that had not come up in the interview, so that I could raise 
them later. Perhaps most important, participant observation 
gave my respondents the opportunity to get to know and trust 
me, and to ask any questions about the research that 
concerned them.
Grounded Theory
Filstead suggests that the "direct examination of the 
empirical social world" embodied in these qualitative 
approaches of in-depth interviewing and participant 
observation allows the researcher to "get close to the data, 
thereby developing the analytical, conceptual and 
categorical components of explanation from the data itself", 
rather than from "a priori assumptions and artificial 
schemes of explanation . . . imposed upon social reality". 
Thus any emerging theory has more validity because it is 
grounded in observable reality.14 Glaser and Strauss
14 Filstead, Qualitative Methodology: Firsthand
Involvement With The Social World, p. 6.
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developed the term "grounded theory"15 to refer to theory 
that is "generated in the course of close inspection and 
analysis of qualitative data".16 Although I did not follow 
their method of analysis in detail, I adopted the principle 
of allowing concepts and categories to emerge from repeated 
readings of my transcripts and notes. I also engaged in 
what Henwood and Pidgeon describe as constant comparative 
analysis, that is, a continuous alertness to "the 
similarities and differences which exist between instances, 
cases and concepts, to ensure that the full diversity and 
complexity of the data is explored".17 The usefulness of 
such an approach is that (though initially I felt rather 
overwhelmed by a mass of unstructured information), as 
recurrent themes and patterns began to emerge, I had some 
confidence that they fitted the data: this approach
contrasts with selecting data to fit a pre-formed 
hypothesis. In fact, one develops a kind of reciprocal 
relationship with the data as insights emerge. For example, 
until reading the interviews, I had not considered the role 
of empathy and different moral orientations in determining 
the choice of non-violent action. This pushed me to do 
further reading and to go back into the field and do a 
second round of more tightly focussed interviews*
15 B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss, The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (New 
York: Aldine, 1967).
16 Karen Henwood and Nick Pidgeon, "Qualitative Research 
and Psychological Theorising", British Journal of Psychology 
83 (1992), p. 103.
17 Ibid., p. 103.
The Critique of Qualitative Methods
21
Qualitative methods, in particular in-depth interviewing and 
participant observation, have been subjected to a number of 
critiscisms: specifically, that the findings are not 
generalisable or reliable; that there is a problem of 
subjective bias, both in the selection of research topic and 
in terms of one's relationship to one's respondents; and 
that retrospective data is not valid. I shall deal with 
each of these points in turn.
Generalisation and Reliability
The difficulty of generalising from qualitative data is only 
a problem if general laws are the sole goal of the research. 
Allport, in the 1960s, pointed out that the study of the 
unique is as important as the study of the general • He 
lamented that "the intricacy of internal structure in 
concrete lives seldom challenges or detains usM. And he 
suggested that the study of the individual was not only a 
"source of hunches" from which to develop hypotheses but 
also a means of examining whether those generalisations were 
relevant. "Instead of growing impatient with the single 
case and hastening on to generalisation, why should we not 
grow impatient with our generalisations and hasten to the
22
internal pattern.”18 Allport was still concerned to find 
ways of making the study of the individual more scientific 
and systematic. This is in contrast to the French 
sociologist Bertaux, who rejects the idea that social 
relations can in any way be understood in terms of 
scientific laws that allow for prediction. In advocating 
life histories as an appropriate method for sociologists, 
Bertaux states that
Sociology will never be a science in the way that 
physics or chemistry or astrophysics or biology 
are. The only knowledge we may hope to reach is 
of a historical character: our present is history. 
Sociological knowledge is the knowledge of a 
historically-given structure of social relations: 
the knowledge of the conditions of social 
struggles, but not the knowledge of their outcome. 
. . • The idea of sociology as science does not 
help the development of social knowledge, on the 
contrary, it hinders it and, if taken seriously, 
it may even prevent its acquisition.19
Sociology is not the only social science for which such 
views make sense. The clinical case history is exactly 
that: a unique historical record of one individual's
experiences. And some of the most powerful and enduring 
therapeutic insights used in the Western psychological 
tradition, such as our understanding of psychological
18 G. W. Allport, ”The General and the Unique in
Psychological Science", in Human Inquiry: A Source Book of 
New Paradigm Research, ed. Peter Reason and John Rowan
(Chichester: Wiley, 1981), pp. 64— 65.
19 Daniel Bertaux, "From the Life History Approach to 
the Transformation Of Sociological Practice", in Biography 
and Society: The Life History Approach In the Social





defence mechanisms, are based on a handful of clinical case 
studies.
In studying groups of activists from different cultures 
I am not attempting to produce any kind of general law about 
the process of engagement. Rather, I hope to increase 
understanding of particular processes, in specific cultural 
contexts, during one period in history. The question that
concerns me is not whether any theory produced is
generalisable, but whether my findings may challenge the 
established generalisations and whether these findings "make 
sense" both to the subjects of the research and to those who 
read about them. It may be that the findings are in some 
way transferable to other groups in similar contexts, hence 
the importance of providing contextual detail.20 However, 
the political and historic context is forever changing and 
cannot be recreated. This is especially the case for my
research, which took place at the time of the dramatic
transformations of 1989. Thus, rather than transferability, 
one should perhaps think more in terms of comparability: how 
do my findings compare with others from different cultures 
and periods and how does this comparison increase our 
understanding of those cultures and periods?
A related question is the issue of reliability. This 
is the positivist notion that the trustworthiness of results 
depends on the possibility of other researchers producing 
the same findings by repeating the same procedures. Such a 
demand ignores the fact that human beings, and the social
20 Henwood and Pidgeon, "Qualitative Research", p. 108.
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world which they inhabit, alter from moment to moment, as do 
their responses to different researchers.21 Nor can one 
imagine any respondent giving an identical history to the 
same researcher twice; indeed, one would be suspicious of 
it's genuineness if they did. Thus no in-depth, 
contextualised research can be reliable in this sense. What 
it offers instead is a unique record of depth and 
complexity. Marshall and Rossman recommend ten standards 
for trustworthiness in qualitative work. These pertain to 
transparency and honesty in documenting one's own research 
method? preserving data; and acknowledging and discussing 
biases and negative findings. I have tried to meet all these 
standards.22
Subjectivity
The question of whether or not the qualitative approach is 
biased because of its subjectivity dominates the discussion 
of qualitative methodology and is the central concern in the 
feminist critique of positivism. The critique challenges 
the assumption that an objective, unbiased position from 
which to do research is possible, an assumption, as Gilligan 
points out, that "runs aground when it comes to discussing
21 Carolyn Wood Sherif, "Bias in Psychology", in 
Feminism and Methodology, ed. Sandra Harding (Milton Keynes, 
Open University Press, 1987) p. 47.
22 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossmann, Designing 
Qualitative Research (London: Sage, 1989) pp. 148— 149.
sex differences: who other than Tiresias could claim
neutrality?" And it is not only in the study of sex 
differences. In relation to any topic the researcher cannot 
escape the standpoint of her or his own gender, and it is 
women's sensitivity to the assumption that the masculine 
gender represents both neutrality and the norm that has 
resulted in the sharpest feminist critiques of the concept 
of valuefree research. Gilligan continues: "as women,
however, we are sensitised to difference - aware how easily 
difference becomes deviation and deviation turns into sin. 
. . .  We know how readily psychological language can cloak 
moral judgement, allowing statements of value to pass for 
scientific norms."23 There is no neutral position "when 
human individuals turn to studying other human 
individuals".24 Thus the real question is not whether we 
are subjective or not, but whether our subjectivities are 
made transparent and can therefore be taken into account, or 
whether they are hidden. Moreover, the attempt to assume 
disinterest is likely to do more harm than good.
With respect to things human, it is not 
disinterest that makes knowledge possible but the 
opposite; without the factor of interest in the 
primary sense of concern or care, there can be no 
recognition of the subject matter in its 
distinctive human character- and hence no real
23 Carol Gilligan, Lyn Mikel Brown, and Annie G. Rogers,
"Psyche Embedded: A Place For Body, Relationships, and 
Culture in Personality Theory", in Studying Persons and 
Lives, ed. A. I. Rabin, Robert A. Zucker, Robert A. Emmons, 
Susan Frank (New York: Springer, 1990) p. 91.
24 Sherif, "Bias in Psychology", p. 47.
26
awareness of its situation and no understanding of 
its behaviour.25
Becker makes the point that the question of values is 
intimately connected to the question of power. "The 
question is not whether we should take sides, since we 
inevitably will, but rather whose side we are on."26 He 
suggests that accusations of bias most commonly arise when 
"the research gives credence, in any serious way, to the 
perspective of the subordinate group in some hierarchical 
relationship".27 This is because there is a "hierarchy of 
credibility". That is, in any social system of ranked 
groups, well-socialised participants take it as a given that 
the highest ranking groups have access to the most 
information and therefore have the most credible view, while 
lower groups, knowing only part of the picture, must 
necessarily have a distorted view. Naturally, any challenge 
to this, by, for instance, suggesting that a lower-ranked 
group's perspective has equal validity, challenges the 
established order and is thus problematic.28 Becker's 
solution is a call for researchers to be honest to
25 Floyd W. Matson, The Broken Image (Garden City N. Y.: 
Anchor, 1966), pp. 242— 243, cited by Filstead, Qualitative 
Methodology, p. 5.
26 Howard S. Becker, 'Whose Side Are we On?', in 
Qualitative Methodology: Firsthand Involvement With the
Social World, ed. William J. Filstead (Chicago: Markham, 
1971), p. 15.
27 Ibid., p. 17.
28 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
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themselves and others about their sympathies and to remain 
open to findings that challenge those sympathies.
The question of whose side we are on is reflected both 
in the choice of topic and in deciding for whom we think we 
are doing research. Harding points out that "the questions 
an oppressed group wants answered are rarely requests for 
so-called pure truth. Instead they are requests about how 
to change its conditions; how its world is shaped by forces 
beyond it; how to win over defeat, or neutralise those 
forces arrayed against its emancipation, growth, or 
development.1,29 All of my respondents, all of whom 
considered themselves to be working in marginalised and 
oppressed groups (although the perpective of the Poles was 
altered by the events of 1989), repeatedly asked me for whom 
and for what purpose I was doing the research. My answer 
was that I believed that the non-violent movements in which 
they were engaged had played an important role in promoting 
peace and human rights. Understanding how people come to act 
non-violently to promote their beliefs, in one particular 
historic period, might increase our understanding of how to 
promote such activity in other periods. It might also, by 
showing the variety of routes to engagement, challenge the 
negative stereotype of "protestors" in the popular 
literature. This did not mean that I was engaged in 
hagiography. It did mean that critique would not be 
malicious but be made on a basis of general goodwill. I see
29 Sandra Harding, Feminism and Methodology (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 1987) p. 8.
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this position as similar to Lifton's recommended one of 
"advocacy and detachment" in which one makes clear one's 
moral advocacies yet is scrupulous and rigorous in the 
application of one’s chosen method.30
The other area where the issue of subjectivity is most 
contested is in the area of the relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee. As Oakley points out in her 
review of the methodology texts of the 1960s, the 
predominant view at that time was that "the errors of poor 
interviewing comprise subjectivity, involvement, the 
'fiction' of equality and an undue concern with ways in 
which people are not statistically comparable"; while proper 
interviewing entailed detatchment, opaqueness and control 
over the interview. Not surprisingly, men were seen to be 
somewhat better at proper interviewing than women.31 In 
contrast, her own view is that "when a feminist interviews 
women, use of the prescribed interviewing practise is 
morally indefensible", and that "the goal of finding out 
about people through interviewing is best achieved when the 
relationship of interviewer and interviewee is 
non-hierarchical, and when the interviewer is prepared to 
invest his or her own personal identity in the 
relationship".32 By "non-hierarchical" she means that the
30 Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: A Study of the 
Psychology of Evil (London: Macmillan, 1986) p. 14.
31 Anne Oakley, "Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in 
Terms" in Doing Feminist Research, ed. Helen Roberts
(London: Routledge, 1981), p. 38.
32 Ibid., p. 41.
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interviewer is open to questions about herself from the 
interviewee.
The value of a genuine and open relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee is not, to my mind, confined to 
feminists interviewing women. Cottle, for example, in his 
life studies of poor families in Boston, makes
no pretence at objective assessments of these 
people's lives, the inquiry being subjective and 
dependent on my relationship with these families.
The expression of the investigator's 
feelings contributes to the reality of the 
situation, as the situation itself is comprised in 
part by the investigator. It is through the 
investigator that one hears these families. Like 
the families, readers too want to know whether the 
investigator can be trusted.33
Cottle argues eloquently that if we are not moved to 
make a human connection with our respondents, it is unlikely 
that our research will touch others:
When anger never appears, when the day to day 
heartache and anguish and personal responses to 
them are deemed inappropriate for intellectuals, 
researchers and legislators, then that 
transcendent situation of mutual recognition, as 
subjective as it must be, is never approached, and 
the traditional distances and inequalities between 
people are reiterated and affirmed.
33 Thomas J. Cottle, nThe Life Study: On Mutual
Recognition and Subjective Inquiry", in Field Research: A 
Source Book and Field Manual, ed., Robert G. Burgess 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 123.
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Andrews, in her study of political commitment in 
lifetime socialists, has no doubt that the relationship 
between herself and her respondents
had considerable influence upon the actual data.
Much of what was said was of a highly personal 
nature: the content was so humanly engaging that 
neither the possibility nor the desire to remain 
detached existed. It is doubtful that the 
respondents would have spoken with the candour 
they did had there not been some form of 
established trust between us.34
I also have no doubt that my long established 
relationship with the Polish and British groups, all the 
groups' knowledge that I shared, in broad terms, their aims, 
and my openness about my own feelings and views when asked, 
made access easier. It contributed to the trust between me 
and my respondents and made it easier for them to talk about 
themselves in depth. Nor did this preclude disagreement 
between us. In one case the prior knowledge that I was 
pro-choice on the abortion issue resulted in one of ray 
Polish respondents talking in far greater depth and with 
greater feeling about his own pro-life views on abortion 
than perhaps would have happened if he had thought I shared 
his position. However, this did not lead to hostility 
between us or constrain other aspects of the interview.
Mutual trust and friendship however should not mask the 
fact that a completely egual relationship between 
interviewee and interviewer is very hard to establish. This
34 Mollie Andrews, Lifetimes of Commitment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 63.
may be possible in truly collaborative research, especially 
if it is respondent generated, but in my case my respondents 
were assisting me with my project. I chose whom to approach 
for interview and whom not. The overall purpose of the 
interview was dictated by me, and in spite of my commitment 
to an open and unstructured interview I was embarrassed to 
hear on the tapes the frustration and impatience in my own 
voice on a few occasions when I did not feel the respondent 
was answering what I considered to be an important question. 
Ideally, I would have liked the respondents to check the 
transcripts of the interviews in order to clarify anything 
they felt unhappy about, but this was only possible with the 
English speaking ones, and the editing, interpretation and 
presentation of the results still remained in my hands. Hy 
personal solution to these issues was, firstly, to make sure 
that the respondents had the option to withdraw at any 
point, including after the interviews were complete. Three 
Greenham women chose to do this. Secondly, to discuss the 
project as a whole and listen to the respondents' 
suggestions both on whom else to interview and on aspects of 
my subject that I might not have considered. One British 
woman, for example, did not feel her own sacrifices could in 
anyway be compared with those of the Guatemalans and was 
worried that I would in some way equate them. (I felt that 
looking to see if the processes of commitment have anything 
in common is not the same as equating the sacrifice and 
cost, something I hope I have not done.) I offered the 
respondents control of their interview material after I had
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finished. The tapes will not be made publically available 
without their consent. I also bore in mind Gilligan's 
injunction that, in writing up results, the researcher 
should imagine she is sitting beside the respondent as she 
reads them. This does not mean hiding uncomfortable ideas; 
it does require respect for the respondents' integrity.35
I am also aware that the benefits were rather one­
sided. However, those respondents that remained in the 
project appeared to believe in the value of the research and 
took enormous trouble to help me: offering me hospitality; 
patiently digging out archives of papers; showing me around 
their communities; introducing me to friends; arranging 
special meetings of the group; and on some occasions - in 
Guatemala - running personal risks. Some of my respondents, 
as occurred with Andrews, seemed to welcome the opportunity 
to review their lives so far and to explore the issues I 
raised. One commented that she found the interviews very 
"therapeutic”.
I was also aware of the power imbalances caused by 
class, gender and cultural differences. I was acutely aware 
of this in Guatemala, where I was interviewing individuals 
earning less than a dollar a day, who would politely enquire 
about the cost of my plane ticket, express amazement, and 
then thank me for coming to see them and taking an interest 
in their work. There is no question that I saw their world 
through my own cultural lens, and am aware that they must 
have edited and adjusted their narratives according to
35 Andrews, Lifetimes of Commitment, p. 49.
33
their perceptions of me: a problem Zur encountered in her 
work on Guatemalan widows.36 Nevertheless, given that the 
political problems they faced were some of the unpleasanter 
tentacles of a global problem - the Cold War - and that the 
movement they had constructed drew on a Western human rights 
tradition, I felt that my subjective view was better than no 
view at all.
Remembering the Past
The anthropologist Boas concluded that life histories were 
"valuable rather as useful material for a study of the 
perversion of truth brought about by the play of memory with 
the past".37 Certainly a concern that people continue to 
have about life history material is that it must necessarily 
be retrospective - even daily journals are written after the 
event - and therefore inaccurate. However, as Andrews 
states, "the way in which a life is recalled by the person 
who lived it is as important as what actually happened 
during that life."38 Like her, I am not attempting to use 
these life histories to reconstruct an accurate historical
36 J. Zur, Violent Memories: Quiche War Widows in 
Northwest Highland Guatemala (PhD Dissertation, University 
of London, 1983), pp. 217—  218.
37 F. Boas, "Recent Anthropology", Science 98 (1943), p. 
335, quoted in David G. Mandelbaum, "The Study of Life 
History", in Field Research: A Source Book and Field Manual, 
ed. Robert B. Burgess (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 
147.
38 Andrews, Lifetimes of Commitment, p. 63.
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record of the period. My interest is in my respondents' own 
understanding of their journey to commitment and in the 
meaning they give to their experience. My aim is to 
understand their understanding of how they became engaged. 
This subjective understanding is as valid as my own 
outsider's perspective. Probably more so, as Andrews 
continues:
When an individual looks back over her life, 
she makes connections between events and 
situations which she would not have had the 
perspective to make at the time that she lived 
through them. The term life story is useful; in 
a story it is not until the end, if at all, that 
the various apects of the tale all come together, 
and connections are thus illuminated.
This being the case, as I stated earlier, it is 
difficult to see how my particular topic could be researched 
either simultaneously or prospectively. It is not simply 
that the researcher cannot have access to what is happening 
inside her respondent's head until these processes are 
narrated to her, but the respondent herself is only able to 
select what circumstances, thoughts, and feelings pushed her 
into, or inhibited her from, action after they have 
occurred. The advantage of narrating her whole life story 
to another person is that in the narration she examines and 
selects what has meaning for her, while, hopefully, through 
supplementary questioning, the outsider might be able to 
identify other attributes or influences that the subject had 
not initially thought of herself. For example, a regular
35
supplementary question that I asked was, "who was the most 
important person for you as a child?" This often 
highlighted aspects of personality and past experience that 
the respondent had not previously recalled. To illustrate 
this point I have selected a long quotation from an 
interview with one of my Polish respondents, Magda:





L: What was her personality like?
M: Oh yes, she was quite strict.
L: Strict?
M: Yes. conscientious, she had a great influence.
L: In what way?
M: I guess that I have many . . . she was very stubborn,
the whole family said that. She said, nothing can change
her mind. So I guess that I have some features of her.39
This led into a discussion of the way politics was discussed 
in Magda's house as a child (this is an edited section of 
the continuing interview):
L: Did she talk about things with you, I mean she must have
known a very different Poland as well?
M: Yes.
L: Did she talk about that with you?
39 In the interviews with, and statements by, repondents 
" indicates a hesitation; "[. . .]" indicates editing 
by the author.
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M: Not really. I know the history of my family very well, 
which was very dramatic, in fact, so, you know, there were 
so many people killed in the Second World War in 
concentration camps. My great . . .  my grandmother's
husband was killed there . . . and her son and sister of the 
husband, many, many people. They were taking part, some of 
them were taking part in the uprising in Warsaw and the 
sister of my grandmother's husband, she was taking part in 
the uprising in the ghetto and she was taken to the 
concentration camp; she is even on the list of the people 
from the ghetto who were. And yes, the other men were taken 
simply from home to the concentration camp.
L: Was this talked about a lot when you were a child?
M: No, not really but somehow it was there,
L: In what way, what do you mean?
M: I don't know. But you know there are always these 
memories, . . * like a postcard that my great-grandmother 
was sent from the concentration camp, you know. And at the
family meetings. They talked because one brother was killed, 
and the other escaped from the camp and he's still alive, 
but I think he was very disturbed mentally because of his 
experience, but at the time he was much better than now , 
and he talked you know. . . .
L: And as a child do you remember thinking about the war or
concentration camps?
M: Yes, very much.
L: Were they the sort of things that frightened you, or .
. . gave you nightmares even, or . . .  ?
M: Yes. [. . .] But in fact what I feel that was not very 
good was my family was . . . they were not talking a lot 
about politics because maybe they thought . . .  I guess they 
wanted, they talked... I was angry because they talked, I 
noticed that they talked when I go to sleep, so that I won't 
hear, but I was crazy with that. Because I was also 
interested in it but they wanted, that maybe it's too early 
for a child to get these, to know these things... so I was 
very angry.
37
L: What sort of things would they talk about when you were
asleep?
M: Oh, about Soviet Union, yes,
L: They were angry with the Soviet Union?
M: Yes, very much.
What comes across in this narrative is, firstly, that some 
of Magda's forebears were activists themselves, that public 
history had a personal meaning for her, which in some 
aspects was very frightening; and, secondly, that politics 
was both present and somehow hidden in her early childhood, 
so that it became a subject of mystery and interest. Later 
in the interview, Magda talked of how she would fantasise, 
before sleeping, of defeating the Germans as the member of 
a famous fictional Polish tank crew. It is not possible to 
see how the subtlety and complexity of the political 
atmosphere in Magda's childhood and its impact on her could 
have been conveyed in anything but narrative retrospective 
form; and what is significant is not the historical facts - 
which relatives actually survived or fought in the Ghetto 
uprising - but the meaning of these events for her.
Conway suggests that autobiographical memory, which he 
defines as
memories of complex events, [containing] high self 
reference, [and usually featuring] sensory, 
perceptual and reflective information fairly 
equally [are] never true in the sense that they 
are literal representations of events.
Nevertheless, autobiographical memories may be 
accurate without being literal and may represent
Ij
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the personal meaning of an event at the expense of
accuracy.1,40
As an example he cites Neisser's study of John Dean's 
remarkably detailed testimony to the Watergate commitee. 
"His amazing ability to recall the minutiae of past events 
earned him the name 'the human tape recorder'." In fact, 
when compared with the real tape-recorded transcripts, he 
was "remarkably innaccurate, in his recollection of 
conversations between himself and the president [and] in his 
recall of specific events". However "the basic accuracy of 
his recall of the meaning of his conversations with Nixon 
showed that [he] had accurately preserved a basically 
correct interpretation of the events. Thus a critical 
feature of autobiographical memories is that they represent 
interpretations or meanings of experienced events." Neisser 
also notes that Dean distorted his own role in the events. 
But one must bear in mind that he was on the defensive in a 
critical inquiry with enormous implications for his 
future.41 In my study it is my respondents' perceptions of 
their role in history rather than their actual role that 
interests me.
What is of equal significance for my own study is the 
research into the role of emotions and self concept. In
40 Martin A. Conway, Autobiographical Memory: An 
Introduction (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990), 
pp. 8— 9.
41 U. Neisser, "John Dean's Memory: A Case Study", 
Cognition, 9 (1981), pp. 1— 22, cited in Martin A. Conway, 
Autobiographical Memory: An Introduction, pp. 96— 98.
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reviewing this topic Conway concludes that "the emotional 
intensity and personal significance of an event gives rise 
to autobiographical memories that are highly available for 
recall and comparatively resistant to forgetting”. An 
example of this would be the initial events of transitional 
periods in a person's life, the degree of recall being in 
part related to the impact of those events upon that 
person's life. ”Such memories may serve many different 
functions in cognition providing the basis for extended 
social interactions, maintenance of a dynamic self concept 
and perhaps . . . the representation of the meaning of
concepts.1,42
Conway looks specifically at vivid and flashbulb 
memories. Flashbulb memories are memories of events of 
national or international significance preserved along with 
a selection of apparently trivial personal details, such as 
exactly what a person was saying and wearing the moment they 
heard of Kennedy's death.43 In summarising a good deal of 
contradictory research, Conway suggests that flashbulb 
memories are distinguished from other vivid memories by the 
degree of surprise and consequentiality, that they appear to 
represent an intersection of personal and public history, 
and are sometimes associated with high levels of overt 
rehearsal. Vivid memories, on the other hand, appear to be
42Conway, Autobiographical Memory, pp. 96, 104.
43 R. Brown and J. Kulik, "Flashbulb Memories”, 
Cognition 5 (1977), pp. 73— 79, cited in Martin A. Conway, 
Autobiographical Memory: An Introduction, Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press), pp. 62— 63.
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related to events of personal significance or change. Both 
are more vivid than other types of memory; are associated 
with high levels of emotional reaction; and ”are remarkably 
consistent over time, suggesting that [they] have some 
immunity to forgetting”.44
All of this suggests that, in asking my respondents to 
remember the circumstances that resulted in life- changing 
political commitment, I was asking for memories that were 
likely to be accessible and genuine. The consistency of 
vivid memories is b o m  out by my own research. With one 
respondent, Mary, I have three interviews made at intervals 
over ten years, and access to other data about her. What is 
remarkable is how her memory of certain personally 
significant episodes remains unchanged. This sequence also 
reinforced the importance of bearing in mind context, both 
in terms of time and place of the interview and in terms of 
who is doing the interviewing: for example, the first
interview was given to explain her presence outside a 
weapons base, to me a fellow activist, with both of us 
sitting outside the base at the time, and she remembered 
only those incidents that seemed directly pertinent. 
Shortly afterwards, she tidied them up into one incident for 
a talk on a TV show. Ten years later, in trying to make 
sense of the whole pattern of commitment over a lifetime, 
the incidents were recalled as before, but there were
44 Conway, Autobiographical Memory, pp. 82— 83, 87.
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additional incidents that she had not seen as significant 
before.
I have found that almost half the subjects have vivid 
memories of certain points of transition in their lives, 
sometimes linked with public events, sometimes not. I 
define these as crucial episodes and, in Chapter 7, explore 
their role in creating commitment. Another perspective is 
that crucial episodes, by their nature, tend to be vividly 
remembered because they have a classical shape. The 
American writer, Fussell, has argued that there is no real 
history, only literature, and that while actuality is the 
world of physical sensation, reality is what we do with that 
world interpretatively. As we know from physiology, 
interpretation starts with the moment of selective 
perception. Fussell believes that we remember what is 
interesting, that is, those sequences that seem to coincide 
with the plots and narrative patterns already available from 
folklore, fiction and the arts: this is how we make sense of 
our lives and we tend to junk the memories that lack 
classical shape. That is perhaps why the plotless 
structures of dreams are so difficult to remember until we 
give them narrative shape.45 Certainly, many of these 
crucial episodes resemble in some manner the conversion 
experience, which has a two-thousand-year history in the 
western Christian tradition, thus providing some classical
45 Paul Fussell, from notes taken at a symposium on 





narrative shape for otherwise unstructured personal 
experience.
Another consideration is the way memory is socially 
constructed. Zur has explored the way violent political 
events such as "la Violencia" - the massive attacks by 
government forces on the indigenous Guatemalans, their 
communities and their way of life in the early 1980s - are 
remembered. The Guatemalan widows whom she interviewed come 
from the same region and were interviewed at the same time 
as the Guatemalan subjects in my own study. In fact, we 
have one subject in common. Zur's main contention is that 
what is remembered depends to a large extent on the 
political and social function of the memory. "The state 
uses public, official memories for rhetorical and political 
purposes; widows, through reworking unofficial secret 
memories, turn personal tragedy into narratives; both are 
designed to undermine alternatives."4* She highlights the 
silencing effect of official terror; the absence or removal 
of many of the natural "markers" of memory, such as graves 
or burned buildings; and the feeling that, as women, they 
had no authoritative voice with which to speak. She 
suggests that with extreme mass trauma, the normal 
mechanisms by which we process memory do not exist. There 
are no pre-existing categories to give memory form. This is 
related to Fussell's point. In a sense we all carry, from 
tradition, observation or experience, schema that say, as it 
were, that "this is how people behave when there is a
46 J. Zur, Violent Memories, p. 216.
death". No such precedents exist for the massive horrors 
these people suffered, so these horrors remain unstructured 
chaos, and there is the difficulty of translating the 
incomprehensible into language. One way to do this was to 
use a ritualised, simplified and symbolic language: "they 
burned the buses, they killed the men".47 Another, used by 
activists such as Petronila (whose pseudonym is Rosa in my 
study), was to remind women of the suffering and courage of 
their ancestors, and particularly the suffering and courage 
of women such as Esther, Judith and the Virgin in the Bible. 
"These processes of collectivisation and universalisation 
through reference to historical figures may put their 
experiences in context, normalising both the situation and 
their actions within it which, in turn, decreases their 
sense of alienation",48 and make it possible to remember.
When violent events were remembered, narratives would 
be reconstructed through communal interaction and would also 
shift in accordance with the narrator's current self 
perception. The narratives might be reworked to rationalise 
inaction or to portray a more heroic version of themselves 
at that time, this enabled them to lessen their diminished 
sense of self. For the widows, choosing to remember is in 
itself a political act requiring courage. "Memory, then is 
constantly in flux. It is continuously being transformed by 
changes in identity, social experience and by membership of 
the group and the narratives produced therein. In turn,
47 Ibid., p. 221.
48 Ibid., p. 253.
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memory transforms the narratives and the social experience 
and possibly even behaviour itself.”49
My own research is in keeping with Zur's findings, and 
shows that understanding the role that the remembered 
traumatic event plays in motivating action does not depend 
on its historic accuracy. In contrast to the vivid memories 
of visualising the imagined trauma of a nuclear holocaust 
that motivated some of the Greenham women, only Rosa among 
the Guatemalans had what could be described as a crucial 
episode containing a vivid memory, and her memory was of 
hearing of the killing of a friend, not actually witnessing 
it. The other three, who actually witnessed the violence in 
their own communities or the city, did not appear to have 
vivid or flashbulb memories. They presented these stories 
in a simple form, unadorned by trivial detail. Moreover, 
these horrific incidents did not immediately motivate them 
into action. However, when, some years later, due to 
changing political conditions, they became activists and 
were asked by me to make sense of their commitment, they 
drew on memories of these events as part of the reason that 
they were active. My suggestion would be that initially 
such incidents had the chaotic formlessness described by 
Zur. But the activism in a human rights movement, entailing 
the endless taking and giving of their own and others' 
testimony, has made it possible to give these incidents 
narrative form. They are reconstructed, certainly, and 
probably inaccurate in many details, but this does not
49 Ibid., p. 233.
45
affect their significance in the process of engagement, 
which is examined in detail in Chapter 7. Another point is 
that none of these three presented heroic versions of their 
actions in response to those traumas. On the contrary, I 
was given the impression that all were now somewhat ashamed 
of their inaction at the time. (Inaction, which from an 
objective point of view, was certainly lifesaving.) It is 
perhaps remembering in the context of their current 
courageous behaviour that enables them to acknowlege this.
Finally, with all my respondents I was able to verify 
the accuracy at a more general level by reading contemporary 
accounts and human rights documentation. Chapter 5 shows 
that none of my respondents' accounts were at odds with the 
cultural and historic context in which they lived.
Conclusion
I have tried in this chapter to explain my choice of method 
the life history interview and participant observation - 
and to explore the issues raised by a qualitative approach: 
focussing particularly on generalisation and reliability, 
subjectivity and the validity of retrospective data. 
Henwood and Pidgeon argue that, in the end, what matters is 
the persuasiveness of the findings: whether they "fit the 
data well”, and are "challenging, stimulating and yet highly 
plausible in the sense of clearly representing substantive 
aspects of the problem domain". If they are there should be
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an "'aha' experience of discovery".50 I hope that this 
proves to be the case.
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In Chapter 1 I explained why I chose the research methods of 
life history and participant observation. In this chapter 
I want to describe the actual process of the research. One 
thing that comes across in reading many published 
descriptions of method is the apparent smoothness of the 
process. This is particularly the case with much scientific 
research: a hypothesis is formed; a procedure to check it is 
established; results are generated; and conclusions made. 
And just as the naturalistic sciences have influenced the 
choice of method of those involved in lifescience research, 
they have also influenced the way working procedure is 
presented. One is given the impression from many of the 
papers reviewed in Chapter 3 that the researchers had a 
clear idea of an exact question at the outset, that the data 
- the beliefs, feelings, attitudes or behaviours of groups 
of human beings - was obtained with ease and the hypothesis 
thus confirmed or refuted. Yet there is now an extensive 
body of research from the sociology of science that 
documents the gap between the sanitised presentation and 
reality.1 And a detailed and personal account of scientific 
inquiry such as Watson's The Double Helix exemplifies how 
even research in pure science is simply not conducted in
1 For example, G. N. Gilbert and M. Mulkay, Opening 
Pandora's Box: A Sociological Analysis of Scientists'
Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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this way.2 Personal inclinations, talents, ambitions, 
relationships: all have an enormous influence on the whole 
process, beginning with the choice of topic to explore. 
Random events and geography - who is working in what lab? 
who met who at what conference; the failure to take notes at 
a particular meeting - all play a part. There may be a 
broad general question but the detailed hypothesis is 
constantly refined and modified as the work proceeds.
All of these influences are obviously even more 
important in research on human beings. What I do in this 
chapter is describe my research process "warts and all”, 
rather than in any "tidied up” form, in order to show the 
way that naturalistic research conducted over four years is 
profoundly affected by the business of ordinary life? that 
the researcher herself is changed by her interaction with 
her respondents and her data? and that both researcher and 
respondents are affected by historical and personal events.
First of all I present an abbreviated research diary 
(see Table 1, pp. 66-71) to set the research process in an 
historical and personal context. Erikson emphasises the 
need in all psychohistorical work to take into account not 
just the psychohistorical moment for the subject of the 
research but also for the researcher. Where the researcher 
is in her own life will profoundly affect the way she 
conducts the interview and what she draw out of it. Thus 
Erikson sets his investigation of Gandhi's "midlife crisis"
2 James D. Watson, The Double Helix: A Personal Account 
of the Structure of DNA (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1981).
clearly in the context of his own journeys to India with his 
wife, the political events of that time and his feelings 
about these, the personal events that occurred, and the 
personal relationships formed. This acknowledgement of his 
presence, and his personal feelings about his informants and 
Gandhi himself, add to the strength of the inquiry.3
Secondly, the chronology will enable me to demonstrate 
the manner in which my initial research question emerged out 
of my personal history and was transformed over time. 
Thirdly, I will describe in detail how I conducted my 
fieldwork and analysed my data.
Even a brief glance at the diary shows what a piecemeal 
affair research is. Ordinary life - relationships, the 
business of earning a living and finding lodgings - intrudes 
all the time. More significantly, the diary shows that the 
research was conducted over a period of enormous historical 
change which affected and altered my own thinking. The 
diary shows that my involvement with the issues and these 
groups began in 1980. The bulk of my fieldwork, however, 
was done in 1989 and the first half of 1990. Events at that 
time, particularly those in Eastern Europe in 1989, appeared 
to justify a belief in the transformative power of non­
violent social movements. And at the outset of my research 
I was as interested in the movement as a collective actor as 
in the individuals within it. However, even at that time it 
was becoming clear that, at least in Europe, this particular 
cycle of movement activity was coming to an end. And by
3 Erik Erikson, Gandhi's Truth (New York: Norton, 1969).
late 1990 only vestiges of these movements remained to 
confront the new threats exemplified by the Gulf War, and 
later, the wars in the Balkans. Moreover, the political 
consensus and frameworks for action in which the movements 
were functioning had disappeared. For example, both the 
Gulf War and Balkan wars split the European peace movements 
over the rights and wrongs of military intervention. Yet, 
interestingly, the majority of my respondents continued to 
be active in different ways, some by transforming themselves 
into politicians, others by establishing new networks and 
frameworks for action. In Guatemala, by contrast, the Cold 
War continued to be fought and the movements it engendered 
continued to function and grow, in a hostile and dangerous 
climate.
What this period of massive historical flux highlighted 
for me clearly was the way my social psychological research 
was both historical and specific, in the way described by 
Bertaux in Chapter 1. I was studying the emergence of 
commitment in a particular historical and political period 
that had now disappeared. This did not lessen the validity 
of the research but it obviously affected its 
generalisability. This is perhaps the case for all
naturalistic studies, although normally the cut-off point is 
not so sharply defined, and the temptation to generalise 
about the applicability of results to other periods remains.
In addition, my interest had shifted. I was now no 
longer concerned with examining what impact individuals had 




part of the specific historic context in which a commitment 
to action emerged. These movements had exemplified the 
growth and emergence of a particular kind of civil society: 
non-violent and committed to increasing democratic space. 
One could argue that the Balkan wars and wars in the former 
Soviet Union and Somalia exemplified civil society in arms.4 
Thus the choice of non-violence in itself seemed of 
increasing significance and importance.
It was not only external events that were transforming 
my ideas. In interviewing my respondents and spending time 
with them, I became increasingly aware of the way 
individuals' moral perspectives, and the way they thought of 
themselves in relation to others, underlay their choice of 
action. It was the combination of this "feedback" from my 
data, and an increasing focus on the individual brought 
about by historical events, that resulted in the second 
round of interviews in 1991/2, interviews which looked 
specifically at morality and non-violence.
Finally, the diary also shows that my academic work had 
to compete with my own "need to act". This, perhaps 
surprisingly, was not a problem in the initial phases of the 
research. I felt no temptation to re-engage in the activism 
of the groups in which I was participant observer, having 
already made a clear decision to step back into the role of 
researcher, and regarding this of value in itself. 
(Although I did, with one of my respondents, and others,




initiate some small scale initiatives against the Gulf War.) 
The conflict emerged as it became clear, with the growing 
horrors of the wars in the Balkans - a region to which I was 
personally connected - that there was clinical work I could 
and should do. In the last year of writing up this work I 
have found myself almost daily struggling with the conflict 
provoked by the fact that writing about others' individual 
commitment to action was preventing me from acting myself. 
In both cases feelings of connection and responsibility 
jostle with each other: my responsibility to my respondents 
and to finishing a project, and my responsibility to act 
where I have specific and appropriate skills. This personal 
conflict obviously affects and informs the interpretation of 
my research - I hope productively - in that it has increased 
my understanding of the way one deals with moral choice.
The Interviews: the Selection of Respondents
In the introduction I described how I came to decide on the 
three groups. The choice was also partly determined by my 
personal knowledge of two of the groups - Greenham and WiP - 
acquired over the previous eight years as an activist and 
journalist. The trust established over these years gave me 
unique access to otherwise unavailable material, and meant 
that participants felt able to talk freely about their 
lives. It also meant that I could draw on my own notes, 
articles, diaries, interviews and observations made in the
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previous years. The group that I had planned to study in 
Guatemala - The GAM: the Relatives of the Disappeared - was 
also familiar to me as a journalist and human rights worker. 
However, friends in the human rights community in 1988 
suggested that the newly formed CERJ, and its sister 
movement CONAVIGUA, had more in common with the other groups 
in ray study, and they were able to provide me with the 
necessary introductions.
I initially interviewed ten participants in each group. 
In all cases my respondents had had at least one year of 
full time engagement in the group. The selection of 
respondents was not random. The groups themselves were 
characterised by their pluralism and fluctuating membership, 
and I wanted as far as possible to capture that variety in 
the sample. Thus, for Greenham, I identified women who had 
been involved at different periods of the camp's history, of 
different ages and marital status, and whose involvement had 
taken different forms. Unfortunately, a split in the camp 
in 1987 had resulted in a small group of women separating 
itself from the rest of the movement. These women refused 
to be interviewed by me because I had already made contact 
and was thus identified with the other group when I 
approached them. For WiP, whose pluralism was reflected in 
its geographical dispersal, different towns having different 
agendas, I chose respondents from the different centres and 
of both sexes.
With CERJ and CONAVIGUA the fact that most of the 
membership lived in remote villages, and the physical
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difficulties and dangers of travel in the highlands, 
necessitated me confining my interviews to the leadership - 
who were most often in the main office - and to members who 
worked in the office on a voluntary basis. These were also 
obviously the most committed activists and therefore the 
most appropriate for the study. These restrictions also 
meant that I was only able to interview five Maya activists. 
In addition, in both Poland and Guatemala I did background 
interviews with political, religious and military leaders, 
and members of other social movements, in order to increase 
my understanding of each group and of the political and 
cultural environment in which it existed.
I used Bertaux's snowballing technique,5 identifying 
potential respondents through discussions of my needs with 
members of the groups who were already known to me. Some of 
these became respondents themselves, some suggested others. 
In each case the purpose of the research project was 
explained and they were asked if they would like to 
participate. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, in three cases 
Greenham women who had agreed to participate initially 
decided to withdraw, two because they had not envisaged how 
personal the interviews would be, and one because she had 
not initially understood that the project was not confined 
to women activists.
5 Daniel Bertaux and Isabelle Bertaux-Wiame, "Life 
Stories in the Baker's Trade", in Biography and Society: The 
Life History Approach In the Social Sciences, ed. Daniel 
Bertaux, (London, Sage, 1981), p. 176.
Conducting the Interviews
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The initial round of interviews took approximately five to 
six hours, split over two or three sessions, depending on 
whether translation was necessary or not. I used a basic 
protocol which listed the topics I wished to cover and gave 
sample questions (see Appendix 2). However, I did not have 
a rigid interviewing technique. I rarely used the exact 
order or wording in the questionnaire, preferring the 
interview to develop as naturally as possible. I would take 
my lead from my respondent, exploring at first those topics 
they found easiest to deal with. Thus an interview might 
begin with a discussion of the respondent's current 
circumstances and engagements and come later to more 
personal material or, as with one Guatemalan woman, the 
respondent might prefer to tell me her childhood story 
first. Ideally, I would have liked them to return the 
transcripts to all my respondents for them to check, to 
clarify anything they felt was unclear, and delete material 
they felt should not be included. As I explained above, 
this could only be done with the English-speaking 
respondents (this group included half the Poles). The 
process was useful. A number of them saw issues they wished 
to make clearer. Only a few wanted to make small deletions, 
in all cases of personal material they felt might upset 
others and which did not affect my own research. Most 
important, being aware of their own development and 
fluidity, they did not request that I changed views that had
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altered with time, but that I noted that they now thought 
differently.
After doing a preliminary data analysis on all the 
transcripts in spring 1990, I realised that both time and 
financial resources would not allow me to continue with so 
large a sample, and that more in-depth analysis and further 
interviews would have to be done with a smaller group. The 
first round of interviews had raised the issues of 
connection and separation and moral values. Thus I decided 
to develop a second protocol (see Appendix 2) with more 
specific questions in order to explore moral orientation and 
sense of self, including a modified version of the Heinz 
dilemma developed by Kohlberg;6 more focussed questions on 
non-violence; and clarifying questions continuing themes 
from earlier interviews, particularly on the role of 
responsibility. Thus I identified four respondents from 
each group, using the same criteria of representativeness as 
before. In Guatemala circumstances again prevented any 
choice, in that one of my respondents was no longer leaving 
her village and it was unsafe to visit her there. Yet, 
while focussing on these twelve activists to provide the 
core data of my study, my thinking as a whole was informed 
by the discussions with the wider group.
6 Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes Of 
Thinking and Choices in Years 10— 16", (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Chicago, 1958).
Translation
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With half of the Polish respondents and all of the 
Guatemalans, I had to work with an interpreter. Interviews 
in Guatemala were conducted in Spanish, ray respondents' 
second language. In each case my interpreters had a full 
understanding of the project and I was fortunate that they 
shared my enthusiasm and interest, often helping me to frame 
questions in a more culturally sensitive way, and 
contributing to my general cultural and political 
understanding. I had been concerned that this would produce 
interviews of limited value compared to my British sample. 
However, this proved not to be the case. My respondents 
were extraordinarily generous with their time and took great 
trouble to make sure I understood them, and they did not 
appear to be inhibited by the presence of another person. 
In fact, in many respects when going over the transcripts 
I felt I had sometimes achieved a better rapport with the 
Guatemalans and Poles than the British respondents.
There appear to be a number of reasons for this. The 
first is a cultural difference in response to the media and 
interviews in general. Greenham women had come to view the 
British media with suspicion, resenting its preoccupation, 
in the early years of the movement, with lifestyle and 
sexuality, and its lack of concern with what they perceived 
as the central issues. In the late 1980s, when the women 
were on the receiving end of a great deal of harassment and 
violence, the media had paid no attention at all. Thus
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anyone, researchers included, wishing to do a "story” on 
Greenham women, was viewed with reserve. I was repeatedly 
grilled both at camp and in a kindly way by my respondents 
as to what my research was for and whom it would benefit. 
Was I "making a career" or "money" "on the backs of women"? 
These were fair and important questions that challenged me 
and made me constantly evaluate what I was doing, but they 
also led to some initial constraint in the interviews. 
(Fortunately the women who appeared most representative of 
different aspects of the group's history for the final 
sample were also those with whom I had developed the 
greatest rapport and had the most open discussion.)
In Guatemala and Poland, however, my repondents 
perceived international interest and concern as a lifeline, 
ensuring the respective group's survival and contributing to 
their personal safety. Guatemalans particularly, used to 
the searching interviews of human rights monitors and the 
affirming value of giving personal testimony, had no 
constraints about sharing their lives with another foreign 
person.
Another important point is that shared language creates 
an assumption of understanding that may not in fact exist. 
When one knows that one does not understand one works harder 
for clarity and asks more questions. Certain dynamics are 
at work that help this process. The interview goes more 
slowly. There is time to pay attention to, and follow up, 
non-verbal signals. Moreover, the presence of the 
interpreter who was not in a sense "interested" in the
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answer seemed sometimes to diffuse any tension created by 
answering an intimate question.
Confidentiality
Another issue was confidentiality. I made the assumption at 
the outset that all respondents would want anonymity because 
of the personal nature of their stories and, particularly 
for the Guatemalans, the dangers of being identified. Some 
respondents felt some conflict over this, feeling, 
understandably, that they wanted acknowledgement for their 
lives and what they had done. After much discussion there 
was agreement from all involved against identifying any of 
the respondents at this point, not only for the reasons 
mentioned but because their stories also inevitably involve 
other living individuals who might not wish to be 
recognised. The names of public figures have not been 
changed but those of others have.
Participant Observation
The periods of participant observation are detailed in the 
diary above.
I have already described in Chapter 1 how I approached 
this aspect of the research. In all cases field notes were 
kept in diary form, providing me with a written record of my
I
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thoughts, feelings, reactions to individuals and situations
as they occurred. The major issues that confronted me with
all three groups were ethical. Although I had a limited
budget available, strictly tied to the research, and not
sufficient to pay for interviews, I was relatively better
off than many of my respondents and was asking them to help
me with my work without remuneration. Indeed on many
occasions, they insisted that I be their guest. My
inadequate solution was to cover all food and travel
expenses and, where possible, to respond in kind. Thus,
when asked for medical consultations by members of CERJ, I
ran a small two-day clinic and travelled with one of my
respondents to visit sick members of her family. I used my
car in Poland and Britain to provide lifts and run errands.
An additional value of such actions was to increase my sense
of belonging to the communities that I was observing. These
periods also made me constantly reexamine the value of my
research from the point of view of its value to my
respondents.
Library and Archival Work
Two kinds of reading have informed this project. One is the 
conceptual work that has informed my thinking and is 
reviewed in Chapter 3. This kind of reading has gone on 
constantly throughout the project as my ideas have developed 
and my data has pushed me to ask further questions. The
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other is historical, anthropological and political, to give 
me as full an understanding as possible of the contexts in 
which individual commitment developed. As there are few 
published accounts of these groups, I located newsletters 
and archives of each group's papers, kept with different 
individuals, including my respondents and myself. I drew on 
these, supplementing this with journalistic accounts, 
information from the supplementary interviews described 
above, and background general reading.
Data Analysis
After the tapes had been transcribed, my first step was to 
check the transcripts against the tapes. My purpose was to 
begin to identify key issues and themes and simultaneously 
annotate for an emotional code. Listening to my 
respondents' voices again, rather than simply reading, 
reminded me of the emotional content of the interview and 
helped to identify parts of the narrative of significance to 
them. At this stage I also made a summary of each 
respondent's narrative that allowed for quick reference to 
key facts and for easy comparison.
I then embarked upon what was my basic interpretative 
technique: repeated reading. Firstly, to get the basic 
factual story and chronology of events, and, secondly, to 
identify topics and themes and patterns as they emerged.
I had two approaches to interpretation: firstly, to
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keep an eye out for already existing topics that I had 
identified through reading the literature. Secondly, to 
note themes that emerged from the respondents' narratives 
that were not in pre-existing schemas. Sometimes there was 
an overlap when my data allowed me to expand on a concept 
that I had already noted in the literature. Whether the 
concepts and themes were new or old, my unit of analysis was 
everything relevant said on that topic. I would then take 
all the pertinent texts from different respondents on the 
same theme to compare and contrast. Themes included, for 
example: the influence of parents, the way action and ideas 
emerged, the respondents' moral orientation, and their 
attitudes to non-violence.7
The best way to explain this process is through 
explaining the emergence of two concepts: firstly, that of 
crucial episodes. Some of my reading had introduced me to 
the idea of triggering events which precipitated shifts of 
behaviour or attitude, but there was no consistent 
description of what these were or how they occurred. It 
seemed possible that they might be part of the engagement 
process. Thus my protocol included open questions about the 
way engagement occurred, and I prompted the respondent to 
relive specific instances if they considered any important. 
Many were able to identify such instances and some brought
7 I developed my own word-processing techniques to ease 
this process: basically, I used a filemaker program in which 
to hold sections of text broken down according to key 
themes. Within each file, separate fields contained 
material on subthemes. This also allowed sections of text 
to be held in more than one file and for rapid comparison to 
be made between individuals.
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them up without prompting. Through reading the transcripts 
I became alert to common features in these instances and, 
through listening to the tapes, noted common modes of 
narrating them. Once identified I could set them in
context, identify their features, begin to examine what 
produced them, and compare these experiences with the 
experiences of those with no such episodes (see Chapter 7).
In contrast I had no preconceived ideas at all about 
the role of empathy in the engagement process. Its 
significance struck me through the repeated description of 
empathic experiences in Anna's transcript, although she did 
not use this word herself. After discovering them in one 
interview, I searched the other transcripts with this 
concept in mind, additionally alert to those formative 
experiences that might have contributed to empathy and to 
the role it played in engagement. Another category that 
emerged from reading the transcripts was that of the 
"connected self.” Its appearance and its significance in 
affecting the respondents' ways of working pushed me first 
into re-reading the interviews, paying attention to the 
respondents' perception of themselves in relation to others, 
and to their "moral voice”. Secondly, it led me to further 
reading and re-interviewing to explore these themes in more 
depth.
Finally, in writing up, for reasons of space I could 
not always quote every section of text pertinent to my 
argument. I have, in each case, taken the whole into 
account but for the purposes of exposition chosen only the
most representative quotations, making clear where they 
speak for the individual and where they might speak for 
others in the group as well. I also had to make a decision 
about editing. Given that half the texts are in translation 
I have not tried to present quotations precisely as spoken, 
with all breath marks and interjections. On some occasions, 
in order to enhance the narrative flow, I have also edited 
out my own clarifying or encouraging comments and some of 
the repetitions. However, where I have edited I have tried 
to remain completely true to the feel and sense of the 
narrative, and I have not edited out uncertainty, 
contradictions or inconsistency where they exist.
This brings my description of my working process to an 
end. I have tried to underline its responsive and 
interactive nature and set it in the context of the personal 
and political lives of myself and my respondents. I hope 
this transparency allows a greater understanding of the way 









Personal Britain Guatemala Poland World
history Events
Working as Exponential Massacre of August: Revolution
newly growth of peaceful Strikes in in
qualified British protestors Gdansk lead Nicaragua
doctor in peace in Spanish to birth of puts left
NHS. Read movement in embassy. Solidarity wing
Edward response to Government Sadinistas
Thompson's 1979 engaged in in power.
Protest and decision to all-out war
Survive. deploy with
Join newly- cruise indigenous






(the first Women's December:
of regular Peace Camp Martial law


















































































1987 INF treaty 
signed
1988: Working as Missile Runujel Polish
Sumner: psychiatric deployment Junam parliament
formulate registrar exercises Council of passes law
research in NHS. continue, Ethnic allowing
proposal: Chair of as does Communities alternative
"To examine European Women’s (CERJ) military





































work in UK 
and US 



















































































































preliminary Return to deployment
data full time exercises
analysis, psychiatry end.



































































































war in the 
Balkans.





































































































May: War in 
Bosnia
CHAPTER 3 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
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Part 1: Coming to Commitment
The problem with any research that takes place at an 
interdiciplinary nexus is that vast fields of relevant 
literature stretch to distant horizons in every direction. 
Political and sociological studies of collective action, 
socio-psychological studies of attitude, motivation and 
belief formation, are all relevant, as are philosophical 
studies on the development of moral values and political 
thought. A comprehensive review of the field of "collective 
action" alone would require a book in itself, beginning with 
a lengthy semantic discussion on the problems of definition 
of both the term "collective action" and the related concept 
of "social movement".
To begin with, therefore, it seems important to sharply 
define the boundaries of my own field. My interest is in 
the process of engagement in non-violent collective action. 
I am specifically concerned with understanding those 
individuals who engage full time in peace and human rights 
movements. The groups in my study fit into Jenkins's 
definition of a sociopolitical movement: "organised groups 
attempting to bring about change in social structures", 
whose actions lie "outside the legitimate channels for 
expressing grievances, or if not actually outside these 
channels, use the existing channels in innovative ways". To
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constitute a movement there must be "collective actions" 
combined with "change oriented beliefs".1 However, as Tilly 
points out, any student of social movements has to face the 
fact that as a movement consists of three elements - 
population, beliefs, and action - it may be considered as 
enduring if only one of these elements remains stable over 
time. For example, the beliefs endure although they are 
upheld by quite different populations with quite different 
action repertoires. Or the action endures but with quite 
different meanings and carried out by different 
populations.2 This latter phenomenom has been well 
illustrated by the example of the protest "camp": first seen 
as an anti-nuclear protest outside nuclear bases, then 
becoming a solidarity action with women in jail, an anti-war 
protest before and during the Gulf War, and most recently 
being used to challenge coalpit closures in Britain, and in 
the protests against new road building.
My focus has been on three particular populations 
rather than on belief or action per se. Thus, while shared 
beliefs and shared forms of action formed the initial 
definition of these populations, I have been concerned with 
how an individual's decision to take part in non-violent 
collective action emerges and develops, not with how 
different populations come to share beliefs or act in the
1 J. Craig Jenkins, "Sociopolitical Movements", in The 
Handbook of Political Behavior, vol. 4, edited by Samuel L. 
Long (New York and London: Plenum, 1991), pp. 82— 83.
2 Charles Tilly, From Mobilisation to Revolution 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978), p. 10.
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same way at the same time. I examine the movement as a 
context for engagement.
In the first part of this chapter I shall simply 
attempt to highlight some of the main approaches that have 
been used in looking at what I call the "why it happens" and 
"how it comes about" of collective action. My purpose is to 
show that, though these approaches increase our 
understanding of the beliefs and personal attributes of 
activists, of the character and structural basis of various 
social movements, and of how organisations themselves 
mobilise others to join them, very little attention has been 
paid to the process of individual engagement in the group, 
or to the specific choice of non-violence. I also hope to 
show that most approaches, both theoretical and empirical, 
have been concerned with producing a general theory of 
political action that has ignored the specificity of 
different forms of action, concerned with different issues, 
at different times. In addition, the literature
predominantly deals with the male activist, or fails to 
specify whether the activist is a man or a woman, thus 
ignoring the impact of gender. It has thus created 
misundertandings and stereotypes that mask a complex and 
diverse process. In subsequent chapters I will draw on some 
additional literature specifically relevant to the issues 
raised by my own research.
Research in this field can not only be divided into the 
why and the how, but also by the unit of analysis: group, 
event, or individual; by whether the researcher is concerned
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with macro or microprocesses? and by whether there is an 
underlying assumption that collective action is normal or 
irrational behaviour. These divisions are not clear cut and 
intersect with one another, but I shall, for the sake of 
simplicity, initially divide them into the macro and micro.
Macro Approaches
Kornhauser's theory of "The Mass Society" is an example of 
a macro approach that sees social movements as abnormal. He 
is particularly concerned to explain the structural 
conditions of modern society that make it vulnerable to the 
emergence of "anti-democratic movements", that is, those 
conditions that are most conducive to the growth of a "mass 
society". His theory rests heavily on a Durkheimian 
analysis of society that sees rapid differentiation 
resulting in disequilibrium and "anomie". In brief, his 
thesis is that at times of rapid social transition - such as 
occur with the sudden introduction of democratic rule after 
a long period of autocracy, or when there is rapid 
urbanisation, rapid industrialisation, or massive population 
movements - there is a breakdown of traditional social 
structures, institutions and associations, and of values and 
cultural norms. This results in atomised, alienated, 
marginalised individuals who are vulnerable to "mobilisation 
by mass-oriented elites" and elites that are vulnerable to
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penetration by mass movements.3
While the theory may have some value in explaining the 
emergence of totalitarian movements - for example, the 
emergence of fascism in interwar Germany - Kornhauser makes 
clear that he regards any extra-constitutional action as 
"mass politics" and therefore anti-democratic.4 In stable 
political democracies political elites should be protected 
from any "ad hoc interference" in their functioning, their 
only constraint being their vulnerability to electoral 
choice at the ballot box. This highly conservative view of 
any kind of social movement as a manifestation of social 
pathology ignores the regulative and democratising role 
played by non-violent civil disobedience5 and is not born 
out by empirical research.
Numerous studies have shown that, at least in liberal 
democracies, it is the "better educated, more sophisticated, 
more interested [and] knowledgeable about politics, . . . 
more subjectively efficacious", who are likely to engage in 
"radical activism" (that is protests, demonstrations, civil
3 W. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 33 ff. There is a 
micro element in the focus on atomised and marginal "man" 
and his guest for community. But "man" here is a 
generalisation, not the subject of individual study.
4Ibid., p. 22.
5 John Rawls, "The Justification of Civil Disobedience", 
in Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practise, ed. Hugo Adam 
Bedau (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1969).
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disobedience and, rarely, riots).6 Moreover, far from being 
marginalised newcomers, those engaged are likely to be long­
term residents of their communities, more sociable, central 
to their social networks, more engaged in group activities 
in general, and to have a higher socioeconomic status.7 
Marsh, in his large-scale study of British protest 
behaviour, makes it clear that those engaged in protest view 
it as an extension of, rather than an alternative to, 
orthodox political behaviour.®
In contrast to Kornhauser, many Marxists9 see 
collective action as the normal and rational expression of 
the conflict of interests within society. Their analysis 
sees social movements as primarily class based. Classes are 
defined in terms of their relationship to the means of 
production, and collective action arises when a particular 
class becomes conscious of common interests and mobilises to 
defend them. One of the main critiscisms of this approach 
is that "material or class interests defined by economic 
relations are not the exclusive source of the conflicting 
interests that underlie movements".10 New cleavages are
6 Lester W. Milbrath, "Political Participation", in The 
Handbook of Political Behavior, vol. 4, ed. Samuel L. Long 
(New York and London: Plenum, 1981), p. 218.
7 Ibid., p. 224.
8 Alan Marsh, Protest and Political Conciousness, Sage 
Library of Social Research 49 (London: Sage Publications, 
1977).
9 I make no attempt to explore the diverse currents of 
Marxism here, merely to indicate a general trend.
10 Jenkins, "Sociopolitical Movements", p. 110.
78
emerging around ethnicity, gender, access to political 
power, and value orientations such as attitudes to the 
environment, all of which cut across class lines. Some 
theorists have attempted to solve this by extending or 
modifying the concept of class to include these new 
groupings. The underlying assumption remains that 
"individuals participate in collective action because they 
belong to a specific social sector which is exposed to the 
contradictory requirements of complex systems."11
This approach and its limitations is exemplified by 
Jonas in The Battle for Guatemala. Her book is a 
comprehensive analysis of the structural conditions that 
have produced the various forms of collective struggle in 
Guatemala in the last half century. She argues that the 
skewed land distribution, the expropriation of resources, 
ethnic discrimination, and the combined effects of 
continuing economic crisis and war have all produced a 
marginalised and impoverished majority who, since the late 
1980s, have mobilised to challenge the dominant minority. 
(I explore this in more detail in Chapter 5.) She 
acknowledges and describes the complex, diverse, but 
"convergent" interests of the "popular bloc", a term she 
substitutes for class to incorporate ethnic and gender 
dimensions. What is not explained is why, given the 87 per 
cent majority now subject to these structural conditions, 
they do not all mobilise, nor why different groupings choose
11 Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present (London: 
Hutchinson Radius, 1989), p. 216.
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different methods.12 As Melucci complains, this form of 
explanation "derives the meaning of action from its analysis 
of the social conditons that the actors appear to have in 
common, . . . while the gap between 'objective conditions' 
and the empirically observed collective behaviour proves 
impossible to explain. Marx's old problem - how to explain 
how a 'class-in -itself' becomes a 'class-for-itself' -
remains in the background unsolved".13
Resource mobilisation theory (RMT) attempts to resolve 
the problem by moving away from the question of why 
collective action occurs to a focus on how "social movement 
organisations" use various "resources", such as access to 
finance, media, skilled elites, and social networks, to 
mobilise support. McCarthy and Zald, for example, argue 
that "there is always enough discontent in any society to 
supply the grass roots support for a movement if the 
movement is effectively organised and has at its disposal 
the power and resources of some established elite group". 
They also state that "grievances and discontent may be 
defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs".14 
RMT theorists distinguish between social movements which 
share beliefs, and social movement organisations (SMO) which 
are "complex or formal organisations which identify [their]
12 Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala (Boulder: 
Westview, 1991).
13 Melucci, Nomads of the Present, p. 18.
14 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource 
Mobilisation and Social Movements: a Partial Theory", 




goals with the preferences of a social movement . . . and 
attempt to implement those goals.1115 "The amount of activity 
directed towards goal accomplishment is, crudely, a function 
of the resources controlled by the organisation.1116 The 
theory makes the point that movement "beneficiaries" may not 
be identical with the "conscience constituents, individual 
and organisational" who provide major sources of support. 
Thus it acknowledges at the outset the diverse nature of 
membership. The theory offers a refreshing challenge, in 
its emphasis on the mobilisation "process", both to those 
groups of theories concerned only with individual motivation 
(see below) and to those based on socio-structural 
conditions. Regarding the latter, "society provides the 
infrastructure which social movement industries utilise", 
including aspects such as communications, pre-existing 
networks, and "degree of access to institutional centres".17
The problem with RMT, however, is, firstly, that the 
heavy emphasis on pre-existing elites and networks ignores 
those groups that appear to come into existence initially 
without either. Secondly, while it acknowledges individual 
diversity in the SMOs, because no attention is paid to 
individual motivation or the meaning of the action, the 
sources of this diversity are not explored (although the 
impact of diversity is: for example, conflict within the 
group). Thirdly, while the theory attempts to explain
15 Ibid., p. 1218.
16 Ibid., p. 1216.
17 Ibid., p. 1217.
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growth and development, the pre-existence of the SMO or of 
Gamson's "challenging group"18 is taken for granted, with no 
exploration of how initial engagement occurred.
This is the main problem underlying all the macro 
approaches, whether based on assumptions about social 
conflict, social breakdown or access to resources. They 
treat the social movement as a "unified datum", a "character 
. endowed with being and purpose"19, ignoring the 
plurality of values, opinions, meanings, and perspectives 
that converge in any given case.
Micro Approaches
One way to get at the diversity and complexity of collective 
action is to shift the focus to the micro level of the 
individual. Paradoxically, however, social psychologists 
who do this have generally used their studies of individual 
personality, motivation, belief and behaviour to produce 
empirically based generalisations, continuing the search for 
a unifying explanatory model. Such a search has taken a 
variety of forms that are worth examining in a little more 
detail. I identify six distinct approaches:
1) psychopathological
2) personality trait
18 William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest 
(Belmont: Wadsworth, 1990), pp. 14 ff.





6) cognitive and emotive
Obviously these approaches overlap but, for the sake of 
clarity, I will separate them out.
1) The psychopathological approach draws heavily upon 
psychoanalytic theory. This rests on the assumption that
much human adult behaviour can only be understood by
reference to the unconscious, whose urges, wishes and 
defences are themselves largely determined by early 
childhood experiences.
The impact of this work in trying to understand 
political behaviour is best exemplified by Harold Lasswell, 
whose argument is summed up in his formula:
p } d } r = P
"Where p equals private motives; d equals displacement onto 
a public object; r equals rationalisation in terms of public 
interest; P equals the political man; and > equals 
transformed into."20 The psychoanalytic theory of
repression is crucial to Lasswell's argument: all
individuals repress memories with unacceptable emotional 
connotations, and in all cases such repressed and 
unconscious impulses remain dynamic and seek an outlet. It
20 Harold Lasswell, The Political Writings of Harold D. 
Lasswell (Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 74— 77.
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is the act of rationalising such impulses in terms of public 
interest that transforms the private into the political man.
Through the study of detailed psychobiographies 
Lasswell explains particular forms of political behaviour as 
manifestations of the unconscious and irrational motivations 
produced by childhood experience. Thus the "love for the 
downtrodden and for humanity” expressed by the political 
agitator and pacifist A (the closest Lasswell comes to 
describing a social movement activist), is a rationalisation 
of the "reactive displacement of his own brother 
hostility",21 while his "wild assaults and defiances" are 
related to his latent homosexual urge and to his "desire to 
provoke the social environment into attacking him and thus 
to gratify powerful unconscious drives", namely, "to be 
forced into a passive, feminine, victimised role and to 
inflict upon himself the punishment which he deserved for 
excessive hatred of others." Hiss G, the sole female in the 
study and an activist who "supports all kinds of measures, 
particularly for the emancipation of women from the 
domination of men" has "an enormous masculine complex" and 
"sought out politics as a career as a means of expressing 
the male role of dominance, a drive which was powerfully 
organised in her early childhood experience."22
Lasswell's work makes depressing reading. His attitude 
to his interviewees is pejorative and disparaging and ridden 
with patriarchal assumptions. For example, the desire by a
21 Ibid., p. 93.
22 Ibid., pp. 121— 124.
girl for a single child is actually the manifestation of the 
unconcious wish for a penis, while cooking and sewing is a 
manifestation of pathology in a boy. The subject's response 
to the analysis is never given. One wonders if it was ever 
shared with them. Most significantly for present purposes, 
the meaning and process of political engagement is never 
explored. Indeed, although there is rich detail on 
childhood and intra-familial experience, only the vaguest 
generalisations are made about the nature of the activists' 
political involvements and the historical, social and 
political context in which they occurred. The only role of 
history is in the random provision of the "public obects" 
onto which rationalised, unconscious feelings may be 
displaced.
Not surprisingly, given the irrational basis of 
political action that he postulates, Lasswell's political 
world is violent and conflictive. "Politics is found 
wherever 'wills' are in conflict."23 And "the prominence of 
hate in politics suggests that . . . the most important
private motive is a repressed and powerful hatred of 
authority."24 Moreover, the implications of his thesis are 
profoundly anti-democratic. "The individual is a poor judge 
of his own interests", and his choice of political policy is 
merely the "irrelevant palliative" by which "he attempts to 
relieve his own disorders", while the only useful role for 
political agitation and discussion is as a form of
23 Ibid., p. 44.
24 Ibid., p. 75.
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catharsis. And Lasswell argues for a "preventative 
politics" that depends not on "democratic discussion" but on 
the application of lessons learnt from the behavioural 
sciences, particularly psychopathology.25
To summarise: for Lasswell the activist is a deviant 
who functions in a historical vacuum. There is no sense 
that war, hunger and exploitation may be genuine human 
problems to which people respond. They are merely the 
fortuitous symbols onto which people displace their 
disordered affects and it is this displacement apparently 
that gives political movements their vitality.
I will deal in more detail with Lasswell's approach and 
the way my own research challenges his thesis in Chapter 8, 
where I look at the role of particularly traumatic 
experiences in activists' lives.
2) Separate from, but related to the psychopathological 
tradition, is the tradition which examines personality 
traits. This has usually been done by the use of cross-* 
sectional surveys that look for an association between 
"activism" and a particular trait. Gergen and Ullman 
critically reviewed a large body of this work, focussing 
particularly on studies looking at social movement 
activists.26 They found that positive correlations had been 
demonstrated between activism and aggression/hostility, high
25 Ibid., pp. 194— 199.
26 Kenneth J. Gergen and Mathew Ullman, "Socialisation 
and the Characterological Basis of Political Activism", in 
The Handbook of Political Socialization, ed. Stanley Allen 
Renshon (New York: Free Press, 1977) pp. 411— 442.
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need for group affiliation, and altruism. More
specifically, right wing activists showed a high need for 
conformity, left wing ones a low need and a greater need for 
autonomy. No correlations were found with alienation, and 
the picture of the relationship with self esteem, power and 
dominance, authoritarian personality, optimism and 
pessimism, and distrust was quite unclear due to very 
disparate results from different studies. There were also 
studies that challenged the strong relationships defined 
above.
The problem with this body of work is that is based on 
some dubious tacit assumptions. The first is that 
demonstrating an association implies a causal link, for 
example: aggressive unconforming individuals are more likely 
to become activists. Causality cannot be established by 
this kind of cross-sectional work. As Gergen and Ullman 
point out:
The reverse possibility is seldom discussed. Yet 
in most cases the possibility that political 
participation may influence personal dispositions 
is not only plausible, but compelling: for
example, if a political movement emphasises the 
use of aggression or is conflict prone, 
participation could well influence the participant 
scores on an aggression indicator. Similarly, 
depending on the character of the movement, the 
individual could well be moved toward greater 
optimism (or pessimism), affiliation, alienation, 
distrust, altruism self esteem, and the like. . . 
. Social psychological literature documents the 
effects of behavioural engagement or role 
playing on subsequent psychological dispositions. 
There is little reason to suspect that involvement 
in political groups is not similarly effective. 
The possibility is indeed unsettling that most of 
the uniformity encountered in our review stems 
from just such effects.
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Thus, it is not that activism arises from certain 
personality types but that it may actually produce them.
This relates to the second point of criticism which 
applies both to the trait and the psychoanalytic approach. 
The assumption that stable and enduring personality traits 
are acquired in early childhood by various socialisation 
processes is not necessarily correct. Firstly, particular 
traits may be more evident in some situations than others. 
Gergen summarises his own research, showing, for example, 
how self esteem fluctuates according to whether one is 
interacting with others considered inferior or superior and 
according to the amount of expressed social approval. Such 
situational variance may well account for the very disparate 
results in correlational studies.27 Secondly, there is 
increasing evidence that personality as a whole is not a 
fixed given, rather, it appears to be flexible and 
protean.28 Individuals are capable of being many thing to 
many people, including themselves. They are also capable of 
enormous shifts and changes in response to external 
circumstances and to their relationships with others.
Finally, Mischel reviewed studies in which personality 
factors have been used to predict behaviour and found that 
"personality variables seldom account for more than 10 per
27 Ibid., p. 436.
28 Kenneth Gergen, The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of 
Identity in Contemporary Life (Basic Books: New York, 1991)? 
and Robert Jay Lifton, The Protean Self: Human Resilience in 
an Age of Fragmentation (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
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cent of the observed behaviour.1,29 Gergen and Ullman state 
that in the studies reviewed by them the figure is similar:
Given the relative triviality of personality 
indicators in predicting behaviour, it has seemed 
apparent to many that factors arising in the 
immediate personal situation may be far more 
powerful determinants than whatever personal 
dispositions the individual caries about with him. 
In effect, political participation may be far 
better understood in terms of the immediate life 
circumstances facing that individual rather than 
in terms of his or her early background: e.g. the
participation of close friends, the costs incurred 
at home, the convenience of committing oneself, 
the immediate promise of action or change.30
3) Tedd Gurr also saw political action arising 
primarily out of an individual's motivational state. In his 
view the main motivation was the frustration produced by a 
state of relative deprivation which, finding no alternative 
outlet, was transformed into aggression that led to 
collective acts of political violence. Gurr was attempting 
to address the difficulty posed by the fact that it is not 
those suffering the worst structural conditions that rebel. 
He argued that the significant factor in producing 
frustration was:
the perceived discrepancy between mens' value 
expectations and their value capabilities. Value 
expectations are the goods and conditions of life
29 Walter Mischel, Personality and Assessment (New York: 
Wiley, 1968), quoted in Gergen and Ullman, "Socialisation
and the Characterological Basis of Political Activism", in 
The Handbook of Political Socialization, ed. Stanley Allen 
Renshon (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 436.
30 Ibid., p. 436.
89
to which people believe they are rightfully 
entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and 
conditions they think they are capable of 
attaining or maintaining given the social means 
available to them. Societal conditions that 
increase the average level or intensity of 
expectations without increasing capabilities 
increase the intensity of discontent.”31
This can happen when rising expectations outstrip the 
"resources and institutions that determine their 
capabilities”, the “revolution of rising frustrations" that 
occurs, for example, when non-western groups are exposed to 
the higher material living standard of the West.32 When
there is a gap between the capability for obtaining these
values and the expectations of doing so, the potential for
discontent and frustration rises, the greater and more
intense the sense of discontent, the greater the potential 
for political violence. Gurr pointed out that
many of the attitudes and societal conditions that 
facilitate political violence may be present and 
relatively unchanging in society over a long 
period; they become relevant only when the
relative deprivation increases in scope and
intensity. Intense politicised discontent also 
can be widespread and persistent over a long 
period without overt manifestation because a
regime monopolises coercive control and
institutional support.33
Moreover, whether the potential for collective
31 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), p 13.
32 Ibid., pp. 93— 94.
33 Ibid., p. 233.
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violence would be transformed into political violence 
depended on the degree to which it was perceived as 
justified, which depended on the normative values and 
ideological underpinnings of society, such as loyalty to the 
state, socialisation processes, and the tradition of 
violence within society.
Thus Gurr acknowledged the importance of external 
political, social and ideological conditions as facilitating 
or inhibiting collective action, but insisted that the 
frustration aggression hypothesis was central. Leaving it 
out from an understanding of political violence was like 
leaving out the law of gravity from the theory of flight.34 
Gurr's theory was not just concerned with collective 
violence. Gurr made it clear that a similar analysis could 
be applied to less violent but still disruptive acts, such 
as demonstrations and other forms of non-violent action.
There are a number of problems with Gurr's approach, 
not least the difficulty of operationalising the concept of 
relative deprivation. Gurr's method is based on the Mthe 
juxtaposition and generalisation of relationships observed 
in studies of political violence and of the individual 
behaviours manifest in it."35 Basically, using
socio-historical material, he assumes that relative 
deprivation has occurred if there is evidence of the 
objective conditions supposed to produce it, such as a 
sudden increase in taxes or a rapid rise in the cost of
34 Ibid., pp. 36— 37.
35 Ibid., p. 17.
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living. Then he looks for an association with outbreaks of 
political violence, which, not surprisingly, he finds. But 
there is no possibility of knowing whether those engaged in 
action actually felt deprived or frustrated at the time. 
Other empirical studies do not support the theory: for
example, Hibb's massive study of political disorders in 108 
countries over two decades found no correlation with 
relative deprivation (objectively measured in the way
described above). It was the factors identified by Gurr as 
facilitative, that is, the degree of repression and 
institutional support, that were more significant.36 Work
on Black riots in the 1960s found no independent
relationship between relative and absolute grievances and a 
tendency to riot.37 Moreover, studies based on attempts to 
measure a subjective sense of deprivation and associate it 
with the tendency to riot have not demonstrated any causal 
link either.38
Another problem is that, as with the work on
personality traits, most studies attempt to demonstrate the
36 D. Hibbs, Mass Political Violence (New York: John 
Wiley, 1973), cited by J. Craig Jenkins, "Sociopolitical 
Movements", in The Handbook of Political Behavior, vol. 4, 
edited by Samuel L. Long (New York and London: Plenum, 
1991), pp. 100-101.
37 Seymour Spilerman, The Causes of Racial Disturbances: 
A Comparison of Alternative Explanations (Madison University 
of Wisconsin, 1969), cited by J. Craig Jenkins, 
"Sociopolitical Movements", in The Handbook of Political 
Behavior, vol. 4, edited by Samuel L. Long (New York and 
London: Plenum, 1991).
38 Michael Billig, Social Psychology and Intergroup 
Relations, European Monographs in Social Psychology, no. 9 
(London: Academic Press in cooperation with the European 
Association of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976) p. 159.
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existence of relative deprivation after the movement has 
come into existence, and fail to ask if its supporters 
shared this feeling before becoming engaged.39 Just as 
political engagement may help to develop a certain form of 
personality, the experience of a sense of relative 
deprivation may actually be a product of the activities of 
a movement that articulates grievances not previously 
understood.
A more fundamental critique of the relative deprivation 
theory is made by Billig, who challenges the hypothesis that 
aggression is always the product of frustration: he points 
out that there is clear evidence that aggressive behaviour 
may be learned and purposive. In addition, he argues, there 
is an ideological bias, similar to Lasswell's and 
Kornhauser's, that presupposes a harmonious society which is 
sometimes disrupted by irrational acts of political 
violence.40 Such a bias is clearly demonstrated by Gurr's 
comment that his study is an attempt to explain "our 
occasional disposition to disrupt violently the order we 
otherwise work so hard to maintain.1,41
Billig also points to the dangers of applying theories 
derived from interpersonal psychology to intergroup work, a 
critique that is relevant to all the psychological theories 
discussed so far. Even in the psychology laboratory, the 
subject's hypothesised internal motivational state does not
39 Jenkins, "Sociopolitical Movements", p. 103.
40 Michael Billig, Social Psychology, p. 128.
41 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 7.
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occur in a social vacuum. Context, beliefs and 
interpretations all codetermine his choice of action.42 
"The cognitive interpretation of the deprivations and 
frustrations suffered by ingroup members must provide the 
basis for a determined social action. Without the coherence 
provided by an ingroup ideology, frustrations will merely 
produce individual reactions; these will take diffuse forms 
and will not be vehicles for mass social change."43
4) Lifecycle theorists, such as Feuer in his Conflict 
of Generations, try to have it both ways. On the one hand, 
Feuer regards collective action by young people, 
specifically students, as a natural and necessary process by 
which society regenerates itself. "The conflict of 
generations . . .  is a driving force of history."44 On the 
other, it is the students' failure to recognise that their 
rebellion has nothing to do with the actual structural 
conditions of their society, but is actually based on 
powerful primordial urges, that produces the negative and 
destructive aspects of every rebellion. He contrasts the 
irrational emotionality of various student movements to the 
rational behaviour of, for example, the labour movement.
Student movements . . . are born of vague
42 Michael Billig, Social Psychology, p. 149.
43Ibid., p. 156. Billig defines ideology as "the 
pattern of beliefs about the social world and about the 
possibilities for social action".
44 Lewis Feuer, The Conflict of Generations: the
Character and Significance of Student Movements (New York: 
Basic Books, 1969), p. 527.
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undefined emotions which seek for some issue, some 
cause to which to attach themselves, a complex of 
urges - altruism, idealism, revolt, self sacrifice 
and self destruction - searches the social order 
for a strategic avenue of expression.45
Moreover, when the student finds a "carrier movement", such 
as peasants or the working class, the "emotions issuing from 
the student's unconscious, and deriving from the conflict of 
generations . . . deflect it in irrational directions.
Solidarity with the suffering is not, for Feuer, a 
genuine response to perceived distress but simply the result 
of the "guilt of . . . the would-be parricide" which can
only be conquered through a demonstration of selflessness 
and the "winning of the comforting maternal love of the 
oppressed".46 The psychoanalytic language is reminiscent of 
Lasswell both in its ahistoricity and in its reduction of 
the building of solidarity and connection to 
psychopathology. And the question remains as to why all 
youth in every generation do not revolt. Feuer's answer is 
to concede a minimal role to structural and historical 
conditions: there must be a society with a "gerontocratic 
order",47 that is, where power and wealth remain in the 
hands of an older generation which has lost legitimacy with 
the younger generation, for example, through military 
defeat.
Erikson's explanations of the outburst of youth and
45 Ibid., pp. 8— 10.
46 Ibid., p. 530.
47 Ibid., p. 12.
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student activism in the 1960s, and of the lives of Martin 
Luther and Gandhi, are rooted in a lifecycle approach. 
However, in contrast to Feuer, he does not regard political 
and ideological engagement as pathological or irrational and 
does see it as firmly embedded in history. Although working 
in the psychoanalytic tradition, Erikson does not regard 
adult behaviour as predetermined by early life experience. 
Indeed, he regrets the way psychoanalysis has "lifted to the 
rank of a cosmology the undeniable fact that man's adulthood 
contains a persistent childishness: that vistas of the
future always reflect the mirages of a missed past". And he 
is dismayed at the "widespread fatalism according to which 
man is nothing but a multiplication of his parents' faults". 
He sees the psyche in constant interaction with historical 
circumstances and as continuing to develop throughout the 
life cycle. Thus, human personality is "a combination of 
capacities created in the distant past and of opportunities 
divined in the present; a combination of totally unconscious 
preconditions developed in individual growth and of social 
conditions created and recreated in the precarious interplay 
of generations".48 The life cycle is marked by a series of 
psychosocial crises in which the individual faces up to the 
tasks appropriate for that stage of development. For 
example the "identity crisis" is that stage when:
Each youth must forge for himself some central
48 Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther, A Study in 
Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Norton, 1958), pp. 18- 
-19.
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perspective and direction, some working unity out 
of the effective remnants of his childhood and the 
hopes of his anticipated adulthood. . . .  In some 
young people, in some classes, at some periods in 
history, this crisis will be minimal; in other 
people, classes, and periods, the crisis will be 
clearly marked off as a critical period, a kind of 
"second birth" apt to be aggravated either by 
widespread neuroticisms or by pervasive 
ideological unrest.49
In the mid- and late 1960s Erikson saw the particular 
quantitative and qualitative changes in North American life, 
such as the growth of mass communication, better education, 
the growing autonomy of youth, and the growing threat of 
nuclear war, as creating a form of historical crisis to 
which youth were peculiarly sensitive because of their own 
developmental crises.50 Similarly, Martin Luther's
prolonged identity crisis coincided with a "political and 
psychological vacuum" in the Catholic church. For Erikson, 
in both cases, resolution of the political crises through 
ideological commitment is intimately intertwined with 
resolution of the personal crisis. In marked contrast to 
Lasswell, he does not see this as the irrational 
displacement of an unconscious affect created by the 
personal crisis. On the contrary, he states that
We cannot separate personal growth and communal 
change, nor can we separate the identity crisis in 
individual life and contemporary crisis in
49 Ibid., p. 14.
50 Erik H. Erikson, Life History and the Historical 
Moment (New York: Norton, 1975), pp. 196— 199.
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historical development because the two help to 
define each other and are truly relative to each 
other. In fact, the whole interplay between the 
psychological and the social, the developmental
and the historical could be conceptualised only as 
a kind of psychosocial relativity.51
Hence the use of the term psychohistory. And, in an 
interesting reversal, he suggests that at moments of 
particular historic crisis, like the 1960s, it is the 
"inverted dissenters", those who are sensitive to the
problems but too sick and too isolated for "joint dissent", 
who are in fact the "patients".52
It is important to note a serious limitation to the 
work. As Gilligan points out, the lifecycle that he 
delineates, with its emphasis on the process of
individuation rather than on the development of
relationship, is a male lifecycle.53 Therefore its 
appropriateness in helping understand the emergence of 
female political engagement may be limited. In addition, 
Erikson's focus in the Gandhi and Luther studies is on the 
development of the exceptional man, not the collective 
actor. Erikson's work is significant, however, not only for 
its pathbreaking attempt to bridge the gap between the 
historical and the personal, but because of the attention 
paid to process. Both Young Man Luther and Gandhi's Truth
51 Erik H. Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis (London: 
Faber, 1968), p. 23.
52 Erik H. Erikson, Life History, p. 196.
53 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982).
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examine the emergence of political and religious commitment 
through the use of psychobiography and history. I shall 
draw on his findings about the emergence of commitment in 
Chapter 7.
5) The most thorough challenge to the 'oedipal 
rebellion/activist as deviant hypotheses' came from the 
large body of empirical studies done on the youth and 
student activists of the 1960s. In this work the focus is 
still the individual activist but the concern is less with 
internal motivational state or personality traits and more 
with the processes of socialisation. The socialisation 
literature, looking at the background of activists through 
both quantitative and qualitative biographical studies was 
mainly concerned with identifying the personal, cultural and 
historical backgrounds from which activists emerged.
The focus was rather narrow, primarily addressing the 
issues of family background, childrearing practises, 
ideological continuity, and family conflict. In addition, 
some interest was shown in the childhood behaviour and 
personalities of the activists, and at what age activism 
emerged. In one study the possibility that the activists' 
perception of their childhoods could be altered by current 
engagement was checked by examining parental perceptions of 
the same period. A remarkable degree of concordance between 
parents and children was found, suggesting that the memories 
were stable and reliable.54
54 Richard Flacks, ”The Liberated Generation: An
Exploration of the Roots of Student Protest”, Journal of 
Social Issues 23 (1967), pp. 52— 75.
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It is worth summarising the main findings. Student 
activists of the 1960s were not marginal but came from an 
"elite” group. They tended to be the most gifted students, 
while their parents had high socioeconomic status, high 
levels of education, and had professional, particularly 
"helping,” careers. Male activists were particularly 
influenced by mothers' values and expectations, and the fact 
that many mothers were in nurturant professions was not 
insignificant.55 Activists showed continuity with parental 
values, if not with parents' political beliefs. Marked 
discontinuity and rebellion was more likely to be associated 
with alienation and political withdrawal. Values also 
appeared to have been handed down over more than one 
generation. And "the dominant socialization pattern" was 
"not permissiveness but a highly principled family culture 
which is transmitted to children through the use of 
reasoning and persuasion and the encouragement of 
independence in thought and action."56
This is a brief summary of a complex body of research. 
It is particularly interesting to note that the presence of 
family conflict discriminates between activist and 
inactivist and between different types of activist. 
Non-constructive activism appears to be associated with the
55 Margaret M. Braungart and Richard R. Braungart, "The 
Life-Course Development of Left- and Right-Wing Youth 
Activist Leaders from the 1960s", Political Psychology 11 
(1990), pp. 254— 258, and Kenneth Keniston, Youth and 
Dissent: The Rise of a New Opposition (New York: Harcourt 
Brace, 1971), pp. 219-221.
56 Keniston, Youth and Dissent, p. 276.
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most conflictive and negative relationships to parents. In 
contrast to Lasswell's view, suppression of conflict is 
associated with inactivity.
Other work has shown that the presence of family 
conflict helps to distinguish between those who have a 
belief and those who act on it. Cowdry studied the 
consistency between action and belief and the determinants 
of this consistency. The advantages of his study were that 
by looking at a homogenous male student population (a random 
sample of 450 male seniors), he was able to control for many 
demographic variables - intelligence and class 
specialisation, for example - and focus on one specific 
issue: attitudes and action taken with regard to the Vietnam 
war. The study looked at attitudes to the war and plans for 
service, and also, because of the circulation during the 
study of a strongly worded anti-war petition, it was able to 
examine the relationship between these attitudes and the 
action of signing the petition. He found that consistency 
- that is, acting upon anti-war beliefs by signing, or on 
pro-war beliefs by not signing - was related to reported 
"family harmony, compatibility and respect." Anti-war 
nonsigners reported more parental disharmony, lower respect 
for parents and more conflict with their fathers. 
Consistent students appeared to have a more positive 
perception of and relationship with their fathers. He 
suggests that the inconsistent subject from a more 
conflicted family has learnt early the value of keeping his
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thoughts to himself.57 The significance of Cowdry's work is 
that it shows the importance of distinguishing belief and 
action and that family constellation may have more effect on 
consistency between belief and action than on the beliefs 
themselves.
None of the authors cited claim that the variables 
studied are predictive. The fact remains that activism in 
the 1960s was a minority phenomenom: the majority, with 
similar backgrounds, were not active, while there were 
others, not from this subculture, who were. Thus the 
Braungarts emphasise the importance of the intersection 
between family background and other socialising experiences, 
such as teachers, books, and peers, and of all of these with 
life cycle and historical events, each of these having a 
different emphasis in different individuals. The
interaction is what is significant. The Braungarts suggest 
that the political ideology of parents tended to form a lens 
through which historical events of childhood were seen and 
on the basis of which the events were regarded as 
significant. Thus, right wing students remembered the 
Hungarian uprising, left wing ones the Cuban missile 
crisis.58
Keniston's thorough review of 300 of these studies
57 R. William Cowdry, Kenneth Keniston, and Seymour 
Cabin, "The War and Military Obligation: Private Attitudes 
and Public Actions", Journal of Pesonality 38 (December
1970), pp. 525-549.
58 Braungart and Braungart, "The Life-Course Development 
of Left- and Right-Wing Youth Activist Leaders", pp. 278—  
280.
points to a number of failings, one of the the main ones 
being the failure to address both the specificity and the 
diversity of student activism. For example, studies using 
behavioural criteria often failed to recognise that an 
activist does not necessarily "hold the same views as all 
the other students active in the same cause at the same 
time",59 nor does he or she have the same motivational base 
and degree of commitment as his or her colleagues. There is 
a tendency to try and impose inappropriate categorisations 
like "right" and "left" and to ignore the significance of 
conflicting views over tactics. He also points to the way 
the social movement, at different stages in its lifecycle, 
draws on a quite different social base. Mankoff and Flacks, 
for example, have shown that first and second generation 
protestors are not the same, and that, as the movement 
grows, there is a widening of the social base and it is less 
easy to distinguish activists from their inactive 
counterparts.60 All of this points to the impossibility of 
arriving at a general picture of the political activist and 
to an increasing need for a sharp focus: what kind of
activist, what issue, in what kind of time and place? It is 
the qualitative studies that provide this focus.
For example, Coles's study of US civil rights activists 
does show that some of the above holds true at least for the
59 Kenneth Keniston, Youth and Dissent, p. xi.
60 Milton Mankoff and Richard Flacks, "The Changing 
Basis of The American Student Movement", Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 395 (May
1971), pp. 54— 67.
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three Black activists in his study. None come from overtly 
political families, but one gets a picture of all of them 
living out values learnt from their parents, particularly 
their mothers. Fred, for example, insisted on going to a 
white school. His father, who had struggled against the 
odds to create his own business, was against it. His mother 
”was on my side. . . .  My dad agreed with her underneath, he 
really did." Another's father "spoke of freedom. He would 
tell me that so long as we weren't on relief we were free.” 
Hard work, self respect and ethical standards were important 
in these families. Their children translated this into 
full-time struggle for emancipation.61
Andrews's study of lifetime English socialists whose 
politicisation mainly occurred in the 1930s found that her 
working class activists came from left wing or apolitical 
families, while the middle class ones were from politically 
liberal families. Apart from the two children whose parents 
were active socialists, it is again the transmission of 
values that seems important: Ed, for example, was raised in 
an environment in which the expression of deep commitment - 
of a totally unpolitical nature - was part of daily life. 
Frida's cultured, academic parents sheltered Jewish 
refugees.62
One of the fullest descriptions of activists'
61 Robert Coles, Children of Crisis: A Study of Courage 
and Fear (London: Faber, 1964), pp. 173— 238.
62 Andrews, Lifetimes of Commitment: Aging, Politics, 
Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
pp. 81— 82.
104
childhoods is Keniston's study of 'young radicals'. He 
notes that, while their experiences were enormously diverse, 
"what distinguished virtually all of them was a feeling, 
from an early age, of being somehow different, separate, 
apart and exceptional, a self characterisation which they 
viewed ambivalently".63 Frank and Nash also identified this 
sense of difference in the peace activists that they 
studied, the majority of whom felt their families were "not 
completely typical of the surrounding community".64 
Keniston sees this sense of alienness as partly a result of 
belonging to that different ethnic or ideological subculture 
identified by Flacks, and also because of early intellectual 
excellence which put them into an intellectual elite and 
gave them sociopolitical and moral precocity. The sense of 
difference did not isolate them. They were sociable, 
outgoing, popular children, frequently elected as form 
leaders and their memories were of happy childhoods. 
Adolescence was much more troubled, characterised by more 
marked periods of alienation, self conciousness and, in 
contrast to childhood, by feelings of loneliness and 
isolation. There were frequent conflicts with parents, 
particularly over the parents' perceived hypocrisy. Some 
made abortive suicide attempts ? others came close to 
despair. Yet, paradoxically, these feelings were coupled
63 Keniston, Youth and Dissent, p. 221.
64 Jerome D.Frank and Earl H. Nash, "Commitment to Peace 
Work: A Preliminary Study of Determinants and Sustainers of 
Behaviour Change", American Journal Of Orthopsychiatry, 35 
(1965) pp. 106— 119.
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with continued good functioning and outward success. These 
were resilient children marked by their psychological 
strength and ability to come through their difficulties.
What also comes across from Andrews and Keniston is 
that political awareness and activism of some kind begins 
early. In the families of political activists, like the 
Glaswegian Rose Kerrigan, the daughter of Jewish socialists, 
this could be overt, public, political action. Rose was 
campaigning for a rent strike at the age of twelve. 65 For 
most, however, it was engagement in discussions about 
politics at home and some form of social or local political 
engagement. Keniston's radicals, as pre-adolescents, stood 
up for bullied children or led opposition to school drills 
for protection against atomic attack, and frequently took 
and defended dissenting views.
These findings challenge Adelson's view that children's 
political ideas, in particular the "sense of community", 
only fully develop in late adolescence. He investigated 
this problem by presenting groups of children, with ages 
ranging from eleven to eighteen, with a series of political 
philosophical problems regarding the organisation and 
governance of a hypothetical community on an island. He 
concluded that "younger adolescents are usually insensitive 
to individual liberties and opt for authoritarian solutions 
to political problems - at the same time they are unable to 
achieve a differentiated view of the social order and thus 
cannot grasp the legitimate claims of the community upon the
65 Andrews, Lifetimes of Commitment, p. 80.
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citizen".66 Rose Kerrigan clearly had a sense of community 
from an early age and Keniston's activist youngsters had a 
coherent concept of individual rights.
One explanation for working class activists may well be 
that their moral and political precocity comes from the 
absence of an adolescence. All Andrews' working class 
activists were working by the age of 14, and most had been 
in some caring or supportive role to the rest of the family 
from a much younger age. Andrews herself argues that, while 
formative experiences occurred early, actual socialist 
consciousness came later. For the "young radicals", 
Keniston suggests that they came from a sub-culture 
encouraging moral and political precocity.
At whatever age political consciousness develops, the 
picture of these activists as children is of resilience, 
intellectual ability and basic psychological health. This 
stands in marked contrast to the childhoods of the activists 
described by Lasswell. These children are politically and 
morally precocious and seem to be particularly sensitive to, 
and have clear memories of, historical and political events. 
They later see these memories as crucial in influencing 
later behaviour. I will look at the significance of these 
findings in Chapter 6.
6) The cognitive and emotional approach. The next wave 
of interest in activism shifted the focus rather than
66 Joseph Adelson and Robert P. O'Neil, "Growth of 
Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community", 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4 (1966), pp. 
295— 306.
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sharpened it. The concern was no longer with explaining the 
emergence of a whole generation of activists but in trying 
to understand different responses to a particular issue: the 
"threat" of nuclear war. In fact, the literature on 
antinuclear activism in the 1980s should be seen in the 
context of what almost constitutes a new subdiscipline: 
nuclear psychology. (And some psychologists would see the 
generation of this research as their own form of political 
engagement with an issue.) Large numbers of studies have 
been done on subjects that range from the psychological 
factors contributing to the risk of accidental nuclear war 
to cross cultural comparisons of children's responses to the 
nuclear threat.
Although not directly concerned with activists, this 
last area produced some results that are indirectly 
pertinent to the issues raised above: that is, whether
protest is a form of pathology and deviance and what are its 
associations with self efficacy. For example, some work 
suggested that "nuclear anxiety" was positively associated 
with poor mental health, in particular drug use, depression 
and powerlessness, and inversely related to self esteem, 
perceived purpose in life and overall life satisfaction. 67 
The implication is that if worrying about the nuclear threat 
is conducive to poor mental health then acting on it is
67 M. D. Newcomb, "Nuclear Attitudes and Reactions: 
Associations with Depression, Drug Use and Quality of Life", 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50 (1986), pp. 
906— 920, guoted in Robert T. Schatz and Susan T. Fiske,
"International Reactions to the Threat of Nuclear War: The 
Rise and Fall of Concern in the Eighties", Political 





likely to be so as well. However, Newcomb's construct of 
"nuclear anxiety" has been criticised for including beliefs 
and attitudes as well as feelings, and for referring to a 
variety of nuclear issues.68 And a substantial amount of 
other work contradicts his findings. Goldberg and others 
found, in a survey of more than 2000 Canadian 7-to-12 year 
olds, that worrying frequently about nuclear war was
not associated with feelings of helplessness but, 
rather, with a greater sense of social efficacy 
and more involvement with personal job and career 
plans, while those who denied any fears on this 
subject were the most helpless and the least 
interested in planning their personal futures.69
These findings were confirmed by Solantaus in her study of 
2100 adolescents in Finland. She found that there was a 
positive relationship between anxiety about the nuclear 
threat and discussions about war and peace; and that those 
who were anxious and discussed the subject had a greater 
sense of self efficacy, that is they felt more confident of 
their ability to contribute to the prevention of war. Those 
with very high or very low levels of anxiety had a reduced 
sense of self efficacy. Both groups of authors stress that 
there is no way of assessing which factor comes first. The 
suggestion is that greater worry may lead to sharing the
68 Robert T. Schatz and Susan T. Fiske, "International 
Reactions to the Threat of Nuclear War: the Rise and Fall 
of Concern in the Eighties", Political Psychology, 13 
(1992), pp. 11— 29.
69 Susan Goldberg et al., "Thinking About the Threat of 
Nuclear War: Relevance to Mental Health", American Journal 
of Orthopsychiatry 55, 4 (October 1985), pp. 503-512.
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concern, and that engagement in a group results in the 
growth of knowledge, and a sense of support and empowerment. 
Alternatively, those feeling efficacious may have the means 
at their disposal to tolerate greater anxiety. More recent 
work by Boenkhe and others on German adolescents has 
confirmed the negative association between political anxiety 
and poor mental health. They have also shown that older 
children are better able to distinguish between political 
and personal anxieties. Political anxieties are positively 
related to active coping methods, such as active 
communication and political engagement, which in themselves 
may increase the amount of political anxiety. However, 
defensive coping methods are positively associated with both 
personal anxiety and psychiatric symptoms.70 The
implications of this work are that the mechanism of 
repression has another significance in the understanding of 
activism than that postulated by Lasswell. Firstly, it is 
those individuals who are least sensitive to political 
threats who have the greatest risk of psychopathology. 
Secondly, activists appear to have chosen the most 
psychically healthy coping mechanism. I shall come back to 
these issues in Chapter 8.
The literature dealing specifically with activists is 
primarily concerned with eliciting the cognitive and 
emotional profiles that distinguish activists from others. 
Two excellent reviews sum up the most consistently reported
70 Klaus Boehnke and others, "How West German 
Adolescents Experience the Nuclear Threat", Political 
Psychology 10, 3 (1989), pp. 419-443.
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findings: activists are more preoccupied with the nuclear 
issue, have "higher levels of worry and anxiety", a
"heightened sense of efficacy with regard to reducing the 
nuclear threat", and "believe that nuclear war is
preventable but not survivable". They also believe that
they have social support for their actions.71 Nuclear 
efficacy is associated with strong feelings of political 
efficacy in general72 and antinuclear activists are more 
likely to have been active on other political issues.73 In 
addition, they believe that events in life can be personally 
controlled rather than that they are subject to external 
forces. Tyler and Mcgraw also found that a feeling of moral 
responsibility to prevent war was strongly and independently 
associated with activism.74
Yet the same criticism can be made of this approach as 
that based on personality traits. It is descriptive and 
correlational and, although most authors are careful to 
disclaim any attempt to establish causal relationships, the 
literature is scattered with deceptive terms such as 
"antecedents", "determinants" and "predictors", all of which
71 Schatz and Fiske, "International Reactions", pp. 19-
-20.
72 Susan T. Fiske, "People's Reactions to Nuclear War: 
Implications for Psychologists", American Psychologist 42 
(March 1987), pp. 207— 217.
73 P. Milburn and M. Watanabe, "Activism Against 
Armageddon: Some Predictors of Nuclear-Related Behaviour", 
Political Psychology 9, 3 (1988), pp. 459— 470.
74 Tom R. Tyler and Kathleen M. Mcgraw, "The Threat of 
Nuclear War: Risk Interpretation and Behavioural Response", 
Journal of Social Issues 39, 1 (1983), pp. 25-40.
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imply that the possession of these beliefs and feelings is 
likely to incline people towards activism. Thus, for 
example, a study by Fiske asked a random sample of telephone 
subscribers questions to determine the concreteness of their 
images of nuclear war, and questions about their degree of 
engagement in anti-nuclear activity.75 The results showed 
that activism was significantly related to the concreteness 
of peoples images about nuclear war. She then claimed that 
"concrete images may catalyse action" but did not examine 
the reverse possibility that activism increases peoples 
concrete images.
Tyler and Mcgraw's study shows that anti-nuclear 
activism can be clearly distinguished from another active 
response to the nuclear threat: that of survivalists, who 
train and prepare to survive the aftermath of a nuclear war, 
and who see nuclear war as survivable but not preventable. 
Survivalists have less feeling of efficacy, less sense of 
internal control or moral responsibility for prevention of 
nuclear war. However, the study drew its sample from 
already established anti-nuclear and survivalist groups and, 
while it highlighted interesting differences, again it is 
impossible to judge the extent to which current forms of 
engagement determined these beliefs.
There have been some attempts to overcome this problem 
experimentally by, for example, manipulating the salience of 
an issue and then measuring its impact on behavioural 
intention and actual action, in this case petition signing.
75 Susan T. Fiske, "People's Reactions to Nuclear War".
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It was found that increased salience did increase both 
intentions and action, and that gender, pro-disarmament 
attitudes and nuclear efficacy were strong predictors of the 
action. However while the experiment showed that increasing 
salience increased the tendency to perform a single action, 
it could not demonstrate a causal relationship with activism 
in general.76
The main problem appears to be that, while there was 
much speculation, little empirical work was done to 
investigate the actual sources of the feelings and beliefs 
under study. There was research on the impact of the film 
The Day After. This was a TV film depicting the effects of 
a nuclear war on a small American town. In keeping with 
already established work on the low impact of the media on 
people's beliefs, the research showed that the film neither 
shifted beliefs on the issue nor galvanised people into 
action: rather, it confirmed existing tendencies.77 Other 
research regarding parental socialisation, by Hamilton and 
others, showed that, firstly, the issue of nuclear war was 
rarely discussed in families 78 and, secondly, while
76 D. L. Fox and J. Schofield, "Issue Salience, 
Perceived Efficacy, and Perceived Risk: An Experimental 
Study of the Origins of Anti-Nuclear War Activity", Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology 19 (1989), pp. 805— 827.
77 Susan T. Fiske, "People's Reactions to Nuclear War",
p. 211.
78 S. B. Hamilton, T. A. Knox, and W. G. Keilin, "The 
Nuclear Family: Correspondence in Cognitive and Affective 
Reactions to the Threat of Nuclear War Amongst Older 
Adolescents and Their Parents", Journal of Youth and 
Adolescence 15 (1986), pp. 133— 145, cited by Susan T. 
Fiske, "People's Reactions to Nuclear War: Implications for 
Psychologists", American Psychologist 42 (March 1987).
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students perceived themselves as having the same beliefs as 
their parents, very often the beliefs did not actually 
coincide.79 However, to my knowledge, no biographical or 
longitudinal work has been done into how the feelings and 
beliefs associated with anti-nuclear activism arose and 
developed over time. Once again process is left out of the 
picture.
It is possible, on the basis of this overview, to make 
some very general points: that movements cannot be
understood simply in terms of the structural conditions from 
which they emerge, or in terms of the resources available? 
that individuals engaged in democratic collective action are 
neither marginal nor deviant; and that the saliency of an 
issue and feelings of personal and political efficacy are 
significantly associated with political engagement. That 
one cannot say more on the basis of more than half a century 
of research raises the question of whether it is wrong to 
try and obtain a global picture. It is certainly not 
profitable to pursue a reductionist approach that searches 
for a causal relationship between engagement and one set of 
social or psychological parameters. My own view is that the 
above demonstrates a clear need, firstly, to acknowledge and 
then investigate the complexity, diversity and specificity 
of social movements; secondly, to acknowledge that their
79 S. B. Hamilton, T. A. Knox , W. G. Keilin, and E.
L. Chavez, "In the Eye of the Beholder: Accounting for 
Variability in Cognitive/Effective Responses to the Threat 
of Nuclear War, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 17 
(1987), pp. 927— 952, cited by Susan T. Fiske, "People's 
Reactions to Nuclear War: Implications for Psychologists", 
American Psychologist 42 (March 1987).
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emergence is a dynamic and interactive process; which means 
that, thirdly, there is a value in examining the specific 
process of individual engagement in a specific form of 
collective action. This is the aim of my own research.
The Synthetic Approach
There are two significant studies that, from slightly 
differing perspectives, have taken what I would call a 
synthetic and dynamic approach and have tried to resolve 
some of the problems raised above.
Melucci is responsible for introducing the concept of 
"New Social Movements". He identified the way that 
political reductionism in particular, with its focus on 
public data sources and collectable and analysable facts and 
events, ignores the multidimensional, composite and plural 
character of collective action, much of which occurs outside 
the public domain. Melucci introduced the formulation of 
New Social Movements to embrace this plurality. In doing so 
he stresses that he is not describing a break with the past 
but is trying to identify those novel characteristics of 
movements, such as the ethno-national mobilisations, womens, 
peace, and environmental movements, that defy both 
description and explanation by the traditional approaches.*0
Melucci identifies a number of key features. Firstly, 
the movements are both prepolitical - using informal
80 A. Melucci, Nomads of the Present,
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networks and reticular and segmented organisational forms - 
and metapolitical in that they "publicise the existence of 
basic dilemmas that cannot be resolved by means of political 
decisions. For example: we cannot eliminate our knowledge 
about nuclear energy, and the problems it poses can never be 
completely resolved by the political acts of negotiation and 
administrative control.1,81
Secondly, the movements are more concerned with 
information and struggles over symbolic resources than with 
the production and distribution of material goods and 
resources. Thirdly, "parts of the movements invest much 
time and energy in constructing forms of organisation which 
are not considered instrumental for the achievement of 
social and political goals, but viewed primarily as a way of 
experiencing collective action in itself." That is, means 
become an end in themselves. This is particularly evident 
in the lifestyle concerns and non-violent actions of the 
peace movement. "Participants . . . act in the present 
tense. They are not driven by grandiose visions of the 
future; their organisations are not vehicles for the 
implementation of such visions. Rather those who 
participate . . . view their participation as an end in
itself." Fourthly, they "integrate latent and visible 
dimensions of collective action . . . there is a
complementarity between private life . . . and publicly
expressed commitment. . . . One does not live to be a
militant. Instead one lives and that is why from time to
81 Ibid., pp. 222— 223.
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time one can be a militant." Finally, there is a "planetary 
consciousness", a new awareness of "the global dimensions of 
complex societies.1,82 He makes other important points: that 
a great deal of movement activity goes on in the invisible 
and submerged networks of everyday life, and that the public 
mass mobilisations are only one aspect of movement life. 
And that involvement in collective action is disruptive, 
disorienting, temporary and highly fragile.
I list them in some detail not because I wish to engage 
in the debate over whether New Social Movements are new or 
not, but because all of these features are evident in the 
movements in my own study. In fact, what Melucci is 
describing is the emergence of what I would call a "politics 
of connection". I define this in greater detail when I 
examine my own groups in Chapter 5. This helps to explain 
why traditional explanations of mobilisation are 
insufficient. Interestingly, Melucci identifies these 
features as "novel structural characteristics". One could 
as easily identify them as new manifestations of individual 
belief and behaviour, which again defy the traditional 
sociopsychological explanations provided above.
Melucci is both a sociologist and an analytically 
trained psychologist, so this synthesis is perhaps not 
surprising; nor is the fact that he challenges "the 
dualistic thinking" that "emphasises either the objective or 
subjective dimensions of social life".83 An approach to
82 Ibid., pp. 204— 206.
83 Ibid., p. 197.
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collective action based on the
common structural conditions of collective actors 
assumes their capacity to perceive, evaluate, and 
decide what they have in common. It ignores, in 
other words, the very processes that enable or 
inhibit actors to define circumstances of common 
action. Individual differences and motivations, 
however, cannot explain how certain 
individuals come to recognise themselves in a more 
or less shared sense of 'we'.84
Meanwhile the pathological approach ignores the
constructive and creative dimensions of collective 
action. . . . People do not act in a void. They 
are always emeshed in relations with other actors 
and through this interaction they produce 
meanings, express their needs and activate their 
relationships. Collective action is never a 
purely irrational phenomenon. It is always to a 
degree socially constructed and meaningful to its 
participants.85
Melucci's main point is that both collective actors and 
their opponents overemphasise the "unity” of the action. 
The actors emphasise the "highest meaning", claiming a unity 
they rarely achieve, while the opponents stress the lowest, 
dismissing it all as pathological. In fact "whatever unity 
does exist should be considered as the result, not the 
starting point, a fact to be explained rather than 
assumed."86 This assumption of unity prevents one 
addressing three crucial questions: through which processes 
do actors construct collective action? How is the unity of 
the various elements produced? And through which processes
84 Ibid., p. 20.
85 Ibid., p. 191.
86 Ibid., p. 26.
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and relationships do individuals become involved in and 
defect from collective action?
Melucci was concerned with process. However, I would 
argue that it is the process of group maintenance rather 
than formation which is his object of study. Melucci starts 
with already established groups from the youth and women's 
movements in the Milan area, and, throughout his research, 
is concerned with group behaviour. What was being observed 
was the renegotiation and discussion of relationships and 
meanings among those already in relationship. What was not 
examined was how individuals came to be there. The third 
question in the triad - how do individuals get engaged? - 
remains unanswered.
Melucci's work incorporates insights and methodologies 
from social psychology, but he is primarily interested in 
the collective. Andrews, by contrast in Lifetimes of 
Commitment, has focussed on the development of individual 
political commitment.87 Andrews interviewed in depth 
fifteen British socialists between the ages of seventy and 
ninety and used these life histories to explore the nature 
of sustained political commitment in those working for 
social change. Her study is a major challenge to the 
received wisdom on the relationship between ageing and 
activism, which is that commitment to political causes 
declines with time. The study also challenges some of the 
established theories of lifespan development, namely,that 
old age is a period of withdrawal and disengagement from
87 Andrews, Lifetimes of Commitment.
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worldly concerns. The significance of her research to my 
own work is that, having made a similar critique to my own 
of the ahistoric and apolitical quality of much 
psychological research into political activism, she argues 
that both the emergence of commitment and its sustainability 
over a lifetime can only be understood by paying attention 
to both the individual and the historical context. Her 
choice of a qualitative methodology is an attempt to do 
this.
Andrews bridges the gap between the social and the 
psychological by using social identity theory, drawing on 
Tajfel's definitions of "social categorisation” as "the 
ordering of the social environment in terms of groupings of 
persons in a manner which makes sense to the individual. It 
helps to structure the causal understanding of the social 
environment and thus it helps as a guide for action."88 She 
also draws on his definition of social identity as "that 
part of an individual's self concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) 
together with the value and emotional significance attached 
to that membership." Andrews extends the concept, 
emphasising the importance of differentiating between 
voluntary - such as political groups - and involuntary group 
membership - such as gender or race - and the fact that
88 Henri Tajfel, "Interindividual Behaviour and 
Intergroup Behaviour", in Differentiation Between Social 
Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup 
Relations, ed. H. Tajfel (London: Academic Press, 1978), 
cited by Molly Andrews, Lifetimes of Commitment: Aging, 
Politics, Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), p. 26.
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group memberships through a lifetime are multiple, shifting 
and complex, and that people cannot be reduced to single 
categories or even series of categories.
The main thrust of Andrews's work is to show how 
political, in this case socialist, consciousness emerges 
from a growing sense of identity within a group, in this 
case a class; and that subsequent understanding and analysis 
of the role of that group - as oppressed working class or 
oppressive middle class - results in the desire to act and 
change the structure that produces oppression and 
exploitation.
For her activists the process of radicalisation, that 
is the "transformation of lived experience" into "political 
consciousness", depended on three influences: "identifiable 
individuals"? "intellectual stimulants"? and "the role of 
highly visible organisations".89 Her respondents were 
impressionable young adults during what she describes as 
"the political turmoil" of the interwar years. Thus these 
influences took a particular form: radical street speakers, 
the Left Book Club, the Communist Party of Great Britain, 
and the National Unemployed Workers Movement, for example. 
It is this intersection of their direct or indirect personal 
experiences - of unemployment and poverty - and of the 
historical context of events such as the miners' strike, the 
hunger marches and the Spanish Civil war, with an easily 
available analysis of that context, that she sees as crucial 
in catalysing commitment.
89 Andrews, Lifetimes, p. 63.
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Andrews distinguishes working class from middle class 
activists, seeing direct experience as playing a more 
central role in radicalising the former, while, for middle 
class activists "radicalisation meant applying intellectual, 
abstract concepts to situations which did not directly 
impinge upon their own circumstances.”90 Class awareness 
itself was a less significant catalyst for this group. 
International concerns and previous religious commitment 
played a larger role.
Although Andrews's main interest is with the nature of 
political commitment and how it is sustained, the 
significance of her work for my own is that she does examine 
the initial process of engagement. In addition, she has 
focussed on a particular type of activist over a particular 
period and makes no claim for the generalisability of her 
findings. What her work does is challenge both the 
psychopathological and the purely structural explanations of 
activism by examining the diverse responses of a group of 
individuals to the real historical and political problems of 
their generation. Moreover, although her work is guided by 
social identity theory, she tacitly acknowledges the 
importance of aspects of a lifecycle approach. Erikson's 
idea - that it is the juxtaposition of critical periods in 
lifespan development with key historical moments which is 
significant - is born out by the fact that the political 
orientation chosen by Andrews's respondents during the 
tumultuous events of young adulthood endures for a lifetime.
90 Ibid., p. 132.
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However, there is a troubling undertone to the book 
that seems to suggest that the only worthwhile form of 
activist commitment is radicalisation through the awakening 
of "socialist conciousness". All of these terms are elided 
and at no point is the term "socialism" clearly defined. 
Rather, Andrews moves between her own, often didactic, 
statements about the responsibilities of socialists - for 
example: "a middle class socialist need not deny or feel 
guilty about her class background. She should, rather, 
acknowledge, accept, and even use it to further the cause 
she believes in"91 - and the varied and conflictive
statements about what socialism means to her respondents. 
This highlights the complexity and diversity underlying even 
those beliefs that share a common label, and emphasises the 
need for even greater in-depth understanding of the 
individual.
My own study draws on both the methodology and many of 
the insights gained from Andrews work. I will return to 
some of them - the role of triggering events, the nature of 
responsibility, the role of empathy, and perceptions of a 
connected self - in later chapters, and compare her findings 
with my own. I also hope that my quite different and more 
time-limited focus - on engagement with the concrete issues 
of peace and human rights in the context of specific 
collective actions, and on a particular method of action 
(non-violence), rather than on a broadly defined ideology 
over an entire lifetime - has allowed a more detailed
91 Ibid., p. 134.
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exploration of some of those aspects of individual 
psychology ignored by Andrews's study.
Part 2: Choosing Non-violence
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At the outset I stated that my concern was with the process 
of engagement in non-violent collective action. This focus 
is important because methods of action, particularly the 
choice between violent and non-violent methods, have 
received very little examination of any kind in attempts to 
understand activism. As illustrated above, generalisations 
about activists using violence are assumed to apply to non­
violence as well.92 Alternatively, single acts like 
petition signing are used to indicate activist tendencies as 
a whole. Yet the decision whether to act encompasses at its 
heart the decision on how to act: the attractiveness and
availability of different methods can have a determining 
effect on whether action takes place at all. For instance, 
the rapid transformations that occurred in Eastern Europe in 
1989 demonstrated the power that televised examples of 
effective non-violent action, transmitted from one country 
to another, had in mobilising millions. Thus, any attempt 
to understand the process of engagement needs to examine the 
method of acting and how the choice to act in a particular 
way came to be made.
It is through focussing on method that one becomes 
aware of the degree to which choosing to act is a moral as 
well as a political choice. Melucci points out that New 
Social Movements are often characterised by having methods
92 See W. Korahauser, The Politics of Mass Society 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960); and Ted Gurr, Why 
Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
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that are goals in themselves and thus reflect and express 
the values of the group. So an examination of method 
perforce necessitates an examination of values, of the moral 
orientation of the actor, and of how this orientation 
emerges. I should make clear that I am using "moral” in the 
same way as the philosopher Midgeley. Midgely defines moral 
choice not simply as the "good" choice but as the overall 
system of values that guides us when we prioritise.93
Provided we are talking practically - talking 
about what people choose to do, think and be, not 
just about what happens to them - any choice of 
central purpose is a moral choice because it 
involves what anyone will call moral thinking.
. . . The moral point of view is the one where we 
consider priorities, where we ask "what are the 
most serious, the central things in life?"
This process of prioritising is also a way of expressing how 
activists perceive themselves. Andrews states that "it is 
through the process of prioritising commitments that 
individuals make essential statements to themselves and to 
the social world of whom they perceive themselves to be."94 
She argues that, for her respondents, choosing to act on a 
radical analysis of lived experience - that is, both 
defining oneself as a socialist and then following this with 
appropriate action, such as organising, fighting in Spain or 
working against poverty - is a form of prioritising that 
results in activism becoming "the most fundamental and
93 Mary Midgeley, Heart and Mind: The Varieties of 
Moral Experience (New York: St Martins Press, 1991), p. 126.
94 Andrews, Lifetimes of Commitment, p. 147.
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enduring aspect of respondents' self definition”. It 
follows that the particular choice of non-violence is likely 
to be connected to both the activist's moral orientation and 
to her sense of self; and that any attempt to understand the 
process of engagement needs to explore these relationships.
There is little exploration of these particular 
relationships in the literature. However there are specific 
areas of literature that provide some pertinent information. 
These are:
1) Political science literature, which looks at non­
violence as a method.
2) Feminist studies, which looks at the relationship 
between gender and the choice of non-violence.
3)Studies of the relationship between moral judgement 
and activism.
4) Studies on the relationship between moral 
orientation and sense of self, which hint at but do not 
explore the relationship with political non-violence.
5) The literature on empathy. This is important for 
three reasons: because of the negative correlation between 
empathy and aggression; because the development of empathy 
appears to be fostered by similar socialisation processes to 
those that foster student activism; and because of the 
suggested correlation between empathy and pro-social 
behaviour, which for some writers includes non-violence.
6) Autobiographical and biographical studies of non­
violent activists, These may show whether or not the 
activists' experience provides evidence for any of the
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points made above.
1. Political Science Literature
The main political theorist in the field, Gene Sharp, has - 
using numerous historical examples - produced an 
encyclopaedic documentation of the methods and dynamics of 
non-violent collective action.95 Sharp does not examine 
individual motivations for action, but, on the basis of his 
historical research, he does identify the qualities he 
believes individuals should have in order to act 
effectively. These are: the ability to deal with fear; self 
esteem, that is, a belief in one's own capacity to act; and 
resilience and autonomy, particularly in the initiators of 
actions. He suggests that engagement in non-violent 
collective action not only requires such qualities, it can 
produce them, as well as decreasing submissiveness and 
aggression, and increasing creativity, responsibility and 
group cooperation. The effects of such changes are also 
felt outside the context of the action.
The other theme running through all of Sharp's work is 
that non-violence is a practical technique that can be, and 
usually has been, adopted by those with no particular 
philosophical interest in it but who regard it as the most 
appropriate tactic at the time. Yet participants may also
95 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action 
(Boston: Extending Horizon Books, 1973).
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find that, while the method may have been adopted for 
tactical reasons in a crisis, with use they shift from a 
pragmatic approach to non-violence to a growing commitment 
to the philosophy.
Sharp believes that, to be fully effective, the choice 
of political non-violence necessarily entails collective 
action. This is because he sees its effectiveness as 
depending on an analysis of power similar to Arendt's. She 
defines power as "the human ability . . .  to act in concert. 
Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to 
a group and remains in existence only so long as the group 
keeps together." Whereas violence "is distinguished by its 
instrumental character." Thus "the extreme form of power is 
All against One, the extreme form of violence is One against 
All. And this latter is never possible without 
instruments."96 One of the implications of this view is 
that for non-violence to have its maximum effect it needs to 
be a collective act. This illustrates how important 
understanding the choice of method can be to understanding 
process: the individual committed to political non-violence 
is likely to look for or initiate a collective in which to 
act.
Solomon and Fishman analysed the choice of non-violence 
in student civil rights activists and showed how, in one 
group, there were multiple motivations, ranging from those 
who had made a pragmatic choice, to others for whom it was
96 Hannah Arendt, Crises of The Republic (London: 
Harvest/HBJ, 1969), pp. 141— 145.
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rooted in religious and moral values. They suggested that 
non-violence was a development of a tradition of passive 
aggression in American Blacks, which had been the only 
possible form of resistance to oppression in the past. 
Given the dangers of retaliation, non-violent action was a 
way of transforming aggression while minimising retaliation. 
They also found that using non-violence appears to increase 
self esteem and sometimes to produce feelings of moral 
superiority.97 The important points that can be drawn from 
Solomon and Fishman are that, while motivations for non­
violence may be multiple, there is a dynamic and 
transformative relationship between the use of non-violence 
and sense of self.
2. Feminist Studies
In both the personal and public writings of women one can 
distinguish two overlapping approaches to two overlapping 
questions: why do women appear to be more non-violent than 
men? And why do they often choose non-violence for 
collective political action? One is the "separate spheres" 
approach, which argues that women's non-violence is rooted 
in biology. The suggestion is that the act of giving birth 
in itself predisposes women to adopt a nurturing and caring 
concern for the world. Many feminists find such a position
97 Frederic Solomon and Jacob R. Fishman, "The 
Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights 
Activities", Psychiatry 25 (1964), pp. 227— 236.
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problematic. For one thing it is only too easy to point to 
women involved in armed struggles, and in control of armies, 
all over the world. Secondly, this approach appears to 
reinforce women's subjugated position in a gender hierarchy, 
where roles are clearly divided.
A modern restatement of these ideas comes from the 
philosopher Ruddick in her book Maternal Thinking. She 
argues that it is specifically the practise of mothering, 
which can be undertaken by either sex, that is related to 
non-violence. She argues that maternal practise should be 
distinguished from other kinds of care activities, in that 
it entails a response to the specific demands from a child 
for "preservation, growth and social acceptability".98 
This generates a particular kind of thinking that "contrasts 
as a whole with military thinking" while political non­
violence is a "natural extension" of maternal practise.99 
Thus "to get their way mothers engage in non-violent 
techniques that are familiar from more public struggles: 
prayer, persuasion, appeasement, self-suffering, 
negotiation, bribery." Non-violence is adopted from a 
position of weakness, because of women's social 
powerlessness, and from a position of strength and 
restraint, because they have enormous power to damage their 
children if they wish.100
98 Sarah Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics 
of Peace (London: The Women's Press, 1989), p. 17.
99 Ibid., p. 150.
100 Ibid., p. 157.
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The four ideals of non-violence - renunciation, 
resistance, reconciliation, and peacekeeping - 
govern only some maternal practises of some 
mothers [but they also] describe, from a 
particular perspective, maternal practise itself.
. They not only modify aggresion in the 
interests of connection but develop connections 
that limit aggression before it arises.101
She argues that these approaches have a political and 
public potential that is already visible in some political 
actions, such as the activities of the Mothers of the 
Disappeared in Latin America. She does not argue that 
mothers are intrinsically peaceful nor does she deny the 
existence of maternal violence. Nor does she suggest that 
maternal thinking is the only source of political non­
violence. What she is identifying is a potential.
Another approach to gender and non-violence sees the 
choice of non-violence as arising from women's exclusion 
from public space as a result of the "patriarchal 
organisation” of society, that is, a society where social 
roles are defined by a gender hierarchy. It is because of 
their role as outsiders, rather than because of their 
biology, that women can see the damage done by militarism. 
This argument was most powerfully articulated by Virginia 
Woolf. She argues that the institutionalisation of the "sex 
gender system" bred in women submission and in men the 
belief that they had the right to dominate. The way out of 
this was not for women to enter the system but to refuse to 
be coopted and to invent different methods of action - such
101 Ibid., pp. 176, 182.
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as non-violence.102
Contemporary women and feminists draw on both these 
strands of thinking, and sometimes a combination of both, 
when explaining why they have engaged in non-violence. For 
example, Tamara Swade, explaining how she created a peace 
group for mothers, says her concern about nuclear weapons 
grew out of the birth of her child, its vulnerability and 
her own responsibility for its survival and "the same 
feeling now extends to all children.1,103 In contrast, a 
British feminist anti-nuclear group called WONT [Women 
Oppose the Nuclear Threat] called for women's "resistance to 
our assigned role" and the need for a "different 
consciousness." This is possible because "women have less 
vested interests in the present system, and are more easily 
able to critiscise it."104 It will be seen that some of the 
women in my study also draw on variations and combinations 
of these two positions to help explain their non-violence.
102 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (London: Penguin, 
1977).
103 Tamara Swade, "Babies Against The Bomb", in Keeping 
the Peace, ed. Lynne Jones (London: The Womens Press, 
1983), p. 65.
104 Nottingham WONT, "Working as a Group: Nottingham 
Women Oppose the Nuclear Threat", in Keeping the Peace, ed. 
Lynne Jones (London: The Women's Press, 1983), p. 28.
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3. The Relationship Between Moral Judgement and Activism
Much of the work that has looked at the connection between 
activism and moral orientation was done within the framework 
of Kohlberg's theory on the development of moral judgement. 
This theory is worth reviewing here because, firstly, it 
provides one explanation of how different patterns of 
socialisation in childhood can contribute to the emergence 
of activism. Secondly, it provides evidence for Kohlberg's 
and others' theories of how action arises from moral 
judgement. These theories posit a cognitive model and I 
shall explore its validity for my own data in Chapter 7.
Through longitudinal study Kohlberg examined the 
responses of children, as they grew into adults, to 
hypothetical moral dilemmas. On the basis of their 
responses he postulated that moral judgement develops in 
stages as the child develops cognitively. At stage one "the 
physical consequences of action determine its goodness or 
badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these 
consequences." At stage two, right action is what 
”instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally 
the needs of others". These, with their emphasis on 
punishment and reward, are regarded as pre-conventional 
stages. Conventional reasoning emphasises conformity and 
the active maintenance of social norms. Thus, at stage 
three, the main concern is to be perceived as doing good or 
well according to stereotypical norms of behaviour. Stage 
four reasoners have a greater concern with law and order and
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fixed rules. Post-conventional reasoners exemplify moral 
maturity. Individuals at stages five and six - which 
Kohlberg later condensed - use autonomous and principled 
reasoning. That is, they are now aware of abstract
principles independent of their own needs and conventions. 
So "right is defined in accord with self chosen ethical 
principles." These are universal principles of justice, 
reciprocity, equality, and respect for the dignity and
rights of all human beings.105 Moral development is
therefore seen as progress towards a greater capacity for 
abstraction, less self-interest and concern with conformity, 
and an increasing capacity to take the role of the other. 
Kohlberg argues that this pattern of development is an 
invariant universal sequence, although adults may
"stabilise" at earlier stages than five. For example "stage 
three personal concordance morality is a functional morality 
for housewives and mothers; it is not for businessmen and 
professionals.1,106
One of the most significant attempts to relate moral 
judgement to political activism is Haan, Smith and Block's 
study of college students and Peace Corps volunteers in 
California at the time of the Berkeley Free Speech (FSM) 
movement.107 In particular they looked at the extent to
105 L. Kohlberg and R. Kramer, "Continuities and 
Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development", 
Human Development 12 (1969), pp. 93— 120.
106 Ibid., p. 108.
107 Norma Haan, M. Brewster Smith, and Jeanne H. Block, 
"Moral Reasoning of Young Adults: Political-Social 
Behaviour, Family Backgrounds, and Personality Correlates",
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which individuals actively engaged in a well publicised "sit 
in". They found that principled moral reasoners, as 
contrasted with the conventionally moral, were more active 
in political-social matters, particularly in protest; their 
views on current issues were more discrepant from their 
parents', who were themselves politically liberal; their 
self- and ideal conceptualizations emphasised interpersonal 
reactivity and obligation, self-expressiveness and a 
willingness to live in opposition.
By contrast, conventional reasoners were less active, 
valued ambition and competition as opposed to interpersonal 
responsiveness, and had more harmonious relationships with 
parents, who favoured a rule based non-permissive 
upbringing. Stage two reasoners were strong supporters of 
radical ideology. Men were more likely to be active but, in 
contrast to principled reasoners, saw self-enhancement as 
more important than reciprocal obligation.
The study shows a strong relationship between the way 
conflict is handled in the family and moral stage, which 
suggests that moderate open conflict during upbringing is 
one of the factors enhancing moral development and thus the 
likelihood of activism. It also shows that "a variety of 
moral reasons can lead to the same behaviour".108 Some 
conventional reasoners did join the "sit in", arguing that 
the authorities had failed to function as good authorities,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 10 (1968), pp. 
183— 201.
108 Ibid., p. 198.
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while principled reaoners acted out of a concern for civil 
rights.
The significance of this study for my own work is that 
it suggests that it is at least in part through the impact 
on moral judgement that upbringing and personality 
contributes to activism. Thus it helps to explain the 
relationship between family conflict, family values and 
activism posited by the socialisation literature reviewed 
above.
A number of other studies reviewed by Haste appear to 
bear out the finding that "post conventional reasoners are 
more engaged in action in general", and that most stage four 
reasoners reject direct action. However, she points out the 
wide definition of activism.109 And while many distinguish 
between community action and political action, which is for 
the most part non-violent, such correlational studies cannot 
fully explore the nature of the connection between moral 
judgement and action, the way the choice of action was made, 
or the interaction between engagement and values. That such 
an interaction exists is shown by Haan/s finding from the 
FSM studies that, for a majority, active engagement in civil 
disobedience produces a different stage of moral reasoning 
than that elicited by a hypothetical dilemma. For post- 
conventional reasoners this different stage is higher, 
suggesting that participation in real life moral action
109 Helen Weinreich-Haste, "Kohlberg's Contribution to 
Political Psychology: A Positive View", in Lawrence 
Kohlberg, Consensus and Controversy, ed. S. Mogdil and C. 
Mogdil (Philadelphia: Falmer Press, 1986), p. 343.
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encourages moral development.110
Kohlberg suggests that the mediating factor between 
moral judgement and action is responsibility defined as ”a 
concern for and acceptance of, the consequences of one's 
actions", and as a desire for "consistency between what one 
says one should or would do and what one actually does."111 
Put simply, moral judgement necessitates a cognitive process 
in which a problem is first defined, then a judgement is 
made as to what is the right action, followed by a judgement 
of the degree to which one is personally responsible for 
acting in a manner consistent with the choice made. Drawing 
on experimental evidence from his own and others' work, 
Kohlberg argues that the sense of personal responsibility 
increases with each moral stage and it is this that accounts 
for the increasing activism of higher stage activists. He 
also shows how this model can be used to interpret real life 
action: for example Michael Bernhardt, the single soldier to 
refuse to shoot in the My Lai massacre, was at the highest 
moral stage. He decided that, in contrast to his "lower 
stage" buddies, he had personal responsibility for his 
actions and that this could not be handed over to others, 
stating "the first step to actually doing right" is to see 
"that something is right. . . .  If I think about it long
110 Norma Haan, "Hypothetical and Actual Moral Reasoning 
in a Situation of Civil Disobedience", Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 32 (1975), pp. 255— 270.
111 Lawrence Kohlberg and Daniel Candee, "The 
Relationship of Moral Judgement to Moral Action", in 
Morality, Moral Behaviour and Moral Development, ed. W. M. 
Kurtines and J. L. Gerwitz (New York: Wiley, 1984), p. 519.
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enough I am just positively compelled.1,112 The My Lai 
situation also demonstrates the way that responsibility 
judgements are themselves affected by situational features 
such as group norms, or the number of people present. 
Kohlberg's point is that the higher the stage the greater 
the capacity for autonomous decision-making and the less 
tendency there is to diffuse responsibility to others.
Blasi's understanding of the relationship between moral 
judgement and action is a variant of this model. He accepts 
the role of responsibility in mediating judgement and 
action, but he sees action arising from a desire to be 
consistent not only with a particular judgement but more 
fundamentally with oneself as a moral being.
Moral identity is connected to action through 
responsibility and integrity. . . . Moral action 
is an extension of the self into the realm of the 
possible, of what is not but needs to be, if the 
agent is to remain true to himself or herself. 
Responsibility in this sense stresses the self as 
a source of 'moral compulsion'. Integrity 
emphasises the idea of moral self-consistency, 
intactness and wholeness.113
What he is saying is that one acts in order to maintain a 
consistent sense of oneself as a person. Action, thus, 
partly depends on the degree to which we are disturbed by 
inconsistency. He suggest that those with defensive
112 Ibid., p. 571.
113 Augusto Blasi, "Moral identity: Its Role in Moral 
Functioning", in Morality, Moral Behaviour and Moral 
Development, ed. W. M. Kurtines and J. L. Gerwitz (New 
York: Wiley, 1984), p. 132.
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pyschological styles that tend to avoid and suppress 
conflict will be less disturbed and therefore less activated 
by inconsistency than those with a more open, organised, 
coping response. He emphasises that moral identity is 
constructed through moral reasoning, which leads to the 
construction and internalisation of a moral self, rather 
than the other way round. There is support for this theory 
in Colby and Damon's study of moral exemplars, that is, 
individuals who have acted with extraordinary moral courage 
and commitment in their lives. The authors found that what 
appeared to distinguish these individuals from others was 
the degree to which they personally identified with their 
moral beliefs. There was a "uniting of self and morality". 
They defined themselves in terms of their moral goals and 
thus felt a greater sense of responsibility to act when a 
moral judgement was made.114
The main characteristic of these models is that action 
results primarily from how one thinks about a situation. 
Kohlberg allows for ego variables such as IQ and attention 
span to modulate one's perceptions of responsibility, and 
Haan suggest that non-cognitive variables, such as the 
degree to which one is group affiliative, may distinguish 
between active and inactive post conventional reasoners. 
Yet, while Blasi's concept of self consistency is to some 
degree dependent on one's affective state, by and large the 
emotions are not given a very significant role in
114 Anne Colby and William Damon, Some Do Care: 
Contemporary Lives of Moral Commitment (New York: The Free 
Press, 1992).
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instigating action. Yet Andrews's activists, who bear out 
the importance of self consistency, see their responsiveness 
as arising from both feeling and intellect, and much of the 
literature seems to suggest that the primary response to an 
event calling for action is emotional. I shall deal at 
greater length with the role of affect in arousing action in 
Chapter 7.
A more fundamental problem lies with the acceptance of 
Kohlberg's model of the development of moral reasoning. 
Firstly, the assumption that individuals universally 
progress towards a clearer conceptualisation of the inherent 
moral worth of liberal democratic values has been widely 
challenged.115 In particular, the assumption that 
individual liberties are of superior moral worth to the 
needs of the group is by no means universal. Secondly, even 
within Western culture the ideological bias of the stages is 
such that, repeatedly, more conservative thinkers produce 
stage four thinking and liberal leftists produce stage 
five.116 This could mean that liberals are necessarily more 
morally mature than conservatives or, as other evidence 
suggests, that liberals endorse the beliefs they perceive as 
the closest match to their morality. But there is the 
possibility that it is political ideology, rather than moral 
stage, that is being measured.
115 Weinreich-Haste, "Kohlberg's Contribution", pp. 339-
-340.
116 Ibid., p. 344.
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4. Studies of the Relationship Between 
Moral Orientation and Sense of Self
One of the most important challenges to Kohlberg's 
perspective comes from Gilligan and her colleagues. This 
body of work is particularly significant for my own because 
it shows that there is more than one moral orientation, that 
different moral orientations appear to be related to 
different perceptions of the self and different 
understandings of responsibility. The political
implications - the fact that the decision to engage in non­
violent action might arise from, or help to create, a 
specific moral orientation and sense of self - are not 
explored. It is this relationship that I explore in Chapter 
9. In order to do this it is important to have a clear 
understanding of how the different moral orientations might 
arise. I will also explore how other writers discuss 
different perceptions of the self, and the suggestions by 
some that these emerge in response to specific social and 
political forces.
Gilligan noticed that Kohlberg's model of moral 
development was initially drawn from an all-male sample, and 
that women's moral development appeared, to many writers, to 
be both anomalous and deficient. Consequently she re­
examined women's responses to Kohlberg's hypothetical 
dilemmas and to the real life moral conflict faced by women 
deciding whether or not to have an abortion. What she 
discovered was that women construct and attempt to resolve
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moral problems from a quite different standpoint, one in 
which mature moral judgement emphasises the "moral problem 
arising from conflicting responsibilities rather than 
competing rights" and which depends on "contextual and 
narrative" rather than "formal and abstract thinking".117
Moral development is, thus, seen not as a growing 
understanding of rights and rules but rather as "the 
emergence of an increasingly complex understanding of the 
relationship between self and other"; proceeding from an 
initial concern with survival of the self to a focus on 
goodness towards others; and finally to a "reflective 
understanding of care as the most adequate guide to the 
resolution of conflicts in human relationships.1,118
Work by Gilligan and her colleagues over the last ten 
years has confirmed that there are at least two moral 
orientations: a justice perspective, which focuses on the 
problems of inequality and oppression, and stresses the 
importance of reciprocity and equal respect; and a care 
perspective, which emphasises the problems of broken 
relationships, and values attention and response to need.119
She emphasises that both perspectives constitute mature 
moral thinking. However, there is a tension between them,
117 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), p. 19.
118 Ibid., p. 114.
119 Carol Gilligan and Jane Attanucci, "Two Moral 
Orientations", in Mapping the Moral Domain, ed. Carol 
Gilligan, Janie Victoria Ward, and Jill Mclean Taylor 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).
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exemplified by the fact that detachment, a mark of maturity 
from the justice perspective, is the moral problem from the 
care perspective, exemplifying the failure to attend to 
need. Conversely, attention to need and context, which 
signifies maturity in the care perspective, is the moral 
problem in the justice perpective, preventing one from 
treating all as equal.
Research on individual responses to real life moral 
dilemmas has shown that both men and women can use both 
orientations, but that there is a tendency to focus on one 
to the exclusion of the other. It has confirmed that there 
is some association with gender and that men are more likely 
to use a justice focus and women a care focus.120 Johnston, 
examining the responses of children to the moral dilemmas 
posed by Aesop's fables, found that children were able to 
switch orientations. She showed that while most of the 
children understood the logic of both orientations, girls 
more often spontaneously adopted a care focus and preferred 
it, while boys both offered and preferred a justice focus. 
She also discovered that different types of dilemma tended 
to "pull" for different orientations. For example, 
heightened inequality in the story produced more justice 
solutions. However, there was also a "tendency for girls to 
see attachment where boys saw inequality and for girls to 
present care solutions as feasible where boys described them
120 Ibid., p. 82
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as naive and unworkable.1,121
If individuals have a tendency to adopt different moral 
orientations, how do these different perspectives emerge? 
Gilligan and Wiggins argue that they are rooted in the early 
childhood experiences of relationship. I cannot improve on 
their own succinct summary of her theory and will quote it 
in full:
The different dynamics of early childhood 
inequality and attachment lay the groundwork for 
two moral visions - one of justice and one of 
care. The child's experience of inequality and of 
attachment, sometimes but not always convergent, 
grounds a distinction between the dimensions of 
inequality/equality and attachment/detatchment 
which characterise all forms of human 
relationships. Although the nature of the 
attachment between child and parent varies across 
individual and cultural settings, and although 
inequality can be heightened or muted by familial 
and societal relationships, all people are born 
into a situation of inequality and no child 
survives in the absence of adult connection. 
Since everyone is vulnerable to both oppression 
and abandonment, two stories about morality recur 
in human experience.122
Children, when they demand fairness in the face of 
unequal power and test the strength of care by demanding 
love, "discover the efficacy of moral standards, the extent
121 K. Johnston, "Two Moral Orientations, Two Problem- 
Solving Strategies: Adolescents' Solutions to Dilemmas in 
Fables", (Ed. D. Dissertation, Harvard Graduate School of 
Education, 1985), cited by Carol Gilligan and Grant Wiggins, 
"The Origins of Morality in Early Childhood Relationships", 
in The Emergence of Morality in Early Childhood, ed. Jerome 
Kagan and Sharon Lamb (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), pp. 277-305.
122 Gilligan and Wiggins, "The Origins of Morality in 
Early Childhood Relationships", in The Emergence of Morality 
in Early Childhood, ed. Jerome Kagan and Sharon Lamb 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 281
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to which justice offers protection to the unequal in the 
face of oppression and the extent to which care protects 
attachment against threats of abandonment or detachment.” 
Thus "two moral injunctions - not to treat others 
unfairly and not to turn away from someone in need - define 
two lines of moral development." Observations of sex 
differences in moral understanding and behaviour reflect a 
tendency for these problems to be salient to different 
degrees or differently organised in male and female 
development. "This is not to imply that one understanding 
is superior to the other or that moral behaviour is 
biologically determined." Rather, that "to the extent that 
biological sex, the psychology of gender, and the cultural 
norms and values that define masculine and feminine 
behaviour affect the experience of equality and attachment, 
these factors presumably will influence moral 
development."123 She draws on Chodorow's work on the 
development of the female ego which suggests that because 
girls are primarily parented by a same sex parent, and 
experience themselves as like their mothers, the experience 
of attachment becomes fused with the process of identity 
formation. While, for boys, self definition depends on 
separation from the primary caretaker.124 Thus Gilligan 
suggests that attachment may mediate the experience of
123 Gilligan and Wiggins, "The Origins of Morality in 
Early Childhood Relationships.
124 Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 150, 
166— 167.
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childhood inequality to a far greater degree for girls than 
for boys. Therefore, it is not surprising that girls gain 
their own sense of efficacy and self esteem from their 
capacity to form connections with others and maintain 
relationships; whereas, for boys, it is the experience of 
inequality with more powerful fathers, with whom they 
identify, that is most salient, and self esteem comes 
through the growth of equality and autonomy. These
differential strands of development are reinforced by a 
society that values male dominance and female nurturing, 
likewise frowning on dependence in men and strivings for 
equality in women.125
To summarise: Gilligan is suggesting that for those - 
primarily girls - for whom attachment is the most salient 
experience in childhood, self definition depends upon 
connection to others, and thus the primary moral concern is 
with care and the maintenance of relationship. When
inequality is the more salient, self definition emphasises 
individual autonomy and separation from others, and the
primary moral concern is with justice and reciprocity. It 
is this second strand of development that has received most 
attention from psychologists and which has been posited as 
the norm for all human development. Not surprisingly, girls 
have therefore been perceived as having problems with 
development. This is exemplified by Haan's work with
Berkeley students described above, where her finding that
125 Gilligan and Wiggins, "The Origins of Morality", p.
282.
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women with post-conventional reasoning have more dysphoric 
self descriptions than men leads her to suggest that "the 
development of autonomous morality - perhaps even autonomous 
ego functioning - may be a more arduous task for girls than 
boys."126 The study shows that women are quite able to use 
a justice-based morality if asked. It would, however, be 
interesting to know whether or not - had a care focus 
morality provided the framework of the study - the higher 
stage women would still have been dysphoric.
Gilligan's thesis that the separate moral orientations 
are rooted in differing perceptions of the self is confirmed 
by Lyons, who developed a clear system of coding 
individuals' self definitions and their responses to moral 
dilemmas. She defines a connected self as one where "the 
individual defines themselves [sic] as connected in relation 
to others, and sees them in their own situations and 
contexts." A separate self is one where "individuals define 
themselves as separate/objective in relation to others and 
see others as one would like to be seen by them." She 
points out that both of these self definitions perceive the 
self as related to the other. The difference is in the form 
Of relationship. She found that "regardless of sex, 
individuals who characterised themselves in predominantly 
connected terms" more frequently used a morality of care, 
which she defines as "resting on an understanding of 
relationships as response to another in their terms", and
126 Norma Haan, M. Brewster Smith, Jeanne H. Block, 
"Moral Reasoning of Young Adults: Political-Social
Behaviour", p. 193.
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where "moral problems are generally construed as issues of 
relationship or response", where the prime consideration is 
how to prevent harm, relieve suffering and maintain 
relationships. Context cannot be ignored. In contrast, 
individuals characterising themselves in separate/objective 
terms more frequently use a "morality of justice", defined 
as "fairness" resting "on an understanding of relationships 
as reciprocity between separate individuals, grounded in the 
duty and obligation of their roles". Moral problems are 
construed as "issues", such as conflicting claims; and the 
prime considerations are one's duty, and how to apply agreed 
rules and principles fairly. She also found that women more 
frequently "used characterisations of a connected self", 
while men more frequently used the separate/ objective mode. 
However, some men and women used both modes, and a small 
proportion did not perceive themselves in relational terms 
at all.127
Thus, different definitions of self would appear to 
give rise to different moral perspectives and also differing 
concepts of responsibility. In the justice focus 
responsibility is seen as obligation and commitment. In 
contrast, in the care focus "responsibility means acting 
responsively in relationships, and the self - as moral agent 
- takes the initiative to gain awareness and respond to a
127 Nona Plesner Lyons, "Two Perspectives On Self, 
Relationships, and Morality, Harvard Educational Review 53 
(1983), pp. 125— 146.
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perception of need.”128 From this perspective
responsibility does not mediate between judgement and action 
but actually provides the framework within which the moral 
judgement is made.
Gilligan's theories on the origins of different selves 
have been challenged by Lykes for having too interpersonal 
a focus and for ignoring the way in which "notions of the 
self are embedded in and reconstructed from social 
arrangements."129 This does not exclude mothering, which is 
socially constructed, but emphasises the effect on self and 
moral development of the differing experiences of power and 
powerlessness. Lykes suggests that "individuals from 
majority groups (e. g., white upper class males), whose 
material conditions and social relations are most likely to 
be consonant with individualism, would be more likely to 
have a notion of the self as autonomous individual". 
Persons in less powerful groups (e. g., women, people of 
colour, working class people) are more likely to perceive 
contradictions between the assumptions of autonomous 
individualism and their social experience. "These
individuals may also experience group solidarity or some 
sense of the 'giveness' of 'being in relation', for their
128 Carol Gilligan, "Remapping the Moral Domain", in 
Mapping the Moral Domain, ed. Carol Gilligan, Janie Victoria 
Ward, and Jill Mclean Taylor (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1988), p. 7.
129 M. Brinton Lykes, "The Caring Self: Social 
Experiences of Power and Powerlessness", in Who Cares? 
Theory Research and Educational Implications of the Ethic of 
Love, ed. M. Brabeck (New York: Prager, 1989), p. 166.
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survival as a group may seem only possible in 
relationship.1,130 In response, the less powerful are more 
likely to develop a sense of self which she identifies as 
"social individuality”, and her empirical research on adult 
working women and men in the USA demonstrated support for 
the idea that different experiences of collective action and 
varied memberships of social groupings are systematically 
associated with concepts of the self. Social individuals, 
as compared to autonomous individuals, are more likely to 
experience a "widening circle of relationship from childhood 
to adulthood, to participate actively in communities, in 
addition to work and family responsibilities [and to] 
describe themselves in terms of relatedness to friends, 
neighbourhood and society". Social individuality was found 
particularly "among women working at the lower ends of the 
occupational ladder" and among
those who have in some way resisted institutional 
forces that excluded them from power. Involvement 
in the transformation of oppressive structures, in 
which one acts on a belief in the interdependance 
of all people or through which one is reinforced 
in one's sense of belonging through community, may 
serve to concretise an abstract sense of oneself 
as an "ensemble of social relations" and to 
provide a place where consciousness and action 
converge.131
The philosopher Tronto similarly suggests that an ethic of 
care may arise from a subordinate or minority status in
130 M. Brinton Lykes, "Gender and Individualistic vs 
Collectivist Bases for Notions About the Self", Journal of 
Personality 53 (1985), p. 364.
131 Lykes, "The Caring Self", p. 167.
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society, rather than specifically from gender. She 
postulates that, given that subordinate groups, including 
women, disproportionately occupy the caretaking roles in our 
society, it may be that it is the daily experience of caring 
that fosters this particular moral orientation. The 
priviledged white male's dearth of caretaking experience is 
what misleads him into construing moral issues in purely 
abstract terms.132
Lykes's suggestion that actual engagement in communal 
political resistance may create a connected sense of self, 
and Tronto's that it is the practice of caring that creates 
a care focussed morality, are relevant to my work because 
they suggest a dynamic, interactive relationship between 
action, moral orientation and sense of self. Both writers 
also highlight the importance of differential access to 
power in creating circumstances where care and connection 
are more likely to occur, although neither state that these 
are the only circumstances possible.
Tronto's and Lykes's views are part of a much wider 
discussion of Gilligan's work about the degree to which 
moral orientation and sense of self are gender mapped, or 
might be the response to oppressive circumstances or 
different societal arrangements. The anthropologist Alun 
Fiske points out that ethnographic evidence shows that while 
all societies organise some relationships in terms of 
"rational benefit/ cost assessment", only a few cultures,
132 Joan C. Tronto, "Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory 
of Care", Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 12 
(1987), pp. 644— 663.
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such as our own, take for granted the "commoditisation of
relationships, competitive entrepreneurial behaviour,
selfish individualism and the rational maximisation of
personal welfare through the exercise of free choice and
contractual commitments. Other cultures consider such
orientations pathological, despicable, or illegitimate."
There are other, more common, forms of social relationship,
particulary those based on a sense of community, or on an
accepted hierarchy in which more caring and responsive
behaviours are very common. Ethnographic evidence also
shows that, whatever the culturally determined mode of
social relationship,
people engage in . . . relationships for the
intrinsic rewards of the relationships themselves.
[They] help others primarily to initiate, 
maintain, reinforce, or repair social 
relationships, not simply because of extrinsic 
restraints or because helping is merely an 
expedient means to some ulterior end.133
In my view none of these approaches is incompatible with
Gilligan's, particularly if one regards gender largely as a
cultural construct in itself.134 It seems likely that one's
sense of self and moral values are determined by multiple
influences from childhood on.
From a somewhat different perspective, Lifton suggests
133 Alan P. Fiske, "The Cultural Relativity of Selfish 
Individualism: Anthropological Evidence that Humans are
Inherently Sociable", in Prosocial Behaviour: Review of
Personality and Social Psychology 12, ed. M. S. Clark 
(London: Sage, 1991), pp. 176— 214.
134 Helen Haste and Jane Baddeley, "Moral Theory and 
Culture: The Case of Gender', in The Handbook of Moral 
Development, ed. W. M. Kurtines and J.L. Gerwitz (Erlbauro, 
1991), pp. 223— 250.
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that it is particular historic and global forces that have 
recently transformed the nature of the self. One response 
is an increasing fluidity and malleabillity, which Lifton 
calls proteanism. He also identifies a rigid and 
fundamentalist response to these same forces.
Proteanism is defined as a psychological "flexibility, 
multiplicity and fluidity", characterised by "restless 
experiments, and odd combinations of involvements" that can 
occur either sequentially or simultaneously. The self 
increasingly has the capacity to move through a series of 
involvements and ways of being, or to hold at the same time 
highly varied, even contradictory ideas and feelings. He 
quotes the pre-presidential Havel as an example:
I get involved in many things, I am an expert in 
none of them. In general,though I have a presence 
in many places, I don't really have a firm 
predestined place anywhere, neither in terms of my 
employment nor my expertise, nor in my education 
and upbringing, nor my qualities and skills. I 
write mercilessly sceptical, even cruel, plays and 
yet in other matters behave almost like Don 
Quixote and an eternal dreamer. For many people 
I am a constant source of hope, and yet I'm always 
succumbing to depressions, doubt and 
uncertainties.135
Lifton argues that "our potential for multiplicity emerges 
from our innate capacity to imagine and symbolise. But it 
is only during the modern era that . . . this capacity has 
been so radically expressed." The experience and behaviour 
of the self have been profoundly affected by three
135 Robert Jay Lifton, The Protean Self: Human Resilience 
in an Age of Fragmentation (New York: Basic Books, 1993)
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historical forces: the first is historical (or
psychohistorical) dislocation; that is, a sense, 
particularly in the last few years, of a breakdown of old 
certainties and symbol systems resulting in a questioning of 
the validity of life experience, and an ambivalence towards 
traditional values. "Actions and decisions take on an ad 
hoc quality rather than being clearly structured by 
prevailing ritual and belief as they had been in the past." 
The second is the impact of the mass media revolution, which 
has meant that enormous numbers of people can "have access 
to any image, event or idea originating anywhere in the 
contemporary world or from any cultural moment of the entire 
human past". And where the availability of the electronic 
media is more limited, it would appear that the impact of 
information received this way can be even more significant. 
Moreover, the massive bombardment of diverse images presents 
people with alternatives. One can see that one's own frame 
of reference and lifestyle are not the only possibilities 
and that there are other ways to live.
The third historical development is the imminent threat 
of extinction, the realisation that everything we hold most 
dear, the planet itself, could disappear in an instant, 
through nuclear or other environmental catastrophe. Fiske, 
cited above in Part 1, suggested that imagery and knowledge 
of this threat is cognitively available to many people even 
if repressed on a day-to-day basis. The threat may be 
perceived in different ways. What matters is that the 
possibility of catastrophe and feelings of futurelessness
increases uncertainty and the adhoc quality of life.
Lifton suggests that proteanism which increases our 
capacity for creativity and survival is one response to 
these threatening historical forces. One important aspect 
of its creative potential is that by developing the capacity 
to hold multiple value patterns within ourselves we also 
increase our capacity for empathy, that is, awareness of how 
the other thinks and feels. He also points out that 
proteanism can manifest itself in a negative way. There is 
obviously the danger of superficiality, fragmentation, or 
the complete lack of coherence.
However, there is "another side to the historical coin, 
that of the constricted, totalised or fundamentalist self". 
These same historical forces that produce the protean self 
that is, an opening up, can result in a closing down. "The 
closing down, however, is itself largely a reaction to the 
perceived dangers of proteanism"; that is, against the 
confusion of formlessness and chaos and its own desire to 
open out. Lifton illustrates this by drawing on his own 
work with American fundamentalists, showing how openess and 
pluralism are perceived as danger and sin, and scepticism 
and doubt as the failure to acknowledge an eternal moral 
truth. "The fundamentalist self clings to a fixed structure 
of absolute purity and virtue that can never be, the quest 
is for unification within and without and above all a sense 
of control over that which cannot be controlled." 
Consequently there is rarely equilibrium. "It tends to be 
engaged instead in a continuous struggle against ever
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present evil, including especially the evil of its own deep 
ambivalences.” Lifton also describes the psychological 
appeal of violence to both the fragmented protean state - 
"where the sense of self can only take shape by living out 
a pattern of violence in accord with others expectations" - 
and to the fundamentalist because of "the appeal of 
purification: by destroying designated enemies one can
reaassert one's own claim to absolute ethical and even 
scientific truth".136
Lifton's protean self clearly shares some 
characterisics with Gilligan's connected self, in particular 
responsiveness and empathy. Gilligan and Wiggins identify 
empathy as a crucial component of the connected self. "A 
more fluid conception of self in relation to others is tied 
to the growth of affective imagination, namely the ability 
to enter into and understand through taking on and 
experiencing the feelings of others."137 Lifton's protean 
self also appears to have what could be seen as a caring 
value orientation, a "species mentality, an awareness of 
ourselves as members of the human species", that produces 
deep concern for others, and a consequent non-violent 
political commitment. This "species self" appears to 
similar Melucci's "planetary conciousness" that identifies 
New Social Movement actors.
One senses a convergence in these writers, coming from
136 Lifton, The Protean Self.
137 Gilligan and Wiggins, "The Origins of Morality", p.
287.
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quite different perspectives, in identifying an interactive 
relationship between moral orientation, sense of self and a 
particular kind of political concern. Added support comes 
from Wingfield and Haste's examination of the relationship 
between cognitive style and political understanding. They 
looked at the way adolescents discussed themes such as 
social order, organisation and government, and found that 
those with a connected cognitive style tended to focus on 
the negotiation of conflicts and attempted to include all 
points of view: through attention to everyone's needs it was 
hoped that conflict could be avoided. In contrast, those 
with a separate orientation focused on rules and codes of 
practice. They presupposed the existence of competitive 
conflict and looked for ways to control it. Again, there 
appeared to be an association between female gender and a 
connected focus, in contrast to a male gender-separateness 
association. Interestingly, Wingfield and Haste describe 
political understanding as outside the "strictly moral 
domain". Certainly it is not often included in the domain 
or the dilemmas posed by moral psychologists, yet it clearly 
falls within Midgeley's definition of what is moral.138
The suggestion from all of this work is that it is the 
protean, or connected, care focussed self that is more 
inclined to non-violence. However, I want to mention two 
studies by Gilligan's colleagues that suggest a more complex 
relationship between moral orientation and attitudes to non-
138 Lindy Wingfield and Helen Haste, "Connectedness and 
Separateness: Cognitive Style or Moral Orientation?",
Journal of Moral Education 16 (1987), pp. 214— 225.
violence. Ward interviewed thirty-seven adolescents of 
mixed ethnic background to elicit their thinking on 
violence. She discovered that the majority had experienced 
or witnessed violence in a family or neighbourhood setting, 
mostly as a result of disrupted human relationships, and 
that they used a moral language to discuss it. She also 
found that the moral judgements made could be categorised in 
four ways, each with a different understanding of the 
appropriateness of violence. Thus, she found that 40 per 
cent of those with a justice focus thought violence was 
justifiable when it was used to rectify or avenge 
unfairness, or in response to undeserved punishment. In 
contrast, those with a care focus found violence
intrinsically wrong because it hurt people and was
"unnecessary, since it could have been avoided through 
dialogue". Psychological pain was as of much concern as 
street crime and there was concern for witnesses as well as 
victims. Violence was understandable, although wrong, when 
people felt they had no other choice to protect themselves 
and others from danger. Some adolescents, however, combined 
both justice and care considerations and, in this case, in 
certain situations, such as when people had reached their 
limit and there was no other choice, violence was no longer 
wrong but justifiable. A frequent example given was of a 
woman using retaliatory violence to stop suffering, which 
was usually seen by the teenagers as empowering. Finally,
Ward identified a fourth group where justice and care
concerns were not simply combined but integrated, that is,
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where "the justice and care ideas could not be pulled apart 
without destroying the meaning of the moral judgements". 
Violence for these teenagers was "acceptable", "tolerable 
and "fair" - but only within clearly defined limits - in 
order to prevent irreparable harm.139
Bardige, looking at students' written journal responses 
to a course on the Holocaust, identified a group, almost 
exclusively girls, who responded with what she calls "face 
value thinking". This could be identified by the immediate 
concrete responsiveness, the sense of outrage, disgust or 
injustice, combined with anger at the abusers and strong 
empathy for the victims. The response "integrated" justice 
and care concerns in the manner described by Ward, and was 
"combined with a strong desire to do something to stop them 
immediately (even violently). . . . The intensity of their 
involvement and their eagerness to do something were 
striking." What was significant was that such responses 
were associated with lower levels of cognitive, moral and 
ego development as conventionally defined. Yet only one of 
those not using face value thinking "used language that 
coupled emotion, shock and action". These more
developmentally advanced students, using "composite" or 
"multiple lens thinking", did respond with feeling, but the 
emotions tended to be located in the self - "I got upset 
watching this" in contrast to "this is disgusting" - and
139 Janie Victoria Ward, "Urban Adolescents' Conceptions 
of Violence", in Mapping the Moral Domain, ed. Carol 
Gilligan, Janie Victoria Ward, and Jill Maclean Taylor 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 175— 200.
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treated with wariness. They showed an increasing awareness 
of complexity, and greater capacity to understand others and 
thus take their needs into consideration, yet they had less 
certainty about the possibilities of personal action. 
"Immediacy [and] passionate clarity" in the face of evil 
appear for some reason to be lost. Growing sophistication 
actually appeared to diminish empathy and in some cases 
rationalised inaction.140
These two studies are particularly important for my own 
work because they demonstrate a clear relationship between 
attitudes to non-violence and different moral orientations. 
The "face value" perspective is also related to a clear 
need to act. And, in contrast to the findings from work 
done in the Kohlbergian framework, this need to act arises 
from strong emotions and is not related to a "higher stage" 
of moral development.
However, while both studies looked at attitudes, and 
while both urban violence and the Holocaust are political 
questions, the interviews dealt in terms of hypotheticals: 
what would or could one do "if"? They could not explore the 
actual choice of collective non-violence in an activist's 
life. It is by looking at the reality of non-violent 
actions and the life histories of those who create them that 
I hope to draw out some of the political implications of 
this suggestive body of theory.
140 Betty Bardige, "Things so Finely Human: Moral
Sensibilities at Risk in Adolescence", in Mapping the Moral 
Domain, ed. Carol Gilligan, Janie Victoria Ward, and Jill 




Bardige highlights the role of empathy in creating the need 
for action, and the other work reviewed above suggests that 
empathy, given its role in mediating a protean, flexible, 
connected, care focussed self, enhances the capacity for 
non-violence. It is therefore worth reviewing some of those 
areas of the literature on empathy that pertain to its 
relationship to non-violent behaviour and moral orientation.
One of the difficulties in reviewing this field is that 
there are conflicting definitions of empathy and the related 
constructs of pro-social and altruistic behaviour. In this 
section I will give my own definition and then review 
briefly some of the literature on empathy and aggression? 
the development of empathy? the relationship between empathy 
and moral judgement? and the role of empathy in a 
naturalistic study of non-violent altruistic behaviour.
I define empathy as the capacity to both feel and know 
how another person is feeling as if one were them. This is 
not sympathy - a word used synonomously in much of the 
research, but which I understand to refer to feelings for 
the other rather than shared with them. Nor is it a 
question of identification with the person, in that one does 
not want to become like them? rather, it is that one's own 
feelings resonate with the other's unconscious affect so 
that one experiences what they are experiencing, while at 
the same time maintaining a consciousness of one's own 
separateness. If "identification” does occur it is with the
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other's "experience of feeling", not with the person him or 
herself. The experience of feeling can then result in a 
cognitive process of interpretation and hypothesis about the 
other's state.
Obviously, defined in this way the empathic capacity is 
neutral. One can conceive of certain situations where the 
capacity to hurt or manipulate another requires just this 
exquisite sensitivity to feeling. In fact, Feschbach found 
that intense euphoric empathy was associated, specifically 
in boys, with anti-social and aggressive behaviour.141 
However, much of the literature suggests that empathy is 
associated with prosocial behaviour,142 prosocial being 
defined as "voluntary intentional behaviour intended to 
benefit another", and that it is negatively associated with 
aggressive, anti-social behaviour.143 Gilligan and Wiggins 
use the word compassion or co-feeling to describe empathy in 
the positive sense.144 Staub uses the term "reactive 
empathy", which "requires (in addition to shared feeling) a 
perception of the other's state (cognitive empathy) and a
141 Norma Deitch Feshbach, "Parental Empathy and Child 
Adjustment/Maladjustment", in Empathy and its Development, 
ed. Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987).
142 N. Eisenberg and P. Millar, "The Relations of Empathy 
to Prosocial and Related Behaviour", Psychological Bulletin 
101 (1989), pp. 91— 119.
143 P. Millar and N. Eisenberg, "The Relation of Empathy 
to Aggressive and Externalising/ Antisocial Behaviour", 
Psychological Bulletin 103 (1988), pp. 324— 344.
144 Gilligan and Wiggins, "The Origins of Morality", pp. 
288— 289.
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caring about the other's need”.145
The explanation suggested for the negative correlation 
between empathy and aggression is that when an empathic 
person behaves in an aggressive manner, their sensitivity to 
the pain of the other is likely to act as a form of negative 
feedback, disinhibiting further aggressive acts. Other 
research suggests that children subjected to physical abuse 
not only have less empathic parents, but are themselves 
likely to be less empathic.146
The research done on the development of empathy is 
important because it shows that the capacity for empathy 
appears to be fostered by socialisation processes similar to 
those identified by Flacks and others as significant in the 
upbringing of student activists. First of all, it should be 
stated that a large body of research has shown that there is 
an innate capacity for empathy and that it is relatively 
stable.147
145 Ervin Staub, "Commentary on Part 1", in Empathy and 
its Development, ed. Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 106.
146 See Feshbach, "Parental Empathy and Child 
Adjustment/Maladjustment"; and M. F. Squires, "Empathic, 
Nurturant and Abusive Behaviour of Normally and Abnormally 
Reared Girls", Dissertation Abstracts International, 40 
(Doctoral Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
1979).
147 See Martin L. Hoffman, "Personality and Social 
Development", Annual Review of Psychology 28 (1977), pp.
295-321; Ross A. Thompson, "Empathy and Emotional 
Understanding: The Early Development of Empathy in Eisenberg 
and Strayer", in Empathy and its Development, ed. Nancy 
Eisenberg and Janet Strayer (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), pp. 119— 146; and E. Mark Cummings et al., 
"Early Organisation of Altruism and Aggression: 
Developmental Patterns and Individual Differences", in 




Empathy also appears to be fostered by secure early 
attachment, parental affection, and the availability of 
empathic models. Mothers in particular who model empathic, 
caregiving behaviour appear to have more emotionally 
responsive and helpful children than non-empathic mothers. 
Modelling by teachers and peers may be important. Inductive 
disciplinary techniques, rather than punitive or coercive 
ones, are also significant.148 Other important factors were 
the degree of identification with the victim, either through 
similarity or shared experience, and the discouragement of 
interpersonal competition. Feschbach, for example, found 
that paternal emphasis on competition was associated with 
low empathy in sons but not daughters. She also found that 
all the above mentioned socialisation antecedents were more 
significant in girls than boys suggesting that "it is as 
though empathy in girls develops through identification, 
normative role adaptations, and positive childrearing 
experiences, whereas the routes to empathy in boys are as 
numerous as the diverse manifestations of empathy for this 
sex.”149 This finding is consistent with Gilligan's thesis 
that women are more likely to have connected selves because
Carolyn Zahn Waxier, E. Mark Cummings, and Ronald Ianotti 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
148 Mark A. Barnett, "Empathy and Related Responses in 
Children", in Empathy and its Development, ed. Nancy 
Eisenberg and Janet Strayer (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), pp. 149— 153.
149 Norma Deitch Feschbach, "Sex Differences in Empathy 
and Social Behaviour in Children", in The Development of 
Prosocial Behaviour, ed. Nancy Eisenberg (New York: Academic 
Press, 1982), pp. 315— 337.
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of empathic identification with their mothers. The 
implication of both Feschbach's and Gilligan's work is that 
the greater tendency to non-violent behaviour in women 
arises, in part, from the specific way girls are socialised 
by a caregiver of the same sex.
In both sexes it would appear that values transmitted 
through induction, not coercion, with an emphasis on 
cooperation rather than competition, encourage both the 
development of activism and empathy. It would be a mistake, 
however, to assume a direct relationship betwen empathy and 
action. Chapman and others found, in examining 4— 11-year - 
olds' helping behaviour, that, while there was a correlation 
with empathy, there was a stronger one with a sense of guilt 
and personal responsibility (assessed through examining 
childrens' responses to stories describing hypothetical 
distress situations), suggesting that this may be an
essential component in the connection between empathy and
action.150 This is reinforced by the finding that 5-year- 
olds who paid attention to distressed peers and were capable 
of active intervention for the most part "did not believe
they were supposed to help when competent adult caregivers
were present".151 Empathy may create a need to act but this 
will not be followed up if the individual does not feel
150 Michael Chapman et al, "Empathy and Responsibility 
in the Motivation of Children's Helping", Developmental 
Psychology 23 (1987), pp. 140— 145.
151 Marlene Zelek Caplan and Dale F. Hay, "Preschoolers' 
Responses to Peers' Distress and Beliefs About Bystander 
Intervention" in Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 
30 (1989), pp. 231— 242.
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responsible.
Hoffman has explored the relationship between empathy 
and moral judgement, drawing on his own and others empirical 
research. In contrast to Gilligan, he is arguing that 
empathy is not only associated with a care-focussed 
morality: different empathic affects are involved in all 
moral judgements, and they may be part of the motivation to 
act. Firstly, he suggests that, rather than one, there are 
three universal moral principles: a principle of "justice 
and fairness", a principle of "impartial benevolence", which 
he interprets as a "principle of caring about the well-being 
of others", and a "principle of maintaining social order", 
and that they are not mutually exclusive either within the 
individual or society.152
Secondly, he suggests that mature empathy consists of 
a number of affective states: empathic and sympathetic
distress, empathic anger, and empathic guilt. He then argues 
that all moral encounters arouse such affects in one form or 
another because, even in hypothetical situations, such 
encounters involve making causal attributions and 
considering victims. At the same time, such encounters 
arouse moral principles, and which principle is most salient 
is likely to depend on the affect aroused. Thus, 
sympathetic distress is likely to be coupled with a 
principle of caring, while empathic anger may be associated
152 Martin Hoffman, "The Contribution of Empathy to 
Justice and Moral Judgement", in Empathy and its 
Development, ed. Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 47— 81.
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with justice. "The resulting co-occurrence of the empathic 
affect and moral principle creates a bond between them that 
is strengthened in subsequent occurrences." Thus moral 
principles may themselves aquire an affective charge and 
become " hot cognitions" which directly arouse affect, even 
when the moral encounter is hypothetical. On the basis of 
affect and principle combined, moral judgements are made, 
which Hoffman points out might thus be limited "by empathic 
bias towards the familiar." This, he argues, can be limited 
by various socialisation techniques that encourage 
"impartiality and multiple empathising." The importance of 
Hoffman's work is to highlight the role of affect in moral 
decision-making and to show that the quality of the aroused 
affect may have a determining role in moral orientation, and 
thus presumably in choice of method of action.
Most of the research discussed above has been based on 
studies done in the laboratory or through naturalistic 
observation of small children. There are some studies that 
look at the role of empathy in a naturalistic setting. One 
important example is the study by Oliner and Oliner of 
non-Jewish rescuers of Jews during the Second World War. 
This massive study used qualitative and quantitative 
techniques to examine the life histories of 406 rescuers 
matched against 126 non-rescuers. The purpose was to 
establish whether or not there were some defining 
characteristics of the altruistic personality. Oliner and 
Oliner present the rescue activity firmly in its historic 
and cultural context, detailing those aspects of physical
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geography, state policy, and cultural attitudes to Jews 
within society that facilitated or worked against rescue. 
However, there were rescuers and non-rescuers in all 
societies. The picture that emerges is that, while external 
factors such as knowledge, opportunity, the degree of risk, 
and material resources contributed to whether rescues 
occurred or not, the two groups could not be distinguished 
on this basis alone. Both groups had access to knowledge 
about Jews in their communities, and both groups heard about 
or witnessed their treatment. However, there was a 
difference in the significance of the knowledge to each 
group. "At some point, for rescuers, awareness became 
attention and attention became focused concentration on what 
was happening to particular people in specific contexts.1,193 
Similarly, while they could not be distinguished by the form 
or degree of religiosity, they did differ in their 
interpretations of religious teaching, the rescuers putting 
an emphasis on the common humanity of all people.
The different meaning and significance given to events 
by the rescuers appeared to arise from a distinct ethical 
orientation in which the language of care predominated: 
"pity, compassion, concern and affection” extended beyond 
family and friends and compelled action. "It meant assuming 
personal responsibility . . . because failure to act meant 
acquiescence in the consequences.”154 Moreover, such values
153 Samuel P. Oliner and Pearl M. Oliner, The Altruistic 
Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (New York: Free 
Press, 1988), p. 123.
154 Ibid., p. 168.
appeared to be integrated into rescuers' lives long before 
the war, and rooted in personality. Rescuers could be 
distinguished by a greater capacity to be moved by pain: 
"sadness and helplessness aroused their empathy"155; a 
greater sense of responsibilty and commitment; and, 
particularly, an inclusive orientation that led them to be 
more disposed to see others as similar to themselves. 
Rescuers tended, for example, to have a wider circle of 
friends. They also had a marked sense of efficacy and 
competence.
The diners' findings on how such a personality emerged 
is in keeping with the research dicussed above. Parents of 
rescuers were more inductive reasoners, used less physical 
coercion, while encouraging feelings of autonomy, respect 
and internal control. One group of rescuers described their 
family relationships as particularly close. In this group, 
values were learnt directly from parents and were often set 
in a religious context, emphasising caring for others and 
self reliance. However, strong family values and 
attachments were not the only source of psychological 
strength. The diners distinguished three other groups, one 
"who developed their extensive orientation primarily through 
close contacts with Jews"; another with a "more abstract 
sense of connectedness . . . marked by broad social
commitments, an intense sense of personal responsibility for 
the welfare of society as a whole"; and a final group of 
"egalitarians" who "derived their sense of responsibility to
155 Ibid., p. 174.
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others from their strong feelings of similarity to humankind 
generally and empathy for persons in pain.” The themes of 
empathy and inclusion run through all of these but are 
differently expressed.156
Similarly, the Oliners emphasise that there was a 
variety of pathways through which the rescuers were actually 
catalysed into action. Thus "most commonly . . . rescuers 
were aroused to act by external authorities whose values and 
standards they had internalised [and] perceived helping Jews 
as a means of expressing and strengthening their 
affiliations with their social groups." The second 
significant group was an empathic group which had a 
"particular capacity to focus on others' needs and to be 
moved by their distress." A third small group was motivated 
by "autonomous principled motivations". Interestingly, the 
Oliners show how motivations changed over time. Both the 
normocentric or principled orientation that motivated the 
first act of rescue could become more empathic through 
continuing relationship with the rescued.
As a result of this research, the Oliners identify two 
prototypical personalities: an "extensive" one characterised 
by strong attachments, empathy, care-focussed values, and an 
inclusive orientation to others? and a "constricted" one, in 
which the external world is perceived as "largely peripheral 
except insofar as it may be instrumentally useful. More 
centred on themselves and their own needs they pay scant 
attention to others, [they are] marked by detachment and
156 Ibid., pp. 184— 185
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exclusiveness." The Oliners emphasise that these are 
prototypes - acts of rescue were carried out by constricted 
personalities and extensive ones remained as bystanders; 
some had only aspects of one personality or the other. 
However, the Oliners found the distinctions significant, and 
concluded that "the rescuers' inclination to act depended 
largely on rescuers' interpretation of events, which was 
largely the product of characteristic ways they interpreted 
their relatonships to others".157
Thus, the Oliners' work appears to confirm the 
relationship suggested by the research above: that there is 
a strong relationship between moral orientation, sense of 
self, the capacity for empathy and a very specific type of 
action. It is important, with regard to my own work, to 
note that rescuers, although not collective actors in the 
political sense, almost invariably relied on informal 
networks of support and cooperation to do the work. In 
addition, their action could be construed as non-violent. 
Although some were also engaged in resistance activities, 
the majority were not, choosing to make rescue work their 
form of resistance. The non-rescue group did include a 
significant number of individuals engaged in resistance. So 
this extensive, empathic, personality does appear to be 
connected to a particular form of action. The picture 
presented also challenges Hoffman's concern that empathy may 
bias moral judgement towards the familiar. Most rescuers 
acted on behalf of complete strangers.
157 Ibid., pp. 249— 253.
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6. Autobiographical and Biographical Studies 
of Non-violent Activists
Unfortunately, the more in-depth studies have focussed on 
the lives of exceptional men, such as Martin Luther King and 
Gandhi. However, they are worth briefly reviewing to see if 
there is any confirmation of the suggestions arising from 
the research summarised above. What comes across is that 
the choice of non-violence appears to be fostered by strong 
religious and moral values and a close and caring family 
atmosphere.
Gandhi, for example, grew up in a family that was 
obviously extensive and inclusive in its outlook, and 
strongly attached to him as the youngest child. What also 
comes across from Erikson's study is the fluidity and 
protean nature of Gandhi's life: his transformations from 
young lawyer, to volunteer for the British army in the Boer 
war, to political tactician, to spiritual father of a 
nation. Non-violence as an idea comes from his reading, but 
it is developed and reinvented throughout his life as the 
result of the interplay of historical circumstances, his own 
personality, and the activities of his followers. Gandhi's 
own writings record his constant adjustment and changes of 
mind as he "experiments with truth.”158
Similarly, Martin Luther King describes the choice of 
non-violence as emerging from his own reflection and reading
158 Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of 
Militant Nonviolence (New York: Norton, 1969).
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in the fields of philosophy and theology. Gandhi hmself was 
an influence, but it was the experience of the Montgomery 
bus boycott, which was not his initiative but for which he 
became spokesperson, that transformed him. "Living through 
the actual experience of protest, non-violence became more 
than a method to which I gave intellectual assent; it became 
a commitment to a way of life."159
Adam Michnik, one of the most articulate Polish 
intellectuals behind Solidarity, Poland's non-violent 
political movement, does not come from a religious tradition 
and does not speak in the language of care and connection 
that marks some of the rhetoric of Gandhi and King. Nor is 
he a pacifist. He sees non-violence as the assertion of 
dignity and autonomy in the face of manifest injustice and 
oppression, and as the best tactical option of the times. 
What one gets from his writings is a sense of what Hoffman 
would call empathic anger and also compassion for his 
enemies. Most significantly he sees the use of non-violence 
as a way of asserting moral difference from the oppressors 
and as a way of avoiding the corruption of "revolutionary 
violence".160
Thus, this autobiographical material reinforces the 
Oliners' finding of multiple pathways to action. The choice 
of non-violence can be both the expression of empathic
159 Martin Luther King, "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence", in 
The Pacifist Conscience, ed. Peter Mayer (London: Rupert 
Hart-Davis, 1966), p. 407.
160 Adam Michnik, Letters from Prison and Other Essays, 
trans. Maya Latynski (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1985), pp. 87— 89.
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concern, and of autonomous principles, and both motivations 
may occur in the same individual.
Overall, the picture that seems to emerge from this 
wide body of literature is that, while the choice of non­
violence may simply be due to pragmatism, for many it is an 
active choice strongly related to an individual's value 
orientation and sense of self, which themselves relate to 
societal arrangements, historic forces, upbringing, gender, 
and the capacity for empathy. These are dynamic 
relationships. Engagement in non-violent action itself may 
alter the individual's values and sense of self. What is 
also clear is that the choice of non-violence is not only 
tied to a connected, care-focussed self. Concerns about 
justice and autonomy and the need to establish a different 
and separate identity, as a group or as an individual, may 
also underlie the choice of non-violence. The question then 
remains whether this is a different form of non-violence. 




All research is in some senses autobiographical and it 
should now be clear that my decision to examine the process 
of engagement in non-violent collective action was not 
arbitrary. It arose out of the desire to understand my own 
lived experience, and the experiences of those around me, 
and to make sense of the cross-cultural continuities that I 
had observed. At the outset I had no particular hypothesis 
or model that I wished to test. My thinking was informed by 
three sources: my experiences as a journalist and total 
participant; my reading in the fields reviewed in Chapter 3; 
and my reading and re-reading of the data gathered during my 
own fieldwork, from taking life histories and doing 
participant observation.
What I discovered was that my earlier, intuitive 
understanding, developed on the ground, and my later 
systematic research, challenged some of the established 
orthodoxies in the field. It also demonstrated the
significance of some of the current research on moral 
development and empathy for the study of political action.
Firstly, my research findings challenge the global 
model of protest behaviour that fails to separate non­
violent collective action from other forms of protest, such 
as riots, or from the development of totalitarian movements. 
It demonstrates the need for a sharp focus. In discussing 
the development of political commitment one needs to specify
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the kind of commitment, to what issues, and in what period.
Secondly, it challenges the idea of a unitary
explanatory model of commitment. My reading revealed a 
number of such models that appeared to talk past each other 
and take a reductionist approach. My findings challenge the 
idea that political engagement is an ahistoric,
decontextualised, irrational process. It also challenges 
the idea that engagement occurs simply as a response to 
structural injustice; or only when sufficient resources are 
available in the form of leadership and networks.
In keeping with the work of Andrews and Melucci, my 
research suggests that political engagement may arise not 
only as the result of psychological processes located within 
the individual, or simply as a response to the external 
world, but rather as a unique combination of the two. It is 
a particular individual's response to a particular set of 
historical circumstances that results in engagement. 
However, unlike Melucci and Andrews, my focus is on the
precise dynamics at work in the first stage of the process.
Indeed Andrews, whose work is closest to my own in 
challenging the reductionist individualism of traditional 
political psychology, has to my mind swung too far and 
ignored crucial aspects of individuality. Her biographies 
provide rich detail as to the personal circumstances of the 
respondents - their family background, education, class, 
work and so on - but little on their interpersonal 
relationships, temperament, character, inner psychic life, 
or on their strategies for coping with significant personal
rather than historical events, such as marriage or the birth 
of children. These aspects are surely relevant to their 
reaction to the wider world. Andrews's argument is that it 
is the "social" orientation of the activists, the "anti­
individualism" that has fuelled their interaction with the 
outside world which has given them a sense of identity, and 
that this sense of identity is more easily defined in terms 
of what they do and to what groups they belong, rather than 
of what they feel about themselves or those intimate with 
them. Yet the fact that the activists perceive themselves 
in this way does not mean the author could not have shared 
her own perceptions or followed up the hints that they do 
give. Such an exploration might have filled some of the 
gaps that emerge in her description of the process of 
radicalisation. What made her activists sensitive to the 
particular books, individuals and organisations? These 
influences were also available to many others undergoing the 
same historical experiences, and yet they did not become 
active, or their activism took another form - joining the 
fascist party, for example. It is possible that the 
transmission of family values, temperament, and certain 
significant emotional experiences all played a part. 
However, while her data hints at this, Andrews does not 
really explore these aspects. In concentrating on both 
personal and historic formative experiences, including 
traumatic ones, and focussing on the initial process of 
engagement, I plan to address this gap.
Thirdly, my work suggests that the choice of and
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commitment to a method of action is as important in
understanding the process of engagement as commitment to a 
particular issue. In this form of political engagement, 
means and ends are closely intertwined and both need to be 
examined in any study of commitment.
Fourthly, through reading widely in a number of
disciplines I have noticed a convergence as different
specialties touch on the same themes. I have demonstrated 
in Chapter 3 how a number of writers have concerned
themselves with the threats of late twentieth century life 
and the new forms of collective response this has generated, 
be it planetary or species consciousness, and the new forms 
of self: protean, flexible, extensive, or connected. There 
is an increasing interest in the genesis of altruistic and 
empathic behaviour and in the formative experiences that 
produce it. However, the writers in their particular fields 
have not explored the implications of their work for the 
genesis of collective non-violent action or taken the 
perspective of individual life stories as a starting point.
I have not come up with a single explanatory model of 
the process of engagement. Rather my work represents, 
through the use of individual narratives, both a synthesis 
and a critique. It demonstrates, firstly, that there is 
more than one route to political commitment and, secondly, 
that the choice of non-violence arises from a number of 
different perspectives. Each of the subsequent chapters of 
the thesis develops these two overall themes in different 
ways.
Chapter 5 is a description of the three groups and of 
the political and historical context in which they emerged. 
As I have argued above, I do not see history as the 
background against which individual engagement occurs; 
rather, such engagement arises out of a continuing and 
transformative interaction between individual and historical 
events. Thus a thick description of those events is 
required, including the emergence of the collective as a 
collective. This description has four main functions. It 
details a major component in the process of engagement, and 
in particular shows the different role that fear played in 
each political culture, in relation to the genesis of 
collective action. It provides a ground map in which to 
locate my respondents' lives without constant recourse to 
explanatory footnotes. It increases the reader's
understanding of the nature of the action and of the modes 
of non-violence with which my respondents became involved. 
Finally, it shows the way the movement as a collective 
helped to create the historical context which generated the 
growth of other movements and further commitment. I have 
described this kind of political action as the politics of 
connection, and this chapter makes it possible to explain 
why.
Chapter 6 takes the focus back to the individuals and 
their pre-activist lives to examine to what extent this may 
have influenced their later engagement. In particular, it 
looks at whether engagement in the collective was preceded 
by other forms of social engagement. And it examines the
180
role of family life and other experiences in influencing the 
values and politics of the respondents.
Chapter 7 looks specifically at the process of 
engagement. In particular, the narratives show that there 
is more than one path to commitment; that both emotional and 
cognitive processes are significant, and that, while there 
are cross-cultural continuities, there are significant 
differences in the role of fear which are crucial to 
understanding the timing of initial involvement.
Chapter 8 sharpens the focus further to look 
specifically at the role of personal trauma in engendering 
political engagement. In particular, the narratives of my 
respondents challenge Lasswell's thesis that political 
activity arises from the irrational displacement of 
repressed hostility. In contrast, I draw on the work of 
analysts such as Alice Miller to show the importance that 
acknowledged personal traumas may have in engendering 
creativity, which includes political commitment.
In Chapter 9 I have two aims. One is to illustrate the 
complexity of the relationship between the choice of non­
violence and moral orientation, and to show the overiding 
influence of political culture on moral focus. The other is 
to show the interactive and dynamic nature of that choice. 
Engagement in non-violence can create a collective dynamic 
that affects one's own moral orientation and sense of self, 
and it impacts on others.
In the Conclusion I look at the significance of my own 




THE POLITICS OF CONNECTION;
THREE ANTI-MILITARIST MOVEMENTS IN THE 1980s
Non-violent collective action does not arise out of nowhere. 
Movements are created by individuals interacting with the 
historical circumstances in which they find themselves. 
Once in existence, the movements themselves become part of 
the historical and political context in which the individual 
acts. Some of the individuals in my study were motivated by 
an issue to start movements, others were inspired by the 
movement to act on an issue. Some changed the movement's 
focus of action, some left the movement because it had 
changed. In all cases the way the process of engagement 
occured can only be fully understood in the context of the 
emergence and development of the movement, within its 
particular historical, political and cultural setting.
Thus, I am adopting Runyan's situational interactionist 
perspective, which clearly requires a full understanding of 
the situation with which my respondents interact. 
Therefore, my purpose in this chapter is to provide an 
account of three antimilitarist movements in the 1980s and 
the historical context in which they emerged. I should make 
clear that this is not an attempt at a critical historical 
analysis of the period. What I want to do is, firstly, 
provide a ground map in which the individual experiences 
recounted in later chapters can be located. Secondly, the 
chapter will provide a rich description of what I regard as
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a major player in generating engagement in non-violent 
action: history, and in particular the history of the
respective movement which, like the individuals out of which 
it is composed, has its own life cycle, which attracts 
different individuals at different stages.
One aspect of the movement history that concerns me is 
the significant role of fear. Fear has its origins both 
within the individual and the external environment. I 
explore in Chapter 7 the crucial role fear has in both 
motivating and inhibiting action. This chapter will show 
that each political culture generated a particular kind of 
fear, exemplified by both by the targets of protest and the 
coercive methods used to inhibit collective action.
Thirdly, this chapter will show the cross-cultural 
continuities between these movements, continuities which I 
argue are part of a common response to the global context of 
the Cold War. And, fourthly, I will show how these 
movements express what I define as a politics of connection. 
A politics of connection puts a primary emphasis on 
relationships. There is a concern with relationships 
between participants within the movement? between the object 
of action and other issues; and with relationships with the 
perceived opponents. Hence the concern with method as an 
end in itself. The non-violent methods used by the actors, 
in rhetoric, and in symbolic and actual forms, express these 
relationships, and the choice of non-violence demonstrates 
a desire to transform rather than disrupt or break 
relationships. In contrast the objects of action - military
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conscription and nuclear weapons - are in all cases seen as, 
amongst other things, disruptive and deeply harmful to 
relations within society.
Although I stressed in the introduction that movements 
cannot simply be treated as collective actors, in order to 
sketch their history I must do exactly that, and the 
struggle to give each a fair representation immediately 
throws up the problems any historian of contemporary social 
movements must face. Only part of the record is available? 
it is not possible, because of lack of access to government 
papers, to honestly assess the movements' perceived impact 
on the state. All the groups lack an institutional base, 
with minute books, formal accounts, or defined membership. 
They are protean in form, and while they have each generated 
a wealth of documentation in a variety of media, such as 
newsletters, leaflets, films, books, and reports by outside 
observers, these sources cannot represent the whole? indeed, 
with most of the Greenham and WiP material, there is usually 
a written proviso that they should not be taken to do so.1 
Oral history is obviously a crucial source, but that also is 
clearly partial, given the pluralism of the groups.
1 Jill Liddington has referred to some of these problems 
in her attempt to provide a preliminary history of the 
Greenham encampment: The Long Road to Greenham: Feminism and 
Antimilitarism in Britain Since 1820 (London: Virago, 1989) 
p. 221.
The New Cold War
1979 was the year that detente definitively came to an end. 
Arguably, it had been ending for some years previously as a 
result of policy shifts within the USA. Throughout the 
1970s, the USSR had continued both its attempts to achieve 
nuclear parity with the USA and its cautious and arbitrary 
support of liberation movements in the Third World. By the 
mid-1970s the USA and its allies had realised that detente 
was not a satisfactory means of "waging globalised social 
conflict to their own advantage"2, and had begun to make a 
strategic shift to a more militarist and aggressive stance. 
Halliday sees this as a direct response particularly to 
developments in the Third World, which was growing in 
importance as "a supplier of raw materials, particularly 
oil, a market for exports and a debtor."3 "A cascade of 
third world revolutions", coming on top of a humiliating 
withdrawal from Vietnam and culminating in the Iranian 
hostage crisis, the Sadinista victory in Nicaragua and 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, brought home the 
fact that the South was no longer "stable" and that 
traditional interests were at stake.
These factors, combined with the emergence of the new 
right in both the USA and Britain, found political 
expression in the elections of Mrs Thatcher in 1979 and
2 Fred Halliday, "The Sources of the New Cold War", in 
Externinisn and Cold War, ed. New Left Review (London: 
Verso, 1982), p. 293.
3 Ibid., p. 300.
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Ronald Reagan in 1980. Both leaders had a strong 
ideological commitment to anti-communism. Reagan
immediately embarked on "an unprecedented build up of 
nuclear and conventional forces."4 He also embarked on 
covert support for right wing dictatorial regimes, 
anti-insurgency and the Contra war against the Sadinistas in 
Central America. Meanwhile Mrs Thatcher had earned her 
title of Iron Lady from Tass, for her strong condemnation of 
Soviet iniquities, as early as 1976.5 Upon election "her 
instincts told her that the appropriate response to the 
expansion of Soviet power was to increase vigilance, spend 
more on defence and move closer to the Americans, who 
ultimately guaranteed British security".6 Thus, her first 
year in office saw the decision to purchase Trident missiles 
as a replacement for Polaris, support a Nato decision to 
increase defence spending, and the endorsement of the 12 
December 1979 decision to deploy cruise and Pershing 2 
missiles in Europe.
4 April Carter, Peace Movements (London: Longman, 1992),
pp. 108— 112.
5 Brian White, Britain, Detente and Changing East-West 
Relations (London: Routledge, 1992) p. 139.
6 Ibid., p. 140.
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Britain: The Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp
There appears to have been no single logic behind the 
decision to deploy intermediate range nuclear weapons (INF). 
They were a form of modernisation, replacing older short 
range nuclear weapons. More important to nuclear 
strategists was that they "plugged a hole in the ladder of 
escalating response".7 The idea being that Nato, faced with 
possible defeat by conventional Soviet forces, needed a 
credible nuclear response short of all out nuclear war as an 
effective deterrent. The missiles also clearly had a 
political function. European allies saw their deployment as 
committing the USA to the defence of Europe and the USA saw 
them as reaffirming the strength of the alliance. However, 
to a European public increasingly troubled by the 
deterioration of East-West relations, the decision to deploy 
seemed like one more act of provocative sabre rattling that
brought the world closer to the brink of nuclear war.
Why did these deployments arouse public opinion to such 
a degree? The main reason would appear to be that by late 
1979 the public was becoming rather frightened. Public 
opinion surveys in various European countries in the late 
1970s and early 1980s show that fear of world war peaked in 
late 1979 and early 1980 with up to 50 per cent believing 
that it was likely within the next ten years.8 The
7 Thomas R. Rochon, Mobilizing for Peace: The
Antinuclear Movements in Western Europe (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 9.
8 Ibid., p. 47.
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discussions around the new generation of nuclear weapons had 
brought to public attention the shift in nuclear doctrine 
that had occurred. Strategists were no longer talking about 
"mutual assured destruction", and deterrence no longer 
appeared to rest on the unethical but at least 
comprehensible idea of holding the other side to ransom. 
The talk was now of fighting a limited nuclear war in the 
"European Theatre".
Concern in Britain was also heightened by the 
government's decision to revamp civil defence plans and 
increase preparedness for a nuclear attack. The ludicrous 
inadequacy of the proposed defence measures9 did little to 
comfort the public as to the adequacy of nuclear deterrence. 
There was also an increasing awareness that the introduction 
of cruise missiles into Britain, without discussion in 
Parliament and under United States control, was an abuse of 
the democratic process. Historian Edward Thompson, who 
highlighted this through his writings10 and public meetings 
around the country, perhaps did more than any other single 
individual to arouse public opinion. The planned 
deployments of cruise missiles at Greenham Common airbase in 
Berkshire in 1983 and at Molesworth in 1984 gave the public 
a concrete and visible focus for their anxiety and a 
timetable within which to act.
9 Central Office of Information, Protect and Survive 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980).
10 E. P. Thompson, Protest and Survive, Spokesman 
Pamphlet 71, 2nd ed. (London: Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament and Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1980).
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And people did act, across Europe, in their millions.11 
CND (The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), for example, 
grew from less than ten thousand national members in 1979 to 
a peak of ninety thousand members in 1984, with an 
additional quarter of a million active in local groups. 
This S curve of exponential growth was repeated in 
communities across the continent. In October 1983, five 
million people in Europe demonstrated their opposition to 
nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the issue had become part of 
mainstream discussion in British public life, debated within 
the political parties, trade unions, church, the medical 
profession,12 and by lawyers, teachers and scientists, and 
within the military establishment itself.
Separate to these developments but growing in parallel 
with them was an autonomous women's peace movement.13
11 James Hinton, Protests and Visions: Peace Politics in 
Twentieth Century Britain (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989), 
pp. 182— 188. Hinton argues that the "Pentagon's plans for 
'limited' nuclear war restored Europe to History - as the 
killing ground of the cold war". Many active on the Left 
had previously come to see "anti-imperialist struggles in 
the Third World as the decisive events in contemporary 
history". Now "newly identified as victims, Europeans could 
reappropriate historical agency" (p. 185). I quote this 
because I appreciate Hinton's understanding that a sense of 
historical role is part of the drive to action. For most of 
the British women in my study, who did not come out of the 
New Left, this particular shift did not, however, occur.
12 British Medical Association, Board of Science and 
Education, The Medical Effects of Nuclear War (Chichester: 
Wiley on behalf of the British Medical Association, 1983); 
and Church of England, Board of Social Responsibility, The 
Church and the Bomb (London: Hodder and Stoughton/CIO 
Publishing, 1982).
13 I have not attempted to document here the complexity 
of either the European or British peace movement. This is 
well covered in Hinton, Carter and Rochon, cited above. I 
merely wish to show the context in which an autonomous
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Separate womens' organisations for peace, like the Women's 
International League for Peace and Freedom, had existed 
since the First World War, and 1980 saw an increase in its 
membership and an influx of younger women. The late 1970s 
had also seen the gradual emergence of a specifically 
feminist analysis of militarism and non-violence, which 
challenged the equal rights-based socialist feminism of the 
earlier part of the decade, and argued that militarism was 
as much a product of patriarchal culture as the subjugation 
of, and violence towards, women. This analysis also 
stressed that non-violence could be an appropriate tool for 
feminist assertiveness and anger, which, unlike the violent 
liberation advocated by some feminists, could challenge the 
male value system itself, as opposed to either taking it 
over or joining it.14 Another strand of influence was the 
growing anti-nuclear power movement, which had introduced 
the concept of affinity groups to Britain as a basis for 
organising mass non-violent actions.15
By the end of 1980 a wide variety of women's peace 
groups with very different philosophies of action were 
functioning in Britain. Most cooperated in a loose, newly
women's peace movement emerged.
14 I have summarised a complex and multi-faceted 
discussion that went on on both sides of the Atlantic 
between women in the peace, enviromental and women's 
movements. Particularly influential were the writings of 
Barbara Demming and Andrea Dworkin. See also Liddington, 
The Long Road to Greenham, pp. 197— 221.
15. For example, at Torness, a proposed nuclear reactor 
site near Edinburgh in Scotland, where a mass occupation was 
organised in 1978.
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formed network called the Women's Peace Alliance. And new 
initiatives kept emerging: one was the idea for a women- 
initiated march from Cardiff to one of the proposed cruise 
missile deployment sites: RAF Greenham Common, near the town 
of Newbury in Berkshire.
Anne Pettit, the originator of the march, could be said 
to be an embodiment of those separate strands of the 1970s 
described above. She had been involved in the women's 
liberation movement in the early seventies, and then moved 
with her husband to raise a family and run a smallholding in 
Dyfed in Wales. In 1980 she helped to found Carmarthen 
Antinuclear campaign, whose initial focus was nuclear power 
and the immediate threat of waste dumping in mid-Wales. By 
the end of the year, like many groups around the country, it 
had shifted its focus to nuclear weapons. Anne had read 
Protest and Survive, and had also read about a peace march 
from Copenhagen to Paris, led by women. She had also heard 
of an action the previous year, 1980, in the United States, 
when wopen had encircled the Pentagon as "the workplace of 
imperial power that threatens us all".16 The idea caught 
her imagination and she determined on organising something 
similar in Britain. Greenham was the obvious focus.17
Yet the interesting thing is that the majority of women 
who joined the original march had had little experience of 
either the women's movement or of political organising of
16 Ynestra King, "All is Connectedness: Scenes From the 
Women's Pentagon Action USA", in Keeping The Peace, ed. 
Lynne Jones (London: Women's Press, 1983), pp. 40— 64.
17 Liddington, The Long Road to Greenham, pp. 222— 225.
191
any kind. Some were already in local CND groups, others 
felt ignorant "about the peace thing" and saw the march as 
a way of learning. All were attracted by the idea of acting 
clearly as women. Some spoke of being deeply afraid.18 It 
was the lack of media interest over the two weeks that the 
march took to reach the base that led to the decision that 
four women would chain themselves to the base fence on 
arrival at the camp, and that they would demand a televised 
debate on the issue of cruise missiles between the women and 
a government representative. These decisions evolved 
through lengthy discussion during the course of the march, 
setting a pattern that would endure for years: action
arising organically in response to immediate need.
The press took a little interest in the chained women. 
The peace movement, particularly local members in Newbury, 
was enthusiatic in its support, sending messages, bringing 
food and equipment, and encouraging the women to set up a 
more permanent encampment. Within a week the decision to do 
so was made. The response of the Ministry of Defence was to 
state that the matter had been fully debated, citing 
occasions when it had been discussed in five British 
universities, and that the campers could stay as long as 
they wished.
For the first year the camp remained relatively unknown 
outside the peace movement. Yet it was becoming 
established. Some women had put themselves on the electoral
18 Barbara Harford and Sarah Hopkins, Greenham Common: 
Women at the Wire (London: The Women's Press, 1983), p. 12
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register. They were paying water rates, receiving post, and 
inspiring imitations at military bases around the country. 
In February 1982 a crucial decision was made to make the 
camp women only. Again this decision arose very much out of 
immediate circumstances: a concern that, with men present, 
women were again falling into the servicing roles that they 
played at home, and an anxiety that men provoked a more 
violent response from the police on actions and seemed less 
able to de-escalate conflict.
The stated reasons for the march being a women's 
initiative in the first place had been to challenge the 
gender-based division of society and culture which 
overstressed what many women saw as the "masculine" values 
of competition, aggression, objectivity and detachment, and 
undervalued the "feminine" ones of compassion and caring, 
thus excluding women from power and providing a basis for 
militarism and the development of nuclear weapons.19 Many 
women were coming to feel that a challenge to the 
"masculine” could only be made if women had the space to 
discover what "feminine" values really were, without the 
distorting effects of a dominant male presence. Some women 
were alienated and disturbed by the decision, arguing that 
this separatism mimicked the worst aspects of male 
chauvinism, others that the nuclear threat was not exclusive 
so neither should the response be. Women replied that their 
purpose was not to exclude men but, through positive
19 "Womens Action for Disarmament: March from South 
Wales to Greenham Common", leaflet advertising march, 1981. 
Personal files of author.
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discrimination, to include women, by marking out one space 
where women were clearly needed. There were many places to 
act as mixed groups. Nor, they argued, was this a return to 
"separate spheres" where women were seen as the natural 
peace makers. On the contrary, women working separately had 
the opportunity not only to reassert the feminine in a way 
that could be valued by all, but to discover strengths and 
abilities traditionally denied them: the organisational and 
political skills that belonged to the public domain from 
which they were normally excluded. Moreover, they believed 
that if men, in support, took up childcare and homemaking to 
enable women's participation, both sexes would be 
challenging the gender division that dehumanised them all.20
The women's argument that, if they were left to 
themselves new ways of working would emerge that could be 
used by the whole movement, proved justified by subsequent
20 There is a vivid description of the violent response 
of the men at the camp to the decision in Harford and 
Hopkins, Greenham Common: Women at the Wire, pp. 32-34. See 
also Lynne Jones, Keeping the Peace (London: Women's Press, 
1983), pp. 86— 88, and Liddington* The Long Road to 
Greenham, pp. 259— 263. I am unhappy about Liddington's use 
of the word "maternalist" to describe a main current of 
Greenham thinking. Maternal iconography - nappies, photos 
of children toys, etc - was an enormous part of the symbolic 
strength of the camp. Many of the women who participated 
were mothers and carers in one capacity or another, but this 
imagery had more to do with the assertion of the validity of 
women's personal experience as positive, life-affirming, and 
politically relevant, than with marking peace action out as 
women's special domain. Many feminists were wary of 
Greenham at the start because of this imagery. See. for 
example, Janet Radcliffe Richards, "Why Should Women have 
the Monopoly of Virtue?", Guardian, 10 May 1983. I should 
add that the debate was long running and multi-faceted: 
between women about the relation between women and peace, 
the importance of separatism, and the form separatism should 
take; and between women and the whole peace movement about 
women's right to a separate space for action.
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events. What came out of the women-only camp over the next 
two years was a radical, innovative and imaginative form of 
non-violent direct action that had a worldwide impact. The 
insistence on leaderless, cooperative, empowering action 
that allowed for the expression of feelings and connected 
the personal and the political was exemplified by the 
"Embrace the Base" action on 12 December, 1982, when some 
30, 000 women, in response to a photocopied chain letter, 
surrounded the base fence and pinned to it "personal items 
that represent the threat of nuclear war to us and that 
express our lives, our anger and our joy".21 The living 
chain, inspired by the Women's Pentagon Action, sprang up 
again and again in the following years: between nuclear 
facilities, connecting embassies, cities, and along the 
Baltic coast linking countries22. In direct actions such as 
dancing on the missile silos? entering the base as snakes 
and dragons, or as bears coated in honey; removing the fence 
while dressed as witches: in all these women combined an 
increasingly bold assertiveness that confronted and mocked 
the nuclear state with an imaginative symbolism that 
communicated on multiple levels. Within this symbolism the 
theme of connection comes up again and again, most 
concretely expressed by the web. This was both an icon and
21."Women for Life on Earth Say" 'No Cruise Missiles at 
Greenham Common'", chain letter, 14 October 1982. Personal 
files of author.
22 For example: CND action linking military bases at 
Burghfield and Greenham Common, April 1983; CND action 
linking East German and Czechoslovak embassies, Autumn 1984; 
West German antiimissile action linking cities, October 
1983, ecological action along Baltic coast, 1989.
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quite an effective form of obstruction, woven quickly to 
bind women together in actions or to temporarily immobilise 
equipment. Here is one woman's description from the 
"Embrace the Base" action:
I saw again the web, the symbol of the Greenham 
women, woven in wool, into the fence and onto the 
grass, drawn on posters and on garments. 
Everywhere the web, and questions of its meaning 
were stilled as somehow from within the 
understanding grew. We are all interdependent, we 
are all responsible for each other, how delicate 
the strands, how strong the web. The ancient 
spider goddess weaving tirelessly the web of life, 
again and again and again, as often as it is 
needed. Never stopping, never hesitating, working 
tirelessly to build again what was.broken torn or 
damaged.23
Through the constant ebb and flow of women to and from 
the camp, and increasing media attention, these ideas of 
non-hierarchical, less alienating and more spontaneous and 
imaginative forms of organising had permeated into the peace 
movement both at home and abroad. By the end of 1983 the 
term "Greenham Woman" had become synonomous in Britain with 
any woman who chose to take non-violent direct action for 
peace. An established women's peace network existed 
throughout the country, communicating largely by word of 
mouth and irregular newsletter, with the camp (which had now 
expanded to six camps around the nine-mile perimeter fence) 
as its symbolic focus.
The women had got their public debate. By January 1983 
67 per cent of women and 55 per cent of men opposed the
23 Harford and Hopkins, Greenham Common: Women at the 
Wire, p. 92.
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deployment of cruise missiles. Many cited Greenham as a 
factor changing their opinion.24. Greenham was affecting 
Tory women and with a general election looming it was 
probably this factor more than any other that pushed a 
previously indifferent Mrs Thatcher into an offensive 
against the peace movement. At the same time the press 
embarked on a campaign of vilification and abuse of Greenham 
women, focussing on their life style, law breaking and the 
nuisance value of the camp. The emphasis was on women's 
"unnatural" and "unfeminine" behaviour, their disregard for 
"family" values, their sexuality, and their dirty and 
unconventional attire. Such coverage fed the vigilanteism 
that emerged in 1983 in Newbury. Women's benders (tents in 
which they lived) were burned or slashed with knives, some 
had blood or excrement thrown over them, there were attacks 
on the women themselves. The focus on the "evils" of the 
women and the eyesore their encampments created was in 
marked contrast to the relative lack of complaint about the 
missiles themselves. One incensed letter writer to the 
local paper wrote: "We are as digusted and repelled by their 
presence as they are by the arrival of cruise. At least 
cruise is clean. . . ." 25
The women made no attempt to improve their image. They 
pointed out that women overly concerned with appearances and
24 Beatrix Campbell, The Iron Ladies: Why Do Women Vote 
Tory? (London: Virago, 1987), and "Over the Greenham Fence 
and into the Poll Findings", Guardian, 21 January 1983.
25. James Duffett, Letter to the Editor, Newbury Weekly 
News, 1984.
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domestic order were unlikely to be attracted to living in 
the mud and to scaling fences; that mud was dirty and hard 
to remove without running water; that living in a community 
open to any woman, next door to what they perceived as 
preparations for genocide, on permanent public view, was 
bound to produce friction and to make them surly and short- 
tempered with each other and the public at times. They 
argued that female assertiveness always challenged male 
supremacy and that that is why it was denounced, and that a 
society that was more frightened by babies being born and 
living in the open air, mothers that breast fed in front of 
school children,26 and women loving women, than by nuclear 
weapons was a very damaged society indeed. They perceived 
their challenging form of action as part of the process of 
healing.
The combined efforts of the peace movement and Greenham 
were unable to prevent the deployment of cruise. The first 
missiles arrived in mid-November 1983, accompanied by a 
massive reinforcement of the base and the threat that 
unarmed demonstrators penetrating high security areas might 
be shot.27
26. A woman breast-fed her baby while giving a talk to 
local school children in Newbury. This was the subject of 
front-page headlines in the local paper, and provoked a 
lengthy correspondence in the local press. See "Peace Women 
Lecture Row Rocks School", Newbury Weekly News, 24 November 
1983.
27 A policy endorsed as reasonable by the Defence 
Committee hearings the following year. See "The Physical 
Security of Military Installations in the United Kingdom", 
vol. I, Second Report from the House of Commons Defence 
Committee, Session 1983-84 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1984), p. xiv.
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Yet if the government hoped that deployment would 
demobilise the women or the wider movement, they were wrong. 
The cruise missiles' invulnerability to Soviet attack 
depended on the fact that at times of crisis they would be 
dispersed to secret locations in the surrounding 
countryside. Over the next three years, Greenham women, in 
combination with a growing network of non-violent resistance 
called "Cruisewatch", became expert at harrassing and 
disrupting the secret dispersal exercises, ensuring that not 
a single one took place in secret, and exposing the myth of 
invulnerability to detection and sabotage.28
It was, perhaps, this form of effective resistance that 
stimulated the authorities to begin serious attempts to 
"finally” evict the camp in the spring of 1984. Women had 
dealt with earlier attempts by exploiting the multiple 
ownership of land around the base and the fact that all of 
it, as common land, was open to the public for recreation. 
However, joint action by the ministries of Transport and 
Defence and the local council resulted in the temporary 
destruction of the oldest camp at the main (Yellow) gate. 
As an eviction it was a failure. The women, no longer able 
to build any form of permanent structures, simply became yet
28 In January 1984 Jane's Defence Weekly reported that 
"training exercises had been shelved because of political 
problems" caused by "the continued presence of the peace 
protestors". See "Cruise Missiles Locked Inside Geenham 
Bse', Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 January 1984. In 1985
General Charles L. Donelly Jnr, Commander of the American 
Airforce in Europe, admitted that protestors had reduced by 
25 per cent the frequency with which convoys were able to 
move outside Greenham: Joan Smith, "Officialdom Grinds the 
Peace Camps", New Statesman, 14 February, 1986.
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more flexible and mobile and learnt to live in the open. 
Yet this eviction did mark the beginning of a new phase in 
the camp's existence. Over the next few months many of 
those who had been there for two or three years decided to 
leave and, while the publicity of the April eviction had 
brought new women to the camp, it was to a much harsher 
existence and a different framework of action than in 
previous years.
Pressure, both official and unofficial, was now 
unremitting. Evictions were taking place up to five times 
a day by the end of 1985.29 The media showed little 
interest, and the lack of public exposure, while a relief in 
some respects, made the women increasingly vulnerable to 
dangerous physical attacks, both from short-tempered 
baillifs and military personnel.
Yet the women persisted. Numbers at the base (always 
difficult to estimate) fluctuated between ten and fifty, 
still more than in the first year. The focus of action had 
changed. Greenham was no longer about alerting the public 
to the presence of cruise missiles but about persistent non­
violent confrontation with the nuclear state. This 
perpetual resistance, a sort of non-violent guerilla warfare 
with humour, took the form of frequent incursions into the 
base, including penetration of the high security areas, the 
removal and publication of secret documents, occupation of 
the air traffic control tower, commandeering of vehicles,
29 Smith, "Officialdom Grinds", p. 13.
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painting, and rollerskating and bicycling down, the runway 
and hangers: an endless series of actions that made a
mockery of military security. The element of ridicule was 
an important part, as were growing relationships of mutual 
understanding, if not always respect, between some base 
personnel, the police and the women. This was combined with 
a growing understanding of the workings of the base, so that 
women were able to judge in advance when a convoy was due 
out and could so alert Cruisewatch. What is more, women had 
extended their area of operations to all the surrounding 
nuclear facilities: entering the atomic weapons research
facility at Aldermaston (AWRE), the bomb stores at Welford, 
and climbing into Fill aircraft at Upper Heyford.
The bombing of Libya and the accident at the nuclear 
power plant at Chernobyl in April 1986 had highlighted the 
dangers of the whole nuclear cycle. However, nuclear 
technology had, from the earliest days, been seen as only 
the most dangerous symptom of more deeper and complex 
problems. By 1984 the rhetoric of connection was being 
turned into practice. Women picketed with miners' wives in 
the coal miners' strike and helped create the LINKS campaign 
that connected the problems of uranium mining and apartheid 
in Namibia, nuclear power, pit closures, and nuclear 
weapons.30 Women campaigned for a Nuclear Free Pacific, 
against food mountains, shared meagre funds with women in 
Nicaragua and Tigre, and abseiled into the House of Lords to
30 Anne Suddick, "Making the Links: Women Against Pit 
Closures", in A Nuclear Future?, ed. Raphael Samuel and 
Hilary Wainwright (London: The Socialist Society, 1986).
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protest against Clause 28 (which aimed to make it illegal 
for local authorities to "promote" homosexuality). In fact, 
the dispersal of energy entailed sometimes created tensions 
at the camp among women hard pressed from coping with both 
nightwatches for the convoys and constant evictions. As one 
woman commented: "Greenham women may be everywhere but they 
certainly are not at Greenham."31 The stress of
maintaining an effective vigil grew as support for the peace 
movement waned generally. Yet Greenham was still the focus 
of an informal network of women and had had an irreversible 
effect on the mainstream peace movement. Greenham women 
were regularly elected onto CND council and at least token 
attention was paid to feminist practice and analysis, while 
the idea of women organising separately, if not acceptable, 
was at least an established fact. Greenham had introduced 
a "new creative culture of radical protest into Britain."32
It is clear that the government, even after missile 
deployment, did not feel it had won the nuclear debate. On 
the contrary, continuing domestic pressure is noted by 
Freedman as one of the factors pushing Mrs Thatcher to adopt 
a more dovish approach to East-West relations in her second
31 Sarah Hipperson, "Are We Making the Best of Cruise?" 
Women For Life on Earth, Autumn 1984.
32 Liddington, The Long Road to Greenham, p. 281. I do 
not agree that "feminist argument and practice had become 
integrated into the mainsteam of analysis". The handling of 
a number of rapes at another mixed peace camp, largely by 
refusing to acknowledge that they had occurred, showed that 
the issue of male violence towards women was still a 
problematic one for the mixed peace movement. For many 
women at the camp the rapes confirmed their view that this 
was the fundamental problem underlying the nuclear issue.
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term of office.33 Concern about public feelings on the 
issue, and sensitivity to a growing debate on civil 
liberties, is probably what restrained the government from 
using the full force of the law against Greenham women. 
Anti-nuclear activists had received sentences of up to 
eighteen years in the United States for direct action,34 and 
six British activists had received punitive sentences under 
the Official Secrets Act (OSA) in 1962. Yet, although on 
many occasions women were charged under the OSA, they were 
never prosecuted. The government was no doubt wary of the 
likely impact of an Old Bailey trial and conscious that a 
jury might not necessarily convict. Instead, pressure took 
the form of manipulating the charges to confine women to an 
unsympathetic magistrates' court, a refusal to accept the 
camp address or to allow the women legal aid,35 and the 
imposition of injunctions on particular women both to 
prevent them from going to the base or from encouraging 
others to do so. None of these pressures proved effective 
in undermining the camp, or in deterring women from action. 
By 1986,according to the New Statesman, Greenham arrests had
33 Laurence Freedman, "Thatcherism and Defence", in The 
Thatcher Effect, ed. D. Kavanagh and A. Seldon (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 143— 53.
34 Helen Woodson received an eighteen-year sentence for 
hammering on nuclear warheads in a missile silo in Missouri, 
USA, in 1984. Other women received eight-year sentences for 
similar actions in 1986. See Women's Peace Alliance 
Newsletter, 27 March 1987.




What this form of pressure did do was increase both the 
women's consciousness of the connections between nuclear 
weapons and the abuse of civil liberties, and give them the 
opportunity to develop a remarkable legal expertise. This 
was crucial in protecting them from mistreatment and 
harassment by the authorities, and it eventually led to a 
successful legal challenge to the government's restrictive 
by-laws, introduced in 1985 in order to control the protest. 
It also resulted in the astounding revelation that all 
military structures within the base were illegal.37
In fact, the greatest threat to the camp and the 
Greenham movement as a whole was internal. In 1987 a 
damaging split occurred between Yellow-gate women and the
36 Liddington, The Long Road to Greenham, p. 280. 
Accurate figures are difficult to obtain, as the deputy 
clerk at Newbury Magistrates' Court prevented the New 
Statesman from obtaining court listings, and women have not 
kept systematic listings. Figures have probably at least 
doubled since this date, many women being charged, fined and 
imprisoned under the now illegal by-laws.
37 The government made its most significant attempt to 
deter the women's actions by introducing new by-laws in 
April 1985. These made it possible to charge women acting 
at or in the base with a number of minor offences. This had 
no deterrent effect whatsoever: over 100 women entered the 
base in the first week after the introduction of the by­
laws, and 370 on a mass tresspass at the end of May. 
Moreover, the women challenged the government on the 
legality of the by-laws, arguing that they denied the rights 
of commoners. After a long drawn out legal battle taking 
five years, the Law Lords agreed that the women were right. 
Work for the case also revealed that the Ministry of Defence 
had failed to seek the necessary permission from the 
Department of Enviroment for building on the base and that, 
consequently, all the structures inside the fence were 
illegal. The ministry's response to this was to attempt a 
sleight of hand that retrospectively resolved the problem by 
extinguishing commoners' rights and offering compensation to 
those affected.
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rest of the camp. This took the form of major disagreements 
over what the camp was about, who constituted a "Greenham 
woman", how to confront racism, what constituted non­
violence, and the role of leaders. There were ugly and 
painful scenes and meetings, many women found friendships 
irreparably broken, were deeply hurt, and chose to 
withdraw.38 Yet the camp continued, perhaps largely due to 
the fact that the geography of the base allowed the two 
groups to function more or less autonomously, and support 
groups were able simply to choose the group with whom they 
had the most sympathy.
1987 also brought the INF treaty. This was the first 
treaty ever to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and was 
seen by the peace movement as a response to their efforts. 
However, the camp had always been about the physical 
reality, not words, and with convoy exercises continuing on 
a monthly basis that reality had not changed. Convoy 
exercises finally ended in autumn 1990 and the last missiles 
were removed shortly after. The camp remained for the next 
three years, still concerned with the issue of common land 
and still a symbolic focus for women engaged in anti­
militarist action. For example, Greenham women from all 
around the country were heavily involved in protests against 
the Gulf War.
38 The role of an outside group, "Wages for Housework", 
in fomenting this division is still debated. I only have 
access to papers and interviews that present one side of the 
debate. See, for example, Beatrix Campbell, "Crisis at 
Greenham", Sanity, November 1987, and "Greenham Women 
Everywhere", Camp Newsletter, issued by Blue Gate to mark 
the sixth anniversary of the camp.
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Poland: Wolnosc i Pokoi (Freedom and Peaces
December 12 is not only a significant date for the history 
of the Cold War in the West. In the last hours of December 
12 1981, Polish leader General Jaruzelski declared a "State 
of War" - martial law - and in the early hours of the 
following day, with the help of the Polish army, brought to 
an end Poland's attempt in self limiting revolution.39
Solidarity, the fifteenth-month-old, independent trade 
union, was completely unprepared for a coup, and in the 
short term the coup was successful. Links with the outside 
world were cut, the civilian telephone network disconnected, 
and over ten thousand activists confined in internment camps 
or prisons in the first year. Riot police - Zomo - and in 
some cases tanks were used to storm factories being defended 
by workers, and it is likely that between 50 and 100 people 
were killed during the same period.40
In the long run, however, "martial law was a failure .
39 The precise factors which made the authorities opt 
for martial law rather than attempt a political compromise 
with society are well discussed in David Ost, Solidarity and 
the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in 
Poland since 1968 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1990), pp. 148 ff. As well as more domestic 
considerations, the hardening of Western attitudes towards 
the Eastern bloc - as demonstrated by the threatened new 
missile deployments - also played a part.
40 Neal Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York: 
Random House, 1987), p. 223. Helsinki Watch reports that 
sixty thousand people were fined for participating in 
various sorts of protest in the first year of martial law. 
More than ten thousand were fired from their jobs for 
political reasons. See: Polish Helsinki Watch Committee, 
Poland under Martial Law: A Report on Human Rights (New 
York: US Helsinki Watch Committee, 1983), pp. 262— 275.
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. . carried out with a brutality that appalled and alienated 
the nation, and yet it was not brutal enough to terrorise 
the Poles into passivity".41 Resistance was facilitated by 
the fact that Solidarity was more than just a trade union of 
ten million people. For one thing, as Ascherson points out, 
it was a very unusual trade union: its horizontal bodies 
that brought people of all trades together in regional 
branches and included groupings for students and farmers, 
and in which the better paid and organised could help the 
less well off, "was the shape of a political movement rather 
than a normal trade union".42 In its fifteenth-month 
existence it had wrought an irreversible change of 
consciousness in Polish society. It had broken down 
artificial barriers between Poles - "barriers of money, 
class or caste, of region, of skill and profession . . . and 
had given back to Poles their feeling of community and 
common interest." The main division was now between civil 
society and the leadership of the Polish United Worker's 
Party.43 As a consequence, it was not difficult for society 
to adopt the strategies recommended by some of the 
Solidarity leadership, now underground, to avoid a head-on
41 Neal Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland, p. 223. 
Helsinki Watch documents seventy-two people who died 
directly or indirectly as a result of police action, prior 
to 1985. See: Polish Helsinki Committee, Human Rights in 
Poland Since December 1981: A Report by the Polish Helsinki 
Committee to the Human Rights Experts' Meeting in Ottawa, 
May 1985, trans. Bogdan and Elizabeth Wasiutynski (New York: 
Helsinki Watch Committee, 1985), p. 36.
42 Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland, p. 207.
43 Ibid., p. 215.
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confrontation that might result in massive bloodshed, and, 
instead to create a strong informal and decentralised 
movement. The idea was to create a parallel society 11 where 
the government will control the empty shops, but not the 
market: places of employment but not people's livelihood: 
the state media, but not information: printing houses, but 
not important publications: post office and telephone
services, but not communication: the schools, but not
education." This was "evolution, not revolution"44 And to 
some degree this is what happened.
Martial law had solved nothing, particularly the basic 
question of how to rconcile the interests of state and 
society. The economic crisis that had brought Solidarity 
and the government into head-on collision deepened, and 
society was even less willing to cooperate with any 
necessary reforms. Sanctions imposed by the West 
exacerbated the problems. Meanwhile, the use of force had 
weakened the theoretical underpinning of the system beyond 
recovery. Communist ideology had lost its last vestiges of 
credibility in its ruthless crushing of a genuine workers 
movement.
Yet the government, by the mid-1980s, showed no signs 
of giving way to opposition demands, in particular for the 
release of political prisoners and the re-legalisation of 
Solidarity. Martial law had been replaced by repressive
44 Norman Davies, A Short History of Poland (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 388. Davies provides a 
good summary of the debates on oppositional strategy at this 
time.
emergency legislation, such as that permitting the police to 
use physical force even when not physically threatened.45 
The authorities, however, while determined to exclude the 
opposition, did make some attempt to rebuild cooperation 
with some sectors of society, in particular intellectuals 
and the Church. Censorship laws, for example, were still 
the least restrictive in Eastern Europe. However, while the 
mass protests and the almost total cultural boycott of the 
first year of martial law had ceased, there was no evidence 
of reconciliation. For the most part people found solace in 
reading underground literature, attending patriotic masses, 
and retreating into private life. The government knew that 
sullen passivity was not consent. It was a stalemate. As 
Ascherson explains, the limits of possibility were well 
demonstrated to both sides by the murder of the radical 
priest Father Jerzy Popielusko. His "Masses for the 
Fatherland" had been immensely popular, and his abduction 
and killing by secret policemen in 1984 provoked a new wave 
of moral outrage and mass protest. The killers were then 
put on trial, though the senior government figures who were 
certainly involved were never implicated. What the murder 
and the subsequent trial showed was that "on the one hand, 
there were elements in the regime prepared to kill rather 
than lose control, and this fact - reinforcing the lessons 
of December 1981 - told the opposition that the price of 
all-out resistance was too high. On the other hand, the





regime was tacitly admitting that the price of reducing 
Poland to conformity and obedience was also too high.”46 
No-one had a clear vision of what should or could happen 
next.
In this atmosphere the emergence of an independent 
anti-militarist movement seemed an unlikely development, yet 
that is what occurred. To understand quite how unlikely, it 
is first necessary to understand Polish attitudes to the 
peace issue in general. First of all, there is no anti­
militarist or pacifist tradition in Poland. Two hundred 
years of armed struggle for Polish independence had made the 
army a respected institution in Polish eyes. This respect 
had not been completely destroyed by the army's role in the 
imposition of martial law. Meanwhile, the communist 
authorities' perpetual propaganda about peace, the dangers 
of the Western nuclear threat, and the peace-loving peoples 
of the Soviet bloc rang hollow in the ears of a society 
which had three times since 1945 (1956; 1971; 1981) seen 
Polish people killed by the Polish authorities, and had seen 
the Polish army used to invade a fraternal ally in 1968. 
Solidarity spokesperson Janusz Onyszkiewicz summed up the 
scepticism Polish people had about the Western peace 
movement: that it was at best an innocent dupe of the KGB, 
and that it completely failed to understand the nature of 
life under a totalitarian regime, from whence came the real 
threat to peace. "Lack of justice and fairness in 
relationships between nations, lack of truly democratic
46 Ascherson, The Struggles For Poland, p. 227.
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control of governments, the reduction of individuals to the 
status of objects, continually creates the danger of war”.47 
The film The Day After, for example, had been greeted with 
cynicism, because, as Onyszkiewicz explained to me at the 
time, "anyone who lived through the forties and fifties in 
Poland is not going to be frightened by this film. We had 
a joke at that time which went 'Truman please drop it, we 
cannot stand it any longer'." Most Poles felt they 
understood the nature of real war - they had lived through 
it - and that the current harsh realities of daily life took 
precedence over the rather vague threat of apocalypse.48
However, there was a growing consciousness that in some 
senses Solidarity, in its disciplined non-violence and 
persistent resistance, was a real peace movement. Jacek 
Kuron, in an Open Letter "to all people in the world who 
care about peace" stated as much:
From December the 13, 1981, Polish society has
been blackmailed with the outbreak of war. The 
Poles remain alone in their responsibility for the 
destiny of their nation and world peace. By 
displaying extraordinairy patience they are today 
maintaining peace in the world. . . • Peace is
impossible without the removal of the situation in 
which the armies of the Warsaw Pact stand ready to 
conduct war at any moment with their own society.
He therefore argued for the demilitarisation of Central 
Europe and stated that the world peace movements should
47 Letter to Mient Jan Faber, Coordinator of the 
External Relations Sub-commitee, European Nuclear
Disarmament Convention, July 1984. Personal Files of
author.
48 Rachel Adams [Lynne Jones], "Dialogue Across the Iron 
Curtain", New Statesman, 12 October 1984.
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support the "peaceful struggle of Polish society against the 
mi 1 itary dictatorship".49
At the end of 1984 the Polish government itself took 
the step that was to initiate a genuine peace movement. On 
8 December 1984 the Military Court of Justice in Szczecin 
sentenced a young draftee in the Polish People's Army, Marek 
Adamkiewicz, to two and a half years in prison for his 
refusal to take the military oath. Adamkiewicz had refused 
because the oath was in conflict with his personal and 
social convictions, in particular the demand that he "remain 
faithful to the Government of the Polish People's republic" 
and "steadfastly guard peace in fraternal alliance with the 
army of the Soviet Union and other allied armies". His 
action was no different from that taken by many young men, 
particularly since martial law. Previously such refusals 
had either been quietly ignored or the objectors dismissed 
from service on grounds of "ill health" or other pretexts. 
However in October 1984, in keeping with the greater 
political repression of that period, the military chamber of 
the Supreme Court had decided that oath refusal was 
equivalent to a refusal to serve and that refusers could 
therefore be punished with up to six years in prison. 
Adamkiewicz was well know in opposition circles as a former 
activist of Student Solidarity (NZS) and had already been 
interned for a year under martial law. In spite of the fact 
that his superior officers had praised him as a good
49 Jacek Kuron, "Open Letter to All People in the World 
Who Care about Peace", Tygodnik Mazowsze (Warsaw), 7 June 
1984.
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soldier, the authorities no doubt wished that his punishment 
would serve as an example and a deterrent to others.50
The reverse happened. Adamkiewicz was well liked, and 
a circle of friends and academics petitioned the Council of 
State for the sentence to be quashed. They argued that 
"military service is a social issue, whereas the oath is an 
ethical one; it is an individual act of human conscience and 
thus it cannot be the object of duress".51 The petition 
produced no response and in March 1985 some twenty young 
people from Warsaw, Poznan and Szczecin, including many old 
NZS friends of Adamkiewicz, organised a week-long fast at 
the Podkowna Lesna church on the outskirts of Warsaw. The 
point of the fast was primarily to demand the release of 
Adamkiewicz. However, during that week there were seminars 
and intense discussions on the peace issue as a whole. 
Prominent members of the opposition attended. The 
discussions crystallised a view that had been growing for 
some months, namely, that the time was ripe for an 
independent peace movement.
That it was the right issue at the right time was
50 The main sources for this chronology are my own 
notes and records, which based on first-hand observation and 
interviews during the period 1985-1991. Additional sources 
are a chronology provided in Documents of Wolnosc i Pokoj
(Seattle and Berkeley: World Without War Council, 1989), pp. 
7-19; and Christopher Lazarski, "The Polish Independent 
Peace Movement", in In Search of Civil Society: Independent 
Peace Movements In the soviet Bloc, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu 
(London: Routledge, 1990). In general these sources agree. 
Where there is disagreement I have relied on my first-hand 
information. I have given my personal archives on WiP a 
preliminary classification, starting chronologically with 
WP1.
51 Documents of Wolnosc i Pokoj, p. 7.
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demonstrated by the almost simultaneous circulation of an 
appeal in Krakow. This appeal annouced the founding of a 
"Freedom and Peace" movement, "inspired primarily by the 
peace sermons of Pope John Paul II".
The main aim of our movement will be to bring as 
many Poles as possible to true unambiguous 
understanding of Peace. "The word 'Peace' - said 
John Paul II - has too often become a slogan that 
puts asleep or misleads'. The word is nowadays 
more often used by those who utter slogans about 
peace cooperation and disarmament while trying to 
deprive free peoples all over the world of the 
means and the will to defend their liberties. . . 
. The intentions of those using the word peace are 
morally suspect and politically alien. Therefore, 
in the first place, we want to give peace 
activities back their moral and political value.
Secondly, the appeal insisted that personal freedom and 
human rights were a precondition for peace. Thus "there is 
no peace in communist Poland. We want to do all we can to 
broaden the space of human freedom in our country so that 
peace in Poland will be given a chance". Thirdly, it 
expressed the desire to cooperate with all those with 
similar goals both in and outside Poland and condemned the 
"ideological violence" being used against the Afghan 
people.52 In May of the same year the Warsaw group signed 
this statement and Wolnosc i Pokoj (WiP) was born.
52 Founding declaration of Wolnosc i Pokoj. English 
translation in "Letter of Freedom and Peace to the END 
Convention in Amsterdam", Krakow, 14 April 1985 [WP2]. WiP 
built on the relationship established with the Western non- 
aligned peace movement by an underground group called KOS, 
the Commitees for Social Resistance, who, through their 
published correspondence with the Western groups, had opened 
up the discussion on peace issues in underground circles.
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WiP was a pluralist, informal and unstructured, and 
geographically dispersed movement from the start. Groups 
grew out of local friendship circles, and different emphases 
and viewpoints reflecting the founders' varied backgrounds 
and previous political experience were evident even at this 
stage. The Krakow appeal, for example, made no mention of 
military service or oath refusal specifically, and 
emphasised the threat of totalitarianism to peace. Some of 
the central figures there were former or current members of 
the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN).
In contrast, a central figure in the Warsaw group was 
Jacek Czaputowicz, ex-NZS, father of three, and a personal 
friend of Adamkiewicz. His comment on the Krakow appeal was 
'•too much Freedom and not enough Peace", and he stressed 
that the movement should have "concrete, limited , 
achievable, Polish goals."®3 "What we are concerned with is 
the human individual. The movement has grown around one 
person. Our main aim is to help particular people - not 
parading slogans like "peace", "disarmament", etc. . . .
Once we score on concrete issues like the release of 
Adamkiewicz, securing an alternative service or a change to 
the military oath, then will be the time to take up more 
general issues."54 Czaputowicz felt that the West failed to 
realise that "the greatest threat to peace is the servility
53 Interview with Jacek Czaputowicz, quoted in "Report 
on trip to Poland, July 8-22, 1985", END Polish Working
Group.
54 "A Conversation with Jacek Czaputowicz", Solidarity 
Information Bulletin,, no. 117/119, reprinted in Uncensored 
Poland, December 1985.
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and submissiveness of the individual in society as well as 
the army."S5 This point was emphasised in a letter to 
Western peace movements:
The majority of us know that it is just as 
possible to be killed by a truncheon in a police 
station as by a death- dealing rocket, though 
death from a weapon of mass destruction is a 
question of tomorrow, whereas we face truncheons 
every day. A man blindly obeying army orders 
constitutes a greater threat to peace than the 
neutron bomb. The murderers of Auschwitz and the 
murderers of Father Popieluszko excused themselves 
by saying they were just carrying out orders.56
Both groups had actually seen where the current regime 
might be vulnerable. A challenge to the military oath was 
a challenge both to Soviet hegemony and to the authority of 
the Polish government. Compulsory military service was one 
remaining form of political and ideological control, which 
the government had used with effect in spring 1983 when it 
drafted large numbers of Solidarity activists into the army. 
Whatever the Polish public might feel about the "peace 
issue" in general, young people particularly were sickened 
by the militarisation of everyday life. Military training 
began at fourteen years with school classes in civil defence 
and handling weapons graded like any other. Military 
service was compulsory for all males and certain groups of 
females like doctors, and at nineteen all non-student males
55 "Interview with Jacek Czaputowicz", War Resister's 
International Bulletin, May/Junel985.
56 WiP Letter to END Convention in Amsterdam, July 1985 
[WP2].
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were conscripted for two to three years, depending on the 
service. College students of both sexes had to undergo 
compulsory military training, which was treated and graded 
like an academic subject and therefore had to be "passed" in 
order for the student to graduate, after which all males had 
to undergo a short officer training. After return to 
civilian life all males had to carry military ID cards and 
remain partially under military jurisdiction until 
retirement. They could be regularly recalled for two to 
three month refresher courses. As stated above, there was 
effectively no conscientious objector status in Poland, in 
spite of a constitutional guarantee of liberty of conscience 
and religion.57 Even the most non-politically minded 
youngster was aware of the humiliation and degradation of 
army life:
The army is hell. . . . Officers and older
soldiers are allowed to mistreat young recruits.
There are frequent cases of nervous breakdown. .
. , even suicides. . . . Let no one kid himself
that the army is a school for life: it is often
the cause of death.58
From the point of view of the state, soldiers who would 
not fight were just as threatening as workers who would not 
work. Yet, in confronting an independent peace movement on
57 "Conscientious Objectors in Poland", Tygodnik 
Mazowsze (Warsaw), no. 143 [English translation: WP 6].
58 From Z Dnia na Dzien [From Day to Day: army
newspaper] 14, 14 April 1985, p. 358, quoted in Lazarski,
"The Polish Independent Peace Movement", in In Search of
Civil Society: Independent Peace Movements In the Soviet 
Bloc, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (London: Routledge, 1990).
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this issue, they were hoist with the petard of their own 
propaganda:
Persecution . . . would compromise their much
cherished "dovish image", useful in the 
"international struggle for peace", and it would 
destroy the "liberal image" necessary for the 
extraction of Western loans. If the regime chose 
a moderate policy . . .  an independent peace 
movement would bring several opportunities. The 
opposition, strong enough to ensure its existence 
and too weak to overthrow the regime, could not 
propose any viable program for the solution of the 
Polish crisis. This failure resulted in general 
frustration. The peace movement seemed to offer 
a new and unorthodox method of weakening the 
communist state and of reviving the opposition 
movement itself.59
One of the most critical decisions WiP activists made at the 
beginning was to act openly. Signing their own names to 
documents made them vulnerable to arrest, but it also 
allowed for growth, and WiP grew rapidly with small groups 
of activists in Warsaw, Krakow, Wroclaw, Szczecin, and 
Gdansk. Numbers were "difficult to judge, we have no lists 
of members, nobody pays fees", but there was thought to be 
a core of one hundred activists and supporters, "maybe 
1000s".60 Growth brought a rethinking and widening of the 
agenda as activists pushed for their own interpretation of 
the peace issue.
For example, many of the Gdansk activists had
59 Lazarski, "The Polish Independent Peace Movement", in 
In Search of Civil Society: Independent Peace Movements In 
the Soviet Bloc, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (London: Routledge, 
1990), p. 120.
60 Interview with Piotr Niemczyk, Poglad, 16 February
1986.
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previously been involved in punk and anarchist movements. 
Their anti-militarism was of a more fundamentalist variety 
than that of the WiP founders:
We do not regard alternative service as a final 
goal, but as a means of getting rid of the army 
altogether. The struggle against the army is part 
of our programme, whose goal is to abolish state 
authority over the individual - more broadly, the 
elimination of violence in public life, the 
elimination of censorship and of the death 
penalty. We fight to protect the natural 
environment (we are opposed to Russian-style 
nuclear power plants in Poland). This cannot be 
achieved instantaneously (either by miracle or 
revolution) - it should be approached in stages, 
today's stage is the army!"61
Their influence, among others', on the agenda of WiP can be 
seen in the lengthy Declaration of Aims, produced by the 
group at Machowa in November 1985.
This was a deeper and more thoughtful statement than 
the previous declaration. It described WiP as having three 
"foundations": firstly, "the struggle for civic rights,
religious freedom and for national independence". Secondly, 
a desire to educate Poles about the dangers of nuclear war: 
"the modern world once again faces the danger of war, with 
consequences for human civilisation which may prove 
irreversible. Many Poles fail to see this danger, treating
61 RSA [The Movement for an Alternative Society] 
leaflet, "Schweik", July 1986, quoted in Franek Michalski, 
"Anarchism and Youth Culture in Poland", Across Frontiers, 
Winter 1988. Even anarchists in Poland held to the strategy 
of evolutionary change first formulated by Adam Michnik in 
his essay "A New Evolutionism", in Adam Michnik, Letters 
from Prison and Other Essays, trans. Maya Latynski 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 135- 
-148.
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it as a figment of communist propaganda. The threat of 
nuclear war, militarism and militaristic education goes 
unnoticed. This we want to change". Thirdly, "we want to 
foster knowledge which would enable people to discover a 
sense to life and their place in the world, a knowledge 
based on Christian ethics, humanistic psychology, the 
philosophy of the East, and other trends in human thought 
which treat man as a subject". The statement then dealt 
with the problems it saw as part of its agenda. These were: 
"human rights", including opposition to the death penalty; 
"National Liberation", which included the "support of 
nations oppressed either ideologically or by a foreign 
power", and for the "striving of ethnic groups and national 
minorities for autonomy and a degree of self determination"; 
the "danger of War" including nuclear war, and the problems 
of both the oath and compulsory military service; 
"preservation of the natural environment"; "starvation in 
the world"; and "the development of man".62
This wide ranging agenda clearly reflected the 
priorities of different groups, a recognition of 
interconnection of issues, and the influence of the Western 
peace movement with whom WiP were in growing contact.63 
Perhaps it was recognition of their own pluralism that
62 Documents of Wolnosc i Pokoj, pp. 22— 27.
63 My impression, from numerous articles and 
discussions, was that the anti-nuclear agenda was always 
secondary. WiP never adopted unilateralism as a tactic, and 
many of its members continued to condemn it as a strategy 
for disarmament in the West.
inspired a special section stating that "the basis of 
cooperation in the movement between people of different 
outlooks is tolerance and mutual understanding of different 
ways leading to solutions of fundamental contemporary 
problems". In fact, in concrete terms and in the eyes of 
the public, WiP's activities and agenda became focussed on 
the joint issues of alternative service and oath refusal. 
This focus was exemplified by the adoption of Otto Schiroek 
as a symbolic patron of the movement. Schimek was a young 
Viennese Catholic, conscripted into the Wehrmacht and 
executed in southern Poland in 1944 for "desertion and 
cowardice in the face of the enemy". Local legend claimed 
that, in fact, he had first sheltered Polish partisans and 
then refused to participate in their execution. His grave 
was already a shrine, and anniversaries of his death and 
birthday were commemorated with a mass before the emergence 
of WiP. For WiP "the significance of this figure extends 
far beyond the historical limits of the Second World War. 
The refusal to carry out orders and the following of the 
dictates of one's own conscience signifies an end to 
totalitarianism, fascism, communism - to every unacceptable 
authority".64 The Machowa declaration was written after an 
attempt by WiP members to attend a commemorative mass and 
lay a wreath on Schimek's grave had been broken up by the 
police.
The attempt to pay public homage to Schimek was an
64 Jaroslaw Dubiel, "The Spirit of Otto Schimek", Voice 
of Solidarity, April 1986.
example of WiP's intention to "find ways of non-violent 
action effective in the conditions created by Communist 
totalitarianism”.65 One method, a reflection of the 
intellectual, oppositional culture from which WiP emerged, 
was the constant production of a stream of articles, open 
letters, magazines, and leaflets for local, national and 
international consumption. This form of illegal activity 
had a much greater influence and significance than it would 
have had in the West. The unofficial media was widely read, 
particularly by young people. WiP was also developing 
concrete actions. Previously, in protest at Adamkiewicz's 
continuing detention, members had begun sending back their 
military ID cards with an accompanying letter stating that 
"I am taking this action not because I am opposed to 
military service, of which the aim is the defence of the 
motherland, but from a decision not to participate in lies 
and hypocrisy".66 The response of the authorities to WiP up 
to this point had been "ignore it and it will go away". 
Even now, although fines were imposed on those involved, no 
follow up was taken for refusal to pay. However, more 
punitive sentences were being imposed on the small but 
growing number refusing military service altogether: 
Wojciech Jankowski, a Gdansk school teacher, was sentenced 
to three and a half years in a maximum security prison. The 
judge commented that the sentence reflected "the socially 
damaging nature of the offence", and the fact that "similar
65 Documents of Wolnosc i Pokoj, p. 23.
66 WiP letter [Wp6].
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offences occur with increasing frequency in the area of the 
court's jurisdiction".67
In 1986 the government opted for full scale repression 
of the movement. This change in tactic was in part no doubt 
stimulated by WiP's increasing public profile. In February, 
Piotr Niemczyk and Jacek Czaputowicz were arrested on 
charges of "having connections with a clandestine or 
outlawed organisation; . . . spreading false information; . 
. . "sowing unrest"; and "giving information to interests 
hostile to Poland": charges which carried penalties of up to 
five years.68 This was not an attempt to deter specific
actions, but was, through criminalising the group, a 
determined attack on its existence.
Again the authorities had miscalculated. The arrests 
provoked an immediate wave of protest both inside and 
outside the country: women members of WiP began a week-long 
hunger strike at the church of Podkowna Lesna to publicise 
the arrests. Prominent members of the opposition signed a 
petition echoing WiP's demands for a change in the oath,
67 "Peace movement on trial", Uncensored Poland, January
1986.
68 Rachel Adams [Lynne Jones], "Take Not that Hypocritic 
Oath", New Statesman, 4 April 1986. In response to the 
outcry the charge of spreading false information was almost 
immediately dropped [WP 19]. But, in July, the charges were 
upgraded to having "entered into an agreement with a person 
working for a foreign organisation in order to act to the 
damage of Polish political interests, and to "organising, 
joining and leading a criminal organisation", making them 
vulnerable to ten years imprisonment. They were also 
excluded, along with a third of political prisoners, from 
the amnesty of that month. The military prosecutor 
announced that he had proof that the non-aligned peace 
movements were financed by the CIA.
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alternative service and the freeing of conscientous 
objectors. Lech Walesa issued a statement in Niemczyk's and 
Czaputowicz's support. Petitions and letters of protest 
from peace groups throughout the West poured in.
The combination of the seriousness of the charges and 
the international attention markedly increased WiP's status 
and visibility. Niemczyk and Czaputowicz were released in 
the amnesty of September 1986. The government, anxious for 
Western aid and the lifting of sanctions, had freed almost 
all of its political prisoners. However, conscientous 
objectors (COs), including Jankowski, had not been released. 
Conseguently, eleven WiP members staged a sit down in 
central Warsaw, in spite of Solidarity's disapproval of such 
provocative tactics. The WiP COs were released from jail 
two days later.69 The government had failed to repress 
peace activity? instead, it had given WiP a place in the 
mainstream opposition.
The mainstream opposition at the end of 1986 was 
actually in a state of some disarray. The amnesty had 
removed Solidarity's main political demand and made it 
possible for the leadership to meet openly.70 WiP had 
demonstrated that there was more political space than had
69 It should be explained that the majority of COs in 
Poland were Jehovah's Witnesses and WiP did much to 
publicise their cause. They were not freed in this amnesty 
but the government agreed to alternative work in coal mines 
at the end of 1986.
70 David Ost provides an excellent summary of this 
period, and of the confusion within Solidarity on its re- 
emergence from underground. See: Solidarity and the Politics 
of Anti-Politics, pp. 160— 169.
been imagined. Moreover, there were changes in the 
international environment. The beginnings of a
rapprochement between Gorbachev and Reagan had changed the 
domestic situation. However, the ten million-strong trade 
union movement no longer existed. Arguably "by late 1986, 
what used to be Solidarity was now a disparate collection of 
political oppositionists loosely held together by the 
authority of Lech Walesa". 71 Moreover, many in the 
Solidarity leadership were now much less interested in trade 
union work per se and much more concerned with systemic 
political reform. This was a "national goal" that could 
only be achieved through "high level negotiations". There 
were few tasks that could be offered to the ordinary 
supporter.72 Thus, for most people, while the word 
Solidarity continued to have a symbolic and mythic function, 
in concrete terms it meant less and less. Yet if "the 
opposition had lost much of its influence, it [was] equally 
true that the authorities [had] not gained any".73 In this 
atmosphere of social inertia and disillusion WiP, with its 
clear concrete goals, its radical and innovatory style of 
action, openness and easy camaraderie, appeared particularly 
inspiring to the younger post-Solidarity generation. The 
movement grew rapidly. By the end of 1986 there were active 
groups in ten cities. At least one hundred people were
71 Ibid., p. 163.
72 Ibid., pp. 164— 5.
73 Zbigniew Romaszewski, "Solidarity at the Crossroads", 
Kultura, no. 1-2 (1987).
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either refusing the oath or military service, at this point 
without arrest,74 while the government appeared to be on 
the defensive about the issue, using its own media to both 
accuse the movement of being "traitors to the homeland" and 
to discuss the feasibility of alternative service.75
In addition, the authorities had decided to attack the 
Schimek legend, not only arresting and beating up 
demonstrators on the now regular trips to his grave, but 
also insisting on the Werhmacht version of the story (that 
stated he was shot merely for desertion, not for refusing to 
execute partisans). The heroic version was far too 
threatening to the Polish communist authorities: it set an 
example of a courageous refusal to carry out orders 
motivated by deep religious faith, not ideology, and it also 
undermined the stereotype of "the bad German". The 
authorities apparently missed not only the irony of having 
to support their version of events with Wehrmacht 
documentation, but also the point made by WiP, namely, that, 
even as "just a deserter", Schimek offered an example. "If 
there had been more plain deserters from the Wehrmacht war
74 "Conversations in Poland", END Journal, March 1987.
75 Documents of Wolnosc i Pokoj, pp. 12— 13. In fact, a 
form of civil service was available for those "whose 
physical and psychological predispositions are somehow 
restricted", and COs might, at the discretion of a local 
commander, be assigned to it. However, such "civil defence 
units are uniformed military formations, quartered in 
barracks and subordinate to the Ministry of Defence". The 
conscripts were subject to military regulations, had to take 
an oath and do a training course with arms. Each region had 
a ceiling on the number of recruits who could do alternative 
service and it was completely arbitrary as to what happened. 
There was no appeal.
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would have ended earlier”.76
Meanwhile, the impact of the Chernobyl disaster in 
April 1986 had pushed the movement to act on its theoretical 
commitment to ecological issues. WiP were the main 
organisers of street demonstrations in Wroclaw and Krakow in 
which over a thousand individuals participated. WiP groups 
also began to turn their attention to local ecological 
targets, with some success. Weekly marches and sitdowns in 
Wroclaw through the winter of 1986/87, in protest at a 
chrome plant that was polluting the local water supply, 
resulted not only in police intervention and heavy fines of 
the participants, but also in a decision by the regional 
council to close the plant by 1992. Throughout 1987 more 
environmental campaigns were begun in Poznan, Szczecin and 
Gdansk, particularly focussing on local nuclear facilities 
like the planned reactor at Zarnowiec, and the proposal to 
dump nuclear waste in former German war bunkers in
Miedyrzecz ,77
WiP had also become increasingly active and influential 
internationally, with a wide network of contacts and support 
in peace and human rights movements throughout Eastern and 
Western Europe, the USSR and the USA. It had substantial 
influence on the debate on the connection between peace and
76 David Warszawski, ”Set an Example . . .", in
Documents of Wolnosc i Pokoj, pp. 32— 35. Also, Jacek 
Czaputowicz, "Why is the State Afraid?", WiP Bulletin, Nov.
1986, trans. Franek Michalski ,in Across Frontiers, Spring
1987.
77 See, for example, Marek Kossakowski, "Leave the
Bunkers to the Bats!", in Documents of Wolnosc i Pokoj, pp.
63——66.
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human rights and the best way to end the Cold War. Its own 
view was that not only technical but "political 
disarmament", that is, "the elimination of the political 
causes of the arms race" was essential. "Only strong self­
organised societies can guarantee the credibility of peace 
agreements.1,78
Perhaps the highpoint of WiP's international activity 
was the organisation of an international seminar entitled 
"Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords." The seminar was 
in many respects a breakthrough. It was the first time an 
independent seminar of this kind had been held openly in a 
Soviet bloc country. Around two hundred and fifty 
representatives from eighteen countries, including a 
participant from Charter 77 and one from Yugoslavia, spent 
three days debating peace, human rights, detente, ecology, 
and non-violence in a Warsaw parish church, coming out at 
the end with joint statements and programmes for action, and 
with a much increased understanding and respect. The most 
remarkable thing was that, in spite of condemnation of the 
seminar by government spokesperson Jerzy Urban as "a 
provocation on an international scale", the refusal of visas 
and admission to some Western activists and most Soviet bloc 
participants, and the harassment and detention of many WiP 
members who wanted to attend, nothing else was done and the
78 Konstanty Radziwill, Speech to END Convention, 
Coventry, July 1987. (Mimeographed.)
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seminar proceeded as planned.79 What is more, participants 
who joined the May visit to Schimek's grave were for the 
first time left undisturbed.
WiP's visibility and impact on public conciousness was 
now at its highest. It had gained the respect of leading 
members of the opposition, who saw it as "breaking new 
ground", challenging both society's polocentrism and the 
government's image of the Western peace movement as a purely 
anti-American phenomenom.80 Some argued that it symbolised 
a new form of independent democratic political activity that 
was necessary to regenerate society. "It is stated nowhere 
in stone that political life is to be realised through trade 
unions".*1 Certainly WiP was having a knock-on effect on 
other official groups, stimulating them to adopt peace and 
ecology issues.
It was clear that the government had now accepted WiP's 
existence as part of the opposition, and was no longer 
intent on destroying it as a movement. Such action might 
have undermined the continuing stream of Soviet peace 
initiatives in this period. Even so, peace activists in the 
late 1980s in Poland were the most persecuted section of the 
opposition. Of the twenty-five individuals arrested for 
political offences since September 1986, fifteen were
79 See Richard Bloom, "Provoking Peace in Poland", END 
Journal, Summer 1987; and Lazarski, "The Polish Independent 
Peace Movement", pp. 128— 9.
80 Interview with J. Onyszkiewicz, quoted in "Report on 
Visit to Poland, May 1987", END Polish Working Group.
81 Author interview with Zbigniew Romaszewski, quoted in 
personal letter from author to Edward Thompson, May 1987.
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imprisoned for refusing military service or the oath.
Sentences averaged three years. Treatment was often harsh, 
as in the case of Slawomir Dutkiewicz, a farmer and 
concientious objector, who went on hunger strike from the 
moment of his arrest and who was beaten and force fed until 
his release ten months later.82
Hunger strikes had become a more common tactic among 
WiP members at this point, both by those imprisoned and by 
those protesting their arrest. Other new tactics included 
"roofing”, in which a group of protestors would place
themselves on a roof of some public building and throw
leaflets down, their relative inaccessibility prolonging the 
action and its impact. Also, like Greenham women, WiP
members had by this time learnt to go on the legal
offensive. In July 1987 the Supreme Court decided that the 
security police were obliged to apologise to Jan Maria
Rokita for the illegal violation of his freedom, and for
battery, during a visit to Schimek's grave that May. It was
an unprecedented decision.83
Not surprisngly, the combination of high visibility, 
continuous action and harrassment, and a commitment to a 
certain spontaneous decentralised movement, was producing 
internal tensions. The movement's cooperative, unstructured 
and informal style encouraged an imaginative spontaneity and 
initiative and made infiltration and subversion difficult,
82 Helsinki Watch, Violations of the Helsinki Accords,
Poland, December 1988: A Supplement (New York: Helsinki 
Watch Committee, 1988), pp. 5— 9.
83 Documents of Wolnosc i Pokoj, p. 14.
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but it also meant that the media focussed primarily on the 
most accessible and well known figures. In fact, at this 
point, with a high profile, a clear commitment to some 
specific goals and a non-violent form of action - as spelt 
out in the Machowa declaration - the movement was strong 
enough to contain internal tensions. There was some 
grumbling, some personality clashes, but geographical 
dispersal made it possible for each local group to find its 
own style and focus, to produce its own journal or magazine, 
and to shrug its shoulders figuratively at other groups' 
priorities. On occasion, individuals moved cities to work 
in a style or on an issue that suited them better.*4
In the summer of 1988 the government made a major 
concession: changing the wording of the oath to drop the 
reference to the Soviet Union and offering some provision 
for alternative service. The alternative service would be 
longer than military service, and the conditions were less 
than ideal, but it was a major victory for the movement: 
this was the first time a communist government had 
acknowledged the need for a full provision of alternative 
service.85 The concessions were obviously not simply the 
result of concerted pressure from WiP, although they could 
not have occured without this. They were part of a slow
84 "Report on Visit to Poland, May 1987", END Polish 
Working Group. For example, Wroclaw was not particularly 
happy with Krakow's preoccupation with the war in 
Afghanistan and strong anti-Sovietism, feeling they 
ninstrumentalised” the peace issue to some extent.
85 In both the GDR and Poland COs could serve previously 
in non-weapons carrying units.
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shift in the whole political landscape that had been going 
on for the last year. For a number of reasons the 
Government and Solidarity were finally moving towards 
rapprochement.
The government had realised that it could not solve the 
now desperate economic situation without the cooperation of 
society, and all attempts to coopt sections of society but 
exclude Solidarity had failed, as had attempts to force 
through various reform measures. In May and August 1988 
there were two waves of strikes demanding both higher pay 
and the restoration of Solidarity. At the end of August 
1988, Jaruzelski invited the Solidarity leadership to 
participate in round table meetings with the government, and 
promised to discuss the relegalisation of Solidarity. On 
this basis Walesa was able to persuade the shipyard workers 
to discontinue their strike. After the relegalisation of 
Solidarity in January 1989, Round Table discussions on the 
country's future began in February.86
None of this would have been possible had it not been 
for the changes in the Soviet Union. It was undergoing its 
own economic crisis and Gorbachev seemed increasingly 
anxious to rid the country of the economic burdens of a 
costly arms race and extensive empire. The internal reforms 
of glasnost and perestroika had been complemented by the 
1987 INF treaty, and the beginning of the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in April 1988.
The details of the Round Table process - how it brought
86 David Ost, Solidarity, pp. 179— 186
232
to power the first non-communist prime minister in August 
1989, and how it contributed to the demise of the communism 
and the changes that occured throughout Eastern Europe - are 
the subject of numerous other books and articles and will 
not be dealt with here.87
Suffice to say that WiP, having contributed to this 
transformation, was having to adjust to very different 
conditions to the ones that produced it. In early 1988 
Czaputowicz had argued that WiP would have to reconsider its 
strategy largely because of its successes, which had 
occurred in almost every area of action.
They have stopped arresting those who visit 
Schimek's grave, the pogrom at Kielce [which Wip 
had drawn attention to] is now seen as a crime, 
the problems of Ukrainians and Byelorussian 
minorities openly discussed, as is the problem of 
death penalty. There have been no new death 
sentences and more talk about the desire to 
abolish it.
And there had been "fundamental changes on Afghanistan 
and disarmament issues", and local ecological successes.88 
He argued that WiP had two choices: to become more
structured, and adopt a broader programme, no longer 
identified primarily with anti-militarism, or to remain as 
a spontaneous initiative in its current form - which might 
prove too constricting for some.
87 See, for example, Timothy Garton Ash, We The People: 
The Revolution of '89, Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin 
(Cambridge: Granta in association with Penguin, 1990).
88 "A New Stage: A Conversation with Jacek Czaputowicz", 
Documents of Wolnosc i Pokoj, pp. 71— 74.
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It was in the nature of the movement and the times that 
it should attempt to adopt both courses. For many, WiP 
proved both too constricting and too undefined. The 
complete absence of press censorship, and freedom of 
association, had meant that many new groups and initiatives 
had emerged dealing with different parts of WiP's pluralist 
agenda. Some, for example, had initially tried to extend 
and develop part of WiP's agenda by creating a new sub­
group, in October 1988, called Future Times. These were 
mostly the older generation from NZS, associated with Warsaw 
and Krakow, whose emphasis had been more oriented to the 
international scene and wider political questions, and whose 
energy had gone into discussion and publication more than 
happenings. Now they saw the process of reform as a chance 
to take their agenda into the mainstream of political life. 
Other participants in WiP, particularly the more anarchist, 
had at best had an ambiguous relationship with Solidarity 
and at worst open conflict.
Tensions between the groups resulted, in the spring 
1989, in the expulsion of Future Times. For the rump of WiP 
there was a perceptible shift of emphasis away from 
anti-totalitarianism to a focus on anti-militarist and 
concrete demands, particularly pertaining to poor pay and 
conditions, and the arbitrariness of the provision for 
alternative service.89 WiP now had to contend with the fact 
that it was no longer in the frontline of the Polish 
opposition or in the mainstream of political life. Peace
89 Draft programme of WiP for 1989, [WP 38].
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and ecology, even civil rights, had become marginal issues 
for most people, compared with the harsh economic realities 
of post-communist life.90 Moreover, the international 
network of peace and human rights groups of which WiP had 
been such an active part was changing. Many of its East 
European participants were preoccupied with the dramatic 
changes in their own countries, while the Western peace 
movement was in decline. The formation of a trade union 
specifically for conscientious objectors at the end of 1989 
took away some of WiP's concrete tasks, leaving a less 
focussed anti-militarist agenda. By late 1991 it was not 
possible to identify a countrywide movement anymore, 
although small pockets of activists, most of them in their 
teens, continued to act as WiP groups.
WiP had not only put anti-militarism permanently on the 
Polish agenda, it had played a major role in the democratic 
transformation of Polish society.
Guatemala; The Runuiel Junam Council 
for Ethnic Communities (CERJ1
Halliday argues that the failure to stabilise the Third 
World and secure Western interests provided "one of the 
major spurs for the unleashing of a new Cold War in the 
West", and accounted for the fact that, contrary to popular
90 Lynne Jones, States of Change: A Central European 
Diary (London: Merlin, 1990), p. 5.
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image, the bulk of the military build up was in conventional 
military forces that could "be used for counter­
revolutionary interventions in the Third World".91
The tragedy of Guatemala is that, while the Soviet 
Union never showed any interest in it, its location, firmly 
in the US backyard, has meant that any challenge to US 
interests has always been labelled as communist-inspired 
subversion and firmly put down. The most notable example of 
this was the CIA-sponsored coup that overthrew the reformist 
government of Jacopo Arbenz in 1954. This was the beginning 
of a thirty-five year war in which the United States, for 
the most part quite overtly, supported a small landholding 
oligarchy and the armed forces in their refusal to
acknowledge the needs and rights of the rest of society.
Government in Guatemala was characterised by corrupt
military dictatorships of various forms, fraudulent and 
manipulated elections that excluded all moderate reformers, 
and a growing militarisation of politics.92
There had been widespread political violence from 1954 
when Arbenz's supporters were put on death lists. Thousands 
had fled into exile and hundreds had been assassinated. The 
emergence of a guerilla movement, and a growing
assertiveness among the intellectuals and labour unions in 
the cities, provided the justification for a new kind of 
counterinsurgency strategy. Sweeps occurred in which all
91 Halliday, "The Sources of the New Cold War", p. 300.
92 Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, 
Death Squads, and U.S. Power (Boulder: Westview Press,
1991).
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sympathisers were arrested and immediately killed or 
"disappeared".93 The objective was to liquidate subversives 
and intimidate everyone else. Villages that had gone over 
to the guerillas were razed to the ground. Eight thousand 
Guatemalans were killed in the military zone of Zacapa in 
one year.94
This counterinsurgency strategy was complemented by 
increasingly effective terror perpetrated by groups such as 
MANO Blanca - Movimiento de Accion Nacionalista Organizada 
(The White Hand - National Movement for Organised Action), 
"the hand that will eradicate national renegades and 
traitors to the fatherland".95 Such groups were allegedly 
clandestine and beyond official control, but clearly 
operated out of police and army facilities and were 
sponsored by the security services to complement 
counterinsurgency.
"Virtually an entire generation of moderate leaders was 
removed from Guatemalan political life during the 1960s and 
1970s."96 Jonas also stresses the psychological toll such 
violence took on the living:
The population was maintained in a permanent state
of fear and uncertainty. The apparently
93 The transitive use of "to disappear" originated in 
Guatemala.
94 Michael Mclintock, The American Connection, Vol.II: 
State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala (London: 
Zed Books, 1985), p. 84.
95 Ibid., p. 85.
96 Ibid., p. 62.
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indiscriminate nature of the violence, the steady 
stream of political assassinations in broad
daylight, the tales of torture by the MANO, the 
blurring of the distinction between official
repression and death squad terror, the
omnipresence of police bearing machine guns in the 
streets - all these were the weapons of
psychological warfare;
The goal of this warfare was "the permanent
demobilisation of the popular classes.” Yet the very
effectiveness of this campaign prevented those in power from 
gaining any legitimacy in society.97
Yet for the indigenous Maya people who make up the 
majority of the population in Guatemala, this thirty-five- 
year war was simply another phase in the "cycles of
conquest" that they had been subjected to since the
sixteenth century: first by imperial Spain, then by local 
and international capitalism, and now by state terror.98 In 
order to understand the activists engaged in the current 
wave of popular movements, it is important to realise that 
their activism grows out of a tradition of resistance that 
goes back five hundred years, a fact increasingly emphasised 
by the current actors.
The Spanish conquest, begun in 1524 by Pedro Alvarado, 
was fiercely resisted by the fragmented political and 
linguistic groups that occupied this region. The success of 
the Spaniards was only partly due to military superiority.
97 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p. 164.
98 George Lovell, "Surviving Conquest: The Maya of 
Guatemala in Historical Perspective", Latin American 
Research Review no. 2 (1988), p. 27.
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Their main ally was disease - epidemics of smallpox, measles 
and mumps - that reduced the Maya population by 90 per cent 
over the following decades. The Spaniards "concentrated” 
the scattered highland communities in new villages, 
introduced various systems of forced labour, and maintained 
order through terror, including rape, which was one source 
of the racial intermixing that produced the ladino 
population. Yet there was resistance. It took two forms: 
direct - local rebellions and escape back to mountain 
communities - and indirect - "strategic acculturation" that 
is, the granting of concessions in order to preserve 
essentials." This was particularly the case in the Tierra 
Fria, the highlands of the north and west that were of less 
commercial interest to the Spaniards and therefore suffered 
less intense repression. "Native people withstood the 
onslaught of acculturation with more resilience, holding 
onto their land, retaining many principles of community 
organisation, and guarding a sense of place that was 
resolutely their own. "10° It was not that Maya culture was 
preserved intact but, rather, that the Maya "effectively 
nurtured a cultural resistance by keeping alive many of 
their long established traditions". Thus "the emerging 
society was a creative blend of elements of Hispanic culture 
. . . mixed with elements of pre-Columbian culture they had
" Nancy M. Fariss, "Indians in Colonial Yucatan: Three
Perspectives", in Spaniards and Indians in Southeastern 
Mesoamerica: Essays on the History of Ethnic Relations, ed. 
Murdo J. Macleod and Robert Wasserstrom (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 34.
100 Lovell, "Surviving Conquest", p. 31.
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defended and upheld.” An example of this capacity for 
resistance via accommodation was the way Catholic ritual was 
adopted and made to incorporate Maya traditional beliefs. 
”This fusion of old and new led to the formation of a 
culture of refuge and the emergence throughout North-West 
Guatemala of 'closed corporate peasant communities'.”101
The second cycle of conquest followed independence from 
Spain, when the Liberal drive for modernisation, centred 
around coffee production, resulted in a massive 
expropriation of native lands and the creation of a migrant 
labour system that endures to this day. Coffee production 
organised on a plantation (finca) basis requires intensive 
labour at harvest time only. Initially, this need for 
labour was ensured by various forms of coercion. Again, 
resistance to this exploitation was "mostly localised and 
uncoordinated”,102 but sufficiently disruptive for the then 
president, President Barrios, to have to adopt the scorched 
earth and resettlement tactics used by the Guatemalan army 
a century later.103 In the post-Second World War period the 
skewed land distribution and rapid growth of population has 
made such coercion less necessary. A 1964 census showed 
that 63 per cent of land was owned by 3 per cent of the 
population.104 90 per cent of peasant farm plots are too 
small for subsistence needs and therefore the owner must
101 Ibid., p. 32.
102 Ibid., p. 39.
103 Ibid., p. 40.
104 Ibid., p. 42.
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migrate in order to survive.
It was the creation of a labour force dependant on both 
waged labour and subsistence acivities that contributed to 
the breakdown of the closed corporate communities and the 
growing politicisation and integration of the Maya into 
Guatemalan life.
This integration was assisted by other forces, in 
particular the Catholic Church. Catholic Action was a 
movement introduced in 1946 to counter native "impurities" 
and communist subversion.105 However, the foreign priests 
invited to lead these reforms found themselves confronting 
the "brutal" Guatemalan reality of "intense misery and 
exploitation"106 and were themselves radicalised. Moreover, 
the impact of the Second Vatican Council (1962-3), preaching 
solidarity with the poor and the need to "structure and 
consolidate the human community according to divine law",107 
affirmed the Church's role in providing a political and 
economic response to deprivation. Liberation theology 
became a driving force in highland communities. Catholic 
Action established small centres with elected officials in
105 Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala 
(Boston: South End Press, 1984), p. 238. At the outset 
Archbishop Rossell warned that "today [the indigenous 
population] is a tame and long suffering lamb, but it is 
very easy to turn it into a cruel wolf, or a ravenous lion, 
or a poisonous snake". Therefore it was necessary to 
encourage "Christian resignation" among the poor, and "to 
awaken the feeling of charity among the rich".
106 Luisa Frank and Philip Wheaton, Indian Guatemala: The 
Path to Liberation (Washington: EPICA Task Force, 1984), p.
29.
107 Handy, Gift of the Devil, p. 239.
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every small canton. Young Maya, trained as catechists, 
speaking Spanish yet retaining the ingrained communitarian 
values of Maya social life, rapidly became community 
leaders, concerned with education and social welfare as much 
as with religion.
The rise in the influence of Catholic Action was linked 
with a development boom in which newly established Catholic 
Action centres were able to encourage the development of 
cooperatives and the use of fertilisers.108 More than half 
of these were located in the Western central highlands, 
where they were having "major impact on political 
attitudes".109 Alongside the growth of literacy, the 
cooperatives produced profits that could be spent on radios, 
and listening to these gave many Maya their first 
introduction to "the concept of Guatemala as a country".110 
Scholarships gave some both university education and a first 
taste of anti-Indian racism. The purchase of fertilisers 
meant engagement in a non-subsistence economy and a 
realisation of the benefits to be gained from participation 
in the electoral system as well. Local parties reflecting 
peasant interests, such as the Christian Democrats, began to 
have some success in local elections.
Unfortunately, the rise of cooperatives, and the growth 
of Maya self reliance and political awareness coincided with
108 Lovell, "Surviving Conquest", p. 44.
109 Sheldon Davis and Julie Hodson, Witnesses to 
Political Violence in Central America (Boston: Oxfam 
America, 1982), p. 14.
110 Frank and Wheaton, Indian Guatemala, p. 32.
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a boom in the agri-export business. In the late 1960s and 
1970s the need for native labour was growing just at a time 
when indigenous people were using their wages to create 
alternatives to seasonal migration.111 The 1976 earthquake 
exacerbated the problem in a dramatic way. Twenty-five 
thousand people were killed, seventy thousand injured and 
two and a half million were left homeless.112 The most 
devastated region was the North-West highlands and, not 
surprisingly, the people from there preferred to stay at 
home and reconstruct their lives and communities, gaining an 
even stronger sense of self sufficiency in the process.
The earthquake also highlighted other political 
developments that paralleled the changes in the countryside: 
in particular, a growing degree of articulateness and 
organisation among students and workers. The 1970s saw the 
emergence of new trade unions and the growth of strike 
action. Most threatening of all was the emergence of the 
Comite de Unidad Campesina (CUC) between 1976 and 1978. 
This was a national rural peasant organisation led primarily 
by the Maya but for the first time uniting them with poor 
ladinos, In 1980 they organised a massive strike of 750,000 
workers in the cotton and sugar plantations of the south 
coast. Although the promised wage increase was never 
implemented and there were severe reprisals against the 
participants by the landowners, the strike, uniting ladinos 
and indigenous peasants, was the landowners' "worst
111 Lovell, "Surviving Conquest", p. 44.
112 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p. 95.
243
nightmare come true”.113
Given the entrenched interests of the oligarchy, the 
growing confidence and self organisation of the community 
could only bring the community into headlong collision with 
the state. It is not possible to put a finger on the point 
where the repression intensified or at what moment it could 
be defined as an all-out war. What is clear is that, 
through the late 1970s, any significant political or 
community leadership in the town or country became a target 
for the death squads, now functioning with complete 
impunity. In the department of El Quiche, 168 cooperative 
and village leaders were killed between 1976 and 1978. The 
villages most brutally attacked were those that had been 
most successful in gaining some measure of autonomy. The 
repression was so severe that in 1980 the Jesuits withdrew 
all their priests from the department citing ”a climate of 
insecurity which prevents any kind of evangelical or 
pastoral work”.114 In the cities, the targets were students 
and trade union leaders, reformist politicians and 
professionals.
Handy argues that it was the removal of all 
possibilities for reform, through electoral fraud, military 
control of the ballot box, and violence directed at all its 
proponents, that forced all those sectors of society that 
favoured reform into at least rhetorical support for
113 Ibid., p. 129.
114 Handy, Gift of the Devil, p. 243.
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revolution.115
Most writers identify at least two significant turning 
points in changing the consciousness of the indigenous 
population. The first was the massacre at Panzos, when a 
special unit of the Guatemalan armed forces opened fire on 
an unarmed crowd of Kekchi Maya, including old people and 
women and children, peacefully protesting against the 
permits given by the government to several transnationals 
for mineral exploration. One hundred people were killed and 
300 wounded. The bodies were dumped in mass graves that had 
been previously dug, suggesting a premeditated act.116 The 
fact that the massacre was carried out in broad daylight by 
the armed forces themselves suggested that the authorities 
were determined to set an example and "terrorise the entire 
population into abandoning its demands for social 
justice".117 The authorities' attempt failed: massive
demonstrations of protest followed in 1978 and 1979.
The second was the attack on the Spanish embassy, in 
January 1980, when a delegation of peasants from the Ixil 
areas of the North-West highlands decided to peacefully 
occupy the embassy in protest at the military repression in 
their area. In spite of protests from the Spanish 
ambassador, the police stormed the building and set it on 
fire, killing thirty-nine people, including a former vice­
115 Ibid., p. 237.
116 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p. 128.
117 Ibid., p. 128.
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president and foreign minister negotiating with the 
peasants.118
These two events were clearly psychological turning 
points for the indigenous population, who now felt that it 
was necessary to take up arms simply as a means of self- 
defence. The guerilla organisations, quiescent since the 
1960s, had not been inactive, but had been slowly building 
up support among the communities of the North-West 
highlands. Now, in 1980, thousands of Indians made a 
transition from passive support to active participation.119
However, in spite of early successes between 1980 and 
early 1982, when large parts of the Western highlands were 
under their control, the guerillas7 offensive failed. This 
was largely because they failed to prepare for the strength 
of the counter-offensive launched against them and because 
they were not well organised enough to support or protect 
the several hundred thousand Indians who had given them
118 The ambassador and one peasant survived. However, the 
latter was later kidnapped from his hospital bed and killed. 
Recent Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigobertu Menchu's father 
was one of the occupants of the Embassy.
119 Frank and Wheaton, Indian Guatemala, p. 67. The 
anthropologist Robert Carmack gives a moving account of this 
process in the hamlet of La Estancia near Quiche, Santa 
Cruz, where selective assassinations of cooperative and CUC 
members was followed by a wholesale indiscriminate massacre 
of fifty people by soldiers, after which forty young people 
left to join the guerillas and the other thousand 
inhabitants abandoned their homes and dispersed. See Robert 
Carmack, "The Story of Santa Cruz Quiche", in Harvest of 
Violence: The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis, ed. 
Robert Carmack (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 
pp. 47— 55.
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moral and practical support.120
The horror and scale of the counter-offensive defies 
description and belief. Yet understanding it is essential 
to any understanding of the re-emergence of popular 
movements in the late 1980s. In the cities repression had 
intensified since 1978, to the point where, by 1982, any 
organiser or advocate of structural change was either dead 
or in exile. However, these killings were to a degree 
targetted and selective. In the countryside in the early 
1980s, being an Indian was synonomous with subversion. One 
could no longer talk of selective killing. There was a 
massive generalisation of the campaign in which the army 
directly attacked the basis of village life.
The massacres were also destroying in a systematic 
manner all that sustains life in the community: 
houses, woods, harvests, to the point that the 
water in the rivers is polluted to drive the 
people to desperation. The current wave of terror 
appears to have as a principle object to 
disarticulate the social life and cultural 
inheritance of the Indian people and the peasant, 
to end the resistance of those that now won't 
support the weight of centuries of robbery, of 
maltreatment and of persecution.
Thus wrote the Dutch Catholic Congress, one of the many 
critical international voices - but to little avail. The
120 Jonas identifies three other reasons for failure: 
they did not coordinate their efforts sufficiently with the 
popular movements of the 1970s; they failed to make a 
successful alliance with the middle classes and moderate 
opposition; and "divisions and rivalries" among themselves 
prevented the formation of a common front - the Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (UNRG) - until too 
late. Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, pp. 140— 144.
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violence escalated to a "Dantesque nightmare of 
brutality".121 The logic was to remove the sea from the fish, 
that is, to deprive the guerillas of any potential support. 
This required the razing of villages, the burning of crops 
and bombing of civilians, combined with the perpetration of 
the most horrifying atrocities.
Survival International provides an eyewitness report of 
what happened after the arrival of a truckload of soldiers 
at a village in June 1982:
They said that all the people in the villages 
were guerillas, even the women and children. He 
ran and hid, then watched as the soldiers killed 
fifteen people, including women, with machetes. 
They set fire to the houses, and sometimes opened 
the doors of the huts and threw hand grenades 
inside. In all fifty people were killed in the 
village. Two of those killed were his uncles. 
From a kilometre away, he saw women from his 
village who were hung by their feet without 
clothes.122
Statistics for this period are uncertain for obvious 
reasons, but an estimated one million Indians were displaced 
between 1981 and 1985 as a result of counterinsurgency 
operations, fleeing either to Mexico, the mountains, or to 
shanty towns in the cities, where staying alive meant 
shedding language and dress and becoming ladino.123 This is 
besides the 100,000 killed and 30,000 disappeared since the
121 Handy, Gift of the Devil, p. 251.
122 Mclintock, The American Connection, p. 244.
123 Lovell, "Surviving Conquest", p. 47.
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mid-1970s.124 Statistics for the department of
Chimaltenango in 1983 show what these figures meant in terms 
of destruction of community: in eleven communities 20 per
cent of families were headed by widows; fifteen communities 
had been abandoned for a year; in others, like Chuabaj 
Grande, twenty-five out of 240 families remained, fifteen of 
these headed by widows. "The massacre of the Indians is 
simply the continuation of the work of the conquest", a 
wealthy Guatemalan explained to a US reporter. "You 
finished off the Indians in your country nearly 100 years 
ago.1,125
Guatemala's international pariah status, combined with 
the failure of the army to defeat the guerillas, resulted in 
a coup in March 1982 that installed General Rioss Montt. 
Rioss Montt was a former Christian Democrat who had been 
fraudulently defeated in the election of 1974, and a member 
of the fundamentalist church of the Word, but any hope that 
he might improve the human rights situation was rapidly 
dispelled. After a brief amnesty the intensity of 
repression in the countryside grew worse as Rioss Montt 
announced: "today we are going to begin a merciless struggle 
. . . to annihilate the subversives that have not understood 
the good intentions of the government."126 He also said: 
"we have no scorched earth policy, . . .  we have a policy of
124 Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal 
Tyranny. New York: Norton, 1987, p. 14.
125 Arthur Allen, Baltimore Sun, 1 June 1982.
126 Handy, Gift of the Devil, p. 257.
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scorched communists."127 What was new was that the 
repression was more effectively combined with a programme of 
militarisation, pacification and civic action. The 
programme had two key components.
One was the creation of development poles around 
strategic hamlets or model villages. Each department was 
turned into a military zone. Local communities were 
reinforced with a garrison, and villagers from the 
surrounding countryside were forced to relocate. Or 
entirely new villages were constructed to house those 
refugees brought down by army sweeps in the mountain. In 
fact the policy was another fundamental attack on the basis 
of Indian life. The population was unable to tend its 
traditional lands or farm in the accustomed manner. 
Villagers in the mountains usually live in dispersed 
settlements surrounded by their fields; these new 
communities bore more resemblance to prison camps. Even the 
army acknowledged that material conditions were appalling 
but it argued that people were grouped thus for their own 
security. The sign outside one such community indicated 
their real role: "Welcome to Saxaroch: an Ideologically New 
Anti-Subversive Community."128
The other key component of Montt's pacification 
strategy was the creation of "Civil Patrols" (PACs). This 
entailed the compulsory recruitment of all adult males into
127 Reuters, New York Times, 6 December 1982.
128 Jean Marie Simon, Guatemala: Eternal Spring, Eternal 
Tyranny (New York: Norton, 1987), p. 236.
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local civil defence units, under army control. 
Theoretically, service was demanded from 18- to 60-year olds 
for approximately twenty-four hours a week. In practice, 
the age ranged from ten to seventy and could be far more 
frequent. They were
required to patrol the streets, roads and 
hillsides day and night, registering all comings 
and goings of the population. In heavily 
patrolled areas and strategic places such as main 
roads, the patrols must record the names of all 
arrivals, where they are going, the reasons for 
their movements and where they have come from. In 
addition to this intensive surveillance over the 
boundaries of their communities, they are required 
to report any suspicious people walking about at 
night, the language they speak and what they are 
saying. These reports are delivered to the local 
military authorities, two officials whose titular 
responsibilities are comandante and ideas 
ideologicas. (Failure to report on strangers can 
result in summary execution.)129
From the army's point of view this was both an 
ingenious way of providing low cost security and of 
controlling the population. "Members of the tight knit 
Indian communities could be collectively held hostage 
against subversion.1,130 It also allowed them to engage in 
ideological work on a constant basis. From the villagers' 
point of view it was discriminatory, onerous, unpaid work 
that took time away from their own fields that they could 
ill afford and further divided and undermined the community.
Military service was compulsory, requiring all adult
129 Mclintock, The American Connection, p. 250.
130 Ibid., p. 250.
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males to do their time and then remain nominally part of the 
army reserve until fifty. PAC service, however, was 
selective, concentrating particularly on the Western 
highlands. Patrollers often found themselves not only 
obliged to be the army's eyes and ears in the community, but 
also to do forced labour, such as road building. Exemptions 
were allowed for migrant workers on the coast, but 
substitutes had to be found and failure to provide a receipt 
from the plantation owner could mean summary execution. 
Thus landowners were given additional control over migrant 
labour. Patrolling could also be very dangerous. Patrollers 
were unarmed, except perhaps with dummy weapons, yet were 
often used as a first line of defence on entering a guerilla 
area. On other occasions patrols were used as a scapegoat 
by the army who blamed their own atrocities on PAC excesses. 
And the patrollers were forced to commit excesses: to kill 
members of their own community, even family, or be accused 
of subversion and face death themselves. One report, for 
example, describes how in Jojabaj in 1983, after a hooded 
informant had selected suspects, patrols were ordered to 
execute the four suspects in public:
The men were struggling and shouting as they 
were held down. Their heads were yanked back by 
their hair, then their heads were hacked from 
their bodies with machetes, the severed heads were 
presented to the local military commander by the 
villagers as proof that the execution had been 
carried out.131
131 Gill Brown, The Sunday Times, 20 March 1983.
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Such actions obviously created enormous guilt, and fear 
of reprisals from neighbours bound the individual more 
tightly to the patrol. Meanwhile, the system of reporting 
to the army effectively displaced "traditional forms of 
self-government and order". The ideological message of the 
army was that "the central identity of an Indian is the 
fatherland, the central institution of the fatherland is the 
army, and one is therefore a patroller foremost".132 At one 
point the PACs involved one million peasants, a quarter Of 
the adult population. The countryside was transformed "into 
a police state. It is difficult to overemphasise the extent 
to which the civil patrol system contributes to a 
totalitarian control of the civilian population.1,133 
Refusal to participate meant that one was immediately 
labelled as a subversive and vulnerable to summary 
execution: thus terror was sustained. Neutrality in such a 
situation was impossible. The highland communities were 
effectively recruited onto the army's side and the guerillas 
were put on the defensive, retreating to the far north. 
Even so, this military success did not prevent Rioss Montt 
being deposed in a coup in August 1983. The new president, 
Humberto Mejia Victores, offered a way back into the world 
community by offering a rapid transition to civilian rule 
and support for US regional policy. The repression
132 Americas Watch, The Runujel Junan Council of Ethnic 
Communities: CERJ (New York: Americas Watch, 1989), pp. 9—  
10, quoted in Lynne Jones,"Where Democracy is Fragile", END 
Journal, April-May 1986.
133 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p. 150.
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continued, though at a lesser intensity than before, and 
after a newly elected constituent assembly had drafted a new 
constitution in 1984, the civilian Christian Democrat, 
Vinicio Cerezo, took office as the first civilian president 
in twenty years, in January 1986.
It would be quite wrong to see the change to civilian 
rule as a defeat or transformation of the military. Jonas 
convincingly argues that Guatemala exemplifies a 
"counterinsurgency state”, that is, one, designed to defend 
the interests of a monopoly bourgeoisie and the military, 
including transnational capital. Its objective is not 
merely to defeat but to annihilate any challenge to its 
authority. This requires a recourse to state terrorism and 
"total war". And this military aspect of the
counterinsurgency struggle defines all aspects of political 
life, even in periods of relative peace.
Because the counterinsurgency state's goal is to 
control the civilian population and eliminate 
significant opposition, it makes truly pluralistic 
politics impossible. . . . Rather than a state of 
exception from a democratic norm it is a 
predominantly coercive state, which denies the 
exercise of individual rights and the autonomous 
functioning of mass organisations. [And it] does 
not require military government at all times; in 
fact, it explicitly proposes the re-establishment 
of formal democracy after the most intensive 
military phase of the counterinsurgency campaign. 
Under certain conditions, civilian regimes can be 
more effective agents of pacification than 
military dictatorships. Within the
counter insurgent conception, "democratic" civilian 
regimes are restricted and controlled, preemptive 
of social protest movements, and unable to 
establish civilian hegemony over the armed
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forces.134
Civilian regimes should be seen as an adjustment of the 
counterinsurgency strategy, giving international legitimacy 
and allowing a resumption of aid to deal with the economic 
crisis.135
Certainly Cerezo's election appeared to bear this 
thesis out. The new constitution "established standard 
political rights on paper and technically returned Guatemala 
to the rule of law", but it also "legalised the basic 
institutions of counter insurgency" such as the PACs.136 
Although the elections were technically clean, half the 
electorate was disenfranchised through the exclusion of 
parties of the left. 55.8 per cent did not participate in 
spite of the fact that voting was compulsory for those over 
eighteen.137 But the clearest indication of continuing 
military control was the amnesty the army granted itself 
before relinquishing power, and Cerezo's own
acknowledgement, when taking office, that he held only 30 
per cent of the power.
Yet there was a limited political opening. At the
134 Ibid., pp. 117— 118.
135 Jonas argues that "in the regional context, the 
United States was interested in Guatemala as a counter­
example to Nicaragua to 'prove' the Jeane Kirkpatrick thesis 
that right-wing authoritarian regimes pose no threat to 
democracy because they 'inevitably' evolve toward democracy 
or 'liberalise'". See The Battle for Guatemala, p. 158.
136 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p. 155.
137 Ibid., p. 155.
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outset Cerezo appeared to have a genuine commitment to 
reform. He had been very critical of the civil patrols, and 
stated that he intended communities to be able to vote on 
their continuing existence. He talked of taxing the larger 
enterprises, of "law and justice at the service of the 
people", and of greater control over the military.138 
Popular organisations and human rights groups began to 
reappear. Most significantly, in rural areas, some 
communities decided to take seriously a new provision in the 
Guatemalan constitution, Article 34, that stated "the right 
of freedom of association is hereby recognised. No 
individual shall be forced to associate with or form part of 
groups or associations of self defence or similar 
organisations."139 The PACs were now voluntary and in some 
communities villagers were refusing to patrol. At first 
this was sporadic, but one community learnt from another. 
This process was fostered partly by Amilcar Mendez, a rural 
school teacher in the town of Santa Cruz del Quiche.140
138 Author interview with Vinicio Cerezo: "The military 
. . . made a strategic decision. Now it has to accept the 
civilian government making decisions or it will have to have 
a coup and show the world that it is in power. . . .  We are 
not going to have a sham democracy in this country. If I 
stay in power, it is because I am making decisions. If not, 
we will be having this discussion in Miami.", quoted in 
Lynne Jones, "Where Democracy is Fragile", END Journal, 
April-May 1986. Sadly, Cerezo became more preoccupied with 
maintaining power than reform.
139 Guatemalan Constitution, in Americas Watch The 
Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic Communities: CERJ (New York: 
Americas Watch, 1989), p. 2.
140 See, for example, Jean Marie Simon, Guatemala, p.
171.
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Amilcar Mendez's own history follows the tragedy of 
Guatemala. His father, a local mayor, had supported Arbenz 
and had consequently been imprisoned twice, avoiding arrest 
a third time only by escaping into the mountains, and then 
dying prematurely of ill health. As a young teacher, Mendez 
had been horrified by the discriminatory treament of the 
Indians and became determined to engage in human rights 
work. As a consequence he and his family had been forced 
into hiding in 1981, and on his return to El Quiche he had 
been abducted from his school and interrogated and abused. 
Repeated death threats forced the family to take refuge in 
Canada in 1987, but they had returned after two months in 
response to requests from the local community.141
Mendez would help the villagers formulate and present 
their petitions, although these often did not reach their 
destination. By 1988, 600 individuals had petitioned not to 
patrol, and resisters had begun to meet informally to 
coordinate their efforts. Two hundred of them made 
themselves visible in public for the first time by marching 
with trade unionists in the traditional May Day parade in 
1988. On 31 July, at a crowded meeting in which several 
hundred participants had squashed into Mendez's garden, the 
Council of Ethnic Communities "Runujel Junam" was founded. 
"Runujel Junam" is Quiche for "everyone is equal". The 
title reflected members desire that the group speak for the
141 Interview with Amilcar Mendez, Santa Cruz de Quiche, 
March 1990.
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Maya Indian majority.142 The founding declaration stated 
that CERJ "will monitor and struggle for the defense of the 
fundamental freedoms and rights of the human being”. Mendez 
was elected president with an executive of seven, all of 
whom were Maya and two of whom were women.
Growing in confidence, CERJ organised its own march in 
Guatemala City in August 1988, when it presented the 
Congressional Commission on Human Rights with a four point 
petition requesting that: the constitutional right not to 
patrol be respected; public education about this right be 
provided; that there be congressional monitoring of the 
situation; and that ex-patrollers be protected.
The petition was presented in an atmosphere of dignity 
and restraint, no antagonistic slogans were shouted, and the 
Commission promised to investigate the threats to 
ex-patrollers.143
In contrast to the highly focussed and concrete demands 
of the August statement, a more elaborate document, 
published in November 1988, lays out CERJ short- and long­
term goals.
142 Americas Watch, The Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic 
Communities, p. 15.
143It should be explained that both the Congressional 
Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Procurator were 
new institutions established, after some debate, at the end 
of 1987. Specifically, the Human Rights Procurator is 
mandated to investigate human rights violations, publically 
report his findings, and initiate court or administrative 
proceedings where appropriate. The Commission is charged 
with drafting and enacting laws related to human rights, 
conducting limited oversight of the enforcement of laws, and 
maintaining contact with domestic and international human 
rights groups.
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1. Defense of cultural and human rights of Guatemala's 
different indigenous communities, in order to preserve their 
identity;
2. Complete respect for and compliance with human 
rights throughout Guatemala;
3. Meaningful, complete land reform;
4. Complete literacy;
5. Elimination of sub-standard housing;
6. Establishment of an anthropology centre;
7. Establishment of a documentation centre and library 
for the study and presevation of ethnic culture;
8. Elimination of discrimination and ethnic; 
predjudice.144
Like WiP in Poland and the Greenham women, CERJ saw 
from the start that the concrete manifestations of 
militarism that were the immediate object of protest were 
actually one symptom of more deeply rooted injustice, in 
their case the exploitation and abuse of ethnic peoples and 
the complete disregard for human rights. Changing this 
would mean fundamental political changes, such as land 
reform.
By March 1989 CERJ had 1,259 delegates and 
representatives in 192 communities, many of which had 
completely stopped patrolling. Most of the communities were 
in the troubled province of Quiche and surrounding 
departments. Executive meetings took place every two weeks,
144 Americas Watch, The Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic 
Communities: CERJ (New York: Americas Watch, 1989), p. 15.
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with delegates meeting as needed. CERJ had also aquired a 
small office, containing a single typewriter and a few 
chairs and a desk.
In contrast to WiP and Greenham, CERJ*s campaign is not 
marked by the invention of innovative non-violent action or 
the use of civil disobedience. It uses the traditional 
forms of education, petitioning, and marching. But one 
should note that the act of existence was itself an enormous 
and risky challenge to the system, quite apart from the 
practical difficulties to be surmounted. Attendance at 
meetings could take one and a half days travel both on foot 
and public transport, and cost several days wages, thus the 
groups continuing existence was a tribute to individual 
commitment. The office had become a drop-in centre not just 
for those protesting the patrols, but for those with 
complaints of other human rights abuses and even for 
domestic and social problems. Petitions against patrolling, 
denunciations and testimonies of violations such as 
killings, abductions, death threats and writs of Habeas 
Corpus would be typed up and signed with a thumb print and 
sent to the appropriate authorities.
Mendez and his co-workers had also begun a programme of 
human rights education. This would involve visits to local 
communities to talk about the concept of human rights, its 
evolution, applicability to Maya lives, and the country's 
constitution. The success of this work was demonstrated by 
the fact that, although the constitution is written in 
Spanish and the cheapest edition costs 70 cents, most
260
members of the group that I met had well-marked copies from 
which they could recite key articles verbatim.
Yet CERJ' s success came at just the time when it was 
becoming clear that the Cerezo presidency had made little 
difference to the established order. Cerezo's survival of 
two coup attempts had been at the cost of a number of 
concessions to the Right. No attempt had been made to limit 
the activities of right wing terrorists in or out of the 
security forces; there was no talk of land reform? no new 
taxes; no dialogue with the guerillas; no relations with 
socialist countries; no regional policies favourable to the 
Sadinistas. And the "bureacracy of death”145 had remained 
intact. There were more political assassinations in 1987 
than in the year before Cerezo took office. The US-based 
"Council on Hemispheric Affairs" named Guatemala as worst 
human rights violator in Latin America for 1989 and 1990.146 
Targets of the attacks were political leaders, labour 
organisers, teachers, students, journalists, and human 
rights workers. A "messenger system" appeared to have 
developed in which prominent members of a particular 
constituency would be targetted until the constituency had 
been terrorised into inaction.147
CERJ, given that it challenged the heart of the army's
145 Allan Nairn and Jean-Marie Simon, "The Bureaucracy 
of Death", The New Republic, 30 June, 1986.
146 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p. 163.
147 Americas Watch, Messengers of Death: Human Rights in 
Guatemala, November 1988-February 1990 (New York: Americas 
Watch, 1990).
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counterinsurgency campaign and its ideological control over 
the rural population, was obviously a target for attack. In 
September 1988 a CERJ member was shot dead in his home, four 
more abductions followed that year, and it was only prompt 
denunciations by CERJ that led to the release of three. In 
1989 the pressure became more intense: four more members 
were abducted by the army from the plantation where they 
worked, and the army began a disinformation campaign against 
CERJ in general and Amilcar Mendez in particular. The army 
accused CERJ of collaboration with the guerillas, showing as 
"proof" an alleged guerilla defector denouncing Mendez as a 
guerilla commander - although, when confronted by 
international human rights groups, the army acknowledged 
that it had no evidence to support the accusation. Another 
video showed a wolf in a chicken coop talking about human 
rights. After persuading the chicks to follow him he eats 
them.148 Such films were accompanied by warnings and 
threats about what would happen if villagers discontinued 
patrolling or joined CERJ. For example, in Chontala the army 
commander told villagers that they were free to give up 
patrolling, but if they did so the army would give them "a 
permanent rest."149 In some communities villagers were 
ordered to kill or capture Mendez if he returned to the 
area, while Mendez himself received repeated death threats.
148 Lynne Jones, "Murder in Guatemala", New Left Review 
182 (July/August 1990), p. 57.
149 Americas Watch, The Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic 
Communities, p . 33.
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Such tactics were not without effect.150 By March 
1990, membership of CERJ was around 10,000 and ninety 
communities had at least partially ended patrolling, but 
some of these communities were divided between those 
determined not to patrol and those too frightened, or with 
too much to lose if they discontinued. Human rights 
activists in CERJ and its newly formed sister group, the 
widow's self help organisation CONAVIGUA, found themselves 
endangered by both army and patrollers. Thus, for example 
when CONAVIGUA member Maria Mejia was murdered by two 
military commissioners in Paraxtut in the spring 1990, 
patrollers drove the rest of the extended family out of the 
village, accusing them of subversion. They took refuge in 
the CERJ office. When the assistant human rights procurator 
attempted to escort the family back, he too was threatened 
and barely escaped with his life. The incident highlighted 
a growing public debate about the patrols. The chief 
procurator stated they were out of control but, ambiguously, 
argued that they were not unconstitutional, contrary to 
CERJ's argument that their existence undermined the 
constitutional rights of ethnic peoples. The incident also 
highlighted the powerlessness of the human rights 
bureaucracy and its lack of coercive power over police and 
judiciary. The government insisted to the international 
community that there was no threat, while doing nothing to 
protect human rights activists at home. The army 
disingenuously continued to insist that the patrols were
150 Lynne Jones, "Murder in Guatemala", p. 57.
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voluntary while the minister of defence, General Gramajo, 
stated that CERJ was a "facade organisation" whose 
"objectives are the same as the guerillas'".151
The human rights situation continued to deteriorate 
through 1990 in the run up to the general election. The 
lower turn out for the 1990 elections showed the general 
disillusionment most felt with electoral democracy. In four 
years of Christian Democrat government there had been at 
least two thousand extrajudicial killings and five hundred 
kidnappings with only one person brought to trial and not a 
single conviction.152 The massacre at Santiago Atitlan, 
when soldiers had opened fire on 1000 unarmed Indians 
protesting peacefully outside the military base and killed 
thirteen people including two children, had resulted in the 
immediate suspension of US aid. The economic situation had 
worsened dramatically, growing unemployment and runaway 
inflation having pushed an unprecedented 87 per cent of the 
population below the poverty line, while the government's 
neo-liberal solutions of wage restraints and cuts in social 
services further polarised the population and increased 
social ferment.153
The election as president of Jorge Serrano Elias in 
November 1990 did nothing to change the basic situation.
151 Ibid , p. 57.
152 "Special Report, Guatemala 1986-90: Rocky transition 
to democracy" Central America Report 18 (May 1991). The 
figures are from the local press. GAM reported 1513 extra­
judicial killings for 1990 alone.
153 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p. 177.
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During his first year in office there were more than 1000 
human rights violations, including five hundred and fifty 
extra-judicial killings. Yet, in spite of this unremitting 
repression, the human rights groups continued to function. 
New groups emerged and formed a coalition in 1990 with the 
evocative title of 'Committee of the Damned'. There were 
also concrete gains. CONAVIGUA, which by this stage was the 
most widespread and effective organisation in rural areas, 
had begun to organise public exhumations from clandestine 
graves. This not only brought some significant
psychological comfort to grieving families. Disclosure of 
the grave sites and proper forensic examination of the 
remains was also a major challenge to the government's 
policy of impunity.
CERJ, meanwhile, continued to wrestle with the problem 
of patrols, which were playing an increasingly divisive role 
in the communities and whose chief's were themselves 
increasingly responsible for human rights abuses. 
Patrollers also continued to be victims, as when ten were 
killed by guerillas while following army orders to remove a 
sheet of guerilla slogans hung on a bridge.154 CERJ also 
went on the legal offensive by taking the Guatemalan 
government to court at the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights over the failure to arrest two patrol chiefs from 
Chunima who had first murdered a prominent CERJ member and 
then two of the three witnesses. This action had actually
154 Americas Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 
Guatemala: Getting Away With Murder (New York: Americas
Watch, 1991), p. 31.
265
resulted in the requested arrest, the first of its kind, 
although the outcome of prosecution remains uncertain.
At least four factors can be seen to underly this 
growing assertiveness and self confidence. One was the 
increasingly outspoken role of the church facilitated by the 
appointment of a new archbishop, Prospero Penados del 
Barrio. Secondly, there was increasing self-awareness of 
ethnic identity. The significance placed on this by the 
Maya respondents in my study had markedly increased in the 
two years from 1990 to 1992 and this, in turn, had increased 
their self confidence. What had brought this about was the 
indigenous peoples involvement in, and growing awareness of, 
themselves as a transcontinental movement in which many 
groups shared problems and histories and together wielded 
growing international clout. The holding of the 1991 
Continental Encounter in Quetzaltenango, and the public 
discussion over the "celebration” of the Columbus 
Centennial, resulted in a "Campaign of 500 Years of 
Indigenous and Popular Resistance". This had massively 
increased the visibility of the issue of ethnic rights, 
nationally and internationally. Within Guatemala a new 
coordinating group had emerged: "Majawil Q'ij" (the New
Awakening), which brought together representatives of 
indigenous people from all the popular organisations, 
including CONAVIGUA and CERJ. Its specific aim was to 
promote the unity of indigenous peoples; to recover their 
history and develop and nourish their identity, culture and 
religious beliefs; and to unite in the struggle against
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discrimination, oppression and dispossession.
Thirdly, there was the continuing immiseration of the 
majority of the population. Social welfare statistics for 
Guatemala, particularly for the indigenous and even more 
particularly for the Maya of the North West Highlands, read 
like a litany of despair. For example: the number in
extreme poverty, that is, unable to afford a minimum diet 
has risen from 52 per cent in 1980 to 72 per cent in 1990. 
(80.2 per cent in the northern rural areas).155 Guatemala 
has, compared to the rest of Central America, the worst 
illiteracy rate; the highest infant mortality rate, at 160 
per 1000 for indigenous children; the highest maternal 
mortality rate; and more than 79 per cent of deaths of 
children under the age of five are from easily preventable 
diseases.156 Thus, according to Jonas, "the power of the 
economic crisis to regenerate social ferment . . . proved 
greater than the ability of the counterinsurgency state to 
repress it."157
And, fourthly, there were dramatic changes in the 
international context. With the ending of the Cold War in 
Europe, the electoral defeat of the Sadinistas in Nicaragua 
and, in 1991, a negotiated end to the war in El Salvador, 
the government's Cold War rhetoric and the military's 
determined equation of "human rights = communist subversion"
155 "Economic stabilization: An Illusion Shared by Few", 
Central America Report 18 (November 1991K  p. 331.
156 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, p. 179.
157 Ibid., p. 177.
267
began to look more and more inappropriate as surrounding 
countries shifted towards more consensual politics. There 
was growing pressure from the United States on the 
Guatemalan government to reform (although the United States 
did not challenge the structural conditions that underlay 
the problems). There was a growing, if superficial, 
discussion of the need for peace and human rights. Large 
posters would assault the eye, at the airport and on public 
highways, announcing the army's and government's commitment 
to peace. This rhetoric appears to have acted in .a similar 
way to that of the Polish communist peace offensive in the 
mid 1980s, putting the government in an ambiguous position 
when it came to repressing movements that took the rhetoric 
seriously and had increasing support from international 
solidarity movements and human rights organisations.
Thus, on January 31 1992, the Committee for the Damned 
held their own peace and human rights conference, 
commemorating the Spanish Embassy massacre twelve years 
before. The published conclusions stated that "only with 
the inclusion of all of civil society would it be possible 
for dialogue and negotiation to create an enduring peace", 
and demanded "an end to impunity", demilitarisation, 
compensation for the losses caused by the army, restoration 
of occupied lands, and guarantees of life and freedom of 
organisation.158 The ambiguity of the situation, and thus 
the possibilty for action, could also be detected in the
158 "Conferencia Por la Paz y los Derechos Humanos",Paid 
advertisement, El Grafico, 2 February, 1992.
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countryside, with some individual commanders demonstrating 
a growing respect for CERJ and its leaders while, at the 
same time, the intensity of the death threats against these 
same leaders and foreign volunteers increased.
Not surprisingly, the ambiguity and volatility of the 
situation has increased the stress on CERJ which, like the 
other movements in this study, seems to be going through a 
cycle of growth, cohesion and fragmentation, reflecting both 
the strains of being an informal movement with a pluralist 
agenda and the pervasive stress caused by permanent terror. 
The tensions within the leadership are over the use of 
resources and style of working, as well as the difficult 
area of ethnicity. However, unlike for WiP or at Greenham, 
the core issue - that of the PACs - remains unresolved, and 
this fact still provides a central focus for activity, as 
does education in human rights. In addition, CERJ has 
become very active on the related issue of forced 
recruitment and, with the help of international awards and 
volunteer staff from abroad, has started a small health 
clinic and women's cooperative. However, the growth of 
other groups has meant that some of CERJ's human rights 
agenda is also tackled by them; because of tensions within 
CERJ some workers have preferred to use their energy 
elsewhere. At my last visit, in January 1992, CERJ had had 
no new elections for its leadership since its inception. 
Twenty-seven of its members have been killed or disappeared, 
and the bulk of the workload has fallen on a contracted and 
increasingly exhausted executive. Yet, even so, the most
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striking impressions I had of the activists was of their 
solidarity, good humour, mutual respect, and enduring 
commitment. No one showed any signs of giving up their 
commitment.
Anti-militarism in a Cold War Climate
I have described these three movements at some length in 
order - as I stated in the introduction - to provide a 
rich description of the environment in which engagement 
occurred. What emerges is that, while each movement has a 
distinct and unique history reflective of the very different 
cultures in which they were situated, there were 
continuities which I see as arising, firstly, from a common 
response to the new Cold War; and, secondly, as a result of 
the choice of non-violence as a method.
This history should make clear that the Cold War as an 
ideological confrontation between two superpowers that 
manifested itself as a dangerous escalation of a nuclear 
arms race had less meaning to the actors on the ground than 
other related confrontations: that within blocs, between 
superpower and client state, and within countries, between 
government and dissenting population. Mary Kaldor has 
argued that these latter aspects of the Cold War are the 
most significant. Her thesis is that far from being in 
ideological conflict, the "Atlanticism" of the West and the 
"post Stalinism" of the East were "complementary and
270
required each other's presence as an external enemy with 
concomitant high levels of military spending, in order to 
legitimise domestic agendas.1,159 She argued that both 
halves of Europe were in some senses "occupied” (although in 
the West this could be seen to be in some respects voluntary 
and far less repressive in its manifestations), and that the 
clamp-down on human rights exemplified by martial law in 
Poland and the new deployments of American missiles in the 
West had more to do with maintaining the internal cohesion 
of alliances than with confronting any external threat. 
Thus, the evolving peace and human rights movements on both 
sides developed converging agendas and could be seen in some 
senses as "anti-occupation" movements.160
Certainly this thesis could be extended to include 
Guatemala. There are obvious parallells between
Jaruzelski's Poland and the counterinsurgency state. In 
both cases attempts at social reform over long periods had 
been seen as challenges to both the ruling elites' hegemony 
and the client state— superpower relationship, and had met 
with repression. This was justified in ideologial terms by 
labelling the reformers as fifth columnists and agents of 
the opposing superpower. The ruling elites in both 
countries had attempted to legitimise their positions, and 
increase economic aid, by formally withdrawing the army from
159 Mary Kaldor, "After the Cold War", in Europe from 
Below: An East West Dialogue, ed. Mary Kaldor (Londons 
Verso, 1990).
160 Kaldor, "After the Cold War".
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politics - by ending martial law in Poland, and by 
transferring to a civilian president in Guatemala - without 
any relaxation of military control.
In all cases, including Britain, control has meant an 
increasing rigidity of the system, a preoccupation with 
"national security" (exemplified in Britain for example by 
the banning of trade unions at GCHQ in Cheltenham) and 
increasing militarisation. This militarisation, whether in 
the form of new nuclear weapons, an increasingly inflexible 
military call up, or the creation of civil patrols, has in 
each case meant a subsequent diminuition in civil liberties. 
Thus the immediate objects of protest - cruise missiles, the 
military oath, the PACs - were in some sense artifacts. 
They provided a focus and an opportunity to mount a 
challenge to the political culture as a whole, a culture 
created to a large degree by the Cold War.
Some of the major differences in the timing of the 
emergence of these groups, and in the form in which they 
emerged, resulted from the different degree to which each of 
these societies used fear as a means of control. Thus, for 
Greenham women, functioning in a liberal democracy in which 
government action is to some degree limited by public 
opinion and the law, fear of a threatened event - nuclear 
destruction - was initially mobilising. Action brought 
women into conflict with the coercive powers of the state, 
which were certainly intimidating for some but not to the 
degree that action ceased. On the contrary, women's 
creative responses to repressive measures, when given
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publicity, actually encouraged the growth of the movement. 
In contrast the governments in Poland, and to an even 
greater degree in Guatemala, made deliberate use of terror 
to demobilise popular protest. An attempt to create WiP in 
the first year of martial law would not have succeeded. Nor 
could CERJ have survived in the pre-Cerezo years. It was 
the opening of some political space that gave some 
individuals the confidence to test and extend the limits of 
the space. And, in a sense, the fear created by repression, 
symbolised by forced recruitment onto the oppressors' side, 
became the object of protest. All three movements could be 
seen as taking action against fear.
The nature and extent of repression also affected the 
form of non-violence and structure of organisation. Both 
WiP and Greenham dealt with states in which the legal 
apparatus functioned and could be used by protestors and 
government alike. Both groups used civil disobedience and 
made skillful propagandistic use of the sanctions applied. 
Moreover their open, informal, leaderless, and structureless 
form not only challenged what both groups perceived as the 
rigid authoritarianism of the state, it also protected the 
movement from both state-sponsored subversion and from 
destruction by targeted arrests. The greater formality of 
CERJ may well reflect the importance of hierarchy in Maya 
social life, but one should also note that it emerged in a 
political environment in which one overriding feature 
appears to have been the absence of the rule of law, with 
army and death squads free to institute terror at random,
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indiscriminately, and with impunity. Thus, the creation of 
a formal, structured, and accountable organisation answered 
both a political and psychological need. Both local 
magistrates and the president of the Supreme Court informed 
me that they had no control over the military.161 In this 
atmosphere civil disobedience would have been extremely 
risky and meaningless. The movement was committed to 
demonstrating that it was not subversive and used 
constitutional means to push the government to uphold its 
own constitution.
For all three movements the theme of occupation had a 
double meaning. Certainly both WiP and Greenham referred to 
the issues of national sovereignty and democratic control. 
WiP, particularly, was concerned with the role of the Soviet 
Union, while Greenham did much to highlight the United 
States's military presence in Britain. CERJ activists are 
well aware of the role of the United States in their 
country's development. All the groups, however, perceived 
themselves as occupied in another sense: by structures
within their own countries. As Polish youth with no belief 
in, or opportunities for, a satisfying career in an 
ideologically and economically bankrupt state? as women in 
a patriarchal, Thatcherite, Britain? and as Maya Indians 
impoverished, exploited and denied their own land: all three 
groups drew on a constituency of alienated outsiders with 
nothing or little to lose from challenging the status guo,
161 Author interviews conducted with local magistrates 
and judiciary, 1990.
274
and with greater freedom of action and a greater sensitivity 
to the issues connected to militarism.
The outsider role also contributed to the way in which 
all three groups were able to stand outside the bipolar 
logic of the Cold War. This distinguished them from some 
other opposition movements within their own countries, both 
antecedent and contemporary. The revolutionary left in 
Guatemala, which had led the guerilla wars of the 1960s and 
early 1980s, was not sponsored by the Soviet Union but was 
socialist in orientation and had initially insisted on a 
hegemonic role in challenging the state. Popular movements 
like CERJ have never taken an ideological position and have 
insisted on their autonomy from the guerilla movement even 
where there is a convergence of goals.162 Solidarity, while 
clearly autonomous itself, accepted the bipolar view of the 
world that argued that Western peace movements and Central 
American revolutions, because they were praised by communist 
propaganda, must be bad, while nuclear weapons that 
challenged the Soviet Union were good. WiP challenged this 
"alignment” by both supporting Western peace initiatives and 
challenging the Soviet Union, opposing US intervention in 
Nicaragua and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Greenham 
Women similarly supported Soviet and East European 
independent peace activists and were heavily criticised by
162 See Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, pp. 135— 144 and 
pp. 189— 193.
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some sections of the British peace movement for doing so.163 
The combination of nonalignment and a non-ideological agenda 
that emphasised issues with a transnational meaning actually 
helped to foster the international connections that played 
a vital role in all the groups' development and support when 
under pressure. All of these groups played to a wider 
audience than their own countries, and this increased the 
sense of working in a common political culture.
The movement histories show that there is a remarkable 
similarity in the lifecycles of Greenham and WiP. And it 
would appear that the development of CERJ is following a 
similar pattern, although it is too early to be sure. This 
cycle appears to have three distinct stages: firstly, the 
organic development of the group around a single issue by a 
small "friendship circle.” By friendship circle I mean 
people geographically contiguous like the Welsh women, or 
villagers around Santa Cruz del Quiche, or personally 
connected like the former NZS members in WiP. What follows 
is a period of exponential growth, fostered by imaginative 
actions, a degree of repression and attendant publicity, the 
development of a pluralist agenda, the formation of 
international connections, and increasing visibility and 
repression, which in itself contributes to further
163 For example, in 1984 Greenham women occupied the 
Soviet embassy in London in protest at the arrest and trial 
in Moasow of peace campaigner Olga Medvedkova. Their 
refusal to align themselves with communist government 
resulted in the refusal of visas and deportations from 
Soviet bloc countries. I was refused entry to Hungary and 
East Germany and deported from Czechoslovakia for peace 
activities carried out with independent activists in those 
countries.
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visibility and growth. The combination of growth, a complex 
agenda, and repression creates tensions within the group. 
However, internal cohesion remains while the central issue 
remains unresolved. If there is some success in achieving 
the main goal, as with WiP and Greenham, the group fragments 
around the different aspects of the agenda. The importance 
of this cycle of organic growth, cohesion and fragmentation 
is that it demonstrates that social movements are not 
static, they are both created by and determine the 
engagement of the individual actors themselves, who bring to 
and develop their own agendas within the context of the 
group. The cycle is part of the dynamic interactive 
environment in which engagement occurs.
Finally, all three groups practised what I describe as 
the 'politics of connection'. That is, a politics that sees 
relationships as central to its agenda. The deliberate use 
of the term connection - drawing on Gilligan's and Lyons's 
work described above - does not mean to imply that these are 
primarily "care focussed" movements. It should be clear 
from the above descriptions that the moral concerns of all 
three movements are with issues of justice and care, with 
both challenging oppression and preventing harm, and that 
while the emphasis may change over time there is an 
observable trend towards integration of these concerns. 
Indeed, from the outset, the issues that functioned as 
triggers for the emergence of the movements - such as a 
change in the courts' treatment of oath refusers, the 
refusal to uphold a new constitutional guarantee, or the
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introduction of a new weapon system - symbolised in a 
powerful way both the central themes that preoccupied these 
groups: occupation and control versus self determination and 
autonomy, and annihilation versus survival, the threat of 
annihilation being to conscience, dignity, culture, 
community and life itself.
The pluralist agenda that emerged in each case could be 
defined as anti-political. Here I am using David Ost's 
definition of anti-politics as "not the negation of 
politics, but a relocation of the political public from 
state to society." 164 Thus, these movements were concerned 
not with control of the means of production but with the 
social and cultural issues of militarism, ecology, human 
rights, gender, and ethnicity. These were issues that had 
a determining effect on the degree of control one had over, 
and the quality of, everyday life in both the personal and 
public spheres. This was a break with the movements of the 
past, notably of the 1930s in Britain and the 1960s 
throughout the world. Understanding this marked difference 
in political context may help to explain differences in the 
nature of engagement and activism between the activists in 
my study and those of others described above in the 
literature review.
I would argue that a significant aspect of such 
anti-political politics is a perception of the 
interconnection between issues, and concern with damage to 
social relationships. Thus, for example, CERJ challenged
164 Ost, Solidarity, p. 16
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the PACs because they threatened indigenous culture and 
usurped traditional structures of authority. They imposed a
new bureaucracy, totally vertical and militarised 
and controlled by one individual, something never 
seen in indigenous communities, nor followed in 
ancient times. . . . The communities are divided, 
subject to psychological terror, and there is a 
militarisation of civil life that clashes with 
ethnic values.165
Greenham women saw the presence of nuclear weapons as 
the most dangerous manifestation of the damage done to 
social relationships, particularly gender relationships, by 
patriarchy; and WiP contrasts the destructiveness of the 
army with the social and communal values exemplified by 
Solidarity and the Catholic Church.
In contrast, all three groups see the types of
relationships fostered within their movements as, at their 
best, prefiguring and exemplifying the kind of relationships 
they would like to see in society at large: non-hierarchical 
and informal, collaborative, supportive, and encouraging of 
creativity. Good relationships were in all cases initially
facilitated by the fact that all three groups grew
organically from friendship circles. This internal
cohesion, and the enjoyment individuals drew from working 
with each other, was one of the main features to attract 
others. In addition, relationships between the movements 
and the other individuals and groups within the national and
165 CERJ statement, November 1990. Personal files of 
author.
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international community was essential to all three
movements' survival. Not only did the dialogue between 
movements help to develop their agendas, but such solidarity 
played a vital role in publicising and limiting repression.
Rapid growth created difficulties for all three groups. 
Individuals found themselves sometimes having to make 
choices between issue and community or between internal and 
external relationships. And for many the breakdown of 
relationships caused as much concern as conflict over
substantive issues.
Finally, non-violence as practised by all three
movements is primarily an act of communication with the 
opponent. All three movements aimed not for the 
revolutionary overthrow of the state but its radical
transformation through relationship. Both rhetoric and 
action focus not on exclusion and destruction but on the 
need for inclusion. This does not mean that there are not 
powerful expressions of anger and demands for justice, but 
these are seen as a necessary basis for healing.
Thus, CERJ argue that real peace and human rights can 
only be reached when the government respects the social, 
economic, civil and cultural rights of the people. "If the 
government was able achieve this it is logical that it would 
earn the loyalty of the people, and not the rejection and 
repudiation that grows each day.”166 And they ask, "How can 
a national consensus be achieved without our participation?
166 CERJ statement to the Conference on Peace and Human 
Rights, 30 January 1992. Personal Files of author.
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. . . How is it possible to exclude those who for centuries 
have been victims of the most monstrous repression?”167 
Diana, one of my Greenham respondents, talks about non­
violent incursions into the missile base as a point of 
communication as well for me. It's a way of saying "look, 
here I am, think about it, talk to me, let's argue about 
it". WiP member Magda explains that the communist regime 
tried to disintegrate the society, and that WiP's political 
activity was to try to integrate people with some kind of 
social world, that is, to rebuild social relationships.
What is impressive is that, in each case, through the 
use of non-clandestine, non-violent methods, each movement 
was able to extend the available political space, fostering 
the engagement of individuals who had not previously been 
engaged in any form of political action, and demonstrating 
the possibility within each culture of new forms of 
political organisation and activity that laid the 
foundations for other groups and initiatives, and, in Poland 
at least, for the transformation of the state itself.
In this chapter I have focussed on the movement as a 
unit in order to highlight its role in fostering engagement, 
and in order to detail the political and cultural context 
from which it emerged. Keeping this context in mind I will 
now turn to the individual process of engagement in all its 
diversity and complexity.
is? »»The First 90 Days of Government: The Crisis, the 
Social Pact, and Total Peace”: CERJ briefing on first three




"IF NOT US. WHO?": FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES
My interest in this chapter is to explore the lives of 
activists prior to their involvement in collective action. 
The overwhelming impression from the literature on family 
background is that activists are especially influenced by 
parental values and do not act in direct contradiction to 
their parents' political outlook. Coherent childrearing 
practises - that encourage self expression and independence 
- combined with early maturity and responsibility may also 
be important. Secure and affectionate families with an 
extensive attitude to the outside world seem more likely to 
produce empathic, pro-social behaviour.
I was interested to find out if my cross-cultural 
sample confirmed these findings. Given that the concept of 
childhood itself differs markedly from culture to culture, 
and that for some engagement came long after childhood was 
over, I expected a more diverse picture. I also wondered if 
one could distinguish a moral orientation. What follows are 
summaries of twelve respondents' lives before engagement.
Britain: The Greenham Women
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Nary was born in 1934, the second youngest of four children. 
She describes her family as ordinary working class.1 They 
voted Labour but were not political people and politics was 
not particularly discussed at home. Nor were they 
religious. Mary sees some of their values and attitudes to 
other people as influencing her own.
Their attitude was, if you couldn't say 
anything nice about somebody, you shouldn't say 
anything, If you couldn't help somebody then you 
know that was a bad thing, and if you did help 
somebody you shouldn't necessarily expect them to 
repay you because they might help somebody else, 
so it was a sort of a spiral thing.
Like her they did not regard material things as the main 
priority. If there was a threat of an earthquake they would 
have grabbed the cat or something and dashed off.
Father was, because of his own harsh treatment in 
childhood, if anything, too easy on us. Mary's memories of 
him are unimportant and not of any particular fondness. He 
was there. Although one conversation sticks in her mind. 
He said you should respect your parents, to which she 
responded you should only respect people if they earn 
respect, regardless of who they were. He had laughed 
because I think he probably agreed. Mother was important, 
but the great influence was Mary's maternal grandmother who
1 All quotations from my respondents' transcripts are 
written in italics without quotation marks.
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was quite irrepressible, a larger than life character, who, 
in spite of her repressive treatment of Mary's mother as a 
child, both spoilt and encouraged Mary to stick up for 
herself. Mary does not romanticise her. The picture 
conveyed is of a manipulative, intolerant and feisty old 
woman who did not suffer fools gladly but who would not, for 
example, be intimidated or inconvenienced by the Blitz, 
defying air raid wardens to shop for tea and refusing to 
sleep anywhere but her own bed because that upstart Hitler 
is not getting me to behave like a mole. She felt that if 
she acknowledged it, Hitler would have won.
Home life was argumentative and nice. [. . .] It was 
a very easy growing-up process, there was no real distress, 
just very ordinary times. . . . You got the odd wallop when 
you deserved it, but, again, you knew that you had that 
coming.2 Too young to be frightened by the war, she found 
it fascinating.
School, on the other hand, was extremely dull, and 
Mary, although not actively rebellious, simply took no part. 
The only thing that kept her there was the hockey that she 
enjoyed and a tight group of friends
that I went up to Primary School with; [it] was a 
really motley assortment - one friend who was 
Jewish, one who was Roman Catholic, one who was an 
evangelical type, and they were all totally 
opposed to their families' religions, so it was 
sort of . . .  we were a sort of rebellious group, 
but me having nothing to rebel against because my
2 In the interviews with, and statements by, repondents 




She left at 16 without any qualifications and worked in 
offices and shops until old enough to apply for nursing 
school, which she had set her heart on since the age of six. 
At that time she had had scarlet fever and spent a long time 
in an isolation ward with little contact with her parents 
and there was just one night sister who made life so 
tolerable, that I knew that that was what I would like to 
do. Undaunted by Matron, who said it was impossible to 
apply without qualifications, she argued that it was not 
right to stop someone doing what they wanted and, after 
persuading Matron to set her some personal exams, obtained 
a place. After training she chose midwifery, which offered 
her independence, a chance to work practically with women, 
which she enjoyed, and exposure to some of the harsher 
realities of life: the poverty in which people lived really 
shocked me. Working in a naval town with both officers and 
ratings' wives also exposed her to the real inequities of 
class: there was definitely two sets of rules. And the
practical application of it was horrifying; because the 
women are the losers, all the way down the line, and in the 
lower income brackets the women lose hand over fist.
The shockingness did not push her into political 
engagement. Never a joiner, actions for her at this stage 
of her life consisted of individual initiative as and when 
problems landed on my doorstep, and a refusal to bow to 
authority for its own sake or to allow anyone to break her
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spirit. This might mean a refusal to use a cheap and 
unpleasant dressing on patients bedsores because I thought, 
well, I wouldn't have that foul commodity near me, so I 
wouldn't use it on somebody else, or catheterising a male 
patient in distress, while working as a nurse in South 
Africa. This confrontation cost her her job and meant she 
had to leave the country as she was aware that the ward 
sister considered her a communist. I was not a communist 
because I didn't have the dedication to belong to any 
political party, it was far too great a commitment. She was 
also aware that I was not comfortable to work with. And I 
didn't like most of the people that I worked with, because 
they tolerated things they shouldn't have tolerated. You 
know, they wouldn't stand up and demand, or put pressure on 
to bring about change.
At twenty-five she married Robert, an engineer whom she 
liked. He was so different from all the rest because he 
talked politics, which she found interesting and absorbing. 
[• . •] I wasn't interested in who was getting the latest 
this or the newest that, you know it always left me 
absolutely cold. Yet her husband's socialism and engagement 
in the trade union movement and Labour party did not touch 
her personally. She belonged, as he did, to CND, but was 
not active. The next few years were taken up with the birth 
and upbringing of five children, district nursing, which 
combined more easily with family responsibilities than 
midwifery, and a move to Wales to live in a better 
environment. It was not until her late thirties that her
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concept of herself as an apolitical non-joiner was to 
undergo a marked change.
Margaret was born in 1939 in Italy. Her parents were 
German-Jewish refugees, and her father was interned as an 
enemy alien in the early part of the war. Her mother 
managed the next few years alone. Margaret's memories are 
of almost dying of bronchitis in dark lodgings, and of 
regularly being taken to a dark building [the air raid 
shelter] and put in this dark bed, high up on the wall where 
I couldn't get down, something that has left her with an 
enduring feeling of discomfort in confined spaces. Her 
father was released from internment to work on munitions and 
they moved to London.
Margaret describes her parents as good parents, and 
loving, providing attention and stability and security in 
the face of considerable upheaval. Her father was an 
intellectual man who valued truthfulness, integrity, culture 
and learning, and who felt that standing on your own feet 
and being independent was important. Her mother lived in 
the way I used to live before Greenham: according to other 
people's expectations of her, with a very strong sense of 
duty. She deferred absolutely to her husband's opinions.
They had become Quakers and the whole family attended 
Meeting regularly. Margaret remembers vividly her first 
experience of feeling drawn into the Meeting, when someone 
stood up and spoke the words that were in her mind. I knew 
that something was happening there. That's what reassured
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me that they weren't all just asleep. However, her father, 
a Tory and never a pacifist, had little time for left wing- 
type Quaker activities. Margaret also describes having a 
spiritual experience at the age of nine. She was walking 
under a railway bridge when the train went by on top and she 
had a sudden view of herself from the perspective of its 
passengers:
a little girl walking along a roadf under a
bridge. It was the first time I'd actually seen 
other people as separate human beings that didn't 
happen to revolve around me. It was like a god's- 
eye view of me and the other people in the train.
This was accompanied by the realisation that the world 
didn't revolve around her. Margaret told this incident to 
me twice during our interviews, seeing it as marking out the 
sense of distance she has always had from herself.
In spite of the stability of home, school was a
stressful experience. Margaret had spoken German with her 
sister until the age of four. She had already discovered in 
primary school that part of what I was wasn't acceptable. 
In secondary school she found it hard to make friends and 
became increasingly shy and withdrawn. She learnt to avoid 
like the plague having any German connections. I knew there 
was something wrong with me. Uncertain what was acceptable 
and what might result in her being laughed at - even being 
a Quaker seemed questionable - she learnt to cope by waiting 
to see what was expected. Her shyness and lack of
confidence were compounded by her father's dominance at
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home, Margaret was very bright and top of the class in most 
subjects, and he bossed me around and he wanted to direct my 
educational career.
Escape from the conflict between home and school was 
provided by a close friendship with another girl, who had a 
great sense of adventure. Together they used every moment 
of spare time to explore London on their bikes and, as they 
got older, they joined the Youth Hostel Association 
together. Pushed by father and her headmaster in academic 
work that she found exhausting and uninteresting, the 
solution again was not confrontation - we avoided conflict 
in our family, it was not Quakerly - but escape, first 
through biking with friends and folk-dancing, then, at the 
age of twenty-one, through marriage to her boyfriend Ed.
Margaret is clear that while Ed's capacity to stand up 
to her father was part of the attraction, it was a good 
relationship in its own right. She kept her job for the 
first four years of marriage to pay off their mortgage, then 
started a family. She was delighted to drop work just as 
she had been glad to drop university. Her main interest now 
was her children and growing vegetables, a skill she had 
acquired from her husband, and which led to the decision to 
buy a house with an extensive piece of land near Newbury. 
Politics through the 1960s and early 1970s played no part in 
their lives, Margaret's group involvements being confined to 
the Quakers, a mother's group and the Women's Institute.
Diana was born in 1969 in the Midlands. Her father was a
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Liberal, probably a closet Tory, and her mother a Labour 
party supporter and member of CND, but no-one was overtly 
political, nor was politics particularly discussed at home. 
In spite of this, Diana's political engagement began at the 
age of ten when she organised a petition against seal- 
culling? followed by joining national CND at eleven and 
starting a school CND group at twelve.
Resilience, self-sufficiency and maturity developed 
early in a childhood marked by a number of comings and 
goings. Her parents split up when she was one, and Diana, 
her elder sister and her father lived with her aunt and 
uncle until she was four, when her father married again. 
When Diana was eleven, her stepmother left to marry someone 
else. Not surprisingly, therefore, the dominant person in 
her childhood was her father, a mechanic with a passion for 
motorbikes, and hill walking. A stubborn man, he had a 
terrible sense of humour and a terrible temper which, on 
occasion, she found frightening. Rarely, tellings-off would 
be accompanied by spanking, which she found excessive: there 
was absolutely no need for it to be done, because by the 
time he finished telling me off, that was enough. But on 
the whole they appear to have had an affectionate, if 
argumentative, relationship. Nor was he neglectful, having 
given up his job to look after his daughters when his second 
wife left, although Diana said she would prefer to have 
fended for herself. I was a very independent child. I used 
to go out on my own, I liked being on my own.
Diana describes her mother as creative, happy, and as
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working too hard, too much of a perfectionist. She married 
again, and Diana saw her every weekend and did not 
apparently have any resentment at her departure. By her 
early teens the household was just Diana and her father, 
each doing our own thing, but she did not miss being in a 
larger, more closely-knit family: J had enough friends with 
large families to appreciate that when J saw it but also 
appreciate what I'd got, [which] was a family I cared about.
Another important figure was Diana's great grandmother: 
a very strong and stroppy little woman who had been widowed 
young and didn't hang on to social niceties, but who was 
straight to the point even if it shocked you slightly. She 
died when Diana was fourteen, a painful death that left 
Diana with a sense of loss.
Junior school was not particularly happy. She 
remembers being jeered for being a cry-baby when her 
stepmother left her father and locking herself in the 
toilets. She also remembers joining in the minor bullying 
of another child and finding the experience so horrible that 
she never wanted to repeat it. Another incident that stands 
out is refusing to leave the football pitch at the age of 
nine because she did not see why girls could not be allowed 
to play. I didn't see good reason for being excluded. She 
had no idea of the wider implications at the time, but I 
knew it was definitely a girl— boy thing. After being sent 
to the headmaster she was allowed to play.
In fact, Diana, although argumentative and with a 
strong sense of right and wrong, does not come across as the
291
conventional rebel. Her challenges were always very
polite. [. . .] I think I was a little pious really, a
goody- goody, people were complaining I was too well 
behaved. Early ambitions ranged from being a nurse to being 
a policewoman, because if you wanted to help the community, 
and stop wicked people doing wicked things, then join the 
police force.
Nevertheless, her last form teacher, right wing and 
vitriolic, had already marked her out as someone likely to 
come to no good, particularly as Diana had chosen to go to 
a progressive secondary school where one didn't wear 
uniforms, and you called teachers by their first names. 
Senior school also meant being with a much larger group of 
children from a variety of backgounds: suddenly, I was 
finding that there were more like me.
Anna was born in 1963, into a working class family in 
Huddersfield. Her father was a factory worker. She describes 
him as incredibly violent, abusive, a heavy drinker, someone 
of whom she was absolutely petrified. [. . .] He would just, 
like, hit me on the back of the head, I just felt sometimes 
he was going to kill me. Her housewife mother was, at that 
time, an emotional wreck, [. . .] totally dependent on her 
older brother and herself, to the point that she rarely let 
the children go to school. She read to the children, 
however, and Anna was bright, teaching herself to read and 
write at an early age and devour[ing] every book I could get 
my hands on.
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They had few friends: the family did not socialize. 
After Anna's birth, her mother refused to have intercourse 
with Anna's father. Anna slept between her parents and was 
persistently sexually abused by her father. As a 
consequence she was totally out of control: when they did 
get me into school I'd fight, or run away, I'd steal if I 
could. The misery, terror and insecurity of these early 
years can be illustrated by the fact that she could not 
volunteer a single happy memory. She later remarked that 
the nights that her father was out late and she was alone in 
bed with her mother, thinking he wasn't going to return, 
were incredibly happy. She also describes having an 
unnatural fear of dying as a very small child. I used to, 
like, just burst into tears thinking about it. And I 
remember when it rained really heavily, I used to cry. I 
used to think that we're going to be flooded and we're all 
going to die.
The fear, however, has always been acompanied by a 
strong instinct for survival and, as she got older, she kept 
running away. Such behaviour required some courage, as she 
was quite unable to articulate what the problems were. So, 
when picked up by the police, in spite of pleas to the 
contrary, she would invariably be returned home to more 
punishment. This pattern continued until the age of twelve 
when she allowed herself to be arrested and charged for 
something she had not done and as a consequence was put into 
care. Just before leaving home her father raped her, 
resulting in pregnancy and a miscarriage while in care, but
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no one considered sexual abuse.
The period in care was a mixed one. On the one hand, 
Anna describes herself, as before, as out of control, 
slashing her wrists, running away, refusing school and 
getting into physical fights. On the other, she was able to 
form warm relationships with staff, two of whom became 
parent figures. One of her key workers was an active trade 
unionist and began discussing politics with her. She got 
involved in creating a movement for the rights of children 
in care: giving them access to their records and case
conference reports and greater say in how they were treated. 
The movement continues to this day, partially staffed and 
run by the children themselves, and Anna sees their success 
in setting it up as very important: J think that was when it 
started for me. I think it was unstoppable from then.
In many ways the backgrounds of these four women could 
not be more different, and the age at which they became 
politically engaged varies widely. For the older women, 
family background and upbringing is only one of a number of 
influences. With Mary, for example, it is nursing and her 
husband's politics that give her a political awareness; but 
this does not push her into action. Both older women also 
have the experience of mothering. Yet some common themes 
emerge: all are clearly intelligent. As expected, it is in 
values rather than politics that three of the women see 
family influence. However, although all three feel 
affection for their families, there is also sense of 
separateness: in Margaret's case fostered by a need to keep
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a German identity hidden at school, and in Diana as a way of 
coping with frequent changes. Anna's traumatic experience 
is the exception and it is the staff of the children's home 
who become her family. What is striking is that all the 
women, in quite different contexts, find ways to to assert 
their independence in some way. Grandmothers provide models 
for two, while Margaret finds peer support, and Anna depends 
on her own instinct to survive and escape an intolerable 
situation.
One can identify the voices of both justice and care in 
these narratives. In Mary's case there are clearly both from 
an early age. Her desire to do nursing emerges in reponse 
to the care she herself is given, while the themes of 
reciprocity and equality recur throughout - in the dialogue 
with her father on respect, and in her concern for and 
treatment of her patients, who get the treatment she would 
want for herself. Diana, similarly, is both concerned over 
seals and wants fair treatment on the football pitch. The 
strength of feeling is enough to push her into action at an 
early age. Not surprisingly, the dominant voice for Anna is 
for equality and autonomy in the face of oppression, and it 
is empathic anger that motivates her first engagement. In 
Margaret's case, morality is grounded in Quaker faith and 
there are two "spiritual experiences": one of connection in 
the Quaker meeting, and a distinctive one of realising that 
self and other are separate and that she is part of but not 
central to the world.
Guatemala: CERJ and CONAVIGUA
295
Christina, born in 1958, is the oldest of six children. Her 
parents are peasant fanners, apolitical people whose main 
goal was to get enough from subsistence farming to avoid the 
yearly migration to the coast. She describes her father as 
a very humble and simple, passive, not an aggressive or 
rebellious man, who could not read, write or speak Spanish. 
He was strict with her, however, as was her mother. Both 
used corporal punishment, which upset her so much that at 
times she contemplated running away, although she felt it 
taught her to behave properly. Unlike many of their 
contemporaries, her father drank little and her parents got 
on well. In spite of hardships she remembers her childhood 
as happy. Both parents were Catholics and she was brought 
up as one.
Her mother was sick shortly after her birth and unable 
to feed her properly and Christina almost died. When she 
was eight, the family started to go regularly to the coast 
to work on the plantations, where, from the start, she 
picked coffee and cotton for more than eight hours a day. 
She remembers that time as one of almost constant illness 
from the poor diet and constant work in rain and fierce sun. 
Moreover, they would often be cheated and underpaid for the 
work. Even so when one's very little one's mind is [on] 
having fun, in the countryside, it didn't matter what kind 
of work there was.
The family stopped going to the coast when she was
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fourteen, and Christina was finally able to achieve her 
ambition to go to school full time. She had begged and 
bullied her parents to allow her to go from the age of 
twelve. They had not been very keen. Her father felt that 
school wasn't important for girls - both brothers had gone - 
and she had had to leave whenever the family migrated. 
However, the parish priest persuaded her father to allow 
Christina to go to the convent school in the nearby town; 
the parish would pay half the fees.
The first year was very difficult. She was older than 
her classmates, she was beaten by the teacher, and laughed 
at by pupils. She thought of leaving, but I took the 
decision myself to struggle on with my studies. In the 
second year, having begun to understand Spanish and make 
friends, things improved. She also had a teacher who didn't 
have an aggressive personality. She didn't hit people, 
instead she was encouraging and supportive. Christina 
finished the sixth grade of primary school in 1974. She 
also had what now seems to her the embarassing experience of 
being elected "Queen of Quiche" in a Iadino-organised 
indigenous festival. She feels she was exploited but 
remembers with pride that she quoted in Maya from the Popol 
Vuh3 in her speech, saying: "we all rise up and no one gets 
left b e h i n d S o  that these festivals for me were in a way 
representations that our culture wasn't dying.
3 The Popol Vuh: The Sacred Book of the Ancient Quiche 
Maya. English version by Delia Goetz and Sylvanus G. Morley 
from the translation of Adrian Recinos. (Norman and London: 
Oklahoma Press, 1950).
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After leaving school, she did the first part of a 
health promoter's course, but then dropped out because she 
did not feel ready for the responsibility. She got a job as 
a domestic in a convent school in Guatemala City. She loved 
being in the city, the most frightening experience being the 
earthquake of 1976, when she spent two days treking home, 
expecting to find her family dead, but they were all alive. 
For the next five years she worked in a series of domestic 
jobs, as a nanny, and a nursing auxiliary, and also managing 
to save enough for night school. But by 1980 "La 
Violencia"4 had started. There were bombings and bus 
burnings and the schools closed. Moreover, she did not have 
the finances for the professional teacher-training which she 
wanted to do.
Christina was advised by her friends to stay in the 
relative safety of the city during the worst of "La 
Violencia". She was frightened most of the time, worrying 
about her family and dreaming that they were bombed by 
helicopters. Something she later discovered was not too far 
from the truth: her family had been terrorised out of their 
village and had camped for months, half starving, in another 
community. Neither she nor they were politically engaged or 
had any contact with the guerillas. Both her brother and 
youngest sister became mentally ill at this time. In 1985 
she came home, and after a year found a job with an 
agricultural cooperative, becoming the main breadwinner in
4 "La Violencia" (The Violence) is how most indigenous 
Guatemalans refer to the period of war in the early 1980s.
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her family.
Francisco was born in 1968 and is the eldest of five 
children. He describes his peasant cultivator family as 
good and loving. This in spite of the fact that he was 
frightened of his father, who often beat them for not doing 
their work, drank heavily and occasionally beat his wife. 
His relationship with his mother he remembers as 
particularly affectionate, although she was quite strict. 
She was friendly and chatty with everyone in the village, 
and his happiest memories of childhood are of attending mass 
with her as a small boy. The family were poor, but had 
sufficient money to avoid prolonged periods on the coast. 
Francisco's work was to watch the sheep, until he was seven, 
when he started to help his father on the land. He 
describes his childhood as happy because he knew nothing 
about the problems of his people. At twelve he went to 
school for two years and learnt Spanish and how to read and 
write. This entailed rising at six to work, and more work 
when he got home, but he enjoyed it and was disappointed 
when he had to leave because his father needed him to work 
with him in the fields. This he did all day, every day.
When Francisco was fifteen, his father, along with 
fifty other men, was summoned to the military base, having 
been told that if he failed to present himself it would 
prove he was a guerilla. He never returned. After five 
days the family assumed he was dead. They dared not enquire 
as this was the height of "La Violencia”, with the army
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burning houses and crops, and they feared for their own 
lives. Seven years later Francisco still does not know what 
happened, but he remembers his sadness. His mother married 
again two years later, to a man that Francisco liked, 
although he was a heavy drinker like his father and also 
sometimes abusive to his mother. His mother appears to have 
stuck up for herself, and it was her attitudes that 
impressed themselves on the children, none of whom drink.
After his father's death a civil patrol was formed in 
the village. Francisco served in it for seven years, doing 
weekly 24-hour shifts. The work was not dangerous - it 
entailed mostly road watching and wood carrying - but he 
clearly found the experience offensive and humiliating 
because of the way the army treated them. For example the 
army called the patrollers words which weren't allowed to us 
in our life such as "shit", words which he had great 
difficulty repeating to me because of their offensiveness. 
He stayed in the patrols until hearing about CERJ in 1988.
Pedro told me he had no good memories of his childhood. 
Like Francisco, his father drank heavily and was violent 
with both his wife and children; the parents fought. It was 
a family with a lot of problems. He remembers having a kind 
of fearful respect for his father: when one is a kid one is 
weak and one cannot protest, and being very close to his 
mother who was a sensitive, caring, sweet, soft character. 
However, he did not regard his situation as abnormal: it's 
the same in every family with extreme poverty. He was born
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in 1962, the eldest of six children, A brother died at 
eighteen and a sister in her first year from malnutrition- 
related illnesses. Pedro thinks both would have survived if 
they had had money for medicine.
Until he was fifteen they spent more time on the 
coastal plantations than in his village. Until he was eight 
he helped his mother make tortillas, after that he worked 
from six in the morning until three in the afternoon helping 
his father pick coffee. The family lived like other migrant 
workers, some 200 people to a thirty-metre tin hut, sleeping 
on the ground, drinking well- or river-water. Interestingly, 
in describing these conditions, Pedro remarked that, while 
he remembered those days with sadness, he was not 
particularly sad at the time because he saw this as normal 
life.
Pedro describes himself as a shy child who didn't share 
any of my pains with people. Yet when his father permitted 
him to go to school at ten he made a personal decision to go 
to the urban school, in spite of the fact that he spoke no 
Spanish and would have to walk much further. He enjoyed 
studying, particularly history, and formed a close 
relationship with one particularly supportive teacher. He 
himself wanted to be a teacher, but after two years his 
father withdrew him from school, needing him to earn money 
on the coast again. Pedro was bitterly disapointed and 
angry with his father, although he understood the situation 
and knew their was no point in arguing. From thirteen to 
fifteen he continued to work on the plantations, which he
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loathed. Then he found a job in a small shop: hard work but 
better conditions. Although he was aware of the 
agricultural workers' strike, he did not participate in it. 
His parents had been completely unpolitical and he himself 
had no interest in politics at that time.
At eighteen he was kidnapped by the army, that is, he 
was forcibly recruited on market day, in spite of the fact 
that as eldest son he had the right to support his family. 
The army was a horrifying experience, where the basic 
principle of theirs is to humiliate by calling you a faggot, 
you're a little chicken, [a] weak person. The aim was to 
destroy indigenous identity. Indigenous clothing was burnt 
and only Spanish was spoken. A competitive atmosphere made 
solidarity difficult, and Pedro acknowledges he was
brainwashed, [They] would say to us "you're 
strong men now, you've got to forget about your 
parents, you've got to forget about everything and 
you've got to control. The people need control 
and the same thing's got to happen when you go 
back to your villages, you've got to control the 
people of the town."
He still remembers with shame an incident where he and 
other soldiers beat up a civilian for no reason. I still had 
with me my principles of compassion for people, and I didn't 
want to get involved, but because they obligated me to, I 
had to do it. After six months, worried by the debts his 
parents were accumulating trying to get him out legally, he 
managed to desert with a junior soldier. At first he stayed 
with this man's family, but, not wishing to be a burden he
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decided to return to the coast.
He felt he had been changed: I thought differently, I 
was very macho, I was very superior. He went back to his 
old job, but then began to buy books and re-educate himself. 
He joined a young peoples' religious group for singing and 
discussion, and planned to start a group himself. But then 
this whole thing started with the patrollers and I had to 
take another step forward and work with that,
Rosa prefaced her story by telling me it was a sad one.
Both her parents were peasant farmers. She was born in 
1962, the second youngest of five children, one of whom had
died aged one. The two elder children left home to get
married when Rosa was six. At this point a grandmother died 
and she describes how because of the great sadness of my 
mother and father they no longer valued the lives of the two 
of us left at home. They didn't value us but, rather, they 
wanted to die and so they started to drink.
The drinking went on steadily for seven years, helped 
by the fact that Rosa's father, as a Maya priest, was 
brought alcohol by his community. They did not physically 
abuse Rosa or her sister, and apparently there was a deep 
love between them, they always went together, my mother 
never left my father's side. But they completely neglected 
the children, who had to learn how to fend for themselves, 
from collecting firewood to brushing each other's hair and 
finding food.
Rosa brought herself and her little sister up. There
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was no schooling, partly because of her parents' 
drunkenness, partly because no one felt it to be necessary. 
At thirteen she began to worry about her parents' drinking 
and, having realised that Catholics in the village did not 
drink, made the decision to convert herself and her parents. 
She explained that [I] kept on until I succeeded. It was a 
big step forward because they stopped drinking and a lot of
love came into the house - we ate together and would go out
together.
Her own initial experience of the Catholic Church was 
unpleasant. The female catechist (a lay preacher and
educator) admonished her for being unable to read, write or 
speak Spanish. She noticed that even those girls and women 
who could speak Spanish never had the courage to sing. 
Things changed, however, when she was sixteen and a new male 
catechist arrived who encouraged her in her desire to do 
parish work, and who had the patience to teach her the
catechism. Her admiration for him is clear from her 
description:
an honourable person, a person who gave his time.
Not just any person gives their time. He had 
patience with us, he respected us and valued the 
work we were doing. He was involved in 
everything, he played the guitar and sang. He was 
the first catechist who got women involved.
One gets a sense of Rosa's own tenacity, intelligence
and determination when one understands that she taught
herself to read and write in Spanish and Quiche by listening 
to the sung words and working out their spelling by a
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process of elimination on the page. Her parish and 
community work became increasingly important, as did her 
frustration at women's position in the community. She 
decided to remain single for a while in order to work and 
learn. She became a catechist herself and started to 
preach, but found that, in spite of the Church's preaching 
on equality, and the catechist's support, the hierarchy 
could not accept women preachers like herself: she was
"banned" three times from working in the church. But I 
didn't take any notice. She just persisted. By now it was 
1982, the height of the violence against the Maya 
population. Rosa's father wanted the family to stay on the 
coast, where he worked as a labourer, for safety. Rosa was, 
therefore, away from her community when the catechist was 
killed.
The formative experiences of these Guatemalans, taken 
as isolated stories, certainly bear little resemblance to 
the "model" presented as conducive to creating an empathic 
or politically activist self. Except for Christina's, 
childhoods are marked by alcohol, violence and abuse, both 
in the family, and from the outside world in the form of 
more or less marked oppression. Discipline for all the 
children is coercive, and there are few happy memories of 
home life, which, from an early age, is distinguished by 
hard work.
However, these narratives must be set in the context of 
Maya culture in which there is a strong sense of community 
and deep respect for parents and elders. Every child is
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brought up with a sense of commitment to the values and 
traditions of their ancestors. Prestige in Maya society 
depends upon the extent of one's service to others. And 
although the narratives are marked by violence, there is 
clearly no lack of love. Both Pedro and Francisco have 
close relationships with gentle mothers. Rosa is aware of 
her parents' love and support for each other even when they 
are drinking.
Such childhoods appear to engender feelings of 
responsibility at an early age, particularly in older sibs. 
This is most marked in Rosa who, as a child, felt 
responsible for helping her parents to recover from 
alcoholism. This sense of responsibility for the family 
continues into adult life. At the time of my first 
interviews in 1990, all my interviewees were taking care of 
and living with older parents and younger sibs.
What also marks three of them out is their 
intelligence, assertiveness and determination. Even though 
they identify themselves as "shy”, all want and obtain some 
kind of education, the girls defying convention to do so. 
All take slightly unconventional jobs in their determination 
to progress. Francisco is the least assertive, with his 
uncritical, rather passive, acceptance of his childhood 
circumstances and role in village life.
It would be wrong to identify this as striving for 
individual autonomy in the Western sense. There is no 
attempt to cut ties with family and community. Rather, 
there is a sense of achievement for the community; this is
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caught in Christina's reaction to being crowned Queen of 
Quiche. She had no interest in being singled out by ladinos 
as the best-educated indigenous girl. She did not care, but 
she used the opportunity to speak for, and show her pride 
in, her community.
None of them come from politically or even communally 
engaged families and none of them involved themselves in the 
political turmoil around them in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
Nor is it possible to distinguish a particular moral voice 
at this stage. Rosa, through the influence of the 
catechist, has the most precocious awareness of injustice, 
but this focusses on the issue most pertinent to her - the 
place of women in the church.
Values appear to come from a variety of sources: 
firstly family, particularly an ethic of hard work and 
responsibility; secondly, the Catholic Church - its teaching 
on equality particularly impresses Rosa; and, thirdly, from 
key individuals, such as good teachers and priests.
Poland: WiP
Janek was born in 1958, the eldest of two children. He grew 
up, like many Poles, living with an extended family of 
grandparents, uncles and aunts in the same house. He 
remembers his early childhood as happy, the only unpleasant 
memory being of his father's occasional beatings which he 
perceived as normal paternal behaviour but unfair. His
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father, a lawyer and away from home all week, comes across 
as a rather distant and severe figure. Janek was closest to 
his mother, whom he described as warm, caring and protective 
in the face of his father's discipline. What was also 
important was that the house was in the suburbs surrounded 
by a garden; behind the garden and the house there was woods 
and water, further water. So throughout his childhood he 
had a close contact with rural nature [. . .] perhaps it is 
one of the key reasons this liking for the nature, this is 
why I had been always interested in the environment.
He enjoyed primary school, where he perceived himself 
not as a leader but as a part of the elite who were always 
good at games and taking initiative. However, his teenage 
years were much more difficult. He felt unable to find his 
place in grammar school and was lonely and depressed. Yet he 
felt unable to discuss these matters at home with his
family, whom he now perceived as distant and unable to show 
emotional warmth. Yet he stresses that in spite of such 
feelings of alienation he was not apathetic. On the
contrary, he was still one of the organisers of school
activities.
The family were not overtly political but, like many 
Poles, they were anti-communist. Janek's maternal 
grandparents had been deported to Siberia, where his mother 
was born, and had lost all their possessions, suffering
again in the purge of 1956, an injustice which his 
grandmother often discussed. Father listened to Radio Free 
Europe and discussed historical events, such as the massacre
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of Polish officers at Katyn in 1940 and the war against the 
Soviet Union in 1921, although contemporary events, like the 
1976 strikes, felt quite distant. As Janek grew older he 
would sometimes deliberately defend communism, largely to be 
different from his father, who encouraged his children to 
express their views openly without trying to change them. 
Similarly, values were not taught didactically but 
practised. He remembers his parents7 honesty and the way 
debts were always repaid, while father particularly pointed 
to the dishonesty of the state.
Janek went to university in Slovakia in 1977 to do 
transportation studies and, as was the norm, joined the 
Socialist Student Society. He became secretary of the 
Polish students7 section, not out of any political 
commitment but, as at school, out of a desire to get 
something going.
Darek, born in 1959, is the only son of professional 
parents, although his mother stopped working when he was 
seven. He gives an ambivalent picture of his childhood: on
the one hand, it was very happy, with a warm and stable 
family life. He describes his mother as someone who gave 
scrupulous attention to the small details of life, and his 
father as the main intellectual influence, a gentle, 
practical man who could always find solutions to conflicts 
without tension. His maternal grandmother was also 
particularly important: a soft and generous person who had 
the gift of making those around her feel good. During the
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last years of her life, when he was a teenager, she shared 
his bedroom. On the other hand, looking back he feels he 
was over-protected and in some ways spoilt. His parents 
were his main friends, time was filled with worthwhile 
activities, and there was little space for playing in the 
street with other children. In addition he was asthmatic 
and vulnerable to bronchitis, which increased the amount of 
time he spent at home. Not surprisingly, he describes 
himself as a good, obedient, and somewhat tense, child.
Although seeing himself now as quite different from 
both parents, he sees them as having given him his basic 
values. Although not overtly political, both are devout 
Catholics, as is Darek, and he points out that he never saw 
a conflict between values which are declared and values 
which are realised. The family also stressed the importance 
of history, both family history and Polish history. Darek 
grew up knowing that his great-grandfather had lost all his 
lands in the Polish insurrection of 1863, and that his 
grandfather had been one of Pilsudski's legionnaires.
Darek's history teacher at secondary school was also 
particularly influential: an inspired teacher who, although 
he avoided controversial issues, communicated his own love 
of the subject to Darek to the point where Darek thought of 
studying history at university. It was in the last years of 
secondary school that his engagement in politics began.
Of all the activists in the study Piotr puts the most 
emphasis on his family background and upbringing as
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contributing to his values and behaviour in life. Both 
parents are from the Polish aristocracy. Piotr is himself 
a prince. Both parents suffered from discrimination and 
material hardship in the Stalinist Poland of the 1980s, 
before their children were born, but even so Piotr, born in 
1959, and his younger brother and sister were brought up 
with a sense of noblesse oblige, this was the basis of my 
education. He explained that it meant because I have been 
given more, so I have to give more, I have to be responsible 
for others, and I have to give example to the others. J 
have to be more honest. Because it's my duty. The more 
that he had been given was not material wealth, which was 
obviously lacking, but the tradition of his family. 
Moreover, while he lived only with parents and sibs he was 
made to feel part of a very extensive family, as he 
demonstrated by showing me an engraving of the family tree 
hung on the apartment wall. He also insisted that, while he 
had felt different from others as a child, this was not a 
sense of superiority.
What he also learnt from his family were strong moral 
principles based on the Catholic faith. As with Darek and 
Janek, his father was a somewhat distant figure when Piotr 
was a small child, a loving, quiet man preoccupied by hard 
work, and, as Piotr grew older, someone with whom he would 
quarrel over intellectual matters. His mother was his best 
friend with whom he shared everything. He describes his 
mother as a woman of clear moral principles and deep faith, 
generous and helpful with neighbours and family, and
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teaching him through example rather than lectures. He 
remembers, for example, that we didn't read many books about 
war, we didn't look at war movies, we didn't have military 
toys.
He remembers his childhood as happy but very poor. 
However, in our second interview, Piotr told me that the one 
blight on his childhood was his father's heavy drinking. 
This did not affect family life or his father's work, but 
Piotr was aware of it for as long as he could remember, and 
even tried to discuss it with his father when he was seven. 
What upset him was that his father seemed to have problems 
that could not be solved. Looking back he recognises that 
his father was frustrated at being prevented from following 
his chosen career, and pressured by harassment because of 
his name and by poverty. Later in life things improved. 
And in spite of the drinking Piotr still saw his father as 
a model for life.
Piotr had no difficulties with school. He was popular, 
did consistently well academically, and was not afraid to 
argue with teachers with whom he disagreed. He was the kind 
of child that helped others with their homework and became 
class captain. However, like Janek, in his mid-teens he had 
a period of intense loneliness and alienation. He could 
identify no immediate cause and it was one experience he was 
unable to share with his mother. The feelings were severe 
enough for him to go to the railway station and consider 
suicide, but his faith and a basic feeling that this was not 
right prevented him. When discussing it with me he remarked
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in some ways I think I was lonely all my life. I mean I 
never had really good friends, besides my mother and my 
wife. In spite of being respected and popular, he mostly 
felt that people around him treated life more superficially 
than he did. Thus, although very sociable, he always felt 
somewhat apart. He read widely. My father was an enemy of 
TV, and I didn't have a TV set until I was seventeen. Also, 
as a teenager, he helped in his uncle's underground 
publishing house and read everything, every line that was 
there. Not only books but also bulletins. [It] confirmed 
ideas and it made my view on the world wider.
The decision to do medicine was a pragmatic one. His 
inclination was to do philosophy, but the course was very 
Marxist and he knew he needed to earn a living. It was 
while he was at medical school that he became involved in 
student Solidarity (NZS).
Magda was born in 1960 and, like Diana, had a childhood 
marked by comings and goings. Her parents divorced when she 
was seven, and her father went to the United States when she 
was nine. She describes her parents as not caring very much 
emotionally, and perceived her mother, who married twice, 
more as the kind of person that doesn't care about serious 
things very much. Yet she feels her childhood was not 
unhappy. This is, firstly, because she developed a defence 
system that put everything in the best possible light - thus 
her family was more interesting than others, and a father in 
the United States meant she could go there too. Secondly,
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because both parents worked, her main caretakers were her 
grandparents and great grandmother, who if anything took too 
much care of me.
Her great-grandmother was particularly important: a
generous, conscientous woman, who was also very stubborn, a 
trait Magda feels she has inherited. All her family were 
decent - meaning anti-communist - but politics was something 
mysterious which tended to be discussed, if at all, behind 
closed doors. This infuriated Magda, who was curious and 
interested. However, as in the other Polish families, Magda 
grew up knowing her own family history well. Many of her 
relatives had suffered or died in the Second World War, 
either in concentration camps or in the Warsaw uprising, and 
as a child she had fantasies, inspired by Polish war movies, 
in which she was one of the heroes. I was sorry that I was 
not a man and that if the war came against Germany again 
that I wouldn't be able to fight with them.
She describes herself as an independent and self- 
contained child who could amuse herself for hours. Primary 
school was stressful because she was placed in a class for 
especially able gymnasts, which she hated. However, at 
secondary school, she discovered that she could not be 
intimidated and therefore could really do what she wanted. 
She remembers clearly the time this discovery was made: at 
a summer camp, when she refused to go on a particular outing 
because it was boringf and the other girls followed her 
lead. She was threatened with expulsion. Pleased at the 
thought of leaving she packed her things, at which point the
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punishment was withdrawn and she was told to stay. She 
suddenly realised that she was not bothered by the worst 
those in authority could do. So after that I never 
listened to any orders. She prided herself on her 
individualism and resisted wearing a uniform or joining 
anything. She was bright and did well, particularly in 
Russian, which made her uncomfortable because it was the 
language of the dominant power.
Another significant experience occurred on a visit to 
England after leaving school, when she made friends with a 
German girl whose father had been a Nazi. Magda felt it was 
as if providence was giving her a particular chance for 
reconciliation and to break with hostility. This feeling 
increased when she stayed with both the German friend and a 
Jewish friend in Germany.
Magda then went to live in the United States with her 
father, but found the life there dull, and resented her 
father's interference with her choice of boyfriends or what 
she should study at university. Meanwhile, it was 1980 and, 
although Magda had never taken an interest in politics, she 
was interested in what was happening in her homeland. She 
decided to return, going to university to study linguistics. 
She met her boyfriend there, who shared his own much deeper 
understanding of politics and history with her. However, 
still uninterested in joining organisations, she stayed out 
of student Solidarity (NZS), though she did participate in 
the student strike at the end of 1981 because there was no 
other way to behave. Her participation was a citizen's duty
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not because she felt patriotic but because she believed that 
freedom should be everywhere and also here. If I am here, 
I should fight for it here. She did not regard this 
participation as political engagement and was not involved 
in anything else until the creation of WiP a few years 
later.
The first thing that one notices about the Polish 
activists is that, compared to their Guatemalan and British 
contemporaries, they were politically literate from an early 
age, yet did not perceive themselves or their families as 
political. Being political in communist Poland meant to be 
engaged in Communist party politics. To be politically 
"decent", to use Magda's word, meant to be anti-communist, 
anti-Soviet and, in a sense, "anti-political" - which is 
what all of these families were. This anti-political 
activity was considered to be moral activity. To be a 
practising Catholic in itself was a political statement, of 
commitment to Polish identity as well as of religious 
belief.
One of the most significant values passed on by my 
Polish respondents' families was a particular understanding 
of Polish history. All had family members to whom they were 
close who had participated in historic events. Public 
history was family history, not something dry, and removed, 
in a textbook. So the idea of being an actor in public 
events was not a completely strange one. Indeed, Magda 
takes participation in a student strike so much for granted 
that she did not regard it as political engagement. These
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stories also show that what was learnt at home was of 
greater significance than the ideological teaching at 
school.
All grew up either close to or living with extended 
families, and grandparents are, as with some of the Greenham 
women, as significant a source of values as parents. The 
Catholic faith provided the framework of morality, and 
although Magda and Janek do not adopt the clear religious 
commitment of their parents - as Darek and Piotr do - they 
see themselves as influenced by a Christian upbringing. One 
can also distinguish a clear moral focus in Piotr's and 
Magda's narratives. Piotr's explanation of noblesse oblige 
emphasises reciprocity, while Magda's childhood fantasies 
are about justice through retribution. Magda then traces 
the growth of her own perspective on reconciliation through 
the experience of friendship and connection.
Again, the most noticeable personality trait, besides 
intelligence, is of a certain kind of independence and 
assertiveness. Janek and Piotr are initiators. Both have 
had adolescent crises rather similar to those of Keniston's 
"Young Radicals".5 Magda, from her first year in secondary 
school, follows her own path. This independence is less 
obvious in Darek before his engagement in politics, but, as 
we shall see, it emerged rapidly once he became engaged.
All of these stories - in Britain, Guatemala, and 
Poland - do confirm that it is values and not politics per
5 Kenneth Keniston, Youth and Dissent: The Rise of a New 
Opposition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971).
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se that families pass on to their children. They also show 
that the concept of family should include grandparents. 
Another point of note is that, while almost all of the
activists have experienced some form of trauma, in the form
of parental separation or death, or prolonged illness, or
abuse, they have displayed active coping strategies and 
appear for the most part psychologically healthy. Anna's 
case is exceptional, but she too has the resilience to find 
the help she needs. I shall look in more detail at the role 
of traumatic experiences in Chapter 8.
In spite of evidence of maturity, and the fact that all 
show an ability, at an early age, to take personal
responsibility for themselves and others around them, one 
cannot say that the majority are marked out by political 
precocity. On the contrary - notwithstanding the immersion 
of Poles in their own history - the absence of marked 
interest in current events is more significant. Moreover, 
the absence of a conventional childhood and the experience 
of oppression, including the war of the early 1980s, did not 
radicalise the Guatemalans. They understand and explain 
their experiences as the norm for their people. This is in 
keeping with Andrews's argument that experience alone is not 
enough to create commitment. It is how experience is 
interpreted that is significant.
Perhaps the most important points one can make about 
all twelve respondents is that, firstly, most of them they 
are noticeably "active" from an early age. The form 
assertiveness takes, however, differs markedly with gender
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and culture. For example, while Rosa and Christina struggle 
against the odds to get an education, both Mary and Greta 
refuse to conform with family and school expectations and 
find ways to escape. For Polish men assertiveness is 
expressed as leadership in the class. Secondly, all, apart 
from Francisco, have some experience of self-efficacy, that 
is, of taking an active part in coping with and trying to 
change adverse circumstances, and of determining their own 
futures. As efficacy has been noted as one of the features 
distinguishing activists from non-activists in cross- 
sectional studies, it is significant to discover that it 
emerges before political engagement.
What this chapter shows is the importance of testing 
generalisations against the detailed study of the 
individual, which in these cases demonstrates the diversity 
of background and experience from which non-violent activism 
emerges, and the significant part played by culture. The 
next chapter should make clear that engagement is not simply 
a lifecycle or generational phenomenom but that it can begin 
in middle age or childhood. The aim of this chapter has 
been to show that the antecedents of engagement are not 
rooted in one particular kind of personality or 
psychopathology. The reader may find it useful before 
reading Chapter 7 to refer to the summaries of each 
respondent's history of engagement. [See Appendix 1.]
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CHAPTER 7
THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS; THE CONVERSION EXPERIENCE 
AND OTHER ROUTES TO ENGAGEMENT.
Sarah was a middle-class housewife living in a seaside town 
with her husband and two children. She was already involved 
with the local Quakers and saw herself as being on the 
fringes of the peace movement, plodding on with my life, 
with its moments of happiness and unhappiness, as everybody 
does, when one day she saw a television programme in which 
the contents of a soon-to-be-published government booklet 
called Protect and Survive were leaked.1 The booklet and 
the programme explained the measures that the government 
considered necessary to protect oneself in the event of a 
nuclear war. She describes what happened:
I was watching television, and my children 
were sort of playing around the house. . . . And 
when that programme came on it struck something in 
me so deep I went into shock, actually watching 
the programme. And my husband came home, walked 
into the room - it had just finished - and said, 
"whatever is the matter?" I was just in complete 
shock and, like, cold inside. I think it was the 
horror of what they were saying on television. 
What the government had said was that people like 
me, if it comes to it, had to build this shelter 
of four doors and push my children under it and 
wait to die, basically. I mean, that's how I 
interpreted what they were saying. And, although 
I had been peripherally involved in peace 
activities a bit before, through the Quakers and 
things, it had never actually hit me in that way 
before. And I was so, at first so shocked, it was 
very personal, which is perhaps a wrong reason for 
getting involved. I remember saying to him "I 
haven't brought my children into this world to put
1 Central Office of Information, Protect and Survive 
(London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980)
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them under four doors and watch them die", it was 
absolutely a moment in time. Then I went through 
a period of months. I lived opposite the sea, my 
house looked over the sea and it's very depressing 
in any case. In the winter you get this grey sea 
and grey sky, and the power station, which doesn't 
help. And I did have images of everything just 
disappearing, of it not being, and what would 
happen if my children were at school and I was 
here, I did have nightmares. Actually, the worst 
nightmare that I had was of my children not dying, 
of them being terribly burned, or half-alive, or 
something. And then I became very angry about it 
and that's what motivated me. I joined the local 
CND and petitions and all that, but it didn't seem 
enough, it seemed ridiculous. And a Quaker friend 
of mine rang me up, and it was about five days 
after, five or seven - within a week of the 
Greenham women [arriving at the base] - and said 
that there was a group of women who had set up a 
camp outside Greenham and they need food and 
blankets. She said "let's go for the day". And I 
went for one day and I just knew that there were 
other people there who were not telling me that it 
was an over-emotional reaction. There were other 
women who were having those kind of experiences, 
that this was a real threat. That our lives and 
the planet really were threatened and that we had 
to do something. Then I knew that that was what 
I wanted to be involved with.2
What Sarah is describing is a crucial episode and the 
manner in which it precipitated a life-changing engagement 
in the anti-nuclear movement. Sarah is not one of the 
respondents in my study, but six of them have had similar 
experiences to the one she describes, experiences in which 
a life-changing shift of perspective occurs and generates 
action.
In Chapter 6 I looked at the pre-engagement lives of
2 Interview, 1992.
all my respondents.3 From these it appeared that all of 
them had been intelligent and resilient from an early age, 
and most had already engaged in independent action to change 
their own life circumstances or those of others around them, 
that is, they had personal efficacy. In this chapter I 
shall explore three different processes that led to full­
time engagement in collective action. For six respondents, 
as for Sarah, there appears to be a life-changing event and 
a sudden change. Fear or a sense of threat are critical to 
motivation, as is an empathic connection to others. For a 
second group, there is a more gradual deepening of 
involvement. This begins at an early age and appears to 
arise from abstract principles and a particularly strong 
sense of personal efficacy. In the third group, there is 
also a gradual deepening of involvement. Fear and threat 
are, again, significant but, in this case, fear inhibits 
action and it is the factors which limit the threat that are 
critical to facilitating engagement. For all my
respondents, in contrast to the model proposed by Kohlberg, 
(summarised in Chapter 3),4 both cognitive and affective 
factors are involved in the process of engagement. In 
addition, for all my respondents, the process entails an 
increasing awareness of an historical self, that is, of a 
self with a role to play in public affairs.
3 Biographies of all my respondents' lives, covering the 
period of political engagement, are provided in Appendix 1 
for reference.
4 See pp. 134— 142 above.
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Crucial Episodes
A crucial episode is an identifiable, time-limited 
experience that the subject can define -it may last minutes 
or months - during which there is a marked shift in 
awareness about an issue, accompanied by an intense affect 
and followed by a need to act. In analysing my recorded 
interviews the episodes stand out for a number of reasons. 
They are remembered with a vividness of recall that provides 
quite arbitrary detail, like time of day, weather, and the 
activities of bystanders; while the emotional intensity of 
the experience is evident both from the fact that such 
details are imprinted on the respondent's memory, and in the 
intensity of tone with which such accounts are narrated.
Other writers have examined episodes such as these and 
their role in the journey to commitment: it is worth
examining their main findings briefly. One of the most 
notable and carefully documented is William James's 
description and analysis of "conversion" experiences in his 
lectures on "The Varieties of Religious Experience", given 
at the beginning of the century.5 He looked at both sudden 
and gradual conversions to particular religious faiths, and 
showed how the experience appeared to consist of a process 
where profound emotions of misery, anxiety, worthlessness 
and despair were transformed into feelings of profound well­
being, joy, and a sense of righteousness. Sometimes this
5 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: 
A Study in Human Nature (New York: Longmans, 1916), pp. 189- 
-258.
323
occured slowly, sometimes abruptly, sometimes with a period 
of exhaustion, numbness and even unconciousness in between. 
He explained the phenomena "as partly due to explicitly 
conscious processes of thought and will, but as due largely 
also to the subconscious incubation and maturing of motives 
deposited by the experiences of life. When ripe, the 
results hatch out or burst into flower."6 He then defines 
the sudden experiences as characterised by "tremendous 
emotional excitement or perturbation of the senses (in 
which) a complete division is established between the old 
life and the new".7 The result of the conversion is that 
the protagonist now experiences "a sense of higher control", 
"a loss of all worry", "a sense of peace", "a willingness to 
be", and a sense of now being able to perceive previously 
unknown truths. In addition, things take on an "appearance 
of newness that beatifies every object",8 and the 
protagonist experiences an "ecstasy of happiness".9 In the 
case histories provided, conversion is followed by a 
commitment to action in some form. He argues that these 
experiences "owe more to the incursion of ordinary conscious 
life from the subliminal" than to any particular grace of 
God.10 He presents some evidence that sudden converts have
6 Ibid., p. 230.
7 Ibid., p. 217.
8 Ibid., p. 248.
9 Ibid., p. 254.
10 When reading the lecture, one can sense his 
tentativeness in proposing such an outrageous theory at the 
turn of the century to an audience that undoubtedly
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a very "active subconcious life" compared to those whose 
awareness comes more gradually. He also makes the point 
that conversion on the whole appears to be enduring.
For Erikson such crucial episodes highlight the 
developmental crises that he details and analyses in his 
studies of the lives of Gandhi and Luther. As I explained 
in Chapter 3, Erikson's work centres on the thesis that the 
human life cycle can be defined in terms of a series of 
stages that "dovetail" with basic human institutions.
At a given age, a human being, by dint of his 
physical, intellectual and emotional growth, 
becomes ready and eager to face a new life task, 
that is, a set of choices and tests which are in 
some traditional way prescribed and prepared for 
him by his society's structure. A new life task 
presents a crisis whose outcome can be a 
successful graduation or, alternatively, an 
impairment of the life cycle which will aggravate 
future crises.11
However, whereas in some periods the transitions and 
resolutions to the crises may be accomplished in established 
and traditional rites of passage, at others society itself 
is in crisis, and the resolution of individual psychological 
crisis at that time is inextricably intermeshed with the
contained many with strong religious convictions. He 
reassures them by explaining that he is not substituting 
natural causes for the call of God, but suggesting that 
indeed the subconscious may be more open to God's influence 
than the concious mind, beset as the latter is with all the 
distractions of everyday life; besides which, in theological 
terms, it is surely the fruits of the call, not its origins, 
that matter.
11 Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in
Psychoanalysis and History (London: Norton, 1958), p. 254.
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resolution of the historical one.
For Erikson crucial episodes highlight these 
developmental crises in the life cycle. In particular, they 
demonstrate the interaction between the self and history. 
Hence the significance of the famous episode when Gandhi is 
ejected from a first class railway compartment on the train 
to Pretoria and spends a chilly night contemplating his own 
and his peoples' condition: this is the moment when Gandhi 
solves his identity crisis by transfoming himself from a shy 
young barrister into a religious and political leader needed 
at that time to solve the historical crisis that faced his 
people.12
Luther's identity crisis is marked by at least "three 
distinct and fragmentary experiences", whose elements were:
Physical paroxysm; a degree of unconsciousness; an 
automatic verbal utterance; a command to change 
the overall direction of effort and aspiration; 
and a spiritual revelation, a flash of 
enlightenment, decisive and pervasive as rebirth. 
The thunderstorm [in which he was struck from his 
horse and made a vow to be a monk] provided him 
with a change in the overall direction of his 
life, a change towards the anonymous, the silent, 
and the obedient. In fits such as the one in the 
choir he experienced the epileptoid paroxysm of 
ego loss, the rage of denial of the identity which 
was to be discarded. And later in the experience 
in the tower . . .  he perceived the light of a new 
spiritual formula.13
It is interesting to note that Erikson feels the
12 Erik H.Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis. (London: 
Faber, 1969), p. 47.
13 Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 39.
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fragmentary nature of the episode - Luther has not attempted 
to tidy up the experience - bears out its veracity and 
Luther's integrity in reporting it.
Erikson demonstrates how this new formula, the basis of 
the solutions that Luther proposed for the problems of his 
time, in particular the political and psychological vacuum 
in the Western Catholic Church, also provided solutions to 
his own identity crisis, particularly in terms of 
confronting his problematic relationship with his father.
Frank and Nash, in a study of some of the determinants 
of commitment to peace, deliberately focussed on a self­
selected sample of activists whose commitment was the result 
of "a well defined, relatively brief experience termed a 
crucial episode". They analysed the questionnaire responses 
of ninety-two volunteer subjects who became active after a 
crucial episode.14
The study and its follow-up are extremely useful in 
laying out clearly what were the activists' preceding states 
of mind, what the features of such episodes might be, and 
what internal and environmental factors sustained attitude 
change. The only common feature of the episodes was that a 
particular event could be identified as a "definite step in 
[the respondents'] progress towards peace activity"; 
otherwise there was a wide variation, ranging from events 
that precipitated minimal attitude change but a great
14 Jerome D. Frank and Earl H. Nash, "Commitment to 
Peace Work: A Preliminary Study of Determinants and
Sustainers of Behaviour Change", American Journal Of 
OrthoPsychiatry 35 (1965), pp. 106— 119.
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increase in activity, to experiences resembling religious 
conversion.
The example that Frank and Nash provide as 
representative of the whole study is strikingly similar to 
Sarah's experience recounted above. The respondent in 
question had many years previously attended a Quaker college 
and "had always had a personal abhorrence of all forms of 
violence". She had however, until Autumn 1961, managed to 
avoid thinking about nuclear war by trusting in government 
policy. However, the resumption of testing and the building 
of the Berlin Wall increased her anxiety about the nuclear 
threat. So she took what appeared to be the rational course 
and wrote away for goverment pamphlets on the building of a 
fall-out shelter. It was while reading this advice that it 
suddenly dawned on her how completely vulnerable she was. 
"It had honestly never dawned on me that there was no place 
to hide. I've never known such panic, and chilling, 
paralysing fear and profound depression".
Soon after this she received a call from a long time 
peace activist who invited her to participate in a women's 
silent vigil of protest. Although initially opposed to this 
form of action as counterproductive, she was deeply 
impressed by the woman's arguments about the need to take 
personal responsibility, and she initiated a discussion 
group in which she discovered that "there were other women 
who felt as I did: we had found each other and out of our 
fears came a new determination to influence the decisions 
that suddenly seemed to have such a direct and threatening
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relationship to our lives”. Her commitment and activism 
continued to increase, sustained by reading new books, the 
support of other people, and a conviction of the rightness 
and moderate effectiveness of her actions.
Frank and Nash's analysis is that the intense emotions 
were triggered by an inability to use her conventional 
coping mechanisms to deal with a newly perceived nuclear 
threat. This anxiety made her receptive to the suggestions 
of the peace worker, and her newly formed attitudes and 
choice of action were then reinforced and extended by public 
action, group support, new information and increased self­
esteem .
Frank and Nash caution that their sample was self­
selected, heterogeneous and, because it was 92 per cent- 
college educated, unrepresentative of the general 
population. However, they tentatively drew the following 
conclusions from a systematic anlysis of the data:15 the 
respondents before the episode were characterised by a high 
degree of initiative, a lively concern for human welfare, 
and an independence of thought, all of which predisposed 
them to heightened awareness of the threat to humanity, a 
critical disposition towards government, and a tendency to 
act on their own interpretation of a problem. Attitudes 
before the episode were already "unfrozen" (following Kurt 
Lewin's model of the three stages involved in changes in 
social conduct - unfreeze old patterns, change, and
15 Frank and Nash, "Commitment to Peace Work".
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refreeze.16) Many were already conflicted and uncertain 
about their attitudes to the threat and their awareness of 
the dangers had increased. The crucial episodes contained 
three important components:
1) heightening of threat of personal destruction, which 
becomes personally real;
2) a discovery that former coping methods - e.g., reliance 
on government and its suggestions for protection - do not 
work, resulting in an intense emotional response; and
3) the arousal of a feeling of personal responsibility to do 
something to remove the danger, and the active seeking of 
means and guidance as to how to do this; or at least a 
greatly enhanced sensitivity to those with suggestions for 
action.
The changes in beliefs and behaviour following the 
episode were sustained by new information, repeated 
demonstrations of public commitment through giving talks and 
demonstrating, the support of like-minded friends and 
family, a conviction of rightness, increased self esteem, 
and a reduction of unpleasant feelings such as anxiety and 
depression. Moreover, there was a generalising of concern, 
anchoring nuclear issues to other issues of human welfare. 
This could be seen as evidence of a need to make a belief 
system consistent, and to reduce cognitive dissonance. For 
example, an attitude shift regarding the relatively greater 
dangers of nuclear war compared to the threat of communism
16 Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science (New 
York: Harper, 1951), pp. 141— 145.
330
took place for the majority after their engagement in 
activism. This supports the view that changes in behaviour 
can push attitude change. Demonstrating for disarmament 
would be inconsistent with a view that communism was the 
greatest threat, so the attitude to that threat had to 
change.
Significantly, it was noted that "changes in behaviour 
far exceeded changes in attitude. . . . The crucial episodes 
served chiefly to clarify existing attitudes, to make them 
more salient or to remove blocks to acting on them, such as 
feelings of fatalism or impotence." 17 Further analysis of 
the results showed that "women were more likely to be 
influenced by direct personal contact, men by the printed 
word. Concern over the welfare of of one's children
heightened sensitivity to events that threatened their 
future." 18 The degree of attitude change was related to the 
intensity of emotional arousal and to changes in friends, 
while the duration of change in activity was related to 
support from family and, with men only, from friends.
Haste uses the term "triggering event", rather than 
crucial episode, and defines this as "any event which 
changes the role of the individual from being a bystander, 
an observer, to being a participant, personally touched by
17 Frank and Nash, "Commitment to Peace Work".
18 Jerome D. Frank and Jacob D. Schonfield, "Commitment 
to Peace Work: II. A Closer Look at the Determinants", 
American Journal Of Orthopsychiatry 37 (1967), p. 118.
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the situation".19 This is a wide definition, but her five 
case histories are of individuals who have experienced 
"conversion experiences which involved powerful affect", and 
she uses them to challenge the thesis, best exemplified by 
Kohlberg and Candee and summarised in Chapter 3, that it is 
mainly in cognitive variables that one should seek 
explanations for the origins of moral action, and that the 
main energy for action comes from the individual's 
perception of responsibility. Haste's view is that 
triggering events demonstrate that initial engagement in an 
issue is affective.
She outlines a complex model in which a triggering 
event produces a reactive affect, cognitive reflection upon 
this transforms it into a moral affect, which in turn 
generates the subsequent cognition that one is personally 
responsible for acting. The degree of responsibility, and 
the extent to which the individual feels personally 
efficacious, are partially determined by previously 
established cognitive structures, such as moral stage and 
social cognitive perception. In addition, she shows that 
such episodes are not unitary phenomena: they may be a
sequence of related incidents, and may trigger a cycle of 
response and engagement that, through the further arousal of 
affect and further cognitive reappraisal and reorganisation, 
"triggers" an even greater commitment to action. She
19 Helen Weinreich-Haste, "Moral Responsibility and 
Moral Commitment: The Integration of Affect and Commitment", 
in The Moral Domain, ed. T. E. Wren (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1990), pp. 315-359.
332
stresses that social context is important, particularly in 
determining whether the cognitive reappraisal of an event 
will be perceived as socially legitimate or not.
At first glance it might appear that the range of 
experience covered by these different researchers is too 
wide to produce a useful synthesis. Do the ecstatic 
transcendent states of those who feel they have just 
encountered God really have anything in common with the 
despair of a woman who has just realised a fall-out shelter 
will not protect her from a nuclear holocaust? Can one 
group together events where there is little attitude change, 
but simply a reinforcing of established beliefs, with those 
where there is a complete transformation? Some episodes 
immediately generate action, some do not, and the sequence 
of commitment appears to vary.
For example, when one looks at the these researchers' 
case material in detail, including source material for two 
of Haste's cases, it is arguable whether the arousal of 
affect always precedes cognitive reappraisal and 
transformation to moral affect in the clear-cut way Haste 
describes. In many cases some kind of cognitive reappraisal 
and moral evaluation, or unfreezing - to use Lewin's term - 
is going on before the episode: for example, Luther is
already in conflict with his father before the thunderstorm 
over whether or not to enter the church. Many of Frank's 
respondents are increasingly bothered by the nuclear build­
up before their own crucial episodes. Gandhi had already 
learnt about and been disturbed by the inequities of the
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apartheid system in South Africa. On the bases of these 
histories and my own research I would suggest that prior 
cognitive awareness is actually necessary for the episode to 
have its full emotional impact.
However, all the evidence available supports the main 
thrust of Haste's argument, which is that it is affect and 
not merely cognition that energises the individual into 
taking action. And, in my view, the heart of the crucial 
episode, the key element that all have in common, is the 
arousal of intense affect and subsequent feeling of personal 
involvement.
My interest with my own data is not only to see how the 
episodes described compare with the findings above, both in 
terms of the nature of the episodes and of their place in 
the sequence of commitment. It is, more particularly, to 
look at what it is about the episode that arouses such an 
intense affective response. Can one identify any common 
themes through the wide variety of experiences and the wide 
range of emotions produced? My hypothesis is that one can: 
there seem to be three common features to the majority of 
crucial episodes (certainly those producing major life- 
change). They are that the episodes:
are threatening to the self: they produce images of the 
loss of life or of destruction of aspects of identity?
are historical: not arbitrary or personal, they are 
symbolic in some way of the historical crisis of the time; 
and
frame an historical event or stimulus in such a way as
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to give it personal meaning. This can happen directly by 
the event involving the individuals themselves, or 
indirectly, by the event involving someone with whom they 
closely identify or to whom they are attached.
As a consequence, the event produces a feeling of acute 
vulnerability in the self, to the point of annihilation; at 
the same time it catapults the self into history. There is 
now a feeling of connection and relationship to the 
political world that generates responsibility and a need to 
act, both on one's own behalf and on behalf of that world to 
which one now feels connected. It is this sudden awareness 
of both one's own vulnerability and of a historical self 
that produces such intense emotions and the sense of a 
historical role. It is as if history had literally reached 
out and grabbed one by the hand so that there is the need to 
personally involve oneself in a public crisis.
This is best exemplified by looking in detail at the 
experiences of some of the respondents in my study. First, 
however, I shall return to Sarah. She is already 
cognitively aware of the issues and peripherally involved in 
peace movement: for example, she wears badges. The
television programme is clearly a historical event. The 
revelation of the goverment's ludicrous advice on protection 
against a nuclear attack takes place in 1980, amidst the 
growing atmospere of public concern about nuclear issues 
that I documented in Chapter 5. The planned publication of 
such advice demonstrates that the government itself feels 
threatened. What the programme does is frame this event in
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a way that makes Sarah realise that nuclear war is not just 
the business of politicians out there: a matter of moral 
interest and concern that it is right to challenge but that 
is on the periphery of her world. Rather, it is personal: 
it is an issue that threatens her and her children directly 
with annihilation. And the information hits her like a 
thunderbolt. She realises that she will have to put the 
children under a table to die, or that they may survive 
horribly without her, but, conversely, there is also the 
sense that what touches her is historical. She has images 
of everything disappearing and of not being. Her anguish is 
at the threat to my life and the threat to the planet (my 
emphasis). Sarah is suddenly thrown into forced intimacy 
with what was previously a general but distant historical 
threat.
Not surprisingly, confronted directly with the real 
possibility of her own and general annihilation, Sarah's 
emotional reaction is intense and shows all the stages 
identified by Kubler Ross in individuals confronting 
terminal illness: shock, numbness, despair, depression, and 
anger.20 In a sense one could say that it was almost as if 
she had died and was grieving for herself. Kubler Ross's 
final stage is acceptance, which, she emphasises, is neither 
the giving up of hope nor the giving in to exhaustion, but 
an ability honestly to come to terms with what is happening. 
For Sarah it is the acceptance of the validity and reality
20 Elizabeth Kubler Ross, On Death and Dying (London: 
Tavistock, 1970).
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of her fears that creates a need to act.
However, I want to make clear in drawing this analogy 
that I do not see the crucial episodes that I describe as 
resulting from the breakdown of denial. Denial is the 
exclusion of ideas and feelings from the conscious mind. 
Lifton's concept of psychic numbing is far more useful here. 
He defines numbing as "a diminished capacity to feel”. 
Rather than ideas and experiences being actively excluded 
from the conscious mind, they are there but not felt. There 
is
an impairment of the human being's essential 
mental function of symbolisation, . . .  an 
incapacity to feel or to confront certain kinds of 
experience, due either to blocking or the absence 
of prior imagery that would enable one to connect 
with such experience. Thus there is an essential 
separation of image and associated feeling.21
What seems to happen in a crucial episode is that, 
because of its personally threatening form, feeling and 
previously acquired knowledge, images and experience are 
reconnected, and numbing is overcome. Once this defence of 
numbing is removed another way of coping must be devised to 
deal with the threat.
Lifton's work has primarily been with survivors of 
various traumas and upheavals, such as Vietnam veterans, or 
survivors of Hiroshima. The theme that dominates much of his 
writing is the way that these survivors have, through 
"anxious immersion in death imagery", confronted the
21 Robert Jay Lifton, The Future of Immortality and 
Other Essays for a Nuclear Age (New York: Basic Books,
1987), p. 240.
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possibility of their own annihilation, ended their own 
numbing and have become able to re-order their existence and 
that of the world around them in a creative way.22 What 
Lifton stresses is that survivorhood, even of imagined 
death, confers a sense of animating guilt and 
responsibility.
It is not too difficult to look at Sarah's experience 
as one of immersion in death imagery and of survival from 
this imagined holocaust. She has, to quote Lifton, 
"struggled to grasp her experience of death immersion and 
render it significant".23 Thus, she feels a need and 
responsibility to act. The first visit to Greenham puts her 
in touch with others who share her views, which helps to 
legitimate and sustain the views in the way described by 
Haste and Frank. It also triggers a further cycle of 
deepening commitment.
The particular motivating power of survivorhood shows 
clearly in Rosa's case. Her home region in Guatemala 
suffered most heavily in the early 1980s. At the height of 
"La Violencia" Rosa's father insisted they move to the 
relative safety of the coast, and it was while she was there 
that she heard of the murder of the catechist who had 
taught, encouraged and supported her. The impact of this 
event can be judged from her ability to relate, almost as if 
present, what happened:
22 Robert Jay Lifton, The Broken Connection (New York: 
Basic Books, 1983), p. 392.
23 Lifton, The Future of Immortality, p. 245.
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[He] was accused of subversion, the army came and
got him and killed him. The took him off and
tortured him for a week, trying to get him to say 
who his companeros were, but he couldn't say
anything, or they would have killed all the
Catholics in the canton. But since he wouldn't 
say anything they brought him back to the canton 
and killed him, with axes and bullets they killed 
him in the churchyard. That's how we know very 
well that he is dead because there, in front of 
the whole community, they killed him. They got 
all the men together and said "we're going to kill 
this man because he's a subversive
Her grief was profound: When we learnt that he had been 
killed we cried every day, when we ate, at every meal we'd 
always think of him that he'd been murdered.
The indigenous community as a whole faced 
extermination. She was well aware of the facts and was 
happy to share her family's rational method of coping - 
escape - until the moment when, through the loss of a friend 
whom she admired and respected and with whom she closely 
identified, the historic catastrophe became intensely 
personal. Along with her feelings of shock and grief there 
are also feelings of guilt and responsibility, both for the 
event occurring - she thought that his betrayal might have 
been caused by members of the community who had bad thoughts 
about their quite innocent teacher— pupil relationship - and 
for her survival on the coast. The personal loss is also 
seen in its historic context: They had killed three other 
leaders in the cantons and there was no one left to take 
charge. Her survi vorhood in the face of such annihilation 
gives her clear responsibilities: she feels she has a duty 
to return. I said he's dead, but I'm here and I've got to
339
carry on the work, because we've been doing it. I had to 
give the people encouragement. . . . So I started to take 
charge and from that time I had the opportunity to teach my 
community.
In Rosa's case, the historic threat is made personal in 
an indirect manner, but it can be seen that the episode is 
no less powerful for this. This is the beginning of full­
time commitment to human rights work: currently, Rosa is one 
of the leaders of CONAVIGUA. Her interest, she says, is to 
make history in Guatemala, with the women themselves, with 
the indigenous people, we've got to make our history.
I want to stress Erikson's point that these episodes do 
not always occur in a neat, confined manner. There can be 
a number of significant but fragmentary occurrences that 
need to be looked at together to understand fully the 
dynamics of what is happening. This was the case with Mary. 
As is clear from her biography, she had alway been 
independent-minded and concerned about social issues, 
including nuclear weapons, but was never a joiner. Although 
she had participated in demonstrations she hadn't ever 
really understood what they were hoping to achieve. I always 
thought it was a total waste of time; I used to think they 
were lunatics. . . wasting all this shoe leather going from 
A to B and then going home.
However, after her family's move to Wales in the late 
1970s, she discovered that there was a plan to dump nuclear 
waste in the area. J thought . . . bloody cheek, you know, 
I've moved here from London and here they were bringing it
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to me, you know. And I had played the game, I hadn't upset 
anybody for a few years, and thought, what a bloody nerve• 
She joined the local anti-dumping coalition, but was 
not particularly active until one morning, when she read 
about a group of young people building a platform on a 
railway line and sitting on it to blockade a train carrying 
nuclear waste.
My normal procedure was to take the kids to 
school, buy The Guardian. go home and read it, 
make the beds, do all those robotic things, and I 
didn't do all that. I read The Guardian. heard, 
saw about these characters, realised in some 
strange way that they had done this by proxy for 
me, and felt that it was up to me to do something 
by proxy for them. It was very personal, yes. I 
think it was a very direct link with me as an 
individual, that these eight people had committed 
an act that was directly on my behalf. And I got 
going on that. It actually made me do something 
political, that I actually got out some container 
and I started bashing on peoples' doors and asking 
them for money, to help pay their fine.
All the dimensions that I have outlined are present to 
a moderate degree: there is the general historical threat of 
nuclear waste, already made personal to Mary by its possible 
arrival in her backyard; and the immediate and concrete 
threat to individuals with whom Mary clearly identifies, 
feeling that they acted on her behalf. This identification 
is what creates a sense of connection for Mary, both with 
the individuals and the issue. And connection generates 
responsibility: the individuals had made themselves
vulnerable, both during the action which was imaginative and 
risky, and to long-term prison sentences and fines. So Mary
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feels she must do something to help them. One senses from 
the interview that, as well as the negative emotions of 
anger about the issue, there is also admiration and respect 
and a sense of guilt at not so far having acted herself.
The next significant event was an invitation to attend 
the inaugural meeting of the Welsh Anti-Nuclear Alliance. 
As before, previously acquired knowledge was given personal 
and emotional significance. It was
the sudden realisation of what the cruise and 
Pershing missiles coming to Europe actually 
represented. It was seeing young people there, 
whose futures were going to be damaged, trying 
desperately to do something to stop it. [. . .] It 
was seeing all these youngsters that really 
weren't going to have a future, possibly because 
my generation had not worked hard enough to 
prevent this happening now. It was a fit of 
guilt, I think, that got me going.
Again, the sense of threat and vulnerability arouse 
feelings of guilt and personal responsibility for others. 
She joins the Labour party and becomes increasingly informed 
about the connections between cruise missiles and Wales. 
She discovers that the area is within the range for 
dispersal and easily a target area.
Given her increasing understanding, it is not 
surprising that the next crucial episode that Mary describes 
is the most directly threatening and arouses the most 
intense emotions:
I was travelling along in the car and I suddenly 
got this clear image of what the countryside would 
look like when it was devastated. It is pretty 
barren countryside anyway, because you could look
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over to the mountains. But I could just see the 
absolute ashes and everything. And it really, 
really had a terrible effect on me and I had to 
stop driving. Well, I was there for about half an 
hour or three-quarters of an hour, and I was so 
angry. I was very upset to start with, and that 
made me just so angry that I really knew I had to 
sort of pull out all the stops and do everything 
I personally could at that moment. It was the 
determination that, you know, I would have to do 
something and that I wouldn't, I wouldn't be 
stopped.
I would suggest that the power of such imagery comes 
from the fact that Mary already knew cognitively what was 
possible, otherwise she could not have summoned up the 
landscape. But this sudden unsolicited visualisation 
enabled her to feel what it would be like, to feel her own 
vulnerability and experience intense misery and anger 
similar to Sarah's. Knowledge and feeling are thus 
powerfully connected, and numbing, already undermined by 
previous episodes, is completely impossible. These 
feelings, combined with the already aroused sense of guilt 
and personal responsibility, create a feeling of having to 
act. What is also clear is that the impact of the episodes 
was cumulative, building up over a period.
I want to look briefly at the crucial episodes in the 
life of Darek from Poland, in order further to underline how 
these events create an awareness of the self in history and 
of history in the self. Darek was brought up with a strong 
sense of family tradition and of his personal historical 
roots. Family history was endlessly discussed at home and 
Darek sees history as critical to his first moment of 
connection to the Polish opposition. Before the episode he
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had already become aware that Polish opposition politics 
were in some way personally important.
My first political engagement was when in 
1976 I turned on Radio Free Europe and I heard 
that in Ursus and Radom there were demonstrations. 
I think I was shocked because my childhood was in 
the normal world without political accents and so 
on, but this moment in 1976 was the moment I felt 
I began my more personal life, more adult life 
also. It was also a very important moment because 
it was the year of my first class, in the 
secondary school.
Darek sees the significance of the moment arising from 
the fact that for him demonstrations were abnormal.
I hadn't seen demonstrations here. I hadn't 
seen anybody beaten in the street like it was in 
Radom and Ursus. They were telling about those 
demonstrations, about the intervention of police 
and the political crisis in Poland, so it was the 
door to the new world.
But at this point he felt no real a sense of personal 
involvement or a need to act. That moment came in 1977 
after the death, in Krakow, of Staszek Pyas, a Polish 
theology student who had been collecting money and arranging 
help for workers in Radom and Ursus and who had died after 
being pushed from a third-floor window by the police. Darek 
knew nothing about the incident until the moment when he and 
his best friend were walking through the centre of Krakow 
and saw
a very strange situation: black, young people 
dressed in black with candles, standing and giving 
leaflets to people, leaflets, and speaking about 
the death of Staszek. And outside the house in
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Szefska Street we saw a long queue of people who 
wanted to see this place [where Staszek had been 
killed]; who wanted to give flowers and who wanted 
to know something.
Darek explained how at this point there was already a 
strange atmosphere in Krakow because a new church in Nowa 
Huta was nearing completion and there were rumours 
prophesying the end of the world when the church opened. He 
felt this atmosphere contributed to the very deep emotion, 
that he felt on seeing the mourners: a huge emotion of, of 
. . .  I don't know, being proud, being independent and . . 
. also of being free. I was seventeen during this time so 
it was my private freedom and it was my freedom as a Pole, 
as one of young people.
The growth of awareness of a historical self could not 
be more clearly demonstrated. Polish big history and Polish 
private history, to use Darek's own words, collide. 
Although Darek denies feeling much identification with the 
killed student, there is clearly a feeling of connection 
both with Pyas and the young people in black. This adds to 
his feeling of vulnerability brought on by the sense of 
apocalyptic threat and the symbolism of mourning and death. 
In Darek's case, these feelings occur simultaneously with 
feelings of empowerment, which increase as he involves 
himself in subsequent events:
three days later there was a big demonstration of 
students in Krakow, the street was completely 
filled with people and I was in this crowd and I 
remember the silence of this crowd and it was like 
the accumulator in the car, of giving energy to
345
the accumulator.
Darek's crucial episodes also provide a good example of 
the way developmental crises (as defined by Erikson) can 
coincide with a historic crisis. Thus, in Darek's case, the 
resolution of his identity crisis is inextricably bound up 
with an active attempt to resolve the political crisis in 
his country. The intensity of this whole episode is so 
great that he breaks with his closest friend, for whom it 
has no significance (an action he regrets now, feeling 
friendship can overide political difference), and throws 
himself into oppositional activity: participating in
demonstrations, and organising an exhibition and independent 
history classes. He becomes part of a network that provides 
him with more information, social support and the 
legitimation and confirmation of his views.
Two other activists have clearly defined episodes of 
this kind. Magda describes the imposition of martial law as 
a deep crisis [. . .] because I didn't think in any
political terms before. I always thought I had a father in 
the United States so whenever I don't like anything I can 
go. Politics was not her concern. However, she had 
intended to travel to the Soviet Union the day after martial 
law was imposed and found that she could not. This was to 
be the first of many occasions that politics would stop her 
from doing something she wanted to do. She found that
it also concerns me [that] I can be so much 
deprived of my personal freedom, to such an extent 
that stupid men can say that [I cannot go], so
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it's a time when I started to think of . . .  I 
thought that I would never cooperate with this 
country. I would not even work here, I mean work 
officially.
She participated in the protest demonstrations because 
it was a citizen's duty to go, let them see that we are 
here, and was shocked at police brutality. I never thought 
such a thing could happen. A further blow was the refusal 
of a passport, when both she and her boyfriend had been 
accepted for a linguistic scholarship to the United States.
At the time I thought, okay, I have to make 
a revenge, not really revenge but for me: it was 
even more the realization of how a stupid thing 
like the army ruins people's lives. It's things 
like that that [made me feel ] my personal freedom 
diminish, my dignity was disappearing.
Again there is a series of political events over a 
short period which increase the sense of personal 
vulnerability and engender an increased sense of connection 
and responsibility. Escape is not seen as an appropriate 
method of coping. In Magda's case, however, although there 
is clearly commitment, apart from demonstrating more life- 
changing action did not follow immediately, because she did 
not have access to the resources or networks that made it 
possible to act in the way she wanted. Here Magda contrasts 
the difficulties of working with Solidarity in the early 
1980s and with WiP four years later.
I wanted to be involved before in some politics, 
but there was too much conspiracy and it was so 
difficult to get to any group [. . .] because it
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vas like you were a knight and you had to work in 
special ways, so it was to difficult for me. . . 
. I was not frightened, but I thought it was too 
difficult for me to get to, and also the other 
thing was that when you started to begin with some 
political group . . . they make you do very 
stupid things, so we never had any influence on 
what was really the politics:. . . they make you, 
like, for example, produce the leaflets, and 
although someone might have had political 
interests it was not possible to say a word. You 
were just told what to do:" okay, you want to be 
involved, so do it", and politics is done 
somewhere else. That was with Solidarity, for 
example. [. . .] I guess WiP was different . . .
because it was open, their names were 
published, so it was easy to find those people, so 
I just went to them and I said I also want to be 
[part of this], and so it was easy. And then, 
from the very beginning, we - because I went 
together with Adam - could participate in meetings 
and in the discussion of issues. . . .
It was WiP's accessibility and the possibilities it 
offered for direct involvement in the issues that mattered 
to her and that made it possible for Magda to act on 
feelings aroused four years earlier.
This illustrates the point that, even where there is a 
sense of personal efficacy, which most of my respondents had 
before these episodes, the occurrence of a crucial episode 
may create a need to act but not be enough for actual 
engagement to occur. When such episodes take place in an 
environment where there are available models of action and 
access to other activists, networks, and information, it is 
possible to observe, as with Darek, the transformation of 
personal efficacy into political efficacy. When potential 
activists are relatively isolated and cannot identify a 
clear role for themselves, as was the case with Magda and 
Anna, there may be no action at this time. Gender is
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clearly important here. Magda was not inspired by the 
romance of underground politics, as Darek was, nor was she 
prepared to play the traditional female role of clerical 
staff. She wanted real engagement on her terms, which, 
although she had not defined them at that time, were 
feminist ones. These themes are explored further in Chapter 
9. I explore the the transformation of personal into 
political efficacyin more detail in Chapter 8.
Margaret identifies a sudden moment of awareness that 
occurred in the early 1980s, when hearing a fellow Quaker 
from her Meeting speak at a study group in her home about 
the problem of nuclear waste and his fear that it was 
insoluble. As a result he had left his job at a nuclear 
facility. At another such meeting she heard about torture 
for the first time
he was talking about people being tortured and 
about governments torturing their own citizens 
deliberately, as a government policy, as a means 
of extracting information out of them. The whole 
thing just sort of shocked and horrified me. I 
mean, I'd not given any thought to that sort of 
thing before . . . you don't sort of think about 
it, but I've got three small kids, you know, and 
didn't think much. . . . Anger, the sheer 
awfulness of doing such a thing as a deliberate 
policy. I mean I can understand all .
cruelty, individual cruelty, on the spur of the 
moment, under stress, that I can understand to a 
certain extent, but this is cold blooded [and] 
deliberate.
As a result both she and her husband joined and became 
active members of Friends of the Earth and Amnesty 
International, which led to involvement in CND and Greenham. 
Again, one can see the way a political threat is made
349
personal through a feeling of connection. The information 
on nuclear waste had more impact because it was conveyed by 
someone from her own Meeting, who in a sense was a victim 
himself, as she felt she would be if the problem of waste 
continued. The information on government torture aroused 
such intense anger perhaps because there was a resonance 
with her own parents' escape from barbarous government 
policy.
What should also be clear from these case studies is 
that crucial episodes are moral encounters, in that they 
involve the protagonist in an examination of their beliefs 
about right and wrong. And crucial episodes bear out 
Hoffman's description of the connection between empathic 
affect, moral judgement, and the motivation to act. In each 
case a causal attribution is made - usually to the 
government - and there are clearly victims, besides the self 
or other with whom the self identifies, to whom my 
respondents feel closely connected and for whom the empathic 
affects of anger, distress, and guilt are felt. These are 
past and future victims. Thus, Mary feels guilty about her 
failure to protect the future of the young people at the 
anti-nuclear meeting? Margaret feels anger on behalf of 
victims of torture? and Rosa feels distress for past and 
future victims of violence. A judgement is made that this 
is wrong, and there is a subsequent feeling of 
responsibility and the need to act.
I have summarised what I see as the essential dynamics 
of a crucial episode in Table 2 (p. 371). I also wish to
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highlight the aspects that the disparate experiences 
described by earlier researchers and my own data have in 
common. This is perhaps most obvious with Erikson, whose 
psychodynamic approach has influenced my own, and who points 
to both the historic and threatening aspects of the events 
he describes. Moreover, in the cases of Darek, Rosa and 
Magda, the historic crisis does coincide with their own 
periods of identity formation, which heightens the feeling 
of vulnerability and possibility. While James emphasises 
the ecstatic and joyful aspects of the affective state, it 
is clear from almost all his examples that this is preceded 
by an awareness of potential disaster: in one example, the 
man vividly describes sensations of strangling and choking 
and the belief that he is near death, which produces 
feelings of intense vulnerability and often complete 
despair.
The episodes clearly share many of the features 
described by Frank and Nash, unsurprisingly in the case of 
the British, as they occur in a similar population. It is 
interesting to note, however, both similar personality 
characteristics - of initiative, independence and concern 
for others - and similar dynamics in the Guatemalan and 
Polish activists. However, as I pointed out above, the 
extent of subsequent activity depends not simply on the 
intensity of the emotions aroused, but also on the extent to 
which networks and resources are available, as well as on 
feelings of efficacy and legitimacy, as Haste suggests.
The main point of difference is with Haste's
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presentation of the sequential relation between cognition, 
affect and action. The data from my activists and other 
studies suggests that this intense affective experience is 
not the first point of engagement, but may itself be 
precipitated by a growing understanding of the threat, and 
that the shift of awareness is less over the issue itself 
than over its personal relevance to the individual. The 
shift results in a growing sense of self as someone who can 
"make history". However, as I stated at the beginning, the 
experience of crucial episodes underlines the importance of 
affect in generating action. I also hope that the case 
histories provided go some way to explaining that it is the 
sense of vulnerability of the self, or of others to whom one 
feels connected, produced by an event that is both 
historical and threatening and framed in a way that makes it 
personally relevant, that produces such intense emotions, 
which in turn generate a need to act.
Lifton sums up the experience more eloquently than I 
can when he states
that to touch death and then rejoin the living can 
be a source of insight and power, and that this is 
true not only for those exposed to holocaust, or 
to the death of parent, lover or friend, but also 
for those who have permited themselves to 
experience fully the "end of an era", personal or 
historical.24
24 Ibid., p. 245.
Abstract Concerns
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Yet six of the activists in my study cannot identify such 
episodes, and the path to engagement is clearly a much more 
gradual process of deepening commitment. This takes two 
different forms: one* where engagement appears to arise
from the coincidence of a particular kind of personality and 
stage in that individual's life cycle with the mobilisation 
of a popular movement; and another, where it is hope rather 
than threat that generates the possibility of action. I 
shall deal with these in turn.
As I showed in Chapter 6, almost all the activists show 
a certain determination and independence of spirit. It is 
most marked in four: Rosa (dealt with above) Piotr, Janek, 
and Diana, all of whom are socially active and engaged from 
an early age: Piotr and Janek as form leaders and initiators 
of school activitites, Diana directly in the political 
issues of animal rights, CND and women. This activity 
appears to arise from a strong sense of right and wrong, as 
Diana describes it, and a precocious sense of community 
responsibility. Diana at one point wanted to be a nurse or 
a policewoman because if you wanted to help the community, 
and stop wicked people doing wicked things then join the 
police force. Piotr refers to his sense of noblesse oblige 
and Janek to organising extra-curricular activities to avoid 
stagnation in the school.
Although not rebellious in the conventional sense, all 
were able to stand up to authority when they saw it as
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wrong, and thought it important to do so. For example Piotr 
tried always to be polite but to say what I think, and Diana 
says that I was very polite about it really. I was fairly 
bloody minded. In addition, all were also aware of feeling 
somewhat different from their classmates. They did not lack 
friends, but were aware that they had different concerns, 
and took the world more seriously in some respects than 
their contemporaries. In Janek and Piotr this sense of 
difference seems to have contributed to a period of 
depression and alienation in their mid-teens. Diana, at the 
same age, had already found like-minded companions at 
Greenham.
It would appear that, rather than needing an intense, 
emotional and personal experience to motivate them to engage 
in collective action, all three, from an early age, had the 
energy, temperament, awareness and sense of personal 
responsibility that made them search for issues in which to 
engage. Engagement in an issue deepened their knowledge and 
skills and led to increasingly deeper commitment. I shall 
illustrate this process in detail with Diana.
Diana, after her seal petition, joined national CND as 
an 11-year old:
It was something, like, easily identifiable 
and you could join. [. . .] I think it was just 
being able to do something, and then it soon 
became obvious that, having joined something, that 
it didn't stop there really. You know, especially 
with all these people knowing, if they'd seen your 
pencil case or membership card, and things like 
that, you immediately, or even if they don't see 
it, you immediately get into discussions with 
people, teachers, other pupils, and arguments. It
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quickly escalates. . . . I'm sure I thought at the 
time, right I've joined CND and that's it.
And her motivation at the start was simply that
it was wrong. It was a reaction to the injustice. 
I mean, I thought, I felt they were wrong, and 
therefore I should do something, I'm trying to 
sort of see it from another point of view . . .  of 
being there rather than now. I think it was that 
you shouldn't threaten people and you shouldn't be 
prepared to kill them, and it was a sort of very 
gut reaction against violence.11
Doing something meant starting a youth CND group in the 
town. This put her in touch with other concerns, such as 
animal rights - she became a vegetarian when she was twelve 
- and feminist politics. At the same time she had begun to 
visit Greenham, which she had seen on TV, the first occasion 
being when she was twelve for the "Embrace the Base" 
demonstration in 1982.
Her description of the effect of the demonstration on 
her and of the way her commitment slowly deepened over the 
next three years shows that, as in crucial episodes, 
engagement is both a cognitive and affective process:
I had not seen anything like it before. I 
was quite bowled over. Totally, I think it took 
me a few more visits to even be able to identify 
anything, really. But all I knew was that I 
wanted to keep going back. Because it captured my 
imagination, although I can't say why really. I
think because, there was this base, you know, 
these weapons, that I'd sort of thought so much 
about, and campaigned so much about, and they were 
actually so close. And it became more and more 
evident to me as well, the more I went, there were 
so many things which I knew nothing about . . . 
the extent of the arms race; and also what
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positive things were being done about it as well, 
that I sort of wanted to find out. I didn't like 
not knowing, really. And that was the real spur 
to keep going down.
Here Diana is already actively engaged in CND but, 
through the powerful metaphor of the action taken by the 
Greenham women, previously known facts have been given a 
concrete reality, which produces a strong emotional response 
and the desire for more knowledge. There are also feelings 
of self- discovery and the desire for these processes to 
continue.
And the sense of community: I just kept meeting
these amazing women, and thinking, God . . . this 
is brilliant . . .  I don't want to go home. [. . 
.] I felt like I was discovering myself as well, 
I felt, like, that suddenly it was like a sounding 
board for me, clearing out a lot of things that I 
was feeling. It was things like, I was sort of 
being born in a strange sense. Often I just 
walked round and just watched what was going on, 
especially if it were a big day . . . just being 
somewhere, like that, that felt so incredible. It 
was sort of the main experience at the very 
beginning, and then it just evolved as I kept 
going back, saving up my dinner money and going 
down at the weekends.
Note that Diana is not precipitated into action by 
fear, but, rather, by a sense of something being wrong. I 
think I went because nuclear weapons were bad things. They 
were threatening the world, they were threatening our 
existence. I didn't have that personal sense of fear. That 
is not to say that fear does not play a role in her 
engagement. She describes her first action at the camp as 
terrifying.
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There were two terrifying points: the going
through the hole. To this day it's the doing of 
the hole and going through the hole that still 
gets my stomach. Once I'm in there, its very 
different. It's that making the hole and going 
through it that to this day frightens me. [And 
secondly,] we were very badly treated by the 
soldiers at the fence, thrown in barbed wire and 
being dragged through it, and that was . . .
really terrifying. I was in tears by the time I 
was shoved in the Landrover. They threw me in 
head first.
L: And how did that make you feel?
D: Well, initially, quite terrified and quite
powerless. Then, once we were going along in the 
Landrover, the women were being very supportive of 
each other, you know, and we sort of brought each 
other back. And that was a really, that was a 
very good experience. So by the time we were sort 
of lined up in the corridor, having our details 
taken, we were very sure of ourselves again.
The experience was not only frightening but 
transforming and empowering. Diana regards fear as an 
unavoidable part of the action, not as a means of generating 
excitement - it's too frightening for me to be excited. I 
mean, I'm too in awe of what we're up against to get excited 
before an action - but as a reminder of the seriousness of 
what she is doing.
L: What are you feeling when you're making the
hole [in the fence]?
D: That was when the fear comes in.
L: Of?
D: I don't know, I've never . . .
L: Of being shot?
D: No. I've never been frightened of being shot,
apart from once when an American went wild in 
front of me with a gun. I think it's a fear of 
something unknown, really. It's just a fear. And 
I'm quite glad I've never lost that too because I 
think it's . . . I've come to the point where I'd 
think twice about doing an action with somebody 
who said they're not frightened. I think, well, 
if you're not frightened then there's probably 
something wrong, rather than the other way around
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around.
Interestingly, engagement produced bad dreams:
I occasionally have bad dreams but they're 
usually not about the world ending, they're 
usually about the convoys or they're things that 
I experience or have experienced: . . . being
chased by the convoy or being run over by the 
convoy, or being locked, you know, framed for 
something I didn't do, or being rounded up. But 
these haven't been happening for a very very long 
time.
The dreams stopped when I demystified it and I actually 
got to grips with it, in a sense. Rather than it being this 
kind of great huge thing that flew by, it became something 
that you could actually stop. Thus, fear for Diana is not 
an emotion that precipitates her into action but part of the 
lived experience of engagement that keeps the issue salient 
and grounds her in reality. It is counterbalanced by 
growing feelings of knowledge, creativity and empowerment.
Greenham also clearly brought together two issues - 
women and nuclear weapons - that concerned her and allowed 
her to feel comfortable rather than unusual in expressing 
them: it being women-only created a certain amount of the 
atmosphere, you know, and made camp what it was, really. . 
. . I felt much less like I was being, you know, obnoxious, 
or a pain in the neck if I challenged something. Weekends 
at the camp led to weeks, and weeks to the decision at 
sixteen to forgo taking A-levels and going to university in 
favour of full-time commitment.
What distinguishes this process from the one involving
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crucial episodes is that while both beliefs and feelings are 
involved and can be hard to disentangle - note that Diana 
both thought and felt nuclear weapons were wrong - it is a 
slow cumulative process. There is no sudden shift of 
perspective, and there is an absence of intense feelings of 
personal vulnerability. Rather, there is a more general 
concern with right and wrong, and an active interest, from 
a young age, in public affairs. Issues do not have to be 
made real for these activists through a close personal 
connection because they are already curious and concerned 
about things. Janek and Piotr argue with their fathers 
about politics. Sources of information differ: Diana
learns about issues from the media; Janek and Piotr from 
reading underground literature. The effect is a growth in 
knowledge and understanding that pushes them into action 
when the right historic moment occurs.
Thus for Janek, brought up in a family that valued 
honesty, it is the lying that concerns him. He is shocked 
and irritated when he first discovers, on a visit to the 
West, that not only information about damage to the 
environment but the whole life, everything that was going 
on, was censored. In literature which he enjoyed there was 
absolute silence about certain writers. [. . .] Young people 
were told that they were developing such wonderful . . . 
they were building socialism, and everything was OK and when 
I realised it was lies, that made me especially angry.
The space between what was said and what was going on 
in reality was particularly noticable on his return to a
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politically stagnant Czechoslovakia, after witnessing the 
birth of Solidarity in Poland in the summer of 1980. It was 
the extra drop in a glass full to the brink. [. . . ] In 
history, it is like that, that certain periods come and 
then. . • Janek, encouraged and inspired by what was
happening in Poland, felt able to act himself within his own 
setting of student politics.
Both Piotr and Janek felt at their most despairing 
when the possibility of action was removed: Piotr, having 
been deeply involved in Student Solidarity (NZS), was both 
surprised and deeply upset by the imposition of martial law.
It was something really terrible in my life.
. . . [I] never thought about the possibility of 
such martial Law or things of that kind, but I was 
so engaged in this activity [. . . and] in one day 
I lost everything. [. . .] I was very unhappy
then. And it was really, I needed, it needed some 
days and weeks to recover, I couldn't find what to 
do.
Janek, likewise, felt frustrated, very angry, and 
helpless. Both immediately searched for some kind of 
underground activity in which to involve themselves. 
However, sustaining an underground trade union had little 
direct relevance to their own lives, and it was the creation 
and growth of WiP, three years later, in which they were 
instrumental, that allowed them to act directly on the 
issues that concerned them. For Janek this meant 
environmental issues, for Piotr it was the issues that are 
central to his Catholic faith: freedom, peace, and human 
dignity. Piotr is clear that the real reason of my public
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activity was not that I was interested in politics. It was 
always , , , somehow the moral mechanism of doing things, it 
was the main motor.
In summary, these activists did not feel compelled into 
action through a feeling of personal vulnerability or 
connection to someone else who was threatened; nor did they 
express strong feelings of empathic concern. Rather, they 
appeared actively to search out ways to express and promote 
the values and issues that have preoccupied them for most of 
their lives. Not surprisingly, they were initiators of 
actions. This latter distinction between these two groups 
is not necessarily clear cut. Rosa, Mary and Darek were 
also initiators but, in their cases, after a process begun 
by a crucial episode.
Inhibited by Fear
With the three remaining Guatemalans - Pedro, Christina and 
Francisco - the process is different again. They act in 
order to deal with a problem affecting them or their 
families directly, but it is a gradual and cumulative 
process and there are no crucial episodes. In contrast to 
those who have crucial episodes, they are not motivated to 
act at the point at which they are most threatened and 
vulnerable. These activists, as indigenous people from the 
Quiche region, have grown up and lived in an atmosphere of 
more or less permanent threat and vulnerability, which they
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regard as normal. They had become aware, in the early 
1980s, of the penalty paid by anyone engaged even in the 
most benign forms of social organisation, let alone any form 
of overtly political activity. Rosa's courage in acting in 
this situation is exceptional and may be related to the 
degree of initiative she had to take as a child, and the 
strong connection and therefore responsibility that she felt 
for the catechist and his work.
The other Guatemalans, although having had the 
independence and initiative to educate themselves and find 
work, had no such connections to social or political action, 
and it was the opening of the political space and the growth 
of hope, rather than fear, that allowed for the possibility 
of action. This is best illustrated by looking at Pedro.
On escaping his military service, he returned to his 
small business on the coast. He felt a different person: I 
thought differently, I was very macho, I was very superior. 
However, he had begun to buy books, very simple books, but 
through these books I began to re-educate myself. The books 
were the Bible and human relations books, and through their 
influence he joined a young people's church group, his first 
experience of constructive social activity. When the army 
came to his community to start the civil patrols (PACs) with 
gifts of maize, beans, powdered milk, giving sweets to the 
children, promising that a new stage was going to start, 
Pedro wanted to believe them. I thought that once they 
created the patrols that the violence would end, but it was 
just the opposite.
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The patrols made them even more vulnerable to arbitrary 
violence. Two occasions stay vividly in Pedro's mind: one 
was when
three villages met together, and the soldiers 
arrived, and the man came with the soldiers who 
had his face covered, and he said, this person is 
a subversive, this person is a subversive, this 
person is a subversive. Well, right in front of me 
they took out four patrollers, and I was very 
scared, because I thought that this man who had 
his face covered, I thought he was going to point 
me out as well as a subversive, but thanks to God 
he didn't point me out. Well, the soldiers 
believed this man with the covered face, they 
started to tie the guys up with this rope and they 
carried them off, and they said if it's proved 
that these men are guerillas, we are going to kill 
them, and they took them away. That time when I 
saw it myself, these patrollers, they tortured 
them, they asked them a lot of questions, they let 
them go after a week, but they were beaten, when 
they returned they were bleeding, they were still 
bleeding, that's what I saw, but in all the 
villages that . . .  in the high plains there were 
a lot of patrollers who weren't freed by their 
soldiers . . .
Another incident occurred in his district when he was 
working on the coast and paying someone to take his place:
The soldiers said they had captured some 
guerillas, that these men, they were peasants too, 
they were our brothers, they were innocent men, 
these people they didn't find a single arm on them 
- weapon - but the soldiers obliged the peasants 
to kill these people, their own brothers, with 
sticks, and the peasants were scared, they were 
frightened of killing their own brothers because 
they knew them, they knew that they were their 
brothers, so they were scared of killing them with 
sticks, but the soldiers, when they came, when 
they saw that the peasants were scared, they said, 
right, if you are not brave enough to kill these 
guerillas, we will kill you first, before the 
other men. So the peasants had to kill them, they 
killed, but through fear, because otherwise they 
were going to be killed themselves.
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These incidents distressed and frightened Pedro but 
they did not at the time make him feel he must take action 
against the patrols. On the contrary, when I asked what he 
would have done had he been at his village at the time of 
this killing he thinks he is likely to have behaved in the 
same way: through fear you have to kill, because if you 
don't kill, well, they will kill you first. Survival in 
these times had to depend on a degree of numbing to the 
atrocities taking place around one.
However, with the election of a civilian president at 
the end of 1985, the repressive political atmosphere eased 
slightly and rumours began to circulate that the PACs were 
voluntary. It was at this point that Pedro and his fellow 
patrollers petitioned the military command in their district 
to allow them only to patrol at night and leave them daytime 
to work in their fields. This was met with a refusal and 
the usual accusations of subversion. However, a year later, 
hearing that another village had given up patrolling 
completely, Pedro and some friends first enquired how they 
had done it and then set the same process in motion in their 
own community. This was to go to Amilcar Mendez, a local 
schoolteacher, and with his assistance write out a 
declaration based on their constitutional rights, and to 
send this directly to the President, Minister of Defence and 
Human Rights Procurator. The second stage was, as a 
community, to act on their rights, stop patrolling and 
ignore the threats and bullying of local military
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commanders. Pedro clearly took the initiative in these 
processes, organising community meetings, learning and then 
teaching others the relevant parts of the constitution. 
Thus it was natural, when a number of non-patrolling 
communities decided to get together and form an organisation 
to represent their interests, that Pedro was made vice- 
president.
In this position it was no longer a question of 
improving his own life situation by not having to patrol, 
but of actually endangering his life by taking the human 
rights message to other communities. Moreover, the more 
effective he was, the greater the danger. However, by this 
stage he felt confident and motivated enough to cope with 
both current and remembered fears in a different manner.
This whole process took place over three years, during 
which Pedro was drawing on his natural capacity for taking 
initiative, his bilingual skills and literacy. He was also 
re-examining the meaning of the horrifying experiences he 
and his people had been through. Numbing was no longer 
necessary and, with hindsight, the emotional content of 
these remembered incidents took on a new meaning that 
provided justification and motivation for his current 
actions. Thus Pedro talked about the feelings he had now 
about murder of the peasants described above:
Two things one can feel: one is to feel frightened 
to see that they've killed friends of yours, 
that's a possible feeling. The other is the 
revitalisation, that you have to do something 
about this, you have to get vengeance for what's 
happened. This incident is what most pushed me to
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do the work that I now do. In a pacific way, but 
it's still vengeance. It's still making sure that 
these people aren't forgotten. . . .  I felt angry 
in that this wasn't the only thing they'd done. 
They'd raped women, burned houses.
I would suggest that the fear was overwhelming and 
inhibiting at the time of the incident, and that it is in 
remembering this fear, in the context of my asking him about 
motivation, that the revitalising emotions of vengeance and 
anger occur. What is more, the act of remembering and 
recounting, not just to me but others requiring testimony, 
helped to create the narrative structures that made sense of 
the fear, gave it personal meaning and historical 
significance and help Pedro to habituate to it. Pedro could 
now place his personal experience in its historic context, 
and recognise that he was part of history and had a 
significant role in creating it. As with other activists 
there is the emergence of a historic self.
There are also feelings of empathy and compassion:
I grew up in a family where the father was 
extremely poor, extremely simple. I worked all my 
life on these fincas, on the plantations like all 
the campesinos do, so I know how the people live, 
I know what it's like to be a widow, and of the 
suffering of orphans.
He partly attributes this to his earlier Bible reading.
Compassion is the main thing it gives you. For 
example, it says in the Bible: "love is stronger 
than fear". And I think that it's very effective. 
I think that it's true, if you have a very large 
love then the fear disappears. I think that's
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what we all work and use as leaders in the groups 
we work in.
Christina goes through a similar process of living through 
the violence with no desire to act. On the contrary, her 
main concern is to stay out of it. She is very distressed 
when she sees the damage it has done to her family when she 
returns home, but it is only when she hears from others of 
the concrete possibility of action that she takes the 
initiative to try and stop the patrols in her village. The 
immediate motivation is the difficulty that her sick brother 
was having in patrolling, although, with hindsight, she 
feels that even without family involvement she would have 
got involved in the issue:
I would say, although, even if I hadn't suffered 
this personal familial problem, I would have seen 
it in other communities. I would have analysed 
that what was going as a whole was violating what 
we are as persons. You know, I participated in 
courses, and I was working with the government, 
and anyone who works for the government, well, 
they know that they're exploited. And it's not 
the question of "oh well, I organised just because 
of these reasons, because of my familial reasons", 
I think I would have done it anyway.
However, looking back, she sees her memory of her own 
and her family's experience of the violence as a primary 
motivation.
As with Pedro, the knowledge and experience she has 
accumulated push her into a leadership position, and thus a 
position of greater danger and vulnerability, which she 
acknowledges as difficult: right at the start I was never
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scared,‘ never, but when the army arrived, to put the 
pressure on, afterwards, and threaten people, yes, I did get 
scared. I thought, somebody could point me out as somebody, 
one of the people who gave advice to others. She has bad 
dreams: I've dreamt that I'm walking along and somebody's 
running after me. I've dreamt that there are bullets coming 
after me. In my dreams I've always escaped, nothing actually 
happens to me, but I do wake up scared, feeling nervous.
She feels unsafe in her village, but she still 
persists: I start thinking, well, if this is going to happen 
to me, then there is nothing I can do about it because, 
anyway, yes, in any case, we all have to die. And she 
considers it worth the risk: it has very great value. The 
value is that the people have courage in the struggle, that 
they don't lose hope. This is the value. The only conflict 
is her responsibility for her family. Thus, in the process 
of becoming fully engaged, fear is no longer paralysing, but 
something that must be confronted and lived with, and her 
family have shifted from being part of her motivation to act 
to becoming part of the constraints on action
I just really had this will, and I felt that I 
wanted to start giving full-time all the little I 
knew about what was going on with the civil 
patrols in the community. I made the decision that 
I would work full-time for them, but always 
thinking that with the problems in my family, 
there would be times that I would have to have 
that as a priority.
Francisco is perhaps the activist with the least
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personal initiative in the study, at least in the early 
stages of his involvement. He, like Pedro and Christina, 
has put up with the terror, and gave a graphic description 
of how terror prevented him and his family from even 
investigating what happened to his father (see Chapter 6). 
He became involved in CERJ in order to improve his own 
situation, and was then offered a job. This provided him 
with interesting work helping others - through meeting all 
those who came to the office - and, perhaps most 
significantly, it also provided a substitute father in the 
form of Mendez. Sadly, it is possible that his involvement 
in CERJ contributed to the assassination of his mother. In 
spite of this and the continuing threats to other members of 
his family, Francisco became more deeply engaged in human 
rights work, becoming an organiser for the campesino trade 
union. Thus, like the others, he makes a transition from 
engagement to serve personal interests to a sense of public 
responsibility that increases his risk. The process of 
engagement itself has in all three cases enabled the 
respondents to confront fear.
I have summarised this third process diagramatically 
(see Table 3, p. 372) to contrast it with that occurring in 
crucial episodes, and to show clearly the importance of 
historical and political context, particularly the role of 
repression, in determining whether or not action occurs. 
Many of the elements that occur in a crucial episode are 
also involved in this process. There is a similar 
generalisation from action taken on the behalf of self to
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acting for others. Feelings of anger, empathy and 
compassion are mobilising. The significant difference is 
not simply that the process takes longer but that, because 
of the already present level of terror, it is not an 
increased sense of personal vulnerability that breaks down 
numbing. Rather, it is only with a decrease in terror, and 
the growth of hope, that personal vulnerability is decreased 
and action becomes possible. Numbing only seems to come to 
an end when, through action, which includes the constructing 
of narratives in the form of testimony and memorials, the 
individual has developed the resources to cope with the 
feelings produced by earlier traumas. These emotions can 
then provide the "revitalising" energy for further action on 
behalf of others. And by this time there is an increase in 
personal efficacy that enables the individual to cope with 
their increased vulnerability to danger
In conclusion, I have, through the experiences of my 
respondents, illustrated three different processes through 
which the individual can become engaged in collective 
action. All three involve both affective and cognitive 
processes and all three depend on the interplay of 
historical events with the individual's own life 
circumstances.
For the majority of my respondents, some form of 
personal involvement with an issue is combined with a 
growing awareness of its historic significance and the 
feeling of empathic concern for others. Within this group 
there are two different responses to fear. One is where
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fear of imagined events stimulates the need to act through 
a breakdown of numbing. In this case, feelings of intense 
personal vulnerability are mobilising. For others living 
with chronic and overwhelming terror, fear leads to numbing 
as a method of coping, and action is only possible when 
repression and the resultant feelings of vulnerability 
decrease. For a minority, for whom action on social issues 
has begun at an early age, feelings of personal 
vulnerability do not play a significant role in the initial 
engagement and a personal connection with the issue is not 
necessary. However, the issues which mobilise them fully 
are ones that have personal meaning, and a realistic 
awareness of the dangers of both the issue and action taken 
to confront it can be part of what keeps it salient.
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Surviving holocaust makes one vulnerable to 
deformations, dislocations, and imaginative 
impediments. The hard-won knowledge of death that 
both defines and plagues one tends to be 
fragmentary at best and half articulate, yet is 
precious in the extreme. It takes shape from the 
survivor's struggle to grasp his or her experience 
of death immersion and render it significant. 
Only by such a formulation can the survivor cease 
to be immobilized by the death imprint, by death 
guilt, and by psychic numbing. That is, in 
struggling to reorder one's own experience, one 
can contribute to the general historical 
reordering so widely craved. And these
psychological emanations - from past holocausts 
and their survivors, from anticipated holocausts 
and their imagined survivors - reach everyone. 
The painful wisdom of the survivor can, at least 
potentially, become universal wisdom.
Robert Lifton, "The Survivor as Creator"1
In this chapter I am interested in exploring the way in 
which childhood trauma might contribute to political 
engagement. The literature reviewed in Chapter 3 is 
somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, there is the view 
that activists are psychopathological deviants acting out 
their personal problems on society at large. Lasswell 
viewed political action as the expression of repressed 
unconscious urges, rationalised and displaced from the 
private to the public world. A recent study by Duncan of a 
civil rights activist, in which his radical activism is
1 Robert Jay Lifton, The Future of Immortality and Other 
Essays for a Nuclear Age (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 
24.
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explained away as an expression of oedipal and oral rage and 
as a defence against depression, demonstrates that this 
pathological interpretation of political action is alive and 
well.2
Meanwhile, the literature on empathy suggests that 
those abused in childhood are less likely to be empathic, or 
to show pro-social behaviour. And the socialisation 
literature suggests that children from families with a high 
degree of overt conflict are less likely to be active. In 
addition, a large body of literature on the effects of 
childhood abuse shows that abused children are likely to 
grow up with low self-esteem and a low sense of personal 
efficacy. All of these factors taken together might suggest 
that those exposed to trauma in childhood are less likely to 
become engaged in non-violent action.
How, then, does one make sense of the fact that, as the 
reader will have noticed in Chapter 6, many of my 
respondents in this study have suffered from various forms 
of traumatic experience in their pre-activist lives: 
prolonged illness; the loss of parents through death or 
separation; parental violence and alcoholism; physical or 
sexual abuse; or periods of intense alienation. In 
addition, the Guatemalans in particular lived through a 
period of horrific violence of which they and their 
communities were the main targets. Such experiences might 
be in keeping with a psychopathological explanation of
2 Martha Duncan, "Only the Marlboro Man: a Psychological 
Study of a Political Agitator", Political Psychology 8, 2, 
pp. 165— 190.
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activism. My respondents could be seen to be acting out the 
repressed pain of childhood hurts. The problem is that, 
firstly, there does not appear to be any repression. The 
respondents are quite open to discussing these events and 
the pain that they caused. Secondly, in spite of abuse, it 
is a capacity for empathy that marks many of them out, and 
all of them have a- strong sense of both personal and 
political efficacy. Thirdly, none of them could be 
described as socially deviant. That is not to say that 
their activity as protestors may not be perceived as deviant 
by some sections of their own societies, but activism is not 
an expression of "dropping out". Rather, it is an expression 
of social concern and engagement, and, as can be seen from 
the biographies in Appendix 1, political engagement of this 
kind, in all three countries, tends to produce upward rather 
than downward mobility.
What I want to do in this chapter, through looking in 
detail at one activist's life, is to show how traumatic 
experiences in childhood can be significant in the process 
of engagement, but not through the pathological mechanism of 
repression and displacement suggested by Lasswell. Rather, 
it is the awareness of these experiences and the development 
of methods to cope with them, that enhanced my respondent's 
capacity for empathy and her sense of efficacy, which in 
turn, contributed to the possibility of action. The 
narrative also demonstrates how a sense of personal efficacy 
can become converted to political efficacy.
376
Others besides Lasswell have noted the significance of 
traumatic experiences in the process of engagement with 
action or creative work. Frank and Nash note that some of 
the respondents in their study had what they called 
"sensitising experiences" prior to the crucial episode that 
precipitated engagement. Such experiences included serious 
illness, divorce, deaths or injury in the immediate family, 
and psychotherapy.3 They also suggest that "a childhood 
containing sources of conflict and tension might also 
heighten a person's sensitivity to environmental threats and 
make him especially attuned to the unpleasant features of 
conflict."4
Lifton suggests that all of us, from birth onwards, are 
vulnerable to what he calls "death equivalents", that is, to 
experiences of "separation, disintegration, and stasis" that 
"serve as psychic precursors and models for later feelings 
about actual death."9 One response to such experiences is 
psychic numbing (described in Chapter 7). The other is a 
process of "confrontation", and subsequent "reordering and 
renewal", that can produce a "deepened general awareness" of 
the dangers we all face and a desire to act upon them. 
Awareness "includes the ability to anticipate and realise 
danger, on the one hand, and the capacity for knowledge and
3 Frank, Jerome D. and Nash, Earl H., "Commitment to 
Peace Work: A Preliminary Study of Determinants and 
Sustainers of Behaviour Change", American Journal Of 
Orthopsychiatry 35 (1965), p. 117.
4 Ibid., p. 117.
5 Robert Jay Lifton, The Broken Connection (New York: 
Basic Books, 1983), p. 53.
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transcendent feeling, on the other. . . . Imaginative access 
to death in its various psychic manifestations is necessary 
for vitality and vision.” The process is historically 
rooted, looking inward at the self and outward to the 
environment in which the individual lives.6 What Lifton is 
saying is that the ability to confront one's personal hurts 
increases one's sensitivity towards, and ability to 
challenge, the historical threats to one's own people and 
the planet. I suggest that this is because the process of 
confrontation with one's own hurts increases one's capacity 
for empathy and connection.
The psychiatrist Miller makes a similar point. Her 
writings examine the role of childhood trauma in producing 
both creativity and destructiveness. Firstly, through her 
detailed psychobiographical work on artists such as Picasso 
and dictators such as Hitler and Stalin, she extends the 
notion of childhood trauma, pointing out that the 
pedagogical approach in child rearing, with its emphasis on 
obedience and duty and the suppression of the child's own 
feelings, is as damaging as overt child abuse:
Child abuse is still sanctioned - indeed, held in 
high regard - in our society as long as it is 
defined as child rearing. It is a tragic fact 
that parents beat their children in order to 
escape the emotions stemming from how they were 
treated by their own parents.7
6 Ibid., pp. 391— 394.
7 Alice Miller, The Untouched Key: Tracing Childhood 
Trauma in Creativity and Destructiveness (London: Virago, 
1990).
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She argues that much child rearing to date has been based on 
the need to stamp out in one's children what has been 
scorned and eradicated in oneself. And, like Lasswell, she 
makes a direct connection between these repressed 
experiences and politics, but, in contrast to him, argues 
that these repressed feelings do not manifest themselves as 
rebellion against authority but as obedience to it: the
result is the destructive politics of fascism and 
totalitarianism and the endorsement of nuclear weapons as a 
means of defence.8 She explains this in vivid metaphorical 
terms by referring to Abraham's preparedness to sacrifice 
his son Isaac at God's command. She points to the fact that 
"In all portrayals of this scene that I found, Abraham's 
face or entire torso is turned away from his son and 
directed upward. Only his hands are occupied with the 
sacrifice. . . . The son, an adult at the peak of manhood, 
is simply lying there quietly waiting to be murdered by his 
father . . .  in not a single one is he rebellious." This, 
she believes, is a "symbolic representation of our 
situation. Inexorably, weapons are being produced for the 
obvious purpose of destroying the next generation." And 
those who are involved "do not see what their hands are 
doing, and they devote their entire attention to fulfilling 
expectations from above, at the same time ignoring their 
feelings", which "they learned to deny as children". What
8 Alice Miller, For Your Own Good: The Roots of Violence 
in Child-Rearing, (London: Virago, 1987)
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is needed, therefore, is for Isaac to become "aware", 
confronting both his own feelings and those of his father.9
The possibility of awareness and of dealing with trauma 
creatively exists if there is any loving and attentive 
presence in childhood, if "at least once in their life they 
come into contact with a person who knows without any doubt 
that the environment, not the helpless, battered child, is 
at fault."10 It is "the absence or presence of a witness in 
childhood" which "determines whether a mistreated child will 
become a despot who turns his repressed feelings of 
helplessness against others or an artist who can tell about 
his or her suffering,"11, and the artist clearly includes 
the creative political activist. It is important to add 
that she does not regard traumatic experiences as in any way 
necessary in the genesis of creativity or political action.
People whose integrity has not been damaged 
in childhood, who were protected, respected, and 
treated with honesty by their parents, will be - 
both in their youth and adulthood - intelligent, 
responsive, empathic, and highly sensitive. They 
will take pleasure in life and will not feel any 
need to kill or even hurt others or themselves. 
They will use their power to defend themselves but 
not to attack others. They will not be able to do 
otherwise than to respect and protect those weaker 
than themselves . . . because it is this
knowledge (and not the experience of cruelty) that 
has been stored up inside them from the beginning.
9 Ibid., pp. 138— 145.
10 Ibid., pp. 168— 169.
11 Ibid., p. 60.
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I want to illustrate, by first looking in detail at 
Anna's life, the processes identified by Lifton and Miller, 
in which awareness of, and confrontation with, one's own 
childhood trauma can lead to creative renewal. In detailing 
Anna's story I shall show how an awareness of her own abuse 
creates an empathic concern for the abuse of others. Empathy 
creates a need to act. Action occurs when resources are 
available and this enhances Anna's sense of personal 
efficacy. As Anna gains the confidence to act in an 
increasingly public sphere, personal efficacy becomes 
political efficacy and makes further action more likely.
At the time of my interviews with Anna she had just 
finished a year at a mature students college and was 
spending part of her summer as warden of the Friends' 
Meeting House in the town neighbouring the missile base. 
She was taking part in incursions into the base and in 
actions against the cruise missile convoy. In between she 
was filling in an application form to Oxford University. 
She came across as a warm and energetic woman, self- 
sufficient, clear about her goals, yet at the same time she 
was both nervous and surprised at the fact that she really 
was about to do something others had told her would be 
impossible, namely, go to Oxford. During the interview, 
although frequently concerned that she was not able to 
express her ideas and feelings as clearly as she wished, and 
that she might sound mundane or incoherent, she was 
articulate and thoughtful. Lasswell, in discussing the 
pacifist A, states the importance of the fact that all
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hostility towards his father is barred from conciousness.12
Yet Anna, perhaps one of the most traumatised individuals 
in my study, was completely open about her experiences with 
her family and the hostile feelings they produced.
I have described in Chapter 6 the horrifying sexual 
abuse that Anna suffered from her father, culminating in 
rape, pregnancy and a miscarriage at the age of twelve; how 
her strong sense of herself as a survivor enabled her to
escape, and how the rest of her childhood was spent in a
children's home. Her initial reaction to such trauma was 
numbing: for the first two years in the home she blanked out 
her earlier childhood experiences. When she did begin to 
acknowledge and gain an insight into what had happened to 
her:
my whole life exploded . . .  I was just totally 
out of control. . . .  It wouldn't have been so bad
if it was anger that I could have directed, but I
didn't feel I could direct it, so I directed it 
inwards. And I guess I just hated myself, and I 
couldn't explain that but I kind of blamed myself 
for what happened.
This is the beginning of confrontation and the end of 
numbing. Fortunately, in spite of these feelings of self- 
destructiveness, the strong positive relationships that she 
formed with both her keyworkers provided enough stability 
and security to enable her to explore her own experiences 
without completely catastrophic consequences. She states 
that, subconciously, she knew that she could push and push
12 Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 97— 99.
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and push. And I did. These were the first of a series of 
helping witnesses identified as important by Miller in 
protecting children from the most destructive effects of 
abuse.
What is apparent is that her ability to recognise her 
own anger at other people making choices and decisions for 
me about my life increased her sensitivity to the anger of 
others, and formed the beginnings of re-ordering, a turning 
outwards from the self, and subsequent politicisation. It 
was a very troubled period for the children's home. Having 
been bullied herself, she found the bullying of other 
children intolerable and started getting angry about the way 
people were treated, and just wanting to do something about 
it. Here we have a clear demonstration of the way 
awareness, rather than the repression of personal traumas, 
can contribute to the growth of empathy, which in the right 
circumstances can lead to action and an increased sense of 
efficacy: Anna's confrontation with her own victimhood
resulted in an empathic concern for those she perceived as 
victims in her own environment and in a desire to act. Her 
previous experiences of the ineffectiveness of some forms of 
action, and her contact with a keyworker, who was himself a 
trade union organiser, gave her resources that facilitated 
more effective action. In this case Anna played a leading 
role in the creation of an organisation for the rights of 
childen in care, empowering herself and others and 
increasing her sense of political efficacy.
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It was in the period after leaving the children's home
that she had her first crucial episode. This occurred in the
early summer of 1982, with the sinking of the HMS Sheffield
during the Falklands War. Anna can vividly recall the
moment that she heard about it:
I saw a newsflash. It was afternoon, and it was 
funny, because this insurance guy had come round 
and I'd stupidly let him in, so we both sat down 
and watched it, and he was as frightened as I was 
. . . just absolute fear and panic that they'd
done it, they were killing people, that it wasn't 
going to end there, it just felt totally out of 
control. . . .
The elements of a crucial episode can be clearly 
identified. Anna's feelings of fear and horror at the 
barbarism and futility of people dying over some islands 
were exacerbated and personalised by anxiety that two of her 
friends from the children's home, who were in the Navy, 
might have gone down with the ship. She herself had 
contemplated joining the forces: thus, the feelings of
personal vulnerability to a historically threatening event 
are produced by connection and identification with known 
potential victims. At the same time, Anna is well aware of 
the implications of the event: this was possibly a war that 
was not going to stop. One can also sense a feeling of 
guilt, both at not sharing the situation and surviving it, 
and at not having done something to prevent it.
The event appears to resonate with traumatic incidents 
from her childhood. I would suggest that the feelings of 
anger, fear and guilt aroused by the sinking of the HMS 
Sheffield resonate with memories and feelings from her own
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previous struggles for survival, and are thus intensified. 
Anna uses the same language of lack of control to describe 
both the sinking of the HMS Sheffield and her childhood 
reaction to her own abuse. Moreover, through recognising in 
her friends on the HMS Sheffield the self she might have 
been, her own awareness of the current problem is 
heightened, as is her desire to act.
There is a similar sequence to the one that occurred in 
the children's home: current events, in this case war,
resonate with earlier traumas and create empathic concern. 
But, as Magda's story made clear in Chapter 7, while such 
events create an "emotional preparedness" for action, 
whether action follows immediately or not depends on the 
resources available at the time. It is clear from her 
history that Anna has already acquired some sense of 
efficacy and of reponsibility through her experiences in the 
childrens' home. What she lacks on this occasion is 
resources. Unlike Mary and Sarah, described in Chapter 7, 
she is not already part of an activist network and does not 
know how to find it, nor is there a prescribed role 
available, as there was for Rosa.
In fact, this is a difficult period of her life: she is 
isolated, and taking drugs. Yet some sense of political 
efficacy is evident. Shortly after this event she moved into 
a therapeutic community, from where she organised a coach to 
Greenham for the "Embrace the Base" action and, like Diana, 
found the occasion profoundly moving:
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It was just incredible, I've just never been in 
anything that big before. . . .  It just got to me 
. . .  I can remember feeling like I was going to 
burst into tears a number of times. It was quite 
frightening, the feeling was so intense. I think 
from that point on I couldn't get it out of my 
system at all.
Again, it is possible to identify the key elements of 
a crucial episode here: participation in a historic event - 
it was surely clear to Anna as she stood decorating the 
fence of a potential nuclear weapons facility with 30,000 
others that she was making history. She was also personally 
confronting the symbol of her worst fear - sudden death 
resulting from nuclear war - that had terrified her since 
childhood. In this case, however, the feeling of threat and 
vulnerability is combined with a feeling of empowerment, 
producing a mixture of intense emotions, including happiness 
and tears. She did not want to leave, yet at that point 
joining the encampment did not appear to be an option; she 
knew she was anti-war but felt completely ignorant.
Yet the interesting thing is that she did act, not in 
an overtly political way, yet the consequences of her 
actions were such as to change her environment so that 
political action was now possible. By enrolling at a 
college of further education she put herself in touch with 
friends and resources, particularly a lecturer who helped 
her get rid of her addiction. She must have been both 
competent and popular, as she was elected president of the 
students' union. One can assume that it was her growing 
sense of confidence and political understanding that made it
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possible for her to act on the feelings aroused a year 
earlier, and start visiting Greenham regularly. She moved 
down permanently in the late summer of 1984, after obtaining 
her O-levels.
This decision to become a full-time peace activist was 
a complex one. One reason was that Greenham offered a vital 
and challenging alternative to the potential stagnation of 
her current situation.
I just can't bear standing still, not feeling like 
I'm doing anything . . . achieving anything. . .
. I just felt like I was banging my head against 
a brick wall. All I could see was getting my O- 
levels, taking some A-levels, and being stuck in 
this council flat, like, forever.
The apparent confidence, autonomy and purposefulness of 
the Greenham women appeared admirable, as did Greenham's 
anti-authoritarian stance. Anna felt inclined to lean 
towards any kind of movement that was challenging. There 
was also the way they talked . . .  it was new to me. I had 
never sat down in a group and it had been that lively.
However, Anna is guite clear that the main attraction 
of Greenham was the issue, the chance to directly oppose 
nuclear weapons. My view is that living there meant that, 
as on her first visit, she could confront her absolute 
terror of death itself, in particular nuclear war: I'm
terrified by the thought of nuclear war. I'm terrified to a 
point, where, if I wasn't doing anything . . .  I think 
almost . . . the urgency that I felt with having to do
something was because the fear paralysed me if I didn't.
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When we talked about this in more detail it emerged that in 
fact her fear was of being
stopped before my time. . . . I'm absolutely
terrified of, like, a sudden death. I hate sudden 
things. I could bear, I could cope with being told 
I'd got six months to live. I could cope with that 
totally, but I couldn't cope with a heart attack. 
I can't cope with things that are sudden. I like 
being able to work them out and to come to terms 
with it.
Nuclear war is particularly frightening because it's 
sudden, it's immediate, there's no way of stopping it, once 
it's started, there's no way of putting it right. And I 
would suggest, this fear of nuclear death resonates with her 
acknowledged fear of sudden death at the hands of her father 
as a small child. Direct action provided the opportunity to 
confront her fear in a concrete, autonomous and personal 
way, and action, as before, led to a growing sense of 
empowerment and political efficacy:
I don't think I've experienced anything like that 
first action, just going in and feeling, just that 
total empowerment of being able to . . . to do
something, and it felt like I was actually doing 
something, I was letting people know how I felt, 
and I was just facing it head on, I was going in 
there and seeing, for myself.
Through Anna's constant direct actions and initiatives 
while she was at the camp, one could say that she "put the 
fear right" by literally burrowing into the heart of it and 
exposing its inner workings. In exposing a hidden bunker,
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for example, she challenged what she describes as the 
nuclear thinkers farcical vision of the future - the belief 
that this elite could survive in this underground bunker 
[when] we wouldn't last five minutes - by working to ensure 
her own and others' continuity.
In fact, there appear to be two parallel processes 
going on. One process is a suppression of immediate risks: 
she appears unperturbed by the real and immediate threat of 
being shot by soldiers, caught by dogs or imprisoned under 
the Official Secrets Act. Although she acknowledges, in 
both discussion and her writings, anxiety at the prospect of 
a long prison sentence, this anxiety does not have the same 
quality as her acknowledgment of the larger threat to the 
planet. In a similar manner to Diana, Anna describes how
I'm always frightened when I go in there 
[Aldermaston (AW RE)]. There is always a moment 
when I'm going through the fence that I'm 
frightened, frightened of what's inside, . . .
not frightened of what's actually going to happen 
to me while I'm in there but frightened of . . . 
like, the meaning of it all.[My emphasis.]
It is important to understand that this kind of fear is 
not a deterrent. If anything, Anna feels the fear is
greater now than in the past, as is her sense of
empowerment. Living and acting at the site of her fears
maintains their saliency, keeps her connected to the issue 
and increases both the need and the ability to act.
This process of confrontation transformed Anna.
Greenham allowed her to realise her own strength and
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creativity and gave her the confidence to make decisions for 
myself, just to say "I don't agree with you". I'd done it in 
Care but that was against "authority". To say it to anyone, 
other women, was a new thing for me. Perhaps most 
important, it opened up a world, you know, that I hadn't 
been a part of, a world in which
the future did have possibilities. . . . To go and 
find out about things . . . to do things that I 
found incredibly frightening, I mean I've often 
felt that, like, fear can totally paralyse me, if 
I let it, unless I actually tackle it head on: and 
that bit of Greenham, [. . .] actually going
inside a base and being absolutely terrified, but, 
like, carrying on and just going in. [. . .] That 
was incredibly empowering, and that's helped me in 
lots of ways.
This cycle of confrontation, and subsequent re-ordering of 
the self, is not a once-only experience, and the periods of 
confrontation may be with different aspects of the past and 
self. In the children's home Anna came to terms in some 
degree with the abuse and oppression she had experienced in 
her family, and at Greenham with the deep-seated and long­
standing fears of annihilation, sparked by her fears that 
her father might kill her and by an early awareness that the 
world as a whole was a very unsafe place. Then, during a 
prison sentence in 1988, another crucial episode occurred 
which caused her to rethink her whole Greenham experience.
The sentence of four months, for an action taken with 
a friend two years previously at Aldermaston, was the 
longest she had received. Although she had no regrets about 
the action, she acknowledges, in an article written later,
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that she felt shit scared and miserable at the thought of 
jeopardising her newly acquired college place. While in 
prison, she found herself scrubbing floors beside a woman 
she had last met at the remand assessment centre when she 
was twelve years old. The longer-term inmates trusted and 
accepted her as one of themselves, and she found herself 
drawn back into a sub-culture she thought she had forgotten. 
It made her think about a lot of things and it re-connected 
her to
a past that I felt almost, like, I'd had to deny, 
whilst I'd lived at Greenham. I had a crisis of 
identity [. . .] because I felt caught between 
two camps. J felt, like, I belonged to both. Or 
I think, to some extent, that I belonged to my 
past one more than I belonged to the Greenham one, 
and I couldn't identify with Greenham women in 
prison any more.
She found herself using old survival mechanisms, 
discovering to her horror that she was a natural baron, an 
expert at exchange and barter; that she could be ruthless 
and competitive in the 'play to win' sport in the gym; and 
that, most significant and most distressing, Greenham 
concepts of non-violence did not work. In order to stand 
her ground against the bullying of another woman she had to 
respond in kind, at least in terms of verbal aggression.
Yet, in spite of being "reconnected" to her past, this 
is not the same Anna who battled her way through a brutal 
and uncaring childhood. Her old survival mechanisms appear 
to have matured. She has gained an insight that enables her 
to handle the subtleties of staff bullying. For example, by
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deliberately choosing the hardest physical labour (digging 
- usually reserved as a punishment) she kept fit, increased 
her wages, and gained respect. Survival also now meant 
caring for herself and others. She refused the offer of 
hard drugs, although tempted to get obliterated, and 
although it meant offending the friends who offered it. Her 
concern was now how, with other women, to do something about 
the terrifying risks of Aids. In fact, the conflicts and 
stress of this sentence brought her very close to complete 
breakdown, and she describes a two-week period on leaving 
prison, when she was hallucinating and unable to handle the 
company of others, as the most frightening experience of her 
life.
However, she emerged from this - having cured herself 
by isolating hersel in her room and catching up on her 
college work - with a renewed sense of clarity and 
commitment. She explained how the Greenham rhetoric that 
women are all the same does not work: not because women in 
prison have different personalities but because the system 
is run to make you different. It is a batrbaric, uncaring, 
ignorant penal system, designed to punish, undermine, 
humiliate [. . .] and basically destroy the human beings 
within it. [. . .] I'm so angered by prison and I want to 
do something about it so badly.
In this episode the processes of confrontation, re­
ordering and renewal identified by Lifton are clearly 
observed. There is confrontation with negative aspects of 
the self, and old fears, guilt feelings, and anxieties are
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revived. Re-ordering requires a re-examination of these 
aspects, and renewal results in an increased sense of 
purpose and responsibility which provides the framework for 
subsequent action. Anna's new awareness of her own potential 
for violence in certain situations has not resulted in a 
rejection of non-violence but in a determination to abolish 
an environment that makes non-violence impossible. 
Initially she saw herself doing this through journalism. 
However, when her college advised her that she could get 
into Oxford, she determined on an academic career as the 
best basis for working for penal reform.
Anna is a survivor. Through each experience of loss, 
devaluation and stagnation, there's always been a bit of me 
that wanted to carry on. The presence of helping witnesses 
meant that, instead of self-blame and low self-esteem turned 
outwards into hatred of others, she could acknowledge the 
hurt done to her, make use of it to generate an empathic 
connection with others, and, step-by-step, acquire an 
increasing sense of efficacy and control, a belief in her 
ability to change both her own life and the lives of others. 
Lifton argues that, in some sense, we are all survivors,
not just of our own personal hurts but of the 
holocausts of the twentieth century, the very real 
ones of past and current wars, plagues and man- 
made disasters, and the imagined and anticipated 
ones from nuclear and chemical war, or ecological 
devastation.13
13 Lifton, The Future of Immortality, pp. 231— 256.
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Anna's experience shows that the way one survives one's 
personal hurts can radically affect whether one chooses to 
act on the more public traumas of the world at large. First 
of all, Anna became aware of what had happened to her, after 
which her capacity to cope and survive was increasingly 
turned outwards to embrace others. This case history 
demonstrates that the processes involved are not the result 
of the rationalisation and displacement of unconscious 
affect. Rather than repression there is, because of the 
presence of helpful witnesses, confrontation with her 
experiences, and a resultant feeling of strength. Anna's 
history also illustrates the dialectical relationship 
between self and environment: she actively seeks out and 
creates the environment she needs if she is, in turn, to 
develop both personally and politically.
Moreover, it is not an ahistorical process. The themes 
that touch Anna are not arbitrary. If the potential threat 
of annihilation through nuclear weapons underpins the way 
relationships are conducted at the political level, it is 
not surprising that violence and brutality contaminate the 
most intimate relationships. It is not coincidence that 
Anna's personal experiences sensitised her to the dangers of 
nuclear devastation and arbitrary authority, or that the 
themes of personal autonomy and control underlie all her 
concerns. Her choice of action in a sharing, non-violent, 
participatory community stands in contrast not just to her 
own personal experiences of alienation and violence, but to 
the historical and political reality which the group
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challenges; the imagined destructiveness of nuclear war, and 
the destruction of values and of liberty entailed in the 
actuality of a nuclear-armed state. These themes of the 
threat of collective violence and lack of human liberty are 
the themes of our age. And crucial episodes can be seen as 
marker stones in the course of an activist's development, 
indicating a growing awareness of the self in history and 
history in the self: an awareness that personal struggles 
and historical-political struggles are intermeshed and 
cannot be resolved separately.
The resonance between past and present struggles, 
between self and other, is facilitated by a marked capacity 
for empathy. And it is this fact that lies at the heart of 
my dispute with Lasswell. However, there is a preliminary 
point. It will have been noted that Anna's history 
contradicts the finding, mentioned in Chapter 3, that 
children who have suffered abuse are likely to be less 
empathic themselves. Yet Anna is clearly acutely empathic. 
When someone else is being hurt, it feels as if she were 
hurt herself: sometimes it's too extreme . . . like when 
women at Yellow Gate [part of the camp] would scream at a 
woman police officer . . . I'd feel so unbearable . . .  I 
just couldn't bear the pain . . .  it felt like someone was 
stabbing me. [. . .] I can feel when someone is hurt. . . .
Note that she does not identify with the woman police 
officer, but knows how it feels to have someone shout at 
you. My suggestion is that, in some situations of abuse and 
neglect - particularly with the kind of violation that Anna
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experienced, where family boundaries are totally lost - one 
develops an acute sensitivity to the feelings of others, 
simply to enable survival: the next move needs to be
anticipated in case it is a blow. Both parents' moods and 
needs must be finely judged. Moreover, Anna had to act in 
some respects as parent to her own mother: a maternal role 
that itself requires an empathic response.
Anna's empathic capacity would be in keeping with a 
study by Barnett and McCoy of young college students.14 
Those who rated their distressful childhood experiences as 
highly distressing scored higher on separate measures of 
empathy than did those who rated their experiences as 
relatively less distressing.
Thus, the traumatic experiences of childhood may 
actually have facilitated the development of a capacity for 
empathy. And it is the continued salience of this 
remembered pain that creates an empathic resonance with the 
pain of others. This is in marked contrast with Lasswell's 
activists where for example the "love for the downtrodden 
and for humanity" of Mr. A, the agitator/pacifist, is 
explained as reactive displacement of his repressed "brother 
hostility", hence the choice of "fraternal ideaologies". 
And the hatred of capitalism and militarism is viewed as the
14 M. A. Barnett and S. J. McCoy, "The Relation of 
Distressful Childhood Experiences and Empathy in College 
Undergraduates", The Journal of Genetic Psychology 150, 4 
(1989), pp. 417— 26.
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displacement of a deeply repressed father-hatred on to 
substitute symbols of authority.15
Anna has not repressed her childhood and later 
experiences. On the contrary, she has clear and vivid 
memories, is willing to talk quite openly about them, and 
part of her life's "work" is clearly tied up in making sense 
of these experiences. The empathic resonance results in an 
increased sense of connectedness with others. Thus the 
other's hurt becomes Anna's hurt and needs to be resolved in 
some way.
It is empathy that allows Anna to perceive both sides 
of an immediate conflict as victims. It is not always a 
pleasant feeling. For example, she describes how a fellow 
activist can be putting her case across [in court] and 
getting stroppy, and I can suddenly feel incredibly 
uncomfortable • . . because I can see this obnoxious
magistrate looking quite pained, and I want to kick myself. 
The feeling makes her incredibly angry, but it also 
underlies her insistence on non-violence and the need for 
dialogue. Empathy, by connecting her to how the magistrate 
or policewoman is feeling, produces the need to take care of 
those feelings as well as her own, and to try to avoid hurt.
Empathy does not protect against fear. On the 
contrary, Anna could be described as being "anxiously 
immersed in death imagery", to use Lifton's expression. Not 
only has she been frightened all her life, but she 
deliberately acts in a way that keeps her fears salient, and
15 Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 78— 104
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thus increases her need to act. This suggests that the 
relationship between issue salience and anti-nuclear 
activism is an interactive one.
What empathy does protect against is Mpychic numbing”. 
In Anna's case, she can feel and confront the possibility of 
nuclear war because the salience of her prior experiences 
allows a real connection to be made with its potential 
victims, including herself. I should emphasise, however, 
that the presence of empathy and absence of numbing are not 
enough in themselves. As explained above, action depends 
also on the availability of other resources and on a sense 
of personal efficacy. Haste argues that activism is not a 
result of overcoming various psychological blocks but ”a 
style of coping which depends on a combination of 
elements.”16 In Anna's case, where that combination of 
elements is missing and action is not possible, her empathic 
sensitivity can be seen to have damaging consequences. Her 
initial reaction when she saw other children being hurt was 
to be quite out of control and to damage herself. Even now 
that she has gained the knowledge and sense of efficacy 
necessary to act, periods of enforced inactivity can result 
in intense depression. One example of this is when, due to 
a combination of bail conditions and a car accident, she 
found herself literally immobilised in a bedsit during the 
Chernobyl accident and the bombing of Libya. She hated 
being physically strapped down in a way that I couldn't move
16 Helen Haste, "Everybody's Scared - But Life Goes On: 
Coping, Defense and Action in the Face of Nuclear Threat", 
Journal of Adolescence 12 (1989), p. 24.
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around, was infuriated, and found it incredibly frightening 
seeing it all on television, [. . .] not being able to do 
anything, and worried sick about. [. . .] the women at camp, 
who I knew would be doing things. The depressions arise 
particularly in those periods when she can feel but not act.
In fact, Anna describes herself as hyperactive and as 
totally depressed, downhearted, and useless if I'm not doing 
something positive. Since her first political action as a 
teenager (setting up the organisation for children in care), 
the periods where I didn't do anything [were] only because 
I didn't know how. And it is pertinent that her most 
frightening and recurrent dream is an image of entrapment 
and stagnation after the bomb has gone off:
[There was] a white horse and it was in a park, 
and I think the park was in Huddersfield, and 
there was these railings around this park, and it 
was raining and really misty, and this horse came 
charging through this park, and somehow, I knew in 
this dream, that the bomb had gone off, and it 
was, like, all kind of stagnant, and this white 
horse running, and it had fallen into this, like 
quagmire, and not being able to get out, and it 
was struggling to get out, and that was the most 
frightening one I've ever had.
There is not the space to explore the role of childhood 
trauma in the other activists' lives in such detail. 
However, it is worth briefly noting some parallels in Rosa's 
story. She also, at an early age, confronted a frightening, 
even terrifying situation outside her control. She "lost" 
her parents in one sense - through alcoholism - and had to 
play adult to both them and a younger sibling. She coped
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and survived. This survival was not accomplished through 
repressing this experience. The pain of it was still 
evident when she told her story to me, prefacing it with the 
remark that it was a sad one and describing the misery of 
being no longer valued. However, there were helping 
witnesses, in the form of an elder married sister and the 
catechist. And, like Anna, this capacity for "coping" and 
"survival" was increasingly turned outwards to embrace 
others. Rosa "converted" her parents, taught herself to 
read and write in a foreign language, became a catechist, a 
woman preacher, a community worker, and latterly, founder 
and vice-president of a national movement. It was a 
gradual, step-by-step process, marked by setbacks, and by 
periods of terrifying violence, and of stagnation, loss and 
devaluation. Overall, however, she gained an increasing 
sense of, firstly, personal and, then, political efficacy 
and control, and a growing belief in her ability to change 
and renew both her own life and the lives of others.
In Rosa's case, one senses a resonance between the loss
of parents and the later death of the catechist. Both these
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experiences sensitised her to the pain and suffering of the 
widows that she determined to help. She is not a widow or 
orphan, nor does she wish to become one in the same way that 
she identified with, and wanted to become like, the 
catechist. However, she had had orphan- and widow-like 
experiences, which increased her ability to know and feel 
how the orphans and widows were feeling. Her empathy is 
clearly evident, empathy that perhaps developed as a seven-
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year-old who had judge the moods and needs of parents who 
were mainly inebriated, and as "parent" herself to a younger 
sibling.
So the women, then, when I went to their cantons, 
they started talking to me about their situation, 
how they live, their great sacrifices. At the 
time, well, it just really pained me - sometimes 
I'd cry when I heard about the widows' situation. 
As well as the orphans: when they saw me - and 
since their mothers would say to them, "She's the 
one who always talks to us on the radio" - the 
children would come right up to me, and they'd 
start to tell me "We're orphans . . . "  Some had 
just lost their father, and some their mother and 
father: complete orphans. So, that's how it
happened - how I was pained: what could I do for 
the people?
Interestingly, Rosa is as perceptive as Miller in 
identifying the brutalising effects of trauma. She 
explained why she does not want revenge against the soldiers 
who have harmed them: They're also our people from the same 
pueblos. Instead of helping people they're just killing 
their own people, but it's not because they want to do it: 
they're just like us, but they've been treated like animals, 
we haven't been treated like people - so all they've got is 
a great anger."
And, as with Anna, empathy has its costs: when I met her in 
1990 she was resting because of exhaustion. She herself saw 
her symptoms - her stomach and headaches, her days when my 
body shakes, when I can't stand up and my skin is burning - 
as attacks of nerves. . . .  I can't find a way out, I can't 
find peace. She explains that it isn't easy to listen to
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the life story of an indigenous person, all that's happened 
to them, all the people who were raped. I feel that it's 
damaged me . . . but I've never said it would be better to 
stop doing the work.
In conclusion, the literature suggests that activism in part 
depends on an individual's sense of political efficacy,17 
and on the saliency of an issue. Anna's and Rosa's 
experiences suggest that political efficacy emerges from 
personal efficacy, which can develop as a person learns to 
cope and overcome the traumatic experiences of childhood. 
It is an interactive process, in which the more one acts, 
the greater one's sense of efficay and the more potential 
there is for further action on a wider stage. Both Anna and 
Rosa appear to go through the cycles of confrontation, re­
ordering and renewal outlined by Lifton. And both are 
assisted by the helping witnesses that Miller identifies as 
essential in making this a creative, rather than 
destructive, process. Action arises not simply from the 
saliency of the issue, but from a sense of personal 
connection with it that can be mediated by the saliency of 
one's own hurts and a capacity for empathy.
Most significantly, these cases show that activism, far 
from being a deviant state in which the individual tries to 
"relieve his own [unconcious] disorders by irrelevant
17 Susan T. Fiske, "People's Reactions to Nuclear War: 
Implications for Psychologists", American Psychologist 42 
(March 1987), pp. 207-217.
palliatives"18, is a healthy state which draws on the 
conscious awareness of childhood traumas. This awarenesss 
increases sensitivity to, and empathy with, the pains of a 
wider community and, when accompanied by feelings of 
efficacy and the resources necessary for action - including 
psychic and physical health - results in active commitment. 
The capacities for empathy and personal efficacy that both 
Anna and Rosa have developed, as survivors of their own 
individual hurts, have enabled them to confront the more 
massive and terrifying problems that threaten us all. Both 
have gained an awareness that enables them creatively to 
imagine and imaginatively to create the future.
18 Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, p. 194.
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CHAPTER 9
"IF NOT THIS WAY. HOW?";
PRACTISING NON-VIOLENCE
In Chapter 5 I introduced the concept of the politics of 
connection. That is, a politics that puts a primary 
emphasis on relationships: both within the movement -
between participants - and with the movement's opponents 
and the "object of action". Relationship is expressed in 
both concrete and symbolic forms, and the transformation of 
relationships constitutes part of the group's goals. I 
explained that the emphasis on sustaining relationships 
meant that non-violence had to be the chosen method of 
action, because other forms of action would be destructive. 
The choice of non-violence is both a collective and an 
individual decision. The literature in Chapter 3, Part 2 
suggested that there is a relationship between an 
individual's chosen method of action, moral orientation and 
sense of self, in particular that a care-focussed, and 
extensive or connected self was more likely to be associated 
with the choice of non-violence. Thus it seems likely that 
those engaged in the politics of connection will fit this 
description.
My data, in fact, suggests that the choice of non­
violence is not as simple as this. The apparent homogeneity 
that exists when one examines action at the level of the 
group masks the varied basis of the choice at the individual 
level. In this chapter I shall attempt to show three 
things: firstly, that, for my respondents, the relationship
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between the choice of a non-violent method, moral 
orientation, and sense of self is a more subtle and complex 
one than described above. Culture, gender, personal 
temperament, and personal and public events all interact to 
determine the method chosen. In particular the influence of 
culture appears to be more significant than gender, although 
gender contributes to the way culture is conceptualised. 
Secondly, the choice is not fixed. The relationship between 
the collective and the individual is interactive. The 
actual process of engagement in non-violent action can 
affect the individual's thinking about non-violence and 
appears to create a greater awareness of the importance of 
connection. Thirdly, I am interested in the degree to which 
a particular moral perspective may be related to particular 
patterns of thinking about the limits of non-violence.
I shall demonstrate these points by looking in detail 
at some of the individual biographies. But I should stress 
at the outset that, while it is possible to group some of 
the narratives together in order to identify particular 
patterns of thinking, I am not attempting to make any 
generalisations on the basis of this tiny sample. My 
interest is in drawing out the complexity of the processes, 
and the way they develop, in order to show their 
significance for my respondents. These individual 
narratives do, however, provide a challenge to simple 
generalisations about why individuals choose non-violence, 
and demonstrate the fluidity and limits of that choice.
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For both Piotr and Margaret the choice of non-violence 
arises out of Christian religious conviction and both stress 
the centrality of love in their morality. Yet this apparent 
similarity, when explored in depth, masks quite different 
interpretations of the Christian message and quite distinct 
value orientations.
Margaret is a Quaker by upbringing and personal choice. 
The values which she feels are central to her life are 
summed up for her in what she describes as the Christian 
concept of love: honesty, truthfulness, integrity,
compassion, love (including for oneself). She perceives the 
common thread in all her actions as trying to prevent harm 
to persons primarily but also [to the] environment. "Harm" 
is anything that damages them either spiritually, or 
mentally, or physically. But non-violence is not just about 
not harming people, not physically hurting them. It's much 
more about working in a totally different way, of using 
persuasion, of using encouragement.
Margaret's choice of non-violence is related to the way 
she perceives the truth:
I see the truth (and I think this comes from 
Voltaire) as round, and, by definition, you can't 
see all of it, but you can recognize that it's 
like a ball and that therefore there are parts 
that you don't see. One person will see one side 
of a problem, and another person will see another 
side of the problem. The truth is that both 
problems exist, but, although, you can recognize 
the other person's, forever seeing everybody's 
point of view is not actually particularly 
helpful. [. . .] You are placed in a particular 
relationship to the truth that is, that you can 
see your particular part of it, and your part in 
the play is to say what you see.
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Margaret is saying that she has a responsibility to present 
the truth as she sees it while recognising that others may 
have a different perception. Non-violence is the only 
strategy that allows for action and listening 
simultaneously.
Thus, for Margaret, non-violent action is an expression 
of a care-focussed morality. It is the only method that 
allows her to act without causing harm; to both present her 
own views and listen reponsively to another's, while 
requiring an empathic connection with them: because
otherwise how else will you know what's going to harm them, 
unless you put yourself in their shoes?
Piotr, in contrast, chooses non-violence as an 
expression of a justice-focussed morality. For Piotr a 
moral person is someone who lives according to his 
principles: To say that this is right and that is wrong and 
then do something else means that I am immoral. These 
principles are drawn from the Ten Commandments, which Piotr 
perceives as an expression of natural law; and from Jesus' 
injunction that we should love one another as ourselves. 
Piotr sees this as the central commandment, from which all 
else follows, including the ideal of non-violence.
Being a Christian to me, the main and the 
basic commandment is the commandment of love . .
. to love everybody, and the other, like, ten 
commandments including not to kill, are more 
technical, but I think that it is impossible to 
find such a situation in which it could be 
possible to kill anybody and in the same time love 
him.
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What is clear from all my interviews with Piotr is that, 
while he has very close and loving relationships with his 
own family, and is clearly kind and courteous to his 
patients and friends, feelings of connection and empathy in 
general do not come easily to him. He describes himself as 
a moral man. I mean, ethics is very important to me and duty 
as the motor of my activity. He also describes himself as 
failing to live up to his ideals: not empathic enough, in 
some ways intolerant and judgemental; sometimes violent, 
hot-tempered, impetuous, vehement, and stubborn. He
defines love as a principle rather than as one of the 
emotions. Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, I try not to act 
by feeling, I try to control my feelings by intellect.
It is his commitment to the abstract principles of love 
and non-violence which provide constructs that allow him to 
act against the grain of his personality. The way in which 
action is motivated by abstract reasoning, rather than 
compassionate identification, is made clear from the 
following excerpt. I asked Piotr if there was a common 
thread to his actions. He responded that the thread was the 
feeling of duty, that his task each day was to judge what 
would be the right action in his current situation
P: The demand, to do something today might may be
completely different than from yesterday. Because 
the situation in which I am now is completely 
different. Today somebody has fallen into a river 
and I have to save him. And yesterday there was 
an old woman wanting to cross the street, and then 
I should help her.
L: But I can see a common theme immediately
between those two things: [both] are to do with 
helping another person.
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P: I would rather say that in those things the
common thing was not that I should help another 
person - perhaps in these examples, yes - but 
that in both these situations I have to think 
about what I should do because of my morality.
Piotr is making clear that it is not response to need that 
motivates him, but a judgement of what is the right action 
based on his principles. Responsibility, for Piotr, arises 
partly from "noblesse oblige": that is - as explained in 
Chapter 7 - his sense that he is relatively privileged 
compared to others and that privilege entails duty. Perhaps 
the most important thing is duty, and then when I feel that 
something is my duty I have to do it. If I don't do it, it 
is something terrible. Responsibility also arises from his 
sense of greater competence than others: I think that very 
often I feel that I have to do something because [. . .] I 
know if I do it it will be well done and if I leave it to 
the others I can't rely on it. One of the things that 
disturbed him about communism was that no one would take 
responsibility: If everybody, or all together, are
responsible, then nobody is in fact responsible. And I don't 
like it! (Piotr's emphasis.)
Piotr has a separate sense of self, and, thus, 
responsibility arises out of his sense of separateness and 
difference from others, and out of the importance of 
personal autonomy rather than of connection to them. One 
has the responsibility to live up to one's principles and 
use one's skills to the best of one's ability. He 
illustrates his perspective graphically by referring to
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Jesus' parable about the man who gave each of his servants 
a sum of money to look after while he was away. The two 
servants with the largest amounts invested it and gave the 
master more on his return. The third servant had hidden his 
small sura away in order to keep it safe. The master, 
angered, took that small sum and gave it to the others. I 
have always found this a difficult story, seeming as it does 
to punish the least privileged and needy. But Piotr was 
clear about the meaning, namely, that one has a 
responsibility to make good use of whatever talents one is 
given, or one will be punished by losing what one has: you 
have some role you know. And you have an obligation to do 
this role [. . .] or vocation . . . you must find it,
sometimes it's not so clear. [. . •] I feel that everybody 
on earth has his own vocation.
For Margaret, in contrast, in keeping with her care- 
focussed morality, responsibility means response to need: I 
work by response, and I respond to stimulus which, 
incidentally, is one of the five things that [. . .] defines 
a living organism. And this continues to reassure me that 
I am living [. . .7. It means the capacity to act on the 
issues put in front of her. Thus Greenham Common and the 
cruise convoys were manifestations of the nuclear threat 
outside her front door. She also feels a particular 
responsibility to respond to what is in front of her because 
of her own background as a German Jew and her awareness of 
the failure of response at that particular historic period.
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Part of the community watched while another 
part of the community was being annihilated. And 
this is, sort of, part of my background - that 
part of my family were amongst the ones that stood 
by and did nothing. And it's very much one of the 
things, obviously, that encourages me to not shut 
my eyes: when something happens on my door step,
I know I shouldn't.
This focussed responsiveness is rooted in her religious 
faith, which itself is an expression of connection: This is 
my relationship with God. That which is in fro fit of my 
nose. [. . .] The next step is generally fairly clear to 
you, or, if it isn't, then you have to wait until it is. It 
also protects her from being overwhelmed by demands.
I get my sense of direction from a combination of 
what my conscience is telling me and the 
opportunity that is actually in front of me from 
where I am. There's just too many things, and this 
is plain common sense.
And, unlike Piotr, she sees her feelings as 
increasingly important in helping her judge how to act: I 
don't see any need to put anything aside. Why restrict any 
source [of light]?
Moreover, Margaret sees this responsiveness as a value 
in itself, one that is missing from public life, which she 
perceives as dominated by warped values, because it excludes 
what women have learnt in the home
Jesus was trying to actually say something quite 
similar. OK, he was a man [but] I thought he had 
a damn good try at identifying that something is 
missing from society, and he actually said it in 
so many words, and the words were "I have come not
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to break the law, or overturn the law, but to 
complete it.
Like Piotr, she illustrates her point further by 
drawing on the parables, in her case that of the Good 
Shepherd.
You know it's not the most cost-effective thing, 
wandering off after one lost sheep, but it's the 
sort of thing every mum does every day. Another 
one is the parable of the guys that were sent out 
to work, and some of them worked for eight hours, 
and some of them worked for two hours, and some of 
them only worked for one hour, and they all got 
paid the same at the end of the day. [. . .] In 
fact, if you were to substitute roast potatoes or 
bread for money you'll find that it is what every 
mother does every day to her family: regardless of 
what they have earned and deserved during the 
course of the day, they get their tea put in front 
of them.
By showing how Christian teaching emphasises the values 
drawn on by maternal practise - compassion and attention to 
need, just as much as justice, reciprocity and fairness - 
Margaret underlines her own care-focussed morality. Not 
surprisingly, she sees the problem posed by the Heinz 
dilemma as the druggist undervaluing need . . . need is an 
undervalued factor in human relationships and, although she 
does not suggest stealing herself, does consider it an 
option, provided she had the skill: thus, context is also 
important. She also emphasises the need for personal 
connection to motivate action.
M: I wouldn't go robbing a chemist to save the 
life of someone I didn't know.
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L: Why not?
M: Because I wouldn't be sufficiently involved to
take that sort of action. My actions are very 
strongly based on what's in front of my nose, you 
know, what is actually placed in the line of my 
life. And something that is not placed in the 
line of my life I don't regard as my personal 
business in the same way as something that is.
Stealing is wrong because it is uncaring:
We can't live in a world where people freely steal 
from each other, this is not integrity, and it is 
not caring and kind to steal from other people. 
So, basically, it's something you don't do unless 
you really, really have to.
Thus Heinz cannot be aquitted, but it was a reasonable 
theft, so he should not be punished. Piotr, in contrast, 
draws attention to rights and obligations. While bothered 
by the druggist's profiteering, he feels stealing is 
absolutely wrong because ownership is a natural right. 
Ownership also carries the duty to share with those who do 
not own. Thus Heinz should be found guilty, although not 
punished.
What Piotr and Margaret do have in common is that it 
was engagement in non-violent collective action that turned 
a rather passive belief in non-violence that had not been 
thought out into a more active and articulated understanding 
of the issues involved. Engagement also had a
transformative effect on themselves.
Piotr felt his perspective was broadened, he became 
more tolerant and found he could relate to people better. 
For Margaret, taking action moved her from the private 
sphere of home to the public one of the street (literally),
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and the effect was more dramatic. She states: I took
Quakers for granted, did not think about violence and non­
violence until Greenham. Greenham, particularly
Cruisewatch, gave her the opportunity to put her ideas into 
practice. It gave her courage, allowed her to rediscover 
her intelligence and ability to think for myself, . . .
[and to] act quickly and decisively when I needed to, and 
organise.
Through contact with the women at the camp she came to 
redefine concepts like altruism:
There's the self-centered and there's the 
other-centered,and I've learnt from Greenham to be 
both. But before that, when I was working on 
Quaker Christianity, you are taught to believe 
that the right thing is to be altruistic and to 
put yourself very much second. I now figure it is 
OK to behave selfishly, and that it is part of 
altruism, the two things go together, and you 
can't have genuine altruism without some sort of 
gratification in it for yourself.
She also came to reconsider what constitutes violence:
I do feel uncomfortable at any aggression at all. 
It has a lot to do with my upbringing and what 
have you, I dare say, but it does make me feel 
uncomfortable, and I do have to make an effort to 
say to myself, "this is reasonable aggression; 
this is reasonable anger; there is cause here." 
And also, I have learnt from Greenham that to do 
this appeasing thing, mediating thing, can 
actually be siding with the [aggressor.]
All of this was bound up with her
growing sense of identity as woman, meaning having 
something to offer. Before, the woman was the 
wife and the mother. [. . .] It's sort of blown me 
apart in some ways, like I've had to start
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questioning my religion and Christianity and all 
my . . . the ways I've run my life and the way 
I've thought of myself, and all the rest of it.
Yet, at the same time, it's brought a lot of 
things together as well. Things have started 
making sense to me that didn't before. Anything 
that increases your perception of truth, or 
ability to be honest, affects your integrity, 
affects your wholeness.
Margaret has not lost her sense of the importance of 
care, or her definition of herself as connected. Defining 
herself in terms of relationships is still a primary part of 
her sense of self, but she has learned to value and take 
care of herself, to value her autonomy and have the 
confidence to explore and extend her own unique ways of 
thinking. She no longer perceives herself as a doormat, but 
exemplifies the mature moral judgement which Gilligan 
identifies as "the emergence of an increasingly complex 
understanding of the relationship between self and other" 
and "a reflective understanding of care as the most adequate 
guide to the resolution of conflicts in human 
relationships.1,1
The contrasting cases of Diana and Darek also show that 
the choice of non-violence can be an expression of both a 
justice-focussed morality and a care-focussed one. They 
also show the interactive nature of the choice, and the way 
that actual practice affects thinking. For both
respondents, in spite of different perspectives, engagement 
leads to increasing emphasis on connection and relationship.
1 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1982), p.105.
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I described Diana as having a mixed moral perspective 
in childhood, and for her, like Bardige's face value 
thinkers, non-violence was initially a gut reaction. It 
was her engagement with Greenham that helped her to 
articulate and develop non-violence as a personal and 
political philosophy of care and connection. Her whole 
concept of morality . . . developed and changed through
engagement with Greenham:
I think part of my activism was intolerance. . .
. I mean part of my motivation was that I couldn't 
stand other people doing these things and I had to 
stop them, and I think intolerance comes into that 
a lot, and now it's much more I think that people 
have the capacity to change and have the capacity 
to be better people.
She now perceives non-violence itself, along with 
feminism, as the central values around which she defines 
herself and organises her life. In fact my feminism 
encompasses my non-violence, non-violence being a method of 
action that entails caring and compassion, and feminism 
meaning a connected sense of self: being a woman who
recognises the values of other women [. . •] a celebration 
of women's reality.
Underlying these beliefs is a morality that entails, 
primarily, awareness and responsiveness to others. For 
Diana, a moral person is a person who is . . . aware that 
there are questions, that we . . . are . . . about the way 
that we live our lives. Morality is
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about recognising what's going on around you and 
reacting accordingly [. . •] having to be very
true to your own beliefs, whatever they may be, 
but with half an ear open or an ear open to what 
others around are feeling and thinking, and being 
able to, sort of, go forward with them too but not 
getting too stuck in it, but not getting swept 
along by the tide.
What Diana appears to be articulating here is the need 
to find a way to be true to oneself while respecting others' 
truths. This is not moral relativism. (She feels, for 
example, that it's absolutely wrong to kill, but 
acknowledges her own inconsistencies in wearing leather and 
the possibility that is necessary to kill animals, for 
survival, in certain cultures.) She takes a position 
similar to Margaret's, stating that
my non-violence stems from a sense that people 
have a right to be listened to, as well as being 
made to listen to me [. . . ] and that, to ever 
change anything, you can't just look at it from 
one side. You've actually got to have a sense of 
other peoples' realities.
Non-violence is the only method that allows this. This is 
why Gandhi defines non-violent struggle as satyagraha, 
literally, truth struggle. His position is that no one has 
the monopoly on truth, thus ones' own must be tested out 
through a method of struggle that allows the other to 
present their truths as well.2
Diana's responsive, care-focussed morality is best 
exemplified by the way she defines the problem with nuclear
2 Ronald Duncan, The Writings of Gandhi (London: Faber, 
1951? Fontana 1971), pp. 65— 99.
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weapons, and the way she puts her non-violence into 
practice. The horror of nuclear weapons is not simply the 
deaths they have caused and will cause, but our 
brutalisation and failure of awareness:
The fact that we can do this [. . .] it's become 
so normal and so unshocking [. . .] we've actually 
come to this stage of being so brutalised that we 
have lost any concept of . . .  I think that's the 
awfulness of it really. [. . .] Death is a huge 
part of it. But it's how we live our lives which 
is even, perhaps, a larger part of it [. . .] it 
can be anything, from driving too fast and so not 
caring about people on the roads, or stealing from 
a radical bookshop that's got no money, or just in 
everyday relationships and friendships.
The practise of non-violence, in contrast, has to be 
imbedded in the maintenance of those everyday relationships 
if it is to have meaning. For example,
there's been times when women have desperately 
needed looking after and I wanted to do something 
in the base, or there's been some action on the 
convoy or something . . . but when it comes to it 
they've got to take priority. Because we're a 
community that relies on women . . . treating
women in a . .  . respecting life really, . . .
that would have been incredibly bad to say "I 
don't care about you, I reckon the base is more 
important", really, that's a mistake. That may be 
frustrating sometimes. I think that's another .
. that's what I also call womens' ways of 
working, counting the cost, if you like, of our 
actions.
Diana clearly has a care-focussed morality. Her 
narrative makes clear that it was the process of engagement, 
through living with women of all ages and from a wide 
variety of backgrounds, and dealing with the base personnel, 
that particularly fostered openness and tolerance.
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Greenham encouraged critical faculties [. . .] but 
in a very creative way, I think. When I got to 
about fifteen it was getting a bit too much, like 
I was having to make a stand against people, and 
having to hold my corner: now I think I'm much 
more . . . relaxed. I'm not frightened of saying 
"I don't know" any more, either. [. . .] I was 
stuck in a bit of that traditional politics of, 
we've got our way and we're going to stick to it 
because this is the way to do it. I think I have 
realised that the world is not as easy as that, 
and that I don't know everything, and I'm going to 
make mistakes, and that is how it's going to be, 
because it's a very constant process. [. . .]
Winning is not so important to me anymore, really.
L: What became important then?
D: To actually have the debate. Winning is
important, but I think if you have a debate, and 
your only aim is to win that debate at the time, 
then if you're very blind to what the other person 
is saying to you you will then make them very 
blind to what you're saying to them. It's a 
short-term solution that offers no long term hope.
One can detect some parallels here with the transition 
from "face value thinking" to "multiple lens thinking” that 
Bardige observed in adolescent girls' responses to the 
holocaust. The difference is that, while Diana's outrage at 
and intolerance of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons 
pushed her into non-violent direct action at fifteen, 
development of an awareness of complexity, and compassion 
for her opponents, has arisen through the actual practice 
and development of that action in a collective context over 
three years. Greenham fostered Diana's capacity to act in 
a way that fostered relationships. Multiple lens thinking 
developed in this way cannot be used to rationalise 
inaction.
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Interviewing Diana over the two-year period after she 
left the camp, it was possible to see her adapting to the 
changing political context, and struggling to find the most 
appropriate way to act and remain true to her self. In 
1990, interviewed while spending time on Salisbury Plain 
alone following the convoy, she stressed the way this form 
of responsive action allowed her to stay in touch with 
reality and be true to herself: hence, she felt ambivalent 
about going to college.
D: [. . .] I actually think that I'm locked into 
this really and I'd be fed up and miserable 
without it.
L: Without confrontation or . . .  ?
D: No without that contact, I prefer to use the
word "contact" rather than "confrontation".
L: With what?
D With . . .  with . . .  with all these things 
that I'm opposed to, really.
L: And you can't see them ever being got rid of?
D: No, not in my lifetime, certainly not. And
also, I think that it's not just about looking at 
those things out there that we've achieved, and 
changed things or not changed things, and failed 
and succeeded or . . . it's also about myself. . 
. it's almost like I need them as much as . . .  to 
find . . .  to be able to . .  . find myself, not 
find myself, I hate that phrase,but to know my own 
mind and to be true to myself. I have to keep 
them in my mind's eye.(Diana/s underlining, 1991) 
L: How does that help you?
D: I think it's . . .it sort of helps with the
sense of purpose and the sense of knowing what it 
is you're talking about.
L: So what do you find that you know about
yourself by being in contact with this? I mean, 
it's like you're almost saying, "I can only define 
myself by these sort of negative things".
D: Well no, it's not a question of only defining
myself, but I feel that I'm on a sounder basis for 
defining myself by the fact that I am in contact 
with these things. That if I shut myself away 
with loads of books and read the life works of 
great writers and things, that I wouldn't have 
that sense of reality that I have from this 
involvement and this contact.
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Diana appears to be saying that she needs a tangible 
physical relationship with the issues that bother her in 
order to be truly herself: she creates this sense of self by 
activism. Eighteen months later the convoys had been 
discontinued and most of the warheads removed. When I 
interviewed her she was living in a flat in North London, 
taking A-levels for university entrance, and was not 
particularly politically engaged: she had difficulty in
defining herself clearly:
L: How do you, how do you describe yourself to
yourself?
D: Dissatisfied. . . . I think I am a person on
a journey but I am not sure where I am going. . .
. I don't know how much time I allow myself to get 
to know myself . . . really. . . .
She had, the previous year at college, become 
increasingly aware of the conflict created by her need to 
respond directly to a problem - in that case the Gulf War - 
and her desire to study and increase her understanding of 
those problems in order to respond more effectively in the 
long term. Not actively responding could be very damaging. 
Because I feel that I'm not really being true to myself, not 
actually living my life in the way that I would feel happy 
with. . . I think that's why I was ill the first term,
partly. She would find herself asking:
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Why am I going to do this course when there's so 
much to be done? Why am I paying attention to 
myself when the world needs the attention?
L: And what was the answer to the question?
D: I can only do what I'm capable of doing, And
if actually the attention to myself enables me to 
do more about the world in which I live, then 
actually , . . that's perfectly valid,
Moreover, she found that the relationships she had with 
other women at the college, some with different perspectives 
on the Gulf War, both grounded her and provided support. 
Like Margaret, she has come to see that care of others 
requires care of the self. Moreover, her beliefs and non­
violence are still central to her self-concept. I'm not 
sure what would be left if you took them away,
Darek, in contrast to Diana, has never considered 
himself a pacifist and was, as a teenager, drawn to the 
romantic ideal of insurrection: the tradition, the history, 
those red-white emblems, symbols and so on, it was my world, 
. It was that automatically, that when Poland is 
independent, this society and me personally, we will be 
happy. After the failure of Solidarity in 1981 and his own 
imprisonment and internment, his anger and hatred of 
communism was so great that he seriously considered 
engagement in some form of insurrectionist movement. 
Because of this big hate I thought that only the fighting 
for independence, but without such non-violence programmes 
like the programme of Solidarity, could be successful, I 
wanted very much to be successful. He then decided this was 
not the way, not for moral reasons, but quite simply because
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Poland lacked the means for a successful insurrection. He 
was still quite clear that demonstrators should respond to 
police violence by fighting back, for example, and 
increasingly concerned by the growing apathy of Polish 
society.
Thus Darek's decision to help initiate a non-violent 
anti-militarist campaign was pragmatic and tactical. He 
remembers asking himself why he was in WiP if I have the big 
commitment with the tradition of Polish insurrection. And 
if he believed that the modern state needed military force, 
why do I make an activity against military force? The 
answer was threefold. Firstly, he was aware that the 
government was using the peace issue itself. Slogans in 
public places, for example, had shifted from exhortations to 
uphold socialism, painted in red, to ones to work for peace, 
painted in blue. Western peace initiatives were heavily 
covered in the media. Darek felt that the West 
misunderstood the role of peace in international relations, 
promoting peace as the only value, at any cost. Because it 
is not a peace, it is a silence, yes? There is a difference 
between silence and peace. However, an anti-militarist 
movement offered the opportunity to protest against 
militarism in the service of the communist power and to 
offer a contradiction for the [government's] peace 
propaganda, that is, to call the government's bluff.
Secondly, it allowed for the creation of an 
organisation which would be more active, and could 
counteract Solidarity's passivity. Thirdly, he knew that it
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was an issue that was likely to draw attention and interest 
from the West.
What is interesting is that the period of engagement in 
WiP from 1985 to 1989 does appear to have altered Darek's 
perception of the peace issue and shifted the way he defined 
his core values. He explains, for example, how initially he 
found the idea of personal peace treaties between activists 
in different countries stupid, not important politically. 
But when . . .  I started thinking about this it started to 
be also for me the basement from which we should start. I 
was interviewing him in autumn 1989, at the time of attacks 
on Polish people in East Germany, and he continued:
I have felt that it is the effect of many years of 
having done nothing on this personal basis. It 
was one of the moments which forced me to feel 
that individual contacts are the best solution for 
making a friendship between nations. And 
whereas I would say before that nation is 
something very important and good, now I don't 
want to say that it is something bad, but it can 
be very bad, yes, thinking in the categories of 
nation, but I'm sure that, generally . 
thinking in the categories of individual contacts, 
individual friendship cannot be bad.
Participation in a workshop on demilitarisation at the 
international seminar in 19873 allowed an opening of my 
heart and my mind on other problems, in other countries, and 
he found himself arguing with fellow Poles that Polish
problems are fundamental but we shouldn't forget 
about other nations and other problems in the
3 See pp. 230— 231.
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other parts of the world, even from tactical 
reason that when we are provincial and when we 
think only about Polish problems we can be alone.
Thus, while in 1983 Darek saw independence and freedom 
as the core values around which he organised his life, by 
1989 he felt that it was necessary to connect freedom and 
responsibility, and that the main value is a person now, 
individual life, [• . .] human dignity and listening to 
people, because it is connected with the listening to 
people. His main interest in the new post-communist Poland 
of 1989 was in editing a political and cultural weekly that 
encouraged dialogue. I would like to have a responsible 
reader who has his own ideas but to be honest to him, to 
show him other ideas that he can choose. Unlike many of his 
friends he had decided to stay out of the political game. 
He wished
to speak in my own voice [. . .] political work 
means to choose between friends and enemies. I 
don't want to be political in this sense. I would 
like to, to make the analysis, for instance, of 
events, of statements, on political gestures and 
so on, without dividing this world into friends 
and enemies.
It is possible to see a convergence in the experiences 
of Diana and Darek in that their participation in collective 
non-violent action has increased their sense of the 
importance of dialogue and relationship as a means of 
political transformation. Both also show a protean 
flexibility in their ability to alter their careers in 
response to the changing political realities. But this
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convergence should not mask basic differences in moral 
focus.
Darek's primary concern is still with the autonomy and 
dignity of the individual. He sees his values as arising 
out of his Christian upbringing and as expressed in the Ten 
Commandments. But the Ten Commandments are now more 
significant as a sound expression of natural law rather than 
theological teaching. His decision to stay out of politics 
in 1989 in order to analyse what was happening and retain 
clarity, and his decision to stand for parliament in the 
1991 elections, because of his feeling that many politicians 
were more concerned with the fight for power than in acting 
responsibly to develop the state as a democratic society, 
reflect his concern with the abstract principles of justice 
rather than a direct response to need: as did his earlier
decision to give up being a doctor for the individual in 
order to be a doctor for society. One of the principle 
reasons for standing as a Democratic Union candidate in 1991 
was that party's emphasis on the rule of law, and its 
concern to somehow achieve a just and equitable transition 
to the free market. Asked by retired people what he would 
do for them if elected he replied
I know what I cannot offer. I cannot offer, for 
example, the organisation of people's lives, 
(because President Walesa was saying I will help 
you and people were thinking that he will solve 
all their problems.) No, I will not do it, I will 
not do it. I can help them in making a good law, 
this means a law that I feel is good; and that I 
will be in contact with them to understand what 
they feel about it and we will have a dialogue.
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He perceives responsibility not in terms of 
responsiveness to others but as being consequent in what you 
say what you do. It entails respect for one's own work and 
behaviour, thus acting to the best of one's ability and 
showing similar respect for the work of others.
However, he is adamant that I don't feel responsible 
for the society, and that his activism did not arise out of 
concern for others needs, but out of an awareness of his own 
oppression and lack of freedom. It is reciprocity, the 
realisation that his own needs are best met by aiming to 
achieve them for all, that motivates him:
I would like to live in a normal society or 
healthy society, and only because of that I am 
interested in this public work. But in the same 
moment I look at my needs and I feel that my needs 
are similar to other peoples'. [. . .] I do it 
because, because of my heart, my heart . . . 
dictates me to do it [. . .] it goes directly from 
my need to be more free. From my need . . .to be 
more independent. From my need to read better 
literature, to speak with free persons, and so on 
[. . .] and the good situation is when my needs 
are similar to the needs of other persons. It is 
a kind of a hedonism for me.
Interestingly, the birth of his son, and the necessity 
of looking after him as a single father, introduced Darek 
for the first time to the concept of responsibility as a 
direct response to another's quite different needs. It was 
the first time that I understood that there is something 
like a duty which is not directly connected, directly 
connected with my own needs, and that it could be a 
pleasure. In Darek's case it appears that taking on 
maternal activites does affect his moral focus, but his
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decision in 1990 to go into television journalism and then 
into mainstream politics meant handing a large part of that 
responsibility to his parents, and left his fundamental 
outlook unchanged.
Diana's and Darek's quite different moral perspectives 
are underlined by their responses to the Heinz dilemma. For 
Darek, the dilemma arises from the conflict between the 
right of the pharmacist to sell the product of his work at 
the price he thinks appropriate, and the right of Heinz to 
help his wife. The solution is for Heinz to find people 
like me who will help him. Stealing is absolutely wrong
because it is the moral law. Thus if he does steal he 
should be found guilty and sentenced: perhaps he should not 
be punished but he should understand that he is guilty.
In contrast, Diana is quite clear that the druggist has 
got his priorities wrong, and asks, can Heinz break in and 
steal it? The duty for changing the situation lies with the 
pharmacist because he's in a position of power, and if Heinz 
does steal the judge should haul up the bloody . . • chemist 
He should let him go free.
While Darek is concerned with abstract principles of 
right and wrong, Diana sets the situation firmly in context. 
Thus, asked if Heinz should steal for a stranger she points 
out that
would and should are two different things. There 
are probably thousands of strangers out there who 
would benefit from me stealing something for them.
I mean, I walk past people on the Tube on Waterloo 
Bridge . . . and sometimes I empty my purse, and 
sometimes I say sorry.
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Stealing is a problem because of its affects on the 
individual. Often people who don't have steal from other 
people who don't have. And she herself knows how painful 
and distressing it can be to be the victim of theft. But at 
the same time I think that often we misidentify the wrong, 
people identify burglary or joyriding or whatever as moral 
wrongs . . . but neglect to look at the society that leaves 
such a percentage of the population on the poverty line.
I have discussed Darek and Diana in detail to show how 
non-violence can be the result of both tactical and a 
philosophical choices that reflect quite distinct moral 
perspectives. And, while the use of this method increases 
the importance of connection and relationship to others, for 
both of them, understanding these different perspectives 
helps to explain the contrasting ways in which commitment 
develops in the long run. Darek's sense of responsibility 
results in engagement in mainstream politics. Diana's 
continuing commitment to principled non-violence and her 
responsiveness to the violence around her pose a constant 
dilemma in terms of career choice.
The other two respondents from Greenham, Mary and Anna, 
also have care-focussed and connected selves, which, like 
Diana's, appear to have developed out of the more mixed 
perspectives of earlier years. During the course of her 
engagement, Mary shifts her energy from the damage done by 
nuclear weapons to what she sees as the underlying issue of 
male violence to women, as expressed in the issues of rape, 
pornography and abortion, but her main concern is still
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protection from harm. Anna's narrative was explored in 
Chapter 8, but it is worth examining further here as it is 
a good example of the way the concept of "oneself" as a non­
violent person with non-violent values develops 
interactively through engagement.
Although, as a child, Anna's main concerns were - 
understandably - surviving and escaping her oppressive 
environment, when I interviewed her in 1990 at Greenham 
she emphasised connection, and her moral orientation could 
be described as care focussed. For example, she evaluated 
the major split that occurred at Greenham in 1987 not in 
terms of who was right or wrong, but in terms of the damage 
it did to relationships and the pain caused. In her view 
the main problem was that women I felt incredibly close to, 
although I might not agree with them all the time, [. . .] 
we'd been torn apart. Her ideal world was one where 
everybody cares about everybody and wouldn't do things that 
would hurt other people [. . . ] where if someone does
something that's hurtful or damaging to someone else, then 
everybody sits down with them, and, like, takes them through 
it, rather than punishes. Although not at all religious, 
she was attracted by James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis of the 
Earth as an organism in which everything is interconnected.4 
Thus, all aspects of life required care to maintain the 
whole. And Anna's capacity for empathy has clearly created 
a "connected self" which underlies her strong feelings of
4 J. E. Lovelock, The Practical Science of Planetary 
Medicine (London: Gaia Books, 1991).
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personal responsibility. Anna explains that she would feel 
that I'd be condoning it if I didn't act. I don't feel 
like I can remain silent on anything that I feel strongly 
about because I feel like I'm part of the problem if, if I 
don't do something to change it.
Yet there was little non-violent about her environment 
or her behaviour as a small child, and a large body of 
literature argues that this is enough to predict the 
development of an equally violent adult self. But this was 
not the case. She found a way to escape that environment and 
although, during her initial period in care, her anger was 
expressed self-punitively in acts of violence, she was also 
able to establish and maintain warm relationships with 
people able to recognise her needs and talents. This gave 
her the basis to begin to act constructively and non- 
violently to increase her own and other's autonomy. Far 
from brutalising her, her childhood experiences gave her a 
sensitivity to the pain of others that made her feel bad if 
she hurt them. She intuitively rejected the military and, 
without being able to explain why, found herself moved and 
attracted by the first non-violent demonstration she 
attended. She knew that she was emotionally opposed to and 
terrified by the thought of nuclear weapons, and her growing 
self-confidence as president of a student union allowed her 
to move to Greenham before she had any articulate 
theoretical position on the value of non-violence. She did 
not go to Greenham because she was a non-violent peace 
activist, but because she thought that she would like to
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become one. I believe there is an important theoretical 
distinction to be made between acting on established values 
and acting in order to develop them. Once at Greenham, Anna 
did not simply adopt the behaviour and values of other 
women, but developed and adapted them, thus, as in the past, 
creating an environment in which she could function.
From the beginning of Anna's time at the camp she was
committed to non-violence, both as a tactic and as
philosophy, because a violent response was just absolutely 
fruitless, and not only that . . . the thing that you were 
fighting against . . . it's a total contradiction if you're 
going to use violence to stop violence. This approach is in 
marked contrast to Anna's way of coping with conflict as a 
child, and she states that she didn't find non-violence 
easy. However, she does not regard her current views as a 
great change in attitude, in that instinctively she had 
always been against violence. It was, rather, that living at 
the camp provided the opportunity, through endless 
discussion and the models provided by other women, to think 
through the implications of non-violence for herself in 
terms of personal action. Frequently arrested and 
imprisoned, she became skilled at defending herself in
court, and succeeded in making positive relationships with 
individual magistrates and police. The dialogue was an
important aspect of non-violent behaviour for her: The more 
we talked about the issues with them, the more dialogue, the 
more their consciousness was raised. [. . .] I felt if we 
were gonna change anything we had to change the people.
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Her ability to change people was demonstrated to her 
quite dramatically on one occasion in court, when a police 
officer supported her account of another officer's 
harrassment and intimidation in the face of that officer 
insisting it had not occurred. She was so moved by the 
first officer's decision to "break ranks" and tell the truth 
that she burst into tears. I felt like I'd achieved 
something, that I'd actually touched this MOD [Ministry of 
Defence] person enough that he actually had to make a 
decision and had go against the grain almost, and stand up 
and tell the truth. At a later date, at some cost to his 
standing with his colleagues, the same officer acted as a 
character witness for her. It was at this time that she 
began to have difficulties with the style of action of some 
of the women at the camp:
I couldn't cope with some women's absolute anger 
at the MOD. I mean, I felt it myself and totally 
understood it [. . .] but [. . .] I couldn't work 
like that. [. . .] Being totally antagonistic
towards them, and screaming at them, wasn't going 
to change a thing.
These were in fact the same loud and firm women that 
she had found admirable on first coming to the camp. She 
still felt emotionally close to them, but was also concerned 
by a growing elitism and dominance that did not match the 
rhetoric of the camp. At the point where she felt she might 
resolve the issue by living with different women in another 
area, the split discussed in Chapter 5 occured. Anna found 
it extremely painful to have women whom she regarded as
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family treat her as an absolute enemy, and it crystallised 
her decision to stop living at the camp on a permanent 
basis. Her sense of her "self” as non-violent was then 
profoundly challenged by her last prison sentence. Indeed, 
it challenged her sense of having a coherent self 
altogether. She resolved the crisis by both re-evaluating 
and reconnecting with the past, which allowed for a 
constructive acknowledgement of aspects that had been 
suppressed in creating the non-violent self at Greenham.
For the Greenham women, non-violent action appears to 
be an expression of a care-focussed morality and a connected 
sense of self. For Darek and Piotr, non-violence is the 
appropriate method by which to struggle for autonomy, 
dignity and justice. Thus these narratives appear to be in 
keeping with the thesis that there may be some association 
between gender and different moral perspectives. However, 
as I stated above, no general conclusions can be drawn from 
this sample. What is significant is that these narratives 
demonstrate that the decision to act non-violently can arise 
from both a justice and a care perspective. Moreover, the 
practise of non-violence increased the importance of 
connection for all six respondents, as demonstrated by their 
greater emphasis on the importance of relationship, 
dialogue, empathy and tolerance.
These case studies also raise the question of how far 
it is possible to separate the influences of gender and 
culture, given that gender can itself be construed as a
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quasi-cultural construct.5. The Greenham women express the 
values created by the particular feminist sub-culture 
created at Greenham. These were values that were challenged 
by other women both inside and outside the feminist 
movement. Non-feminist women, for example, accused Greenham 
women of failing to care by neglecting their families. 
Feminists accused Greenham women of overemphasising care and 
connection and thus reinforcing a dangerous stereotype. In 
fact, Greenham women constantly undermined both gender 
stereotypes - that of the uncaring feminist monster and that 
of the submissive, nurturing, passive, pacifist woman.6 The 
values expressed by Darek and Piotr are also those of a 
particular sub-culture. They are the public values of the 
male-dominated Polish intelligentsia of the 1980s, drawing
5 Helen Haste and Jane Baddeley, "Moral Theory and 
Culture: The Case of Gender", in The Handbook of Moral 
Development, ed. W. M. Kurtines and J. L. Gewirtz (Erlbaum, 
1991).
6 An action taken on Nagasaki Day (9 August) 1984 
demonstrates this. On this occasion the women stripped 
naked, covered themselves with ashes, and blockaded the main 
gate to the base. The base personnel were horrified, 
reluctant to touch or remove the women, and were profoundly 
disturbed. (They eventually donned protective clothing to do 
so.) The immediate connection was with the naked, burned 
survivors of the Nagasaki bomb, and the women wanted to 
confront the military with that reality. But they were also 
presenting the men with a challenge to their own stereotypes 
of naked women: how they should look - beautiful; where they 
should be - at men's disposal; and how much power they 
should have - none at all, unless one counts the power of an 
attractive object. These ugly, terrifying, yet naked and 
therefore vulnerable, women were stopping the men getting to 
work, confronting the men with the possible results of their 
work, and demanding a response. The naked women action 
could be seen as a demonstration of extreme vulnerability. 
It was, in fact, a clear statement of women's right to be 
themselves and an attempt to create awareness and 
responsiveness in those confronted. The women were in 
control.
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on the romantic tradition of the struggle for independence, 
the moral teachings of Pope John Paul II emphasising human 
dignity, and the communitarian values of Solidarity. These 
values are clearly articulated in the writings of Adam 
Michnik. He regarded non-violence as the assertion of 
dignity and autonomy in the face of manifest injustice and 
oppression, and as the best tactical option for the times. 
Most significantly, he saw the use of non-violence as a way 
of asserting moral difference from the oppressors and as a 
way of avoiding the corruption of "revolutionary violence".7
However, Janek's narrative suggests the possibility 
that issues themselves may "pull" for a particular 
perspective and overide the influence of both gender and 
culture. Janek, with his deep concern and love for the 
environment from an early age, is the most care-focussed of 
the Poles and appears to have the most connected sense of 
self.
This is clear from his definition of what is good as 
what aims at the heart. Good is what serves all creatures 
on the earth, and from his definiton of what makes a person 
moral as the ability to bend over another man, the ability 
to listen to other people. His suggestion in the Heinz
dilemma is that the druggist should be brought to the dying 
woman, so maybe he could reconsider his decision and 
reconsider his greed and the fact that she could die for his 
greed for $1000. That is, Janek wishes the pharmacist to be
7 Adam Michnik, Letters from Prison and other Essays, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) pp. 87— 89.
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given the opportunity to respond to need. And his sense of 
self is defined not simply in terms of connections to other 
people but the universe:
I consider myself as One particle of the universe 
and that has never changed, I have always felt 
like that. One particle that considers that what 
it does has good influence on other particles and 
the universe itself. But after all it's not sure 
if it is good or not, and if the whole world will 
not fall apart.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the local WiP group that he 
helped to create put an emphasis on relationship and 
community. There were friendships among people who 
established the movement, it was like a big family, one in 
which his own was completely involved. Because of that 
closeness, that family atmosphere, WiP organisations in 
other places appreciated [the group], and those friendships 
which started then continue and they are very close, 
although politically now they may be a little divided. 
Janek's emphasis on connection is one he carries with him 
when he decided to be an M.P., a decision arising from his 
environmental concern: My attitude was quite pragmatic, the 
country is dying ecologically. However, his 1991 electoral 
pamphlet which called for an improved quality of life and 
improved communication between people was considered too 
emotional and too lyrical, and he is aware of the risk of 
losing oneself in "cabinet politics" [. . .] just being
involved in the paper bureaucracy and losing the connection 
with real life.
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In the other five narratives in my study it is not 
possible to distinguish between a justice and a care 
perspective. That is to say, all five respondents appear to 
integrate justice and care concerns in a way similar to that 
identified by Ward in her study of urban adolescents, 
(described in Chapter 3). An integrated perspective means 
that justice and care concerns cannot be separated out 
without destroying the meaning of the moral judgement.8 
This is not to say that the perspectives are identical to 
each other. As with the other narratives, they illustrate 
the overriding importance of culture, particularly in the 
different meanings and values given to concepts such as 
justice and equality. And again they demonstrate that the 
actual practice of non-violence can increase the importance 
of connection for the individual• These points are best 
illustrated by looking in greater detail at Magda from 
Poland and Pedro from Guatemala.
Both are committed to non-violence in principle and 
both are concerned with issues of justice and care. Magda 
defines her goal as activating people in order to create a 
just society or whatever . . . it's like conscientious
objection and human rights and women and ecology is all 
interconnected, bringing human rights as a rule and creating 
a society without violence, solving problems in public 
debate and so on. Justice entails fair treatment and no
8 Janie V. Ward, "Urban Adolescents' Conceptions of 
Violence" in Mapping the Moral Domain, ed. Carol Gilligan, 
Janie Victoria Ward, and Jill McLean Taylor (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 175— 200.
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cheating. An action is just if such rules are established 
that it avoids hurting as many people as possible. An 
action is good if it's for the justice and bad if it hurts 
another person or animal.
Pedro's goal is social justice, so that the future 
generations will [. . ,] have a little bit better life than 
what we are living now. For him a good man is someone who 
is both non-violent, understanding, flexible, and thinks 
about equality, democracy. He is motivated not only by
seeing victims, but also by injustice.
All the aspects really come together to motivate 
me to work for human rights, because it's not just 
when someone's killed that's a violation of human 
rights, but social and economic rights as well. 
Watching [the abuse of those rights] motivates 
me.
However, Pedro, coming from a deprived and marginalised 
section of his own society, has a different construction of 
social justice to Magda. He sees it as meaning an bringing 
an end to terror and repression, and he regards equality as 
an important component. Magda, brought up under communism, 
is wary of imposed equality, and, in common with Darek and 
Piotr, stresses the value of human dignity and 
individuality, dignity being the ability to retain oneself, 
one's [own] values, not to resign or to compromise. Her 
most recent project, when I interviewed her in 1991, shortly 
after she had become president of Polish Amnesty, was a 
human rights education programme in schools to combat any 
form of discrimination. Although one might interpret this
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as a concern for equality, for Magda it arises from the 
importance she places on individuality and the strength she 
gains from her sense of difference: I have a strong need for 
individuality, to stress my own difference [. . .] respect 
for difference is the most important thing
Pedro also campaigns against discrimination but avoids 
stressing individual difference.
My principles are non-racial, well, let me 
elaborate that, they're equality. So if I am here 
in Guatemala, I'm seeing tons of problems around 
me between men and women, professionals and 
peasants, ladinos and indigenous people. If I
were to say I'm Maya, I'm indigenous, I would feel 
like I was racist, cutting out other people.
In this respect I should add, he is different from his 
three compatriots, who put increasing stress upon their Maya 
identity.
With the Heinz dilemma, both Magda and Pedro see the 
pharmacist as abusing his rights. Pedro also feels there is 
a failure of awareness and response: the person who makes 
the drug doesn't understand the suffering of the peasant. 
And both regard stealing as wrong, Magda because
it is breaking somebody's privacy and it creates 
the feeling of injustice in this person from whom 
something is stolen. It is not the rule around 
which society should be organised: that stealing 
could be a way of solving problems. There should 
be rules. Robin Hood is not a solution; it is, 
rather, a just system that makes stealing 
unnecessary.
Magda, however, feels that Heinz has a duty to steal 
even for a stranger, if that person is dying, although it
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would be easier to act in cooperation with a group in which 
there was a friend of the dying person. For Pedro and for 
all the Guatemalans, stealing is wrong partly because they 
cannot imagine it being successful. Pedro also feels that 
the law requires respect, and his solution is for Heinz to 
work extremely hard or to borrow money.
In contrast to gender stereotypes, it is Magda who sees 
herself as somewhat lacking in empathy and inflexible. She 
finds it hard to forgive members of the old regime for the 
harm they have done to people, or tolerate them in the new 
government. Engagement in WiP, however, brought her into 
contact with Western feminism. She became more aware of 
what she identified as women's values: greater emotional 
sensitivity and less competitiveness, and the sexist and 
discriminatory nature of Polish society: for me, being a 
feminist means that those features of women should be 
treated as seriously as men's characteristic features. Like 
the Greenham women she now sees the practice of non­
violence, which in practical terms means more understanding, 
[and] more democratic decision-making, as embodying feminist 
thinking.
While both see action as arising from a synthesis of 
feeling and intellect, Magda identifies anger and excitement 
as the primary motivating emotions, while Pedro identifies 
love. We're all humans, and humans love life, and, for me, 
to love is to do the things that are most necessary for the 
people that are most needy. Pedro feels that, largely due 
to the influence of his mother, he has always been
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personally inclined to non-violence. But he is clear that it 
is his engagemement in CERJ that has shown him how to 
practise non-violence, and that that has created this growth 
in compassion. Although I had these principles, I never had 
ideas before of how I could fight for what I believed in a 
pacific way. Later he explained
P: I feel much more mature in my work, [. . •] I
feel much more humane than I did. A Spanish woman 
friend of mine said this to me a while ago, and I 
feel the same, that "the more one suffers, the 
more humane one becomes, the more aware of 
humanity".
L: What does it mean to be humane? [NB, the word 
"humano" in Spanish means both "human" and 
"humane". My translator used "human" (above) and 
"human" (below): as text.]
P: The word human is extremely complicated, I
mean we're all human beings, but to say I'm more 
human now is to say that I'm more compassionate, 
I'm more capable of sharing with the suffering of 
other people.
L: Is this a change from how you would describe
yourself, say ten years ago?
P: I wouldn't have been able to answer in the same 
manner, but I probably would have explained that 
they're principles that I've always held, which is 
non-violent principles.
L : What's changed?
P: I've come to understand the political situation 
in my country and I've come to understand and 
learn about the pacific fight.
This combination of awareness and love also protects 
him from fear: the thing I believe is that, knowing exactly 
what you're doing and why you're doing it: if you have this 
love, then you lose the fear. Love, however, is not a 
substitute for justice. Thus, while Pedro feels that the 
problem with the commissioners and the Civil Patrol heads is 
that they don't believe in love, he also thinks those who
murdered Mrs Mejia (Francisco's mother) should be punished, 
although he is opposed to the death penalty.
To love is to do the things that are most necessary for 
the people that are most needy. Thus, love underlies 
responsiveness. But both Pedro and Magda also see 
responsibility as arising from relative priviledge: for
Pedro, this arises from the competence and knowledge he has 
gained through educating himself. The knowledge gained from 
his engagement in CERJ gives him a particular responsibility 
to act, one he cannot relinquish until he feels confident 
that there are others who can replace him.
Magda, like Piotr, sees responsibility as arising from 
the relative priviledge of having a good education and 
financial support: I have somehow to pay back this debt [. 
. .J Everybody has his or her role to fulfil. Magda also 
sees responsibility as arising from what she identifies as 
both a cosmic and a material connection between her capacity 
to confront the problems in her own country and the chances 
of others confronting other problems in their own countries. 
If someone
supports something which is unjust and wrong here 
and so then she takes responsibility for unjustice 
in the world. [. . .] I have to somehow help some 
people or some things to happen, in order to have 
the feeling that then someone in South Africa also 
would help. How can I explain? It's like in 
Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment. that at the end 
he realises that there is this responsibility on 
all of people in the world, so if there are tribes 
of Indians - he wouldn't say it in these words - 
killed somewhere in America, then it also lies on 
his conscience, the responsibility to do something 
to prevent it, but he cannot . . . I mean no one 
can do it straight, you have to do something here.
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Thus it's connected . . . humankind, I mean, if I were 
in the United States and protested against nuclear power 
plants [there], then it's also OK for me because I have this 
feeling that at that time I would also protest against 
Zarnowiec [in Poland].
In exploring my respondents' reasoning behind the choice of 
non-violence I have shown how that choice can arise from 
both justice and care perspectives and a perspective that 
integrates both. In addition the actual practice of non­
violence appears to increase the importance of connection 
and relationship.
What is interesting is that, in spite of this 
convergence, the different perspectives in ray sample do 
appear to be related to different thinking about the limits 
of non-violence in a similar manner to Ward's urban 
adolescents. To recap: Ward found that those with a care 
perspective saw violence as intrinsically wrong, even if 
understandable in certain situations. Those with a justice 
perspective saw violence as justifiable to rectify 
unfairness; and those with an integrated perspective saw 
violence as "tolerable and fair" within clearly defined 
limits established to prevent irreparable harm.
In my study, Diana and Margaret, who have care 
perspectives, reject violence as fundamentally wrong. 
Piotr, with a justice perspective, acknowledges 
contradictory feelings as the following quotation 
illustrates:
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one nature is, let's say Polish nature, very much 
connected to the Polish tradition of military 
struggle for independence, and in this nature I 
can't deny the whole Polish tradition, and all 
these uprisings, and tradition also of my family, 
well everybody. And the other nature is, . . . 
perhaps its something new because the Catholic 
Church was very much connected to this tradition, 
in Poland at least, it was supporting this 
struggle for independence. But I can't think about 
violence being a Catholic thing. I read something 
about the just war in Catholic theory and things 
like that, and J think it is very complicated, 
because, somehow, in theory perhaps it is possible 
to believe that a just war is possible. . . . I 
think I don't have the last answer on it, perhaps 
sometimes there are some situations when . . .  or 
some bigger values than human life, but it is very 
difficult for me to find such a situation.
However, his commitment to non-violence does not 
exclude corporal punishment for his children: It is very 
difficult but I think that you can beat a child with love 
also. And he can perceive situations where violence might 
be necessary.
Society should use as little violence as possible. 
But [ . . . ]  I can't imagine a society with no 
police, for instance. It's impossible to organise 
the public life. Even in relations between 
nations, for instance. There might be a situation 
like an uprising in [. . .] the Warsaw ghetto.
When they were fighting . . . not to defend
anything but dignity. I don't know if it was the 
only solution, but I think it was right.
Darek, likewise, sees violence as a necessity in 
certain situations when the state has to defend itself.
Pedro and Magda, in keeping with their integrated 
perspective, are committed to non-violence in principle at 
a personal and professional level. Both are aware of the
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potential for violence in their own work, but reject it. 
Magda, for example, has studied the
biographies of terrorists and it is frightening 
how similar they are: a background in political 
science, some kind of activities in non-violent 
struggle even- and then out of frustration, say, 
of being on the margin and not accepted and not 
wanting to be that 60-year-old who is being used 
instrumentally, they go into terrorism. But I 
think it is not a good way because they can kill 
people who are not guilty, and that also endangers 
their goals because that puts a question mark in 
the eyes of the society, so their goals can be 
questioned.
This is why she feels that violence as a means of 
struggle is wrong. Pedro, similarly, felt that at some 
point that there
was an option to take up arms. I'll give you an 
example: during La Violencia we were running from 
the army always, they were following us. And there 
was a moment when they were really pursuing my 
parents, and I thought, if I find my parents dead, 
I might have to take up arms. But now, if you ask 
me, whatever happens, I will always continue in a 
pacific route. When CERJ began, which was soon 
after, my ideas became much more complete and 
concrete about the possibility of this pacific 
route. [. . .] When a person acts in the same way 
that they're enemy is acting, then it always makes 
the situation worse. It's like saying, if there's 
a fire, feed it with more wood, then there are 
always more flames, so the problem doesn't get 
solved. To make a situation better - you have to 
if there's trouble - you just leave it for another 
day and start again. You have to be flexible, 
it's not to say that one then sits there and just 
shuts up, it's that both sides have to compromise.
He is also aware that it is the government that suffers 
in terms of national and international public opinion if we 
can achieve a pacific fight; but if we take up arms, if
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we're fighting for rights below the base of reason, then we 
become part of that.
But both can envisage certain situations where violence 
is justified, coining out of their cultural situation. Magda 
feels that both the Warsaw ghetto uprising and US 
intervention in the Second World War were right, but the 
bombing of Dresden was wrong because it was not just to kill 
unarmed civilians.
And Pedro is careful not to condemn the guerillas in 
his country.
It's a very difficult situation. [. . .] Our
people have experienced repression, we could say 
for five hundred years, against the indigenous 
people, and have always been reclaiming their 
rights and reclaiming their rights, and the answer 
from the government has always been a violent one, 
with arms. And so they answer with arms, some 
people answer with arms and some people don't. So 
there are really two forms of fighting.
This view, that non-violence is a personal choice 
and that armed struggle cannot be condemned in the 
Guatemalan situation, is shared by the other Guatemalans.
But again, detailed study of individual narratives 
confounds any attempt at simple categorisations or 
generalisation. All the care-focussed activists feel their 
perspective is limited by experience and that they cannot 
impose their views on others. For example, Margaret states, 
you can't be a pacifist on someone else's behalf. She also 
sees that it might have limits.
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I speak from a fairly comfortable middle class 
background. I've never been that pushed, you know, 
that I need to kill people or hurt people to get 
out of the holes I'm in. So I can only speak from 
where I am, and respect people who speak or act 
from totally different positions to mine. [. . .] 
A situation may arise where it's the lesser evil 
to harm somebody.
And Anna, Mary, and Janek, who are all care-focussed, 
feel that in certain circumstances violence is the only 
appropriate response:
It is difficult to speak about non-violence when 
concentration camps appear, and when people are 
shot for smiling or just on suspicion. The only 
way against such tyrants seems to be violence. 
(Janek.)
I can't and I will not condemn people who have to 
take up arms, because when I see what's happening 
in the world. [. . .] But my confusion is from my 
own point of view: I also understand the moment 
you move into an armed conflict you are actually 
supporting the people you are trying to oppose. 
And it's a catch-22 position. But I have never 
had, you know, since I was an infant and since 
1945 situation, I have never personally had an 
armed individual trying to threaten directly the 
lives of anyone connected personally with me on 
that one-to-one basis. [. . .] And, therefore,
when it comes to people not just building a peace 
but having to win the peace, I don't know that I 
have the right to take up some high moral 
philosophical ground. I don't feel competent to do 
that.
(Mary.)
What my respondents illustrate is the direct influence 
of personal and historical experiences on thinking about 
non-violence, especially its use outside the interpersonal 
sphere. They make direct reference to key historic events 
within their own cultures, the influence of which can be in 
contradiction to their moral inclinations - hence the
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acknowledgement of internal inconsistencies and feelings of 
ambivalence. What is clear for all the respondents is that 
the actual practice of non-violence has extended the sphere 
of action in which they believe it could be used.
In this chapter I have used my respondents' narratives 
to explore the thinking behind the choice of non-violence. 
The fact that the collective acts with the public rhetoric 
of care and connection may tempt one to assume that those 
engaged in such groups will themselves come from a care- 
focussed moral perspective and have a connected sense of 
self. Some of the literature on moral development, reviewed 
in Chapter 3, suggests that those with a care focus, or 
maternal thinking, are more likely to be non-violent.
Detailed study of individual narratives does not bear 
this out, and challenges any assumption of a link between 
non-violent action and one specific moral perspective. For 
my respondents, the choice to act non-violently arose from 
those with both a connected and those with a separate sense 
of self, and from both justice and care perspectives, and 
from those who integrated both. The process of engagement 
in non-violent action did appear to foster a greater 
awareness of the importance of connection and relationship, 
but the underlying perspectives remained the same. In these 
narratives there did appear to be some relationship between 
moral perspective and thinking on the limits of the use of 
non-violence. Those with a justice or integrated 
perspective appeared to find violence more acceptable in 
certain limited circumstances than those with a care
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perspective. However, this relationship appeared to be 
confounded by the influence of historical and personal 
circumstances, creating ambivalence for many of the 
respondents.
What these narratives showed is that culture, 
particularly the sub-culture created by the collective 
itself, can have an overriding influence on the development 
of a particular moral perspective, but that no one moral 
perspective is particularly associated with the choice of 
non-violence. Nor is this choice associated with a 
particular gender, personality, or religious outlook. 
Instead, the choice is a product of a complex and fluid 
combination of all of these.
CONCLUSION
As I stated at the outset, I have made no attempt to produce 
a single explanatory model of the process of political 
engagement. In keeping with Allport's suggestion, I have 
grown impatient with generalisations and have "hastened to 
the internal pattern".1 Through examining the life 
histories of activists in three anti-militarist movements 
that emerged in the 1980s, I have been able to explore the 
relevance of various generalisations about political 
commitment to a specific type of political engagement 
occurring in a particular historic period. I have also been 
able to suggest three possible models for the process of 
engagement in non-violent collective action. I have 
stressed the need to distinguish violent from non-violent 
action, pointing out that any attempt to understand 
engagement in collective action must examine the methods 
chosen, as these are just as likely to reflect the values 
and attitudes of the activist as are the objects of protest.
I argued that a qualitative methodology, in particular 
the use of retrospective narratives, appeared to be the the 
most suitable way to obtain a clear understanding of a 
dynamic and interactive process occurring between 
individual, group and environment over a period. This is 
the only method that allows the respondents themselves to
1 G. W. Allport, "The General and the Unique in 
Psychological Science", in Human Inquiry: A Source Book of 
New Paradigm Research, ed. Peter Reason and John Rowan 
(Chichester: Wiley, 1981), pp. 64— 65.
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examine the significance of events in their own lives. 
Hindsight is a necessary component of the search for 
meaning, and the respondents' interpretation of their coming 
to commitment is not accessible through structured 
questionnaires or direct observation.
I focussed particularly on non-violent activists in 
peace and human rights movements of the 1980s. These 
movements emerged in different cultures, with similar 
agendas and similar patterns of action, in response to the 
global expressions of Cold War militarism. Their primary 
aims were anti-militarist, challenging either forced 
conscription or a particular nuclear weapon system. As the 
movements grew, they began to embrace a wider agenda, 
including civil liberties and human rights, ecological 
concerns, and women's issues. These movements could be 
characterised as "New Social Movements" in that they 
addressed "basic dilemmas"? concerned themselves with group 
process and non-violent methods of action; blurred the 
distinction between private life and public action, so that 
activism became a way of life; and manifested what Melucci 
calls a "planetary consciousness".2 In examining these 
movements, I also became aware of a common philosophy that 
I have defined as a "politics of connection". To reiterate, 
"a politics of connection puts a primary emphasis on 
relationships. There is a concern with relationships 
between participants within the movement? between the object
2 A. Melucci, Nomads of the Present (London: Hutchinson
Radius, 1989).
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of action and other issues? and with relationships with the 
perceived opponents. Hence the concern with method as an 
end in itself. The non-violent methods used by the actors, 
in rhetorical, symbolic and actual forms, express these 
relationships, and the choice of non-violence demonstrates 
a desire to transform rather than disrupt or break 
relationships. In contrast, the objects of action - 
military conscription and nuclear weapons - are in all cases 
seen as, amongst other things, disruptive and deeply harmful 
to relations within society."3
Thus, there are significant differences from those 
totalitarian and revolutionary movements that provided the 
basis for some of the explanations of political commitment 
reviewed in Chapter 3. This may help to account for why 
these explanations do not fit. I also suggested that, given 
the constantly changing nature of the political and 
historical environment, any attempt to produce a global 
model of protest behaviour is futile.
In particular, these movements with their fluid, 
egalitarian structures, and emphasis on internal democracy 
and non-violent process, are the antithesis of the 
anti-democratic movements that Kornhauser suggested may 
emerge in times of rapid social transition.4 However, 
Kornhauser's stress on alienation is not irrelevant: the 
Guatemalans are obviously economically marginalised, and all
3 See above, pp. 184— 185.
4 W. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 33 ff.
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my respondents felt alienated from the conventional 
political processes of their country, which appeared to 
exclude them because of ethnicity, gender or political 
ideology? they also felt alienated because of the failure of 
those in power to address what the respondents saw as 
fundamental issues. Yet the process of engagement led not 
to revolutionary destabilisation but to greater involvement 
in attempts to transform the political process and, in some 
cases, to direct engagement in conventional politics at a 
local or national level.
I shall now summarise the way my findings challenge the 
other established models that explain political engagement. 
Taking the structural approach first, the enormous social 
inequities that existed in Guatemala, and the severe 
political repression in both that country and Poland, may 
well have contributed to the widespread social disturbances 
that occurred in both countries in the early 1980s. Yet, 
after the failure of these movements, more severe repression 
followed, and yet only a tiny proportion of those subject to 
these conditions mobilised, nor was there any evidence that 
it was in response to a perception of "relative 
deprivation". Mobilisation was often on behalf of others 
more directly affected by the process of militarisation, and 
at the expense of the activists' own relative wellbeing. 
Structural theories do not deal adequately with this kind of 
pro-social, or altruistic, behaviour.
Resources were significant to my respondents. Access 
to networks, information and particular skills played a role
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in facilitating engagement. But the availability of 
resources was not sufficient in itself to explain 
mobilisation. It was clear that many of my respondents felt 
emotionally and cognitively engaged for some period before 
they were able to find the resources to act. Nor does 
resource mobilisation theory explain the attraction of a 
particular issue to a particular person, or why many with 
easy access to resources did not act.
An additional problem was that all these theories treat 
a movement as a unified entity, with a homogeneous 
membership whose reasons for engagement were identical. My 
findings confirm the views of those writers who stress the 
heterogeneity of membership, and the wide variety of 
attitudes and motivations that push people into action 
around a common cause. Moreover, in keeping with Mankoff 
and Flacks,5 my research also shows that movements can 
recruit members with different agendas at different points 
in their life cycle. Thus, for example, Mary's agenda at 
the outset of her march to Greenham was purely anti-nuclear. 
Mary's views developed to embrace a feminist agenda. Diana, 
at a later date, was attracted by both the feminism and the 
anti-nuclear stance of the movement Mary had helped to 
create. Darek joined WiP to revitalise the Polish political 
opposition, Magda, two years later, to campaign against 
nuclear power.
5 Milton Mankoff and Richard Flacks, "The Changing 
Basis of the American Student Movement", Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 395 (May 
1971), pp. 54— 67.
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However, although I stressed the importance of 
understanding the individual, my research did not provide 
much evidence for those theorists who locate the process of 
engagement entirely within the individual, divorced from his 
or her historical and social context. I found no evidence 
that reaching a particular stage in the life cycle was the 
most significant precipitant of action. Certainly, Darek 
and Diana became engaged as adolescents, and the 
vulnerabilities and possibilities of that period clearly 
played a role in facilitating their commitment. But other 
respondents' narratives show that there are other 
significant periods of opportunity, such as that which 
occurs for women when children go to school, or for either 
sex when an employment opportunity ends. It is, as Erikson 
suggests, the psychohistorical moment6 - the coincidence of 
these particular moments in an individual's life story with 
particular historic events - that appears to be mobilising. 
Moreover, if the event is overwhelming, the respondent may 
well act to create an opportunity for engagement, regardless 
of personal convenience or the appropriateness for their 
personal life course.
Regarding the importance of different personality 
traits, the most significant finding from my work is the 
challenge it makes to the psychopathological explanation of 
political commitment. My respondents' narratives did not 
support this explanatory model. What they did show is that,
6 Erik H. Erikson, Life History and the Historical 
Moment (New York: Norton, 1975), pp. 196— 199.
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while traumatic experiences in childhood are not essential 
to later engagement, when they do occur their contribution 
to the process of engagement appears to be the opposite of 
that suggested by Lasswell.7 For my respondents, activism 
was not the expression of redirected affects produced by 
repressed childhood hostilities. They were aware of their 
childhood hurts and saw this awareness as fostering their 
capacity for empathy. In addition, their knowledge of their 
own survivorhood increased their sense of personal efficacy, 
which contributed to their preparedness for engagement.
My research is in keeping with many of the findings of 
the research done on activists in the youth movements of the 
1960s and the anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s. This is 
not surprising given these movements' shared agendas and 
similar methods of action. In common with the 1960s' 
studies, I found that parental, and grandparental, values 
were a more significant influence than political ideology. 
My respondents were also intelligent, resilient and tended 
to be socially engaged from an early age. However, my study 
suggests that movements can arise in a wide variety of 
social backgrounds, not simply amongst a middle class elite. 
Regarding the cognitive work of the anti-nuclear studies, I 
pointed out the difficulties raised by its cross-sectional 
nature. For my respondents, what emerges from their 
longitudinal narratives is that personal efficacy appears to 
precede political engagement, and that the engagement
7 Harold Lasswell, The Political Writings of Harold D . 
Lasswell (Illinois: The Free Press, 1951).
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transforms personal efficacy into political efficacy. And 
engagement appears, in part, to be a way of sustaining issue 
saliency in order to sustain further engagement.
The main aim of the study was not, however, simply to 
test the validity of various theories about political 
mobilisation, but, rather, to focus on a hitherto neglected 
aspect, namely, the process of engagement itself, rather 
than the conditions producing activism or the 
characteristics of those engaged.
Three overlapping process models have emerged from the 
narratives: for the majority of my respondents engagement
arises as a personal response to a particular historic 
event. For some of these engagement centres around a 
crucial episode, that is, a qualitative shift of attitude 
and behaviour taking place in a time-limited period. The 
particular nature of the historic event, and the personal 
history of the respondent, are such that he or she is 
suddenly aware of the personal significance of a public 
event. She feels herself to be threatened and vulnerable, 
or else has a sense of empathic connection to someone she 
sees as threatened. The sense of vulnerability breaks down 
numbing. The respondent now perceives her personal 
situation to have a wider political significance and is 
motivated to act. Action occurs if the resources are 
available. According to this model, fear plays a mobilising 
role, and is most powerful when it is fear of a future or 
imagined event.
In the second model, which applies to three of the
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Guatemalans, fear is inhibiting. This model also depends on 
a sense of empathic or personal connection to historic 
events. But the process is far more gradual, because the 
sense of powerlessness and terror created by overwhelming 
events has to be overcome. Indeed, it is probably numbing 
to public events that has facilitated survival. It is the 
reduction of repression, the opening of political space, and 
the emergence of issues that appear soluble, that allows the 
process of engagement to proceed.
For the third group empathy and fear are not 
significant factors in the process. These are a small group 
for whom abstract principles of social justice and other 
concerns are important from an early age, and who have a 
strong sense of personal efficacy.
The validity of these models is certainly confined to 
these particular movements at this period. But, while they 
cannot be applied elsewhere, they can suggest certain 
pointers for further studies. All three routes to 
commitment challenge Kohlberg's model of moral engagement as 
a purely cognitive process. Both cognitive and affective 
factors are important. All three models appear to involve 
some kind of prior cognitive processing, and at some point 
the intense arousal of affect, be it anger, sorrow or 
compassion.
Secondly, all three models show that commitment cannot 
be explained away either as the result of intra-psychic 
processes or simply as a response to external conditions. 
It is the unique interaction between history and the
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individual over varying periods that creates engagement. In 
this respect, history is not background context against 
which engagement takes place: it is an essential player. 
This work suggests that particular historic moments may be 
more significant than general conditions. Without that 
particular event, this person would not have become engaged. 
Conversely, this moment only mobilised those individuals, 
rather than others, because of who that person was.
Finally, the choice of non-violence as a means of 
action. I have argued for the necessity of examining the 
choice of method because the decision whether or not to act 
at all depends on the availability and attractiveness of 
different methods. Political non-violence, for example, 
because of its non-instrumental nature, is most effective as 
a collective act. Therefore, actors require resources that 
enable them to initiate a collective, or to join one. My 
respondents' narratives show that, for some, a decision to 
act was followed by a long delay before they found a 
suitable collective to join? others had immediate access to 
networks that facilitated action.
Choosing non-violence is a choice about central 
purpose, which thus entails moral thinking and reflects 
fundamental aspects of self definition. On the basis of the 
literature on empathy, moral orientation and sense of self, 
I hypothesised that those who chose non-violence would be 
more likely to be empathic, have a care-focussed moral 
orientation and a connected sense of self. Some of the 
literature suggested that this constellation was more likely
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to occur in women. Other literature suggested that it was 
the actual practice of caretaking activities, or maternal 
practise8 - both more likely in our society to be done by 
women - that produced this orientation.9 A third suggestion 
was that the experience of interdependence and community 
that arises from resisting oppression was key to the 
creation of 'social individuality',10 a concept similar to 
that of a connected self. I pointed out that these 
explanations are not mutually exclusive.
My respondents' narratives both challenged and extended 
the possibilitites. Accounts of their pre-activist lives 
showed that all of them had the experience of living within 
and drawing some value from "extensive” communities, that 
is, communities or families that encouraged open attitudes 
to others and a sense of responsibility for them, be this 
the institutional setting of a children's home, extended 
family life, or the communal values of Maya society, 
Catholic Poland, or the Religious Society of Friends 
(Quakers).
Secondly, it is clear that both justice and care- 
focussed moral reasoning can underlie the choice to act non- 
violently, and that individuals, of both genders, with both
8 Sarah Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics 
of Peace (London: The Women's Press, 1989), p. 17.
9 Joan C. Tronto, "Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory 
of Care", Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 12 
(1987).
10 M. Brinton Lykes, "The Caring Self: Social 
Experiences of Power and Powerlessness" in Who Cares? Theory 
Research and Educational Implications of the Ethic of Love, 
ed M. Brabek (New York: Prager, 1989), p. 167.
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a connected and separate sense of self, do so. However, in 
keeping with Bardige's work, justice and care perspectives 
did appear to be related to my respondents' understanding of 
the limits of non-violence. Those with a justice or an 
integrated perspective saw non-violence as a more limited 
method and were more tolerant, in theory, of the use of 
violence. This may be because the principle of self defence 
- which was the most common justification for violence - was 
more easily drawn upon by those valuing fairness and equity 
as values in themselves, than by those emphasising concern 
for others.
The explanatory models proposed by Lykes, Tronto and 
Ruddick all help to make sense of some aspects of my 
respondents' narratives: in particular, the fact that the 
actual process of engagement and practice of non-violence 
enhances a connected sense of self in all of them. There is 
an interactive relationship between movement and individual, 
and it would appear that "Involvement in the transformation 
of oppressive structures, in which one acts . . . serve[s] 
to concretise an abstract sense of oneself as an 'ensemble 
of social relations'".11 Margaret's and Mary's narratives 
are in keeping with the suggestion that maternal practice 
and caretaking enhance a care-focussed morality. So, 
interestingly, is Darek's acknowledgement that his concept 
of responsibility changed, through the care of his son, from 
one of duty to response to need. This raises the 
possibility that practice may be more significant than
11 Lykes, "The Caring Self", p. 167.
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gender. Darek's narrative also suggests that maternal 
practice would need to be sustained to have a sustained 
effect.
What my narratives do not suggest is that one gender is 
more inclined towards non-violence than the other, or even 
that gender per se is associated with a particular kind of 
non-violence. The counterfactual cases of Janek and Magda 
should be noted. Janek's exemplifies the importance of the 
"pull" of the issue, Magda's the significance of culture. 
That is not to say that gender cannot, in some 
circumstances, be the basis of a particular set of sub­
cultural values, as exemplified by Greenham, but the 
creation of this particular sub-culture was a political 
choice on the part of those women involved.
In fact, for all my respondents, culture, including the 
sub-cultures created out of ethnicity and religion, was the 
overriding influence on their moral focus and sense of self, 
and thus appeared as one of the main determinants of their 
choice of non-violence and of which non-violent tactics 
should be used.
Overall, the main finding of my work is that the available 
global models of commitment do not have much useful 
explanatory power when trying to understand the actual 
process of engagement. Reasons for this have been 
suggested. Narrowing the focus to a specific kind of action 
in a specific period still leaves one with complexity and 
heterogeneity that can only be fully explained through the
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study of the individual case.
The other main finding is that history cannot be 
relegated to background context. The process of engagement 
is the process of engagement with an historic event as 
public events become personally meaningful and the 
individual moves from private to public space. Therefore, 
studies of commitment cannot confine themselves either to 
purely intra-psychic processes or to external factors. They 
must look at the relationship between the two.
Traumatic experiences are not essential to later 
commitment, but, if they occur, they can, in the right 
circumstances, help foster a capacity for empathy and for 
creative survival strategies that enhance personal efficacy. 
Empathy has been seen to be important but not essential in 
the process of engagement. Non-violence can arise from 
different moral perspectives and in both genders.
Fear has a significant role in motivation, which varies 
in different political contexts. It can be mobilising for 
those not directly experiencing overwhelming terror. In the 
latter case it can be paralysing, although the memory of 
that terror can be recruited to sustain later engagement.
All these suggestions arise from the detailed study of 
twelve peace and human rights activists working in the 
1980s. With the emergence of a new wave of protest around 
ecological issues in this country, much of which draws on 
the example of a sustained occupation provided by Greenham, 
it may be that the process models developed here can be 
applied and adapted to this new generation of activists.
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APPENDIX 1
SUMMARIES OF RESPONDENTS' POLITICAL COMMITMENTS
I have summarised the histories of active engagement up to 
1992 for all twelve respondents. These histories follow on 
from those given in Chapter 6 that described formative 
experiences, and provide background information relevant to 
all the other chapters.
Guatemala
Rosa is a Maya woman from the Quiche region of Guatemala. 
At the time I first interviewed her in 1990 she was 29 and 
living with her parents. One year later she had moved to 
the city, married and was pregnant with her first child.
In the early 1980, while Rosa was away from her 
community living on the coast, the catechist was killed. 
She was absolutely clear about her duty to leave the 
relative safety of the coast and return to her community to 
take his place. Her work as a catechist, with her emphasis 
on the use of her own language - Quiche - and her 
encouragement of women, brought her into conflict with the 
hierarchy again and led to "expulsion” from her local 
church. This time she did not object: having acguired a 
reputation in the wider community, she was now interested in 
talking to and organising with women. By now it was 1987 
and she had the support of another radical clergyman in
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Chichicastenango and access to a weekly local Catholic radio 
programme which she used for talks. She found herself 
making connections between the Virgin's suffering and loss 
of her son Jesus and the losses of the increasing numbers of 
widows and orphans around her. On visits to the cantons 
women would talk to her about their losses and sacrifices, 
and while listening and empathising with their grief she had 
the idea of creating some form of self-help group.
She decided to set up a widows' group, initiating it by 
calling, with the help of the priest and the local radio, a 
widow's mass on the Virgin's day, 10 May 1988. The mass was 
held in Chichicastenango. She was astounded at how many 
came: some hundreds from all the surrounding communities. 
The cost of the mass, however, was that the Bishop was
harrassed by army and civil patrols into leaving the
community for fear of his life. The widows and Rosa were 
also harassed. But at this time they joined up with other 
grass roots initiatives to form a larger widows'
organisation (CONAVIGUA^ and Rosa found herself elected 
vice-president.
When I returned in January 1992 CONAVIGUA had grown to 
be one of the largest and most effective popular movements 
in the country. Rosa was clearly a central figure in the 
organisation, organising a conference and a large march, 
working hard in the background, and obviously loved and
respected by all.
In addition to continuing on the board of CONAVIGUA, 
she has, with others, set up an indigenous rights group
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called Majawil Q'ij, or New Awakening. The idea for this 
came out of organising and attending the Continental 
Conferences for Indigenous and Popular movements in the 
Americas. She had attended the first in Quito and had been 
one of the main organisers for the second, in Guatemala, in 
October 1991. She also saw that, while indigenous people 
participated in many groups, they had none that specifically 
spoke for them. The idea of Mahawil Q'ij is to provide a 
coordinating group for indigenous Guatemalans involved in 
other groups? Rosa represents CONAVIGUA. Its aims are to 
help the most repressed and terrorised sections of 
Guatemalan society recover a sense of dignity through 
increasing their knowledge and understanding of their own 
cultures, languages and traditions. Rosa is convinced that 
this increase in self-respect must be the first step in 
organising against repression and injustice. Her particular 
interest has been encouraging women. Activities have 
included organising a seminar for Maya women and publishing 
and circulating its proceedings.
Rosa recently got married to someone also involved in 
human rights work. Currently they manage to spend one week 
in every three together. The rest of the time she is 
travelling and organising, setting up local groups, 
organising seminars, doing office work. She is pregnant and 
admits that the birth of the baby may mean she has to slow 
down, and she is looking forward to its arrival, but drily 
reminded me that the women working on the tineas have no 
such luxury as taking time off for childbirth.
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Pedro was a single Maya man of 28 when I first interviewed 
him in 1990, and lived with his parents in the province of 
Quiche. The following year he moved into the town and shared 
a flat with a fellow member of CERJ.
In 1983 the Army came to Pedro's village bringing food 
and promises of a new relationship between them and the 
people. A civil patrol was formed and Pedro, like the rest 
of the community, accepted it, hoping that this would mean 
the violence would diminish. But the violence grew worse, 
and patrollers were particularly vulnerable. Two incidents 
stand out in is mind: on one occasion the army lined up the 
patrollers and a hooded figure walked along identifying 
"subversives.” Four men were singled out and interrogated 
and badly beaten. On another occasion, when Pedro was away 
at the coast, his patrol were ordered to kill some men 
identified as guerillas. The men knew the victims were not 
guerillas, but were told if they refused the order they 
would be killed themselves, so they carried it out. Pedro 
thinks that from fear he might have done likewise. 
Patrolling was initially every fortnight. Pedro, like 
others, paid someone to patrol for him while he was on the 
coast.
In 1986, with the election of Cerezo, his community 
heard the rumour that patrolling was voluntary. However, 
petitions to the military commander to stop patrolling were 
met with threats. In 1988, however, Pedro heard of a 
neighbouring community that had completely ceased 
patrolling. Their method had been to bypass the army and
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send a petition direct to the President, the Ministry of 
Defense and the Procurator for Human Rights. They had been 
helped by a local school teacher. Pedro and some friends 
made contact with the teacher, Amilcar Mendez, who showed 
them how to set about a similar process. This was Pedro's 
first experience of seeing that the constituition and law 
could be used to his benefit. His community met and the 
majority decided they would stop patrolling. They have 
continued to refuse in spite of continuing harrassment and 
threats from the local military.
By the middle of 1988 the loose network of communities 
that had stopped patrolling decided to form an organisation, 
in order to have their interests represented more clearly. 
Pedro was made vice-president and became increasingly 
involved in educating villagers about their human rights and 
in visiting the city to argue with officials. In 1990 he 
was dividing his time between his small piece of land and 
the office. By 1992 he had moved into town to live near the 
office and was working full time. He was still single. 
Work now includes speaking tours abroad, organising courses 
on human rights, sitting in the office taking testimony, and 
coordinating action with other grass roots groups.
When I interviewed her in 1990 Christina was a single woman 
of 28 living with her family and working for an agricultural 
cooperative. The journey from home to the office takes 
three hours by foot and bus and she would do this for each 
meeting. The following year she was spending more time away
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from home, because of political work, and sleeping in 
friends' houses.
Christina's engagement in CERJ occurred initially 
because of concern for her two brothers, particularly one 
who was ill with depression. She had had no previous 
involvement with any form of political action. A group were 
meeting in her village, discussing the possibility of 
stopping patrolling, and she joined them to study the 
constitution and share her ideas. The group often met in 
her house and, as with Pedro's community, sought Amilcar's 
help and participated in founding CERJ. At the founding 
meeting, Christina was elected onto the executive, which 
surprised and pleased her although she was concerned about 
the responsibility.
Over the next two years Christina became increasingly 
involved with CERJ, juggling work in the office with looking 
after her elderly parents and sibs. However, in 1992, with 
the planned celebrations of Columbus's arrival in the 
Americas, she, like many others - including Rosa - found 
herself increasingly interested in and concerned about her 
peoples' identity as indigenous Maya. Like Rosa she joined 
the New Awakening, as a representative of CERJ, and uses the 
opportunity both to educate herself and others through 
discussions and cultural events. We're not learning about 
these things from books, she explained, but from old people 
and priests in the community.
Continual problems with ill health in her family (and 
with her own health) meant that she had had to take some
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months off work to take care of them. Money for medicine is 
a continual anxiety as she only gets expenses for her human 
rights work. However, by the time of my second interview in 
1992, she was re-engaged in CERJ and planning to go on a 
speaking tour in Europe.
Francisco was a single Maya man of 22, living as a caretaker 
in the CERJ office, when I did the first interview in 1990. 
By 1992 he had moved away to work for another organisation 
and lived mainly in his village.
Francisco was in the civil patrols from the ages of 15 
to 22.
We had to patrol every five days. So we realised 
we were just wasting our time. Sometimes we were 
sent up to the mountains and, because it was so 
far, we might be away for two or three days just 
hanging about. We saw there was nothing up there, 
no reason to be there. And we knew that in the 
constitution it says that it's not obligatory to 
patrol and we were wasting time; we thought: "why 
are we doing this?"
Like Pedro, he had heard the rumours of patrolling being 
voluntary, and so he and others got in touch with CERJ, 
newly formed, and wrote out a petition. In Francisco's 
village, however, only eight men, all relatives, decided not 
to patrol. This made them much more vulnerable to 
harrassment.
In 1990 Amilcar Mendez offered Francisco a job as 
caretaker at the office, which he took. After he had been 
away from home a month, his mother, who had joined the 
widow's group CONAVIGUA, was shot dead in her house, and his
471
stepfather wounded, by two military commisssioners. The 
whole of Francisco's extended family then moved to the CERJ 
office for safety and the case became a major human rights 
issue. I first interviewed him the night after this event.
After two years of working in the office of CERJ, 
Francisco, feeling increasingly exploited by Mendez, had a 
disagreement and left. Shortly afterwards he began working 
for CUC, the peasants' trade union. He attended a training 
course and now gives talks in local communities on subjects 
like using organic fertilisers and explaining human rights. 
He is much happier working in CUC, where he feels valued, 
although the work is unpaid, which means that, periodically, 
he returns home to look after his fields.
Britain
Diana was a single woman of 20, working for a pacifist 
magazine, when I first interviewed her in 1989. By the time 
of my final interview in 1991, she was working in London 
while waiting to go to Oxford to read politics, philosophy 
and economics (PPE).
Diana's first political action was at age 10 when she 
organised a petition against seal killing. She has 
difficulty remembering what inspired her but thinks it was 
probably a television programme. The whole school signed 
and the local press quoted her as saying they had as much a 
right to live on this earth as we did and they shouldn't be
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killing them. When she was eleven she joined national CND 
and started a Youth CND group with some friends. The group 
organised the double deckers to go to CND demos and things 
like that. . . . leafleting and street stuff and stalls at 
peace festivals. Involvement in CND was combined with a 
growing concern about other issues, such as animal rights - 
she became a vegetarian at twelve - and womens' issues, 
which she guickly discovered were not as acceptable to the 
authorities as a peace group. She remembers particularly 
trying to put up a poster that she had been given 
advertising a lesbian and gay march, which, unlike her CND 
posters, was immediately taken down. Suddenly this was not 
allowed. I think that took a few of us aback as to why it 
is, that why it was that certain things were acceptable and 
certain things weren't.
She went to a women's history group but found it 
totally boring and patronising. However, at fourteen, she 
was participating in "Reclaim the Night Marches" because 
they captured my imagination. . . it was nice to see groups 
of women walking through the streets saying "we should be 
able to walk through the streets safely, no matter how we're 
dressed", because I had at that age become aware that the 
world wasn't such a safe place as I had thought it was when 
I was a child.
By now she had also heard about Greenham and seen it on 
television. Living reasonably near it was not difficult to 
go to Greenham regularly, each time feeling more involved 
and wanting to stay longer. By the time she was 16, in
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1985, she had decided to stay at the camp full-time and not 
do her A-levels. It was a conflict because part of her 
enjoyed intellectual work, but compared to what else I 
wanted to do they didn't stand a chance.
She remained at camp for three years. By this time, 
cruise missiles were sited there and Diana, frustrated by 
the exhausting process of sitting up at night in case they 
were taken out on exercise, became quite skilled at watching 
the base and predicting when exercises would occur. She 
would also follow the convoys down to Salisbury Plain and 
stay doing her own actions, sometimes alone, sometimes with 
others until the convoy returned.
In 1988, she felt she had been at the camp long enough 
and took a job with the pacifist magazine "Peace News." By 
now she was clear that she was committed to a non-violent 
way of life. She continued to involve herself with 
Cruisewatch and to go down to Salisbury plain when the 
convoy came out. By 1990 she had decided she would like to 
study more and accepted a place at a college for mature 
women. After a year there, during which she remained in 
contact with Greenham women and involved herself in protests 
against the Gulf War, she obtained a place at Oxford to read 
PPE.
Mary had recently moved back to London in order to be more 
involved in women's politics, particularly the abortion 
issue, when I first interviewed her in 1989. She was 56.
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However, by 1991, she had returned to the north of England 
and was no longer engaged in any form of collective action.
Mary's first engagement in politics was in 1979 when 
she joined an anti-nuclear alliance in her area, having 
heard that the government intended to bury nuclear waste in 
her region. I didn't want nuclear waste dumped on my door 
step, it was that simple. However, what actually pushed her 
into more active engagement was hearing of a blockade by 
four people of a train carrying nuclear waste. That was a 
very key moment. Because it actually made me do something 
political: which was collect money for their support. After 
this she joined the Labour party, seeing it as one way to 
work. With the growth of the anti-nuclear weapons movement 
in the early 1980s she realised that nuclear weapons was as 
great a threat as nuclear waste, and she increasingly 
focussed her energy on this issue.
Her decision to join the march to Greenham Common was 
also precipitated by a key moment: when driving through the 
countryside she suddenly had an intense image of what it 
would look like after a nuclear war. She realised then that 
she would have to put all her energy into stopping nuclear 
war happening. During the two-week march she made a further 
decision to take direct action at the base and, when the 
idea of a peace camp arose, she became one of the small 
group of women that kept it going during the first year, 
dividing her time between the camp and her five children at 
home. During the second year, as the number of women 
increased, and media attention grew, Mary, because of her
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forthright and humourous speaking style and the fact that 
she was one of the founder members, was increasingly treated 
as a spokesperson for the camp, which sometimes caused 
friction with the other women. In addition, although now 
involved in a relationship with a woman herself, and 
separated from her husband, Mary's political focus remained 
cruise missiles, and she was impatient with the feminist 
politics of some of the other women.
In 1983 she moved away from living full-time at the 
camp to involve herself more directly with national CND and 
the Labour party. She and other women organised a court 
case against President Reagan over the deployment of cruise 
missiles which drew attention to the size of the American 
military presence in Britain. For the next three years she 
continued living in London and involving herself in peace 
movement politics.
However, in 1986 the rape of two women at another peace 
camp by men in the peace movement helped to crystallise 
another shift of perspective. Mary increasingly began to 
feel that violence against women was the fundamental issue 
and that the peace movement's failure to deal with it was 
part of its failure to deal with missiles. She got herself 
elected as a vice-chair of CND purely to raise the issue, 
but left in frustration after six months. She returned to 
Greenham for two short periods in 1986 and 1987 but felt 
uncomfortable there and moved with her partner to the north 
of England. In 1988 and 1989 she took little part in any 
political work. Her relationship with her partner ended,
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causing considable pain. However, when I interviewed her at 
the end of that year she was looking for a way to re-engage, 
particularly on the issues of abortion and pornography. At 
my last interview in 1991 she still had not found a way to 
do this satisfactorily, putting her failure down to her own 
laziness.
Margaret is an organic gardener, living with her husband and 
children on a smallholding near Newbury. All my interviews 
were conducted at her home. In 1989 she was 46.
Margaret feels that her own political awareness began 
to grow along with many other peoples' in the early 1970s. 
Quaker Meeting provided the opportunity for talks and study 
groups on any issue that a member wished. Thus she and her 
husband became involved in Friends of the Earth: I woke up 
to the environment and the fact that the world is finite. . 
. . I was staggered at my own ignorance, actually. Another 
influence was the stable and rooted world she had got 
involved with through organic gardening. Margaret herself 
helped to start the Amnesty International group, having 
heard a speaker at Yearly Meeting who made her realise that 
governments weren't always nice kind fatherly [things].
She did not involve herself in a local and successful 
campaign against heavy tanker aircraft being brought to the 
local airbase, feeling it was a "Not in My Backyard" 
campaign. However, with the announcement that cruise 
missiles would be sited at Greenham Common next to the town, 
Margaret felt it was impossible to turn a blind eye and
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joined the newly formed anti-nuclear group "Newbury Campaign 
Against Cruise Missiles" (NCACM). Thus, when the women's 
march from Cardiff arrived, she was part of the group that 
met and accompanied it up to the base. She admired the 
womens' guts but did not consider joining in the direct 
action.
She became increasingly involved in supporting the 
camp, even though its existence had proved divisive in the 
local campaign group, particularly the decision to be women- 
only. She felt that the women were doing what the campaign 
should have been doing - focussing on the missiles' 
presence. Even so, as the camp became more feminist and 
radical, she found herself initially petrified as a nice 
middle class housewife trying to explain it to the local 
community.
However, as time passed, her own involvement changed 
from support to direct involvement in actions such as 
cutting into the base. Her work as a gardener allowed her 
the flexibility to be at the base whenever needed. In 
particular, once the missiles were deployed she was 
instrumental in setting up the telephone trees that were the 
start of Cruisewatch and, in the five years of exercises, 
missed only three convoys, always managing to stage a 
personal protest in the first few miles of the journey.
Her stability and longstanding involvement with the 
camp made her a bridge between women and the local 
community. She persuaded Quakers to help concretely by 
providing laundry and washing facilities and, during the
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later years when evictions were regular occurrences, became 
involved in mediating with the police to diminish the 
bailiffs' violence. She also became increasingly involved 
in the legal issues surrounding the base. Firstly, in 
challenging the by-laws and then, after the INF treaty in 
1987, acting as a link between women and the commoners who 
were trying to ensure that the base would be returned to 
common land after the missiles were removed. She was one of 
the few women to win an acguittal in the magistrates' court 
for cutting into the base, arguing her case on the basis of 
rights of access.
With the ending of Cruisewatch and NCACM in 1990, 
Margaret has become increasingly interested in ethics and 
theology and in what women have to contribute in those 
areas. She continues to be very active with the Quakers and 
is turning her attention to other issues, such as world 
hunger.
Anna, aged 26, was spending her vacation from college acting 
as temporary caretaker of Friends Meeting House in Newbury 
and hoping to get into Oxford when I interviewed her in 
1989. She was still participating in occasional actions at 
the camp.
Anna had a difficult period on leaving the home at the 
age of 18. She had had little formal schooling and no 
qualifications. Her institutionalisation was such that, like 
many of her friends, she considered joining the forces, but 
decided against it because of an intuitive dislike of what
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the military represented. She found herself living in the 
middle of Huddersfield, in a high rise flat with few friends 
and no prospects. A series of unsatisfying jobs was 
followed by an unproductive period in a therapeutic 
community, during which she formed a relationship with a 
drug abuser, became addicted to heroin, and overdosed.
However, there were two significant events in that 
year. The first came with the sinking of the HMS Sheffield, 
during the Falklands' war. She saw the news on television, 
and her horror at the futility of people dying over some 
islands was exacerbated by anxiety that two of her friends 
from the home who were in the Navy might have gone down with 
the ship. She wanted to act, yet felt she lacked the 
resources and contacts to do so.
The second significant event was her decision, after 
seeing a poster, to organise a coach from the community to 
join the "Embrace the Base” action at Greenham Common in 
December 1982 (where women were protesting against cruise 
missiles). She found herself demonstrating with 30,000 
women. It impressed her and she did not want to leave, yet 
at that point joining the encampment did not appear as an 
option: she knew she was anti-war but felt completely
ignorant.
She decided to enrol at a college of further education 
to obtain some O-levels. Once there she gained the 
friendship and support of a female lecturer who gave her 
accommodation. In this environment she was able to get 
herself off heroin. She made friends with two lesbian women
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and came out herself as a lesbian. She channelled her 
frustrations at the limitations of institutional authority 
into a student campaign for a creche. She was then elected 
president of the students union. This meant she was now in 
touch with a network of information and she started visiting 
Greenham regularly. She moved down permanently to Greenham 
in the late summer of 1984, after obtaining her O-levels.
At just the point when Anna decided to commit herself 
full-time, many of the original campers were deciding to 
leave. Moreover, the camp at this time was under heavy 
pressure, with frequent evictions taking place, and violent 
physical harassment by bailiffs, police and local 
vigilantes. Yet she felt powerful, and she is quite clear 
that the main attraction of Greenham was the issue: the 
chance directly to oppose nuclear weapons.
During her time at the camp Anna was almost continually 
engaged in action. She built up a body of knowledge and 
expertise about the functioning of the underground command 
and control network, discovering previously hidden 
establishments. She organised a new peace camp outside the 
Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) at Aldermaston, 
making frequent actions to challenge and publicise the 
building of a new research facility involving the processing 
of plutonium. The AWRE has a notoriously poor safety record 
and connections have been made between its presence and the 
increased incidence of Leukaemia in the area. Frequently 
arrested and imprisoned, she became skilled at defending
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herself in court and succeeded in establishing positive 
relationships with individual magistrates and police.
However, Anna became increasingly unhappy with the 
approach of some women at the camp, and the eruption of a 
major split between women crystallised her decision to stop 
living at the camp on a permanent basis, and to accept the 
offer of a research job on a political weekly. The offer 
had arisen as a direct result of the information she had 
gathered on nuclear facilities. Anna had discovered that 
she had a talent for research, and its rejection by some 
women who did not see it as either important or as a womens' 
way of working she also found problematic.
The research job provided a new way to work. While 
there she was encouraged to apply to a mature students' 
college and suceeded in obtaining a place. After one year 
there she applied to Oxford University and got in. Because 
of her own experience in care and in prison for actions at 
Greenham, she had decided to pursue a career in penal 
reform. She continues to remain in touch with Greenham 
women.
Poland
When I interviewed Magda in 1989 she was in the process of 
turning part of her apartment in Gdansk into an art gallery, 
and involved in setting up a women's section for Solidarity 
and in discussions over the restructuring of WiP. She was
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28. By 1991, when I met her again, she had moved with her 
partner to Warsaw and was president of the newly-founded 
Polish Amnesty, which took up most of her time.
In spite of her acts of individual rebellion at school, 
Magda saw herself as totally apolitical until she went to 
university. There she met her boyfriend and from him gained 
a new perspective on Polish history, learning of events that 
no-one had discussed with her before, such as the Warsaw 
uprising. She participated in the student strike as a 
matter of course. However, martial law came as a complete 
shock, and affected her personally: she was unable to make 
a planned trip to Russia. This was the first time her 
personal freedom had been limited and she realised that 
political events in some way concerned her. She joined in 
the demonstrations and protests, again not regarding this as 
political action but as a citizen's duty . . .  to let them 
see that we are here. And she was shocked and angry at the 
brutality of the police.
During the early 1980s Magda wanted to get engaged in 
politics but could not find a way. She felt that Solidarity 
was both elitist and too conspiratorial. Even if one 
managed to make contact one could not get involved in the 
political discussion, only with the mundane tasks. It was 
only in 1987, when Magda heard about WiP, that she became 
involved. WiP appealed to her because of its openness, 
because of the way it worked, immediately involving her in 
the discussion, and because of the issues with which it was 
concerned. She felt that she had instinctively been against
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the army and nuclear technology all her life and WiP gave 
her a concrete possibility to act. Her first action was to 
solicit signatures for a petition in protest against the 
building of a nuclear power plant nearby.
Because part of WiP's role was contact with the West 
and Magda spoke fluent English, she found herself 
increasingly involved and taking increasing responsibility 
for sustaining the movement. WiP also, through its contacts 
with women in the West, introduced her to feminist politics 
for the first time and she became increasingly aware of 
sexist practices around her.
Magda played a central role in 1989 in trying to create 
an enduring structure and role for WiP, after the 
transformation that occurred with the change of government. 
This was not successful, but in the meantime she had 
accepted a job with the Solidarity trade union as organiser 
of a women's section. This job went well but, as the 
women's section became more visible and articulate and began 
to pay attention to issues such as abortion, there was 
increasing conflict with the trade union hierarchy. Magda, 
finding her own position as a paid employee untenable, 
resigned in the spring of 1991. Shortly afterwards she was 
elected president of the newly founded Polish Amnesty 
International group. When I last interviewed her in 
September 1991 she was working full time on building the 
membership and devising a pilot scheme for the teaching of 
human rights in Polish schools.
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Piotr is a doctor. He is married and lives with his wife 
and five children in a three room apartment. When I first 
interviewed him in 1989 he was 31, doing three jobs - in a 
health centre by day and an emergency clinic at night - in 
order to make ends meet.
His first political action was when he was 16. A group 
of teachers at his school were dismissed for signing a 
protest at proposed amendments in the Polish constitution. 
He knew little about the politics but he was aware that 
these were the best teachers in the school, both 
professionally and morally. He felt it was his duty to do 
something and he organised a petition to send to the First 
Secretary of the Communist party. The petition was not 
successful in reinstating the teachers, but Piotr saw it as 
successful in other ways. It brought together the most 
interesting students and made them all more mature.
Following that, he helped a relative who was in 
underground publishing. Then, with the birth of Solidarity, 
in 1980 when he was already at medical school, he became the 
leader of his section of Student Solidarity (NZS). Martial 
law came as a complete shock. Because of his involvement in 
the student strike he had been away from home at a meeting 
the night of 13 December when the police came to arrest him. 
After that he was in hiding until the rector of his 
university arranged an amnesty and he was able to go on with 
his studies. He continued with some underground activities, 
doing some publishing on a very small scale with some 
friends.
In 1985, with other old friends from NZS, he helped 
organise the week-long fast and seminar that began WiP. The 
seminar was very important, giving him a chance to focus 
deeply on ideas to which he had previously not given much 
attention, such as militarism, and to look at the 
connections between peace and freedom. As WiP grew Piotr 
became increasingly involved with organisation rather than 
actions. In particular he took responsibility for finances. 
As WiP had no structure, finance meetings were the main 
meetings of the group and Piotr found himself trying to 
compromise between two increasingly divergent groups: 
anarchists who favoured spontaneity and wanted no kind of 
representation; and those, including his own friends in 
Warsaw, who wished for a more structured approach. In 
addition he represented WiP abroad at an international peace 
convention. In 1988, having handed over financial 
responsibility, he joined the second group in establishing 
"Future Times" and gradually withdrew from WiP which he felt 
had achieved its main goal with the change of law on 
alternative service in 1988.
With the transformation of society that took place in 
1989, the Future Times group nominated Piotr as a possible 
deputy for the parliament. He was not selected, but in the 
meantime he had restarted and was chair of a Solidarity 
branch at his work place, also because of duty. There came 
time that there was the time to organise Solidarity in my 
workplace and so I did it. He actually felt that he was 
more interested in the problems of good health care
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provision than in the amount of pay given to employees, and 
was looking for ways to work in this area when I saw him in 
the autumn of 1989. He had also had an offer to work in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as other WiP colleagues were 
doing, WiP's internationalism in the previous years having 
in some senses prepared them for this work.
By 1991 he had made the decision to focus on medicine. 
He had little involvement in public activities except for 
the trade union at work, which was winding down, and a 
continuing interest in health care reform. He felt he had 
two vocations: one was to be a good father, and the second 
a good doctor, providing safety and support for both his 
family and his patients.
Darek was 30 separated, and living with his 7-year-old son 
in his parents home, when I first interviewed him in 1989.
Darek's engagement with politics began quite suddenly 
in 1977, while he was still at school. He had been moved by 
the death, in police custody, of a young theology student, 
and began to participate in oppositional activities, first 
by attending alternative classes in history, politics, and 
literature, organised by the illegal independent student 
union (SKS). Together with a friend, he organised an 
exhibition and attended a demonstration in 1978 to mark the 
anniversary of Polish independence. However, the police 
broke up the course and it was only because of support from 
his head teacher that he was not expelled from school.
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At university he continued with underground activities, 
producing and distributing leaflets. He had his first 
arrest and found that he had the strength to cope with it. 
Then, with the birth of Solidarity in 1980, he was naturally 
involved in establishing NZS, the founding meeting of the 
Krakow branch taking place in his room. He was elected to 
the national commitee and became completely exhausted so 
that martial law came almost as a relief. He avoided arrest 
on the night of the 13th December 1981 and, with other NZS 
friends, started a students group for the defence of 
democracy. He was arrested and interned at the end of 
January.
On leaving prison eight months later his hatred for the 
system was so great that for some time he toyed with the 
idea of joining the illegal Confederation for an Independent 
Poland (KPN) and actually fighting for Polish independence. 
However, after two or three months he realised that there 
were not the means for an insurrection, thus there was no 
logic in making independence the main goal from which all 
else followed.
By 1985 Darek was feeling, like others, that Solidarity 
had become too passive and that there was a need for a new 
initiative that would draw in young people. Thus he, with 
nine others, was one of the founders of WiP in Krakow. He 
is clear that although he was opposed to the ideological 
indocrination of a communist army he was not necessarily 
anti-militarist, and at the beginning his interest in the 
issues of peace and ecology was purely instrumental. The
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peace issue was increasingly on the government's agenda, 
and, through the arrest of Adamkiewicz, on the opposition's 
agenda as well. Forming a movement was a way to confront 
government with its own propaganda and to get support from 
the large peace movements in the West.
As the movement developed, however, he found himself 
increasingly interested in the role of peace politics in 
international relations and the different perspectives 
between East and West. For two years he was the central 
figure in the Krakow group. However, as internal divisions 
grew in WiP, he, like Piotr, joined the more intellectually 
oriented Future Times group. His own perspective on the 
split was that it was as much a clash between the Solidarity 
generation, like himself, and a younger group who had grown 
up during martial law and had a more manichean and 
fundamentalist approach to politics.
Darek, along with other WiP members, supported the 
strikes that led to the revival of Solidarity in 1988. By 
1989 he had completely withdrawn from WiP and had also 
decide against a career in medicine, although he had 
qualified. Instead, he and friends were editing and 
producing a new journal which he hoped would deal with both 
culture and politics. He had rejected what he called the 
temptation of being active in state politics, and hoped in 
this way to be able to stand back and comment on them, for 
he had many criticisms of the new developments, particularly 
the lack of democracy. In 1990 he was offered a job as a 
television news editor, which he took. This went well until
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the presidential elections, when, because of political 
differences with his boss, he was moved to a more senior but 
less interesting position. He was also increasingly
concerned at the political developments in Poland, and in 
1991 he decided after all to seek nomination as a deputy for 
the parliament: he was selected as a candidate by Democratic 
Union (the party to which most of the former intellectual 
opposition belonged.)
Janek was a 32-year-old parliamentary deputy from western 
Poland when I first interviewed him in 1989. He travelled 
from his home town, where his wife and three children lived, 
to spend part of the week at the parliament in Warsaw.
Janek's political involvement began as a university 
student in Czechoslovakia, when he became secretary of the 
Polish Socialist Students society. This was not out of any 
commitment to socialism but because he saw a need for Polish 
students to have some kind of organisation.
During his last two years at school he had become 
increasingly aware of problems in Polish society. He had 
begun reading underground publications. One in particular, 
The Black Book of Censorship, which showed the degree to 
which information was censored, had shocked him and alerted 
him to the fact that there were serious environmental 
problems in Poland which people knew nothing about. He 
thought of switching to environmental studies at university, 
but it was too difficult.
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In the summer of 1980, while the strikes were going on 
in Poland, he made his first trip to the West. Through 
discussions with friends and reading more books he felt that 
somehow politically I was growing up. His return to Poland 
coincided with the signing of the Gdansk agreement and the 
birth of Solidarity. The political stagnation in 
Czechoslovakia, when he returned there, where nothing had 
changed, was in marked contrast to what was happening in 
Poland. He organised a meeting about the events in Poland 
and made a speech at the student society saying that some 
things would have to change within the organisation or he 
would resign. What bothered him particularly was 
falsehood, and the lies, and corruption. It was the gap 
between what young people were told and reality that made 
him especially angry. He was aware of the risks of speaking 
out, that he might be expelled from the university, but did 
not mind. Nothing changed and a month later he and a number 
of others resigned. In addition, he wrote about the Polish 
events in a student newspaper which was immediately stopped 
by the Czechoslovak security services.
He was not expelled. He completed his studies and 
returned to Poland and to a job as a teacher in September
1981. Like others, he was upset by the sudden imposition of 
martial law. His immediate response was to do some crazy 
actions, such as flyposting protests. He felt very 
frustrated, very angry, and helpless. He wanted to do more 
but initially he had no contacts with the underground. 
Later he was able to assist one of his friends-in-hiding
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with certain tasks. It was through this friend that he met 
his wife and that he later heard about WiP.
He had done military service and he perceived it as an 
abuse of human rights, but at first he was not particularly 
interested in WiP. However, his wife took part in the 
women's hunger strike organised in protest at the arrest of 
two members. Shortly afterwards, Janek, his wife, his 
friend, and a few others initiated a local WiP group. His 
impulse to deal with environmental issues was reinforced by 
a visitor from Gdansk who urged them to tackle nuclear 
power. At first they were unsure if this mattered, but a 
few weeks later the Chernobyl accident occurred and they 
realised that this was a key issue. The group organised two 
street protests and became increasingly integrated and 
confident.
At Janek's suggestion the group began regular 
demonstrations demanding the closure of a local chrome 
factory. He had learned of its dangers from underground 
environmental bulletins, and sees himself as the main person 
responsible for putting enviromental issues on WiP's agenda. 
The WiP group in this city was a closely knit community of 
about thirty people. Janek felt it functioned like a large 
extended family, sharing many activities as well as 
political work.
However, by 1989 this local WiP group was undergoing 
the same process of fragmentation that was occurring to WiP 
nationally, and Janek, unhappy with some of the developments 
in the local group, became less involved. He had already,
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in 1987, joined the newly formed Solidarity trade union 
regional council, seeing it as a place where environmental 
issues could be raised. To his surprise the local 
leadership proposed he should stand as a candidate in the 
1989 elections. He did so and was elected. He saw his 
position as a deputy as giving him the opportunity to push 
both local and national environmental issues. He 
immediately joined both the environmental and the finance 
commissions.
He felt that as a deputy he was doing effective and 
productive work, and two years later was planning to run 
again to continue what I have just begun. In particular he 
had helped to create legislation protecting the environment, 
most of which he felt was reasonably satifactory. The 
biggest problem was the lack of time available to spend with 
his family. When I interviewed him just before the
elections in 1991 he was spending all week at the parliament 
and the weekend at home.
APPENDIX 2
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-Can you tell me what were your feelings about the issues of 
(eg, peace/human rights) before your involvement with the 
group began?
-How did you first become involved with the group? What was 
the nature of that initial involvement? Can you remember how 
it felt at the time? Did you hear someone speak or read an 
article? Can we go back to that moment: tell me how it
feels? Was it a sudden moment or more gradual?
-What happened after you got involved?
-What impact has it had upon your life: personal
relationships, family, children, work, study, future goals? 
-Has it changed your view of yourself?
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-Have the beliefs we discussed earlier altered during your 
involvement with the group?
-Where does your engagement end? Is there a point at which 
you intend to pull out?
Efficacy:
-Has your involvement with the group made you feel more 
effective in obtaining your goals?
-Do you feel more confident in your self?
-Do you feel more effective personally?
Gender issues:
-What's the importance of gender in doing this work?
-Would it be different if you were a man/woman?
-What does feminism mean to you?
-Do women work differently?
-Does this matter?
-Is a separate women's space important?
-Is there a relationship between peace and feminism?
3.Personal History:
(Focus will come from interviewee? issues raised need to be 
explored in depth.)
Family history:
-Who made up the family when you were growing up? 
-Description of each family member (personality, occupation, 
etc.)
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-Relationship with each, relationships between family 
members, atmosphere at home.
-What kind of child were you?
-Favourite activities.
-What's your first memory?
-What's the happiest memory?
-What's the worst thing that happened?
Interpersonal relationships:
-Ask about friendships, sexual relationships, sexual
orientation.
-Current relationships with partner, children, parents.
Dependency issues:
-Were you alone a lot?
-Who could you most depend on (child, teenager, adult)? 
Separation and death:
-What frightens you most in your life?
-Have you ever seen anyone die?
-What's your first memory of death?
-Did you talk about it to anyone at the time, or since?
-Do you think about death? Are you afraid of death?
-Was there much separation or divorce in your family as a 
child?
-Have things ever seemed to be falling apart?
-Have you ever thought that you might be going mad?
-How do you cope when things go wrong?
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Authority issues:
-What kind of people did you most respect when growing up? 
-Were there people you found it difficult to deal with? 
-Were you rebellious?
-Who is the person that has influenced you most in your 
life? How and why?
Ethical issues;
-Why is it so important to do this work? (Or, why are you no 
longer involved?)
-What do you get out of it?
-Do you feel personally responsible? For the problem? for 
the solution?
-Is there a conflict for you between personal and public 
responsibilities?
-You put a great deal of stress on (eg, democracy and human 
rights, peace] What do these terms mean for you?
-What makes ,fx" (use example of specific situation used by 
interviewee) right or wrong?
Ultimate concerns:
-Do you believe in any kind of God or Goddess?
-Is there any kind of life after death?
-What gives you a sense of vitality and authority?
-What do you feel connected to that is larger than yourself?
View of the future:
-What do you think is going to happen: to you? to the world?
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-Can you see yourself in thirty years time?
-Do you think we are heading for some kind of disaster 
(economic catastrophe, nuclear or ecological)?
-Do you feel you can do any thing to prevent it?
Ask for dreams and fantasies pertinent to any of the 
above.
4.Structure and functioning of the group.




-Degree of structure, presence of hierarchy 
-Resources
-Dealing with conflict (interpersonal and intergroup)
-Do you perceive the group as a threat to anyone?
-How do you interpret this antagonism?
-Feelings about these aspects, role in creating them. 
-Impact of this way of working on other aspects of life. 
-Comparison with other ways of working?(eg, Solidarnosc, 
political parties, etc.) Is it more effective? enjoyable?
-Where does the group fit in the political scene? Is it a 
party in the making? Is it a single issue movement?
-Are political parties necessary?
-Do you vote/support a political party?
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-Have your views on these issues changed during your 
involvement with group?
-Has your involvement changed the way you function 
politically?
5. Views on non-violence:
-Is it a tactic, or moral position?
-Ask for detailed examples of key events for that person: 
eg, conflict with police, soldiers, arrest, imprisonment. 
-Can you relive feelings, thoughts, fears, hopes at the 
time.
Interview Protocol 2 (With Sample Questions
1. Non-violence:
-Do you define yourself as non-violent?
-What does that mean: is non-violence a political, a
personal or a philosophical stance?
-Is there any situation in which you would use violence to 
achieve your goals? If so, explain.
-What justifies it?
-Describe the most important non-violent action. What was 
good/ bad about it? What did it achieve?
-Has the Gulf War changed your perspective?
1 Many of the questions in this protocol are derived 
from the protocol used by Molly Andrews in "Lifetimes of 
Commitment: A Study of Socialist Activists" (Ph.D
Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1989).
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-How do you see change occuring?
-Terrorism, IRA, ANC: what is your view of this kind of 
action?
2. Politics:
-Are your actions political? What does that mean?
-Where do you see your group in political space?
-Was it or is it a threat to anyone, are you?
-Do you see personal life and political life as distinct 
spheres or intermingled?
3. Heart or Head:
-In your life are you generally guided by your heart or 
head, that is, by feelings or more detatched intellectual 
analysis?
-Do heart and mind pull in different directions? Can they be 
distinguished? Is one more prominent during action?
-Was there a situation where you did not agree 
intellectually with what the heart wanted to do? How was 
this resolved?
-When thinking through a problem and acting on it is it 
necessary to put feelings aside?
-What would you identify as the main emotion behind your 
need to act?
-And the main thoughts?
-What ideas/knowledge stimulate you to action: knowledge
about injustice? pain? suffering? violence (to self or to 
others)?
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-What feelings: anger? guilt? misery? fear?
4. Belief and action:
-Is there a gap between what you believe and what you do? 
-How do you define commitment, to what or whom are you 
committed?
-To what or whom are you responsible?
-What do you mean by responsibility?
-Where does it come from?
5. Self:
-How do you describe yourself to yourself?
-How do you think others would describe you?
-Is the way you see yourself now different to how you saw 
self before?
-What has changed you?
-Does what you believe make up part of what you are? Even if 
these beliefs are not acted upon?
-How important is your activism to your concept of yourself? 
-Is your membership of a class or ethnic group an important 
part of your identity?
-Did you have a sense of knowing who you were prior to 
engagement?
-Is being a woman/ man an important part of your identity? 
-How has this changed?
-When most discouraged what has kept you going?
-What has most affirmed your values?
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-What has shaken them?
-What is your main method of coping when things go wrong? 
Eg, running away, getting angry, seeking help.
-How important is interaction with others to your activism? 
-Are friendships associated with political activities or 
separate?
-How important is success? Define it.
6. Moral Concerns:
-What makes a person moral?
-How do you define and distinguish right and wrong?
-Does morality change according to situation?
7. Moral dilemmas: real life (after Gilligan)2
-Have you ever experienced a situation where you had to 
choose between two or more courses of action and felt some 
conflict about which was the right course to take?
-What was the conflict?
-What did you decide to do?
-How did you decide what was right?
-What factors helped you decide?
-In retrospect was it the right decision? why?
2 Based on questions devised by Gillligan, Lyons and co­
workers to explore moral choices in real life. See, for 
example, Nona Plesner Lyons, "Two Perspectives On Self, 
Relationships, and Morality", Harvard Educational Review 53,
2 (1983), p. 143.
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The Heinz Dilemma (after Kohlberg)3
In Europe, there is a woman who is near death from a rare 
disease. There is one drug which the doctor thinks might 
save her. It is a drug that a druggist in the town has 
recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, and 
the druggist is charging ten times what the drug cost him to 
make. He paid it200 for the materials and is charging §2000. 
The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to 
borrow the money, but he could only get together half of 
what he needed. So he told the druggist that his wife was 
dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper, or let him pay 
later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered a drug and 
I'm entitled to make money for it."
-What do you see as the problem here?
-What should be done about it?
-Does Heinz have a duty to steal the drug? If so, why?
-If Heinz didn't love his wife anymore, should he still 
steal the drug for her? Why, or why not?
-Should he steal the drug for a stranger? Why, or why not? 
-Imagine that he did steal the drug: he is caught and
brought to trial, the jury finds him guilty, and the judge 
has to decide on a sentence. What should it be?
-Does the chemist have the right to charge what he likes for 
the medicine?
3 Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes Of 
Thinking and Choices in Years 10— 16" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Chicago, 1958).
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